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WOMEN IN CHANGING ISLAMIC SYSTEM

WOMEN IN THE CHANGING ISLAMIC SYSTEM

RUTH FRANCES WOODSMALL



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**PUBLICATIONS
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SOCIAL SCIENCE SERIES

No. 14

TO MY SISTER

WHO FIRST STIMULATED MY INTEREST
IN THE EAST

P R E F A C E

THE American University of Beirut serves as a means for the exchange of ideas between the Orient and the Occident. It is therefore a privilege for the University to include in its series of Social Science publications Miss Woodsmall's volume—*Moslem Women Enter a New World*.

The book tells how the traditional customs of the East are being treated by a post-war generation. A great renaissance is taking place in Asia. As in all periods of transition, there are radicals who go to extremes and others who defend their cherished customs by calling upon moral precept and canon law. It is inevitable that such a comprehensive volume should contain material of a controversial nature, but even those who may disagree with some of the author's interpretations will doubtless appreciate the importance of the material.

The University does not seek through this book to promote some particular point of view. As Miss Woodsmall explains in her Foreword, the book represents her personal observations and she assumes full responsibility for her own remarks and conclusions. She has endeavoured to describe what is taking place in an objective and scientifically minded way.

Since Miss Woodsmall was intimately connected with the growing girls and young women of Istanbul for a long period of years, she gained a clear understanding of the social problems of the Near East. She has also been able to observe the customs of Muhammadan women in a great many countries and in a leisurely way. Her material has been gathered by constant travel, by intimate conversations with all kinds of people, by first-hand observation and by careful reading of recent newspapers and periodicals.

Miss Woodsmall is sympathetic with movements which are enabling Moslem women to enter new spheres of activity. On the other hand, her concluding chapter explains that she is aware of the danger of too rapid change and hopeful that the best qualities of Eastern life may be preserved. She has always been an understanding friend of the East.

Her book shows that her great concern is to see young Moslems adjust themselves to the modern world, without losing touch with spiritual values.

We are living in one of the most important yet baffling eras that the world has ever known. *Moslem Women Enter a New World* gives such valuable first-hand information, that it helps to clarify a fundamental problem of our age,—woman's place in modern life.

BAYARD DODGE

BEIRUT

April 1936

Although the University has its own system of transliteration, the Arabic names in Miss Woodsmall's book have been spelt as they are usually written in popular English books, so as to avoid confusing the reader.

FOREWORD

SOME books are written to fulfil the definite objective of travel or residence abroad; others are the inevitable result of a period of foreign experience. Of this latter type the present effort to portray the changing life of Moslem women is an illustration. Through the post-war years of living and journeying in the East, this subject has been for me an absorbing interest. Like a constant friend, who could not be forgotten after life has moved on to new associations, it has craved expression on the printed page.

During nine years in Y.W.C.A. service in Turkey and Syria, the transformation of the Near East, especially in Turkey, gripped my attention. From the balcony of our residence in Taksim Square, witnessing as from a box seat in a play the main events of the change in Turkey, I realized that I was also witnessing the drama of the changing East. The swift sequence of events in Turkey constantly lured me on to seek to know more of the meaning of change that lay behind its external evidence and especially to lift the veil in order that I might catch some glimpse of what was happening in the life of Moslem women.

Such an opportunity came through a travelling fellowship of the Rockefeller Foundation, which made possible over a year and a half of leisure to journey through the Near East—Turkey, Syria, Egypt, Palestine and Trans-jordan, across the Syrian desert to Mosul and Baghdad and thence over the Iraq border across the high plateaus and mountain passes of Iran, visiting Teheran and Ispahan and less frequented places. Finally this journey of discovery brought me to India with its great Moslem centres like Lucknow and Agra, Delhi and Lahore. To see and try to understand more fully the changing life of Moslem women were the only terms of reference for my study; I was free from any compulsion save that of the inner urge of an absorbing interest.

This book represents then the composite of some years of active service followed by a no less active period of a free-lance pursuit. The quest to understand the changing East

has led me to seek knowledge in many places—in cities, towns and villages, in schools and hospitals, in homes of many types, secluded harems and modern apartments. I have tried to view the East through many eyes—those of foreign observers, diplomats of my own and other countries, officials, missionaries, nationalist leaders in many spheres, conservative sheikhs, defenders of the Faith, and modern youth impelled by other loyalties than religion, Moslems and non-Moslems, peasant women untouched by modern progress, women leaders in civil and national life, and women whose life is bounded by the four walls of the harem.

Even with such a wide and diverse view of the Moslem East, I labour under no illusion of having unveiled the mysteries of the life of Moslem women. No outsider, however sympathetic, can penetrate the inner secrets of another life and culture foreign to his own. Moreover, observation, however unerring it may be, cannot be divorced from the eyes of the observer. My view of the East is inevitably tinged by my own personal background, and hence cannot completely mirror the facts. Therefore this book can only give the observation of one who has seen the East frankly and sympathetically through the eyes of the West. A Moslem woman would write very differently of her changing world.

Undoubtedly, long time residents in the East might give a more intimate portrayal of their special fields of knowledge. Their very familiarity with one single field, however, has necessarily precluded the wider view which this book attempts to give. Its main justification may be, therefore, the fact that it presents the synthesis of change in the East. The same forward movement characterizes the life of the East as a whole, whatever may be the rate of speed in different countries, and the changing life of Moslem women is merely one phase of the whole transformation. This integral connection between the change in the position of Moslem women and the present fundamental change in Islamic life and thought makes a study of Moslem women to-day more than a study in Eastern feminism. Rather may it be interpreted as the index of the change in the whole Islamic social system. Therefore a study of the

position of Moslem women made ten years hence, would, I believe, have less fundamental significance than such a study at the present time.

Although I have centred my attention on the changing status of Moslem women, I am not unmindful of the steady advance during the post-war period in the position of women of other religious communities in the Islamic world, primarily Christians. But in all of the countries except India, included in this study, Moslems constitute a majority, Islam is the dominant religion, and Moslem cultural and social patterns of life prevail. Hence changes affecting Moslem women have primary significance for women of other faiths in this same area. It is true also that the progress among Moslem women has undoubtedly been promoted by the example of the higher status of women of other communities. The interweaving of these reciprocal influences affecting the life of women of different religions, Moslems, Christians and others, is part of the whole subject of the interaction of different religious influences on the total life of the East and offers an interesting and important field for exploration. But such a study is beyond the scope of this book.

It has also not been possible to include all of the countries in the Moslem world in the range of this one study. The almost unchanged Arabia affords a view of early Islam, which would have given the background for present-day change; as would also the comparative lack of change in other parts of Moslem Africa, except Egypt. The Netherlands Indies opens up a field of entirely different Islamic influence, where Moslem women have been singularly free from the veil. The Moslem area of the Soviet Republics presents the unusual laboratory of enforced and successful social revolution. Afghanistan, on the contrary, recalls the fate of a reformer who tried to impose reform on a backward country. A letter of introduction to the ex-King Amanullah and Queen Suriyeh, which I unfortunately had no opportunity to present, is a reminder of the effect of political events on personal plans. These several areas of Islam, which for various reasons, I have been unable to include in this study, would doubtless reveal specific trends of change in the Moslem world. But the countries which it has been possible

to cover, give perhaps a fair cross-section of the changing Islamic scene.

In the attempt to find the meaning behind the fact of change in the Moslem world I have realized that statistics are not of principal value. The East has not as yet registered its life in statistical form. Moreover, statistics to-day are half-truths to-morrow. The subtle nuances of change are of real significance. To see one woman from a high-class family of Mecca to-day unveiled would be a more surprising symptom of change than the thousands now unveiled in Istanbul. I have tried, therefore, primarily to understand trends of Eastern life, the currents already visible on the surface and the undercurrents which determine the main movement, using statistics, where available, only as subsidiary indications of change. It is evident that the very essence of change makes it impossible accurately to portray it, for while you have stopped to record trends of change, life has moved on. To-day a new book each month could scarcely keep up with the changing status of Moslem women; whereas formerly one every century would have given a fair picture, for there was no change.

Into the texture of this book are woven countless conversations indulged in with a sense of leisure that is not yet a luxury in the East. The pages of the book recall to me the spell of the East—the beauty of secluded courtyards and lovely Persian gardens, the peace and repose of mosques, the teeming life of cities, the colourful confusion of bazaars, the charm of Eastern hospitality. Although all this cannot be shared with the reader, perhaps this book may arouse in some a new desire to see and know the life of the East. If so it will not have been written in vain.

To express my gratitude by name to all of those who have had a share in this book would be indeed a difficult task as there are so many, both of the East and of the West, to whom I am indebted. It would be a very real pleasure, however, to mention all of them, as their names recall friendly services of many kinds and gracious hospitality. But perhaps to leave my thanks to individuals unexpressed publicly may be the better part of kindness and also wisdom, since I could not wish these friends, who have so generously

helped me, to bear any criticism from my purely personal observations. I cannot, however, fail to express my appreciation to the American University of Beirut, for the many contacts it has afforded throughout the Arabic world, and also my deep indebtedness to the Rockefeller Foundation for the travelling fellowship without which this panoramic view of the changing life of Moslem women would not have been possible.

RUTH FRANCES WOODSMALL

GENEVA

January 5, 1936

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INTRODUCTION

THE NEW EAST

RETURNING from India in 1929 on the way from Basra to Baghdad I was led by the lure of the past to step off at Ur of the Chaldees Junction for a visit to the excavations. But a sudden sandstorm on the desert held me marooned for the day at the Government Guest House which, although the season was over, was fortunately still open under the care of an Indian servant. As I sat in the empty house listening to the wild fury of the wind whipping the sand against the windows, and realized that I was quite alone and cut off from human contacts—even the Indian caretaker was outside in the servants' quarters—I was overwhelmed by a sense of isolation. Suddenly I was awakened from reflections over my complete remoteness from the outside world by voices and immediately, without waiting for an answer to their knock, two French aviators taking refuge from the storm burst into the room. On their way from Paris to Saigon, as I learned, they had been forced down because of the hurricane, fortunately landing near the guest-house. Three days before, they had left Paris, the day before had lunched at the Pera Palace Hotel in Istanbul and a few hours later had passed over Aleppo. Impatient at the delay, as soon as the storm began to subside, they resumed their flight to Saigon. As I waved farewell I realized anew, as I had many times in the months just preceding, the reality of change in the East to-day.

At that time I was just finishing a year of travel, as already mentioned in the Foreword, observing signs of change in the life of women in the Moslem world. Vivid impressions of new, and for the most part, unfamiliar parts of the East, gained in that year of almost continuous travel, have been sharply outlined against the background of a more intimate contact with the Near East through several years' residence in Istanbul, with frequent visits to Syria, and an occasional journey to Egypt, Palestine and Transjordan. Through this panoramic view of the Near East, the

Middle East and India, I have felt what other residents and travellers in the East, even the most casual tourist, must feel, that a remarkable transformation is taking place throughout the Eastern world.

The isolation of the East is passing. Since the World War Western influence has been steadily penetrating the Eastern world, filtering through many channels into the life of the East. As a result of the remarkable development of transportation and lines of communication, the East and West are now physically linked together in a way that would have been unbelievable a decade and a half ago. The flight of the aviators from Paris to Saigon is only one of many evidences of the post-war era of achievement. My journey in a Dodge car from Damascus to Baghdad in 1929, which took less than two days, would have meant before the war a weary month by camel caravan. If more speed is desired to-day the airplane takes only a few hours. A mother with a baby, as a woman in Baghdad told me, can make her journey by air from Baghdad to Jerusalem and on to Cairo between the nursing periods.

In 1927 over three thousand automobiles came into Iraq; before the war there was not one. These convoys of empty Dodge cars and trucks *en route* for Baghdad and Teheran were a twentieth-century motor migration, which recalled the days of the covered wagon moving westwards in America, but what a vivid contrast. Fares for travel across the desert have been steadily lowered so that a journey from Iraq to Syria is now within the reach of the many. A week's honeymoon trip to Beirut or Cairo is a possibility for the young Baghdadi, and the Lebanon mountains have become the popular summer resort of Iraq. "If wishes were horses then beggars would ride" would not apply to Iraq to-day, as even a beggar would ask for a seat in a Ford car.

Iran before the war was a country of various unrelated cities; the Iranian was a citizen of a city, not of a country. Now a national consciousness is developing with the building of roads. Formerly from the Iraq border to Hamadan there was not even a carriage road; travel in and out of Iran was by caravan from the Caspian Sea. Now, over the road from

Khanikin to Teheran, which was built by the British Army, flows a constant stream of travel. In 1925 the Shah of Iran brought twenty-four fine motors across the desert through Baghdad via Khanikin to Teheran. In October 1928 I was held up at the same border for several hours while the overburdened official cleared through the customs ten *de luxe* passenger buses of the latest French model *en route* to Teheran. Mails were formerly carried by horse cart, now by motor or airplane. "Before the war," as a young lawyer in Ispahan said, "we felt out of the world. Now Teheran seems very near." As in Iraq, so in Iran, geographical distances have a new meaning. From Teheran to Meshed before the World War was a journey of five weeks by camel; in 1925, five days by motor car; in 1935, five hours by airplane. If it is possible even to approximate the goal of 1,000 miles of road each year for seven years, this will mean more roads than Iran has built in the past seven centuries.

In India the socializing effect of good roads and constantly increasing travel is tremendous. Third-class railway carriages go by, so full that passengers literally bulge out of them. Bus service is being extended, connecting out-of-the-way villages with the large cities and modern life. India is drawn closer to the world by the airplane. An airplane service each week from Karachi via Baghdad thence to Cairo and London spans the vast desert spaces, and in five days links up distant parts of the far-flung British Empire.

All this marked development in communications has meant a complete change in the horizon of the people of the East. Isolation means ignorance. Contact inevitably brings new ideas and is the beginning of change. Travellers from the West to the East in increasing numbers leave behind a cumulative impression of the West, something more than merely the money they spend. Eastern travellers going Westward are constantly exposed to new ideas. Especially is this true of women, who see a different basis of social and home life in the West, and become a part of it. Communications, a network of roads, new air services connecting different cities of the East, different countries

and continents, have been a tremendous socializing force in changing the whole outlook of Eastern people.

With the rapid expansion of facilities for communications has come a corresponding increase in economic penetration. The East is flooded with Western goods. Lalezar, the main street in Teheran, presents an unclassified jumble of wares from all over Europe with Germany in the lead: flash-lights, woollen sweaters, quantities of silk hose, heavy upholstered furniture, postcards in garish colours showing women in evening dress, and high-heeled modern shoes, which are in contrast to the native Iranian shoes being made in the adjoining shop. The International Harvester, Dodge car and various other cars display America's chief contribution, and signs in Russian and French add to the general *mélange* of foreign influences.

New Street, Baghdad, recalls to my mind a similar hodge-podge of foreign and native goods with cars, alcohol, soap, soda-water and "His Master's Voice" conspicuously in evidence. On Anerkali, the artery of Lahore's shopping life, I was impressed with the display of books, a larger selection than one usually finds in the East, and also with the varied assortment of plumbing supplies, which seemed to me remarkable in view of the lack of a modern sewerage system. In Amman in Trans-jordan, an outpost on the desert, I found in the few glass show-windows, exhibited in dust and confusion, the usual perfumes, soap, silk hose, and alcohol with a few dust-begrimed Arabic books, apparently not best first sellers, but probably the best last, as there seemed to be no demand for books. Everywhere, on and off the beaten path, on the main street in a conspicuous location, or in the native bazaar, tucked away in dim little cubby-holes, and in secluded harems, I found the Singer sewing machine. Everywhere on the broad desert track, on mountain passes, in town and open country from Assiut to Peshawar, I saw the ever-present Ford car.

The economic conquest of the East seems complete, but is never ended. Western goods find a ready Eastern market and the constantly increasing supply continues to increase the demand. The introduction of new facilities of civilization constantly forces up the standard of living. The Arab who

formerly walked, now, if possible, has a Ford car. The cars dashing around the curves of the Lebanon mountains at breakneck speed are very often not filled with Europeans, nor city-bred Syrians, but with Syrian villagers or perhaps Arabs from the desert in flowing robes and picturesque head-gear. The Arab beside me in a very commodious French bus on the way to Algiers, produced in the gathering twilight a pocket flashlight to look at his Ingersol watch.

The East, I have noticed, adopts quickly and easily, without any mental strain the material civilization of the West. A seventeenth-century mentality may quite easily use twentieth-century goods. With remarkable agility the people of the East have leapt over the decades of ordinary measured evolution which the West has made before the twentieth-century stage of development. The desert sheikh in Iraq views with equanimity the air mail from Baghdad to Cairo thundering overhead, asking no questions as to whither or whence. The driver of the ox-cart unperturbed draws aside on the rough roadside to let the limousine go by. To him the juxtaposition of medieval and modern calls forth no surprise; the process of change, taking place in this shock era of impact between two different civilizations, East and West, has no interest for the Easterner. In the spirit of fatalism characteristic of the East, he regards whatever is as entirely natural.

The flow of material goods of the West into the East makes one wonder as to their fundamental effect. A sign on a side street in Baghdad "Clothes Make the Man. A Perfect Fit Guaranteed" makes one ponder on the psychology of external things. The buying and use of material things eventually, it seems logical to conclude, will have more than a surface effect. Increase in demand means increase in expense; life becomes more complex and old customs give place to new, so that eventually the social system changes. A Syrian friend in Beirut commented on the growing difficulty of trying to combine a Western standard of living with Eastern ideas of unlimited hospitality. "The two are incompatible," she said. "With the use of furniture, beds, and individual rooms, instead of sleeping on mattresses on the floor, and with the need for dining at tables with

knives and forks and china, and the service of meals in courses, instead of sitting on the floor in Arab fashion all gathered around one central tray, it has become very difficult to welcome whole-heartedly and entertain indefinitely any number of guests as we used to do. Our Syrian laws of hospitality still demand it, but these will have to change as our standards of living have changed." Economic penetration from the West introduces elements of change that seem superficial in the beginning, but eventually affect the whole basis of Eastern social life.

The rapid transit of material things from the West, I have found coincident with the introduction of new forms of amusement and the increase in the interchange of ideas. The cinema, the phonograph, the radio and the newspaper all are exerting an influence over a wide area. Before the entrance of the radio the phonograph was regarded as the sign and seal of civilization, so much so that for example tea-shops in Teheran were forced to provide phonographs as a necessary part of the equipment in order to keep their trade. The sound of Eastern voices on a phonograph record pierces the babel of every Eastern bazaar, or emanating from food-shops or coffee-houses, mingles in the confused din of the main streets. Phonographs in Syria are such a commonplace that lemonade sellers carry them around going full blast, as they circulate selling their wares. The masses who know no foreign language may listen everywhere to "His Master's Voice" in Arabic.

In the main streets of Eastern cities to-day, my attention was always caught by the conspicuous signs of the cinema, which in a decade has so rapidly grown in popularity. In Lahore five years ago there were only six picture-houses; to-day there are over twenty, which for a population of 300,000 means one for every 15,000, not an adverse comparison with some Western cities. The latest screen successes are advertised in the best Eastern dailies and the weekly Hollywood letter and latest news of the celluloid screen find space along with political dispatches. Even into smaller towns the cinema has penetrated and is competing favourably with native forms of amusement—the coffee-house in the Arabic world, the tea-house in Iran. An air-conditioned

cinema in Beirut registers a growth in cinema attendance and the higher standard of amusement now demanded. Movie theatres in Cairo, save for the difference in the audience, remind one of cinemas anywhere in the Western world.

In Turkey the range of the cinema has steadily widened. In 1923 there were movie theatres only in Istanbul and Izmir; ten years later seventy-nine towns had cinemas. The sale in one year of 120,000 postcards of foreign movie stars—Douglas Fairbanks, Rudolph Valentino, Charlie Chaplin, Greto Garbo, Norma Shearer and others—gives a hint of the appeal of the Western film to the Turkish movie fans.

Perhaps ninety per cent of the people in the East are still untouched by the film but the remaining ten per cent represent the important progressive minority whose thought to-day is in large measure determined by the film. The far-reaching sociological effects of the cinema, it is impossible to estimate. Certain it is that Hollywood brings into the peaceful tenor of Eastern life a new jazz rhythm and a different type of spectacular entertainment than the appeal of the picturesque religious feasts and festivals characteristic of the East. Glimpses of social customs of the West cannot fail to lead the imagination of Eastern youth beyond the social barriers of the East. Certain it is also that the movies determine the Eastern concept of the West. Customs of living, fashions in dress, home furnishing, automobiles, standards of manners and morals as portrayed on the screen, are accepted very frequently as the current patterns of Western civilization. "I saw by the movies" is given as conclusive evidence of Western life. The picture is the final authority, from which the cinema-goer may conclude that Western social life is entirely superficial, that Western women are all ultra-free, and Western morals loose and questionable. The frequent misrepresentation of the West is prejudicial to general social advance in the East, since it stimulates the imitation of the lower standards of the West. Moreover, because such an adverse portrayal of Western life is identified with the new social goals of the East, the conservatives in the East are often strengthened

in their opposition to all social advance. Obviously this type of Western interpretation is detrimental not only to the East, but to the West in lowering Western prestige. Hence this question of the derogatory impression of Western culture which the film often conveys to the East is a problem of mutual concern both to the East and West, which demands for its solution a new type of censorship, international in character.

It would, however, be erroneous to conclude that all the films of doubtful morals are Western exports. In the early days the West was the only source of supply and the East, the easy dumping-ground of the low-grade Western films. To-day, a number of Eastern countries are producing films, some of which are, in the opinion of an Eastern observer, not better, but in fact, worse than the Western imports. Eastern censorship, where it already exists has been primarily concerned with political safeguards. The more difficult problems of moral censorship have not yet been tackled except in a limited degree in Palestine.

Fortunately, along with the films both of Eastern and Western production which exert a harmful influence, the East is receiving also the best films from the West and is beginning to improve its own production. An appreciative Eastern public, whose standards of taste and demands are growing, makes these higher class films profitable. It is a hopeful sign also that the number of educational films in commercial production is growing and the potential influence of the cinema as an educational force is being recognized by non-commercial agencies and Governments in the East. In India several years ago, the North-western Railway demonstration train in the Punjab, which used the cinema for educational propaganda on a six months' tour recorded a total of half a million spectators at their performances.

Following the cinema in its development the radio has now linked up the East with the world. Istanbul, Cairo, Baghdad and Teheran tune in on Paris and London, or Budapesth and Moscow. The Arabic world in town and village listens to the voice of the muezzin from the minaret in Cairo, transmitted from the Government broadcasting centre. In Beirut one may hear the radio at any hour

during the day or night in any language. Many of the taxis in Beirut have radios and some of the buses with radios installed break their schedules to give the Lebanon villages the benefit of the radio programme. Rural Turkey gets the news each day over the radio, and very often health talks and health exercises, advertisements and lessons in the new language. Private radio sets in cities in Turkey are becoming very popular, as also in Syria and Egypt. In the Middle East, in Iraq and Iran, individual sets are not yet a commonplace, but it is only a question of time before even the semi-nomadic tribes of the desert will tune in on the world. London has listened to the voice of India over the air from Bombay, and India each year hears the King's Christmas greetings.

As yet the development of the radio in Asia as a Government medium for education is in the beginning stage. Plans to utilize the radio more effectively are under consideration in a number of countries in Asia. In India following the Report of a British expert on broadcasting services (May 1936) proposals have been made for a five-year Government programme of radio extension.¹ Efforts are being made in the Punjab to install loud-speakers in various villages for the transmission of radio messages from Lahore to the villagers. In Turkey and Egypt the Government Broadcasting System carries on an educational programme. Palestine and Syria have Government plans under consideration for increasing radio facilities.

The radio, as also the cinema, undoubtedly offers great educational possibilities for the East, especially for the rural population in overcoming its ignorance and isolation. Through the radio undoubtedly the mental attitude of Asia is being widened, as the world is brought near. The limited number of private radio sets makes it difficult to educate public opinion through the radio, but its educational importance is fully recognized.

¹ The increase of 1,500 radio licenses a month shows the growing demand for radio sets. The total number of radio licenses in India (May 1936) was 27,042. In addition about 5,000 people in the Indian States own a radio. The exact number is not known, as Indian States do not require a radio license. Information through the League of Nations Information Section.

The Press is also bringing the East into touch with the life of the world, not only the foreign Press in French and English, which is the direct channel of Western thought and affects the educated minority, but the native Press in every country. Speaking of the growing importance of the Press, a leading editor in Cairo said: "We editors used to have to request interviews with the ministers of the State, and felt greatly favoured if they were granted. Now the Prime Minister telephones and asks whether he can talk over with me an important question which he wants presented to the public." The power of the Eastern Press is peculiarly great because it shapes public opinion rather than registers it. The thinking of the masses throughout the East is determined by the educated few, for whom the Press is a most powerful instrument. As an English administrator in India said, "The common people believe that whatever is written must be true; hence the few who control the voice of the Press can exert a tremendous force." One is inclined to believe however, that this is scarcely less true in the West, where the few dictate the thoughts of the many and the public is no less blindly credulous of the printed word, even though the level of education is far higher than in the East.

For the Moslem world the thought centres are Lahore, Istanbul, Cairo and Teheran; especially Lahore and Cairo affect Moslem opinion over a wide area. The influence of Lahore as a Press centre reaches Moslems all over India. Cairo affects the entire Arabic-speaking world of 45,000,000 Moslems. From Algiers to Baghdad and Delhi, through the Straits Settlements to China, Cairo exercises an intellectual superterritorial influence. The busy printing presses of Cairo produce over five hundred daily and weekly papers and a constant stream of books and pamphlets. On the edge of the Sahara in Tunisia in the date-palm oasis of Tozeur, a small but well-arranged open bookstall on the main street attracted my attention with its copy of *Al Musawar* from Cairo. In the harems of Baghdad and Mosul I noticed Arabic reading matter, perhaps one of the several women's magazines from Cairo, and especially the Cairo pictorial weekly which has for Moslem women such stimulating,

thought-producing pictures as that of Kamal Ataturk (at the time of the picture, 1929, called Ghazi Mustapha Kemal Pasha) dancing at the Ankara Republic Day Ball with a Turkish woman in an evening gown, possibly from Paris.

The Press in Iraq and Iran is awakening. In Baghdad in 1930 five journals were published; in Mosul and Basra each two. The number of Iranian newspapers constantly changes. At least three hundred and fifty daily or weekly papers are published in Iran. Teheran is a busy centre of journalistic activity. To-day Shiraz, Meshed on the Afghanistan border, Doulatabad off the beaten path of regular travel, all follow daily events in Iran, see the Western world, feel Western influence through the Teheran Press, and receive the news before it has ceased to be news. Istanbul, by the adoption of the new script has cut off its reading public outside of Turkey but has greatly increased the Turkish readers, as is evident from the crowds on the boats and trains all reading the daily paper, women as well as men. The Turkish Press has played a vital role in teaching a whole nation to read and thus is a dominant influence in shaping the thinking of the public along new lines. Since the Press in Turkey is practically, if not literally, under close Government surveillance, it serves the important function of giving to the public the Turkish Government's interpretation of desired social reforms and of Western values to be adopted.

All the educated class in the East to-day take the leading newspapers. But to-day as in the past, in most countries in the East the number of subscribers does not indicate the entire reading public; each one who can read may represent twenty who share the news. In countries where literacy is the great exception, the literate few pass on the day's events to the unlettered many. The story-teller in the Baghdad coffee-house is still the verbal newspaper. Thus the news of the West penetrates the East through the long-established Eastern channel. Through the daily activity of the Press, world events and world currents of thought are brought now to every village of the East and furnish conversation for every Eastern bazaar.

All of these various influences for change in the East have been operative in increasing degree since the World

War. For the Eastern world, as a whole, the Great War is the date line for the beginning of the social transformation. One may safely say that if the World War had not come, Asia might have gone along another fifty years without any radical movements of change. Through their war service in Europe the Eastern allies, especially the Indians, were brought into direct physical contact with the West. Thousands of Punjabi soldiers saw Europe at close range and brought back new ideas along many lines. Not the least significant new idea in the Eastern mind was a changed concept toward the West and likewise toward the East. The prestige of the West was unquestionably lowered in the eyes of the East by the wholesale conflict of Christian nations. The morale of the East at the same time was raised by the awakening of confidence in its own capacity for competition with the Western world, since a West divided in itself no longer commanded unquestioned respect and fear.

Furthermore, the disillusionment of the East, due to the broken promises of the West—promises made under the strain of war and broken in the security of peace—have aroused in some parts of the East the spirit of opposition. The East as a whole has been imbued with the determination that the East should no longer be a switchboard for Western powers to operate. With such a changed psychological attitude it has been natural that the doctrines of democracy and self-determination, which were declared in the Councils of State in the West, should become also the slogans of the East. The teachings of the West have been applied by apt Eastern pupils, and come back like a boomerang on the West. I had the impression of listening to a familiar phonograph record when I heard a young nationalist in Iraq express his idea of nationalism, as it might have been a comment made in any other country east of the Mediterranean: "The war brought a general awakening," he said, "through close contact with Western nations we were disillusioned and also inspired with the desire for independence, and a belief in our capacity which did not exist before the war. This new spirit which has been planted in us must continue to grow."

This increasing sense of nationalism has had a direct

effect on social progress. As the East has awakened to self-consciousness and self-respect, it has become sensitive to Western criticism of Eastern social customs, and realized that the claims for political equality should be justified in the eyes of the West by a social system in harmony with modern ideas. The spirit of nationalism has, however, furnished also a deeper motif for social change than self-justification and reinstated self-respect. Social advance has been genuinely recognized as a *sine qua non* of national development. In varying degree in the East nationalist leaders have promoted social change as a necessary condition of political progress. A case in point is the fact that Pandit Moti Lal Nehru, the great Indian leader, included in his political platform enunciated at the National Congress in Calcutta, December 1928, a plank for social reform. "Purdah and other disabilities of women," he said, "are a curse and should be abolished without delay." Mahatma Gandhi in commenting on this speech said, "Moti Lal Nehru doesn't care a tuppence for social reform, as a social propagandist; he hasn't taken it as his call, but he endorses and promotes it as a definite programme, knowing its necessity as part of his political reform. I was surprised and delighted to see how completely he realized the relationship between political and social advance."

In this same speech of Nehru's, freedom from the handicaps of religious tradition is urged as a necessity for progress. "Religion as practised to-day is a great separatist force—it prevents the development of healthy and co-operative life." Such a statement sounds a new note in the East. To-day in the Eastern world nationalism, and not religion, is the controlling spirit, which is determining the whole direction of the life and thought of Asia. Before the war, Pan-Islam was the lodestar for the Moslem world, and the East was turned Eastward, concerned only passively, if at all, with the West. Now many Eastern eyes look Westward, since the models for nationalism are in the West. In the urge for success measured by modern or Western national standards, the East is impelled to break old and form new alliances, which are no longer determined by the dictates of religion. As a young Moslem student in Baghdad said: "We are

nearer the Christians in Iraq than the Moslems in India.' It may be true that the conservatives in religion and politics in some countries may be numerically still in the majority, but they belong to the passing generation.

Throughout the Moslem world nationalism in running counter to Islam has produced a reaction against religion, which has been evident either in an opposition to religion or in a growing religious indifference. The reason for this alienation from religion is inherent in the reaction against the integrated socio-religious system of Islam. As has already been explained, social reform is recognized as a condition of national development, and religion is often regarded as a block to national progress. In Turkey the principle of secularism was made the corner-stone of national policy. In other countries where Islam is officially maintained and an effort made to harmonize religion and progress, the spirit of secularism is evident in individual thought. Through this influence the absolute authority of Islam is being steadily undermined. This growing reaction against religion, or away from religion, in the East is strongly reinforced by the trend toward secularism in the West. Recognizing the West as the epitome of material progress and likewise conscious of the highly developed materialism of the Western world, the Eastern modernist concludes that secularism is the condition of progress. He naturally tends, therefore, to identify religion in general, West or East, with retrogression and considers that the repudiation of religion is necessary for national advance.

In contrast, however, to the materialistic effect of some of the Western forces in the East, a very different type of influence has been exerted by the West in the East over a long period through Western institutions along educational, medical and philanthropic lines, which have been carried on by various Christian agencies. The peaceful penetration of Western ideas through these channels has gone steadily on, regardless of wars with all their troubled political and economic aftermath. The contact between East and West through these institutions in the East offers, after all, a freer field for the interplay of influence than the contact through political and economic relationships. The stream of influence

through these other channels is too often polluted by selfish motives on the part of the West, and suspicion and fear on the part of the East. But in the peaceful atmosphere of an educational institution, in the classroom, the open forum, or athletic field, the Eastern student profits freely from the contact with foreign leaders and fellow-students of different racial and religious groups. Without any feeling of competition or self-defence, he may receive the best that Western culture has to offer, make it his own, and transmute it into his own community and national life.

Women have been especially affected by Western institutions which throughout the East have pioneered in the field of promoting woman's health and education, and have blazed the trail for the freer life of Eastern women. The Western woman doctor and trained nurse have brought a new gospel of health for Eastern women. Each country in the East has its outstanding foreign girls' school or woman's college, the very presence of which has been a powerful example of equality of opportunity and freedom for women and has stimulated in no small measure the present educational awakening of the East.

Through all this composite of forces exerted in the East to-day—the rapidly extending network of communications, the spread of Western material goods and modern forms of amusement, the expansion of world knowledge through the Press, the growth of nationalism and repudiation of old religious formula, and the humanizing benefits of modern education, life in the East has been powerfully affected. Whatever may be the special manifestation in each country, the meaning of the change taking place is the same. For the inarticulate and unthinking masses it represents an involuntary adaptation to a new environment, which is being formed on a modern basis. For the thoughtful minority, it signifies a voluntary shifting of values, a general protest against the Eastern *status quo*, and a conscious attempt to restate life, in order to participate more effectively in a modern world.

In this general process of refashioning Eastern life on a modern basis the forward movement of Moslem women is perhaps the most significant evidence of a changing East.

The East, as a whole, regardless of religion, has developed a different conception of women's position from that of the West. For the Moslem woman this prevailing Eastern idea of the status of women has been further reinforced by the teachings and interpretation of Islam. But to-day a re-orientation as to the position of Eastern women in general is taking place. There is an increasing realization that society in the East must be a unit as in the West; and that it is impossible to promote successfully twentieth-century politics and economic progress and at the same time maintain a medieval status of women. Even where conservatism is most strongly entrenched, one finds at least a quiver of new life, for there is no complete inoculation against the contagion of ideas in a modern world. The new spirit of freedom which dominates the coffee-house must eventually pervade the harem. Just as the wave-lengths of the radio are not blocked by walls, so new ideas are finding their way into the walled-in seclusion of the Moslem woman's life. The great majority of Moslem women is as yet scarcely aware of any urge for change. Their progress will come slowly as the natural result of their changing environment. But at least a small minority of leaders in each country is conscious of the world spirit of freedom and eagerly desires change. As they adopt new ideas, they will give direction to the imperceptible forward movement of the unthinking masses.

PART ONE

Frontiers of Social Change

CHAPTER I

LIFTING THE VEIL

WHEN the Easterner travels West or the Westerner travels East, each is sharply conscious of having crossed a social frontier which is more real than geographical boundaries, or distinctions of language, nationality or race.

The social systems of the East and West are established on diametrically different principles. The pivotal difference is the difference in the position of woman. In the East society has always been based on the separation of the sexes and seclusion of women, limiting their sphere to the home. Perhaps their power within this limited world has been considerable, but there are boundaries beyond which they have not been free to go. The West has not sharply differentiated between the world of women and that of men. Western society is built on the basis of unity, which may not mean equality, but which does not definitely place women in a sphere apart.

This present unified basis of Western society is undoubtedly the result of evolution as the Western world of the twentieth century is very different from the Western world of the Middle Ages, especially in regard to the position of women. In the East the social system has until the last decade remained practically unchanged throughout the centuries. The Islamic world with its integrated system of religion and society, has preserved with little if any variation, the social customs of the seventh century. Between the social practices of the East and of the West, there has always been until recently the cleavage of centuries.

But to-day life in the East in many ways is being catapulted across the centuries. Eastern society is being reshaped on a united basis. The social position of women is undergoing a fundamental change slowly or rapidly according to different factors in different countries. The variation in the degree of social change as it affects women is very great throughout the East, but it is a variation in degree rather than in kind. The same questions everywhere constitute

the centre of public interest and private conversation—changing ideals of marriage and family life, polygamy and divorce, social relationships, and always as the centre of interest, the veil.

Undoubtedly the barometer of social change in the Moslem world is the veil. Where the veil persists without variation, the life of the Moslem woman is like the blank walled streets of Bhopal, India, which afford no outlook from within and no contact from without. But the Bhopal streets within the last few years have been pierced by a few small windows, very high up to be sure, but breaking the dead monotony, and one can imagine some purdah woman unseen looking out on the street life below. The Moslem woman's veil, even in the most conservative places, betrays some suggestion of movement; in some places it is slowly being lifted and elsewhere has even entirely disappeared.

The term veil in the Moslem world indicates not one particular style of protective covering, as various countries have developed their own distinctive type of veiling. It may mean covering the face completely, or the lower part only, leaving the eyes exposed as in Egypt. The essential point however in all types of the veil, is the covering of the hair, a woman's crowning glory, and the avoidance in public of any feminine appeal. Hence the costume connected with the actual face covering is important, as for example the *charshaf* and veil in Turkey and the Near East, the *chaddur* and *pecheh* in Iran, the *aba* in Iraq, and the *burqa* in India. The gradual lifting of the veil in all countries is marked by the deviation from the idea of covering the hair and concealing feminine charm. It is interesting to see where the barometer of unveiling now stands in different Moslem countries.

India represents the extreme of conservatism in reference to the customs of seclusion, or purdah system, as it is called, the literal meaning of purdah being a curtain. There is practically no variation in the outdoor garment of Moslem women, the *burqa*, that all-enveloping white garb without form, which falls from the crown of the head to the feet, like a Hallowe'en costume, with no suggestion of the face except a

narrow piece of drawnwork before the eyes, through which the Moslem woman can catch a glimpse of the world, but the world cannot see her. Such a costume entirely conceals all personality. At home within the zenana, the woman's quarter, there is a tendency to adopt the *sari* instead of the characteristic indoor costume of the Moslem woman—the pyjamas or loose trousers with the long shirt and head or shoulder scarf. Such a change, formerly considered quite radical, now is more or less accepted.

The whole life of the *pardahnashin*, the woman in purdah, is determined by the fixed rules of seclusion; for purdah in India involves a rigidity and complexity of segregation unlike any other country and beyond any Islamic injunctions. In its strictest application it demands seclusion from men servants and from the sight of any man other than immediate non-marriageable relatives, a rule which is enforced more strictly in India than in other countries. It forbids a woman of the higher class from appearing on the street, or in any public place, even though veiled; hence, the covered purdah conveyance, purdah arrangements for all public gatherings, and purdah restrictions for schools and travel are necessary. In its most rigid form purdah prohibits a woman's voice from being heard by a man outside her own circle of relatives; in short, it keeps a woman closely confined within the walls of her own zenana. These rules for purdah apply not only to Moslem women in purdah, but also to Hindu women who keep purdah, of whom there are many, especially in the parts of India where Moslem influence has been dominant.

Purdah is being observed with less variation in India than in any other country. One can generalize without fear of inaccuracy in saying that at least ninety-five per cent of Moslem women, perhaps even more, observe purdah consistently and logically. Of the remaining five per cent far less than one per cent are actually out of purdah, the others are in and out in a fluctuating freedom determined by the time and place. But India offers fewer half-way stations than the Near East for the purdah woman to catch her breath, lift her veil, and look around furtively before moving on. The small number of Moslem women in India

who are really out of purdah, completely and at all times, one can still count almost by families. When one considers this number in relation to the Moslem population of approximately 77,000,000, about half of which are women, the rigidity of the purdah in India is graphically clear.

But there are rumours everywhere of change; the educated minority of women is more aggressive in India than in any other country of the East, and a definite protest is being made against the purdah, led by non-purdah women, Hindus as well as Moslems, and endorsed by many prominent men. The Moslem women who have discarded the purdah are outstanding leaders, fortunately well scattered all over India so that practically each Moslem centre has at least one prominent unveiled Moslem woman of wealth and position. This is of great importance for the movement as a whole, as India is a country of millions led by a few.

A rapid or wholesale discarding of the purdah is scarcely conceivable, but the movement has started. It will doubtless not develop at the same speed in different parts of India. That purdah is recognized by men and women alike as a national problem is the most hopeful sign of advance. Aside from the actual breaking of the purdah, there are signs of greater freedom behind the purdah, a slight loosening of the bonds and shifting within limits. The freedom will move outward as the pressure against purdah from the outside which has already begun, grows stronger.

Neither the veil nor the customs prescribed by it have ever demanded as complete seclusion in Iran as in India, but the *chaddur* and the *pecheh*, the typical costume of the conservative Iranian woman, have offered little more scope than the *burqa* for the expression of personality. The old-styled *chaddur* was a loose black sheet of silk, alpaca or sateen, which covered the whole figure and concealed the ankles; the face was screened by the *pecheh*, a coarse black plaque of woven horse-hair. Heelless slippers and black stockings and loose black trousers under the shapeless *chaddur* completed the costume. In some places a long white veil instead of the black veil was worn. For the indoor costume most women in Teheran some time ago adopted

European clothes instead of the full short skirts and loose shirt with the head scarf, the *chaddur namaz*, a style which however is still retained in conservative centres. The shifting from Iranian to European dress for the inside costume was regarded as a radical step. Often this change occurred without any knowledge of European styles and such interesting anomalies, as an evening dress worn in the morning were not unusual.

The movement away from the *chaddur* in Iran at the present time offers a striking contrast to India and is distinctly reminiscent of Turkey. In the last year the lifting of the veil has been rapidly speeded up by orders to teachers and schoolgirls to unveil. The dramatic climax came when His Majesty Shah Riza Pahlavi attended by Her Majesty the Queen and two young princesses, unveiled and in European dress, made the official presentation of diplomas at the Normal School in Teheran. The Queen presented the diplomas to the girl graduates in one room; the Shah, in another room, presided over the similar ceremony for the men students.¹

The Shah then addressed the gathering of five hundred women urging them to avail themselves fully of their new opportunity. His speech has unusual significance. "It is not too much to say that formerly half the population of our country was not counted, or—in other words—half the working force was unemployed. There was no census taken of women, as if they belonged to another species. You women must consider this a great day and make use of your opportunities in the progress of the country. My sisters and daughters now that you have entered society, know your duty that you must work for your native land. The happiness of the future is in your hands."

It is needless to say that all the women and girls in the gathering at the Normal School were unveiled, and the streets along which the royal procession passed were lined with eager crowds of women also with unveiled faces, as no veiled women were permitted in sight along the city avenues at this time. This function is probably the most

¹ It is interesting to note that all diplomas previously given in 1935 were recalled to be formally presented by the Shah.

significant milestone in the advance of Iranian women and hence in the modernization of Iran.

The repercussion of this event was felt all over Iran. Emulating the Shah's example, in many places the Governor with the Chief of Police and School Superintendent held meetings in girls' schools to promote the progress of women and on this occasion the pupils threw off their veils. The Iran Press after the eventful day of emancipation (January 8, 1936), was filled for days with news articles and pictures on women's advance. Photographs of school girls' athletics, Girl Scouts, Women's Club activities, held the front page. The forward movement was also promoted through the theatre by a special play depicting social advance with two Iranian girls in the contrasting roles of the old and new women of Iran.

A number of definite regulations against the *chaddur* and the *pecheh* have been passed since this event, which will probably make unveiling inevitable. For example, no veiled woman can now receive treatment in Iran at a public clinic, or ride in a public conveyance. These two regulations will doubtless for a time work genuine hardship on conservative Moslem women but eventually their conservatism will doubtless be overcome. The sudden demand for women's hats and coats to replace the *chaddur* and *pecheh* has led to the necessity for special municipal measures against the profiteering of tailors, hat makers, and merchants, such as the regulation made in Teheran regarding fixed prices for ready-made clothes and for labour.¹

It is interesting also to note that the need is recognized

¹ "The maximum price for labour on women's clothes in the tailoring shops shall be on the following basis:

	<i>First-Class Shops</i>	<i>Second-Class Shops</i>	<i>Third-Class Shops</i>
Labour on woman's coat	Rials 120	Rials 80	Rials 60
Labour on an evening dress	„ 100	„ 60	„ 40
Labour on ordinary dress	„ 80	„ 40	„ 30
Labour on a woman's hats	„ 20	„ 10	„ 5

(1 rial = 4d. or \$.08.)

"The city of Teheran will prosecute and punish those who violate the regulations. Those subject to extortion may refer to the proper city office."—Quoted from the *Iran*, January 19, 1936.

for the great majority of women to be instructed as to the new social etiquette required by the discarding of the veil and the adoption of European styles. Of course a minority are already familiar with modern customs. Some of the newspapers have printed articles giving rather pertinent suggestions on feminine behaviour in public; such as the following: "Ladies in public meetings should not remove their hats; they may or may not take off their coats and gloves. They should not stare at other lady guests to observe their toilet; nor should they primp with the aid of their hand-bag mirrors. Those who have always put their handkerchiefs, cigarette cases and other articles up their sleeves must now use their hand-bags for such things. Conversation about the dress and age of other ladies present is displeasing. To take fruit or sweets with gloves on is forbidden."

The final dramatic movement of unveiling which has followed the Queen's public appearance unveiled does not represent as sudden a break with the past as might be supposed. There had been in fact a period of steady preparation for seven or eight years. A spectacular change such as the event in the Normal School, was expected in 1928 after King Amanullah and Queen Suriyeh with face uncovered visited Teheran on their return to Afghanistan from the triumphal European tour. At that time Iran was on the *qui vive* for change. Men leaders began to endorse unveiling. Women eagerly anticipated an order from the Shah to abolish the veil or perhaps to establish a Pahlavi *chaddur* for women following the idea of a Pahlavi hat for men. There was a sort of a "Buy your hats to be ready" expectancy in the harem. But Amanullah with his unveiled Queen proved to be a bad advance salesman for hats for women in Iran. His tragic fall very soon after strengthened conservatism in Iran. No order from the Shah was issued; the spirit of swift change died down.

Due to the *débâcle* in Afghanistan, the reform movement in Iran settled into a slower pace. After that time a *laissez-faire* policy, a promoted evolution, if one can use the term, was successfully pursued. Behind the scenes the word was apparently passed around that greater freedom for women was favoured. From time to time some official's wife took a safe

chance on unveiling. The police, doubtless under instructions, relaxed its vigilant enforcement of restriction of women's freedom, as shown by the story of the zealous chauffeur who reported to the police that a girl who had left Teheran in his car veiled, took off her veil when she got out in the country. This was a police offence in the old days, but the official merely shrugged his shoulders and coolly dismissed the chauffeur, who still kept insisting that "if they left their homes veiled, they should stay veiled." This policy of police indifference created a favourable impression for unveiling and promoted advance. Discarding the *chaddur* therefore became a matter of personal decision, made by the individual woman, or perhaps for her by her husband or mother-in-law.

In Teheran during the last few years the *chaddur* and the *pecheh* have become steadily less concealing. The *chaddur* was no longer worn drawn closely over the hair and held under the chin. The *pecheh* was steadily raised and shortened, and often was merely like a slight protection for the eyes. Moreover, wearing the *chaddur* and *pecheh* in Teheran grew to be for an increasing number a rather casual matter. Some women on occasions wore hats and European clothes, especially at night for public entertainment. Some discarded the veil for ordinary use but retained it for the bazaars, which are noted for their conservatism. The story is told of a Moslem woman and her daughter who were shopping unveiled in the bazaar when an earthquake shock occurred. The merchant upbraided the mother, insisting that the earthquake was due to Allah's disapproval of young girls being too free.

Recently there has been an increasing expectancy of change. Women who had not yet broken with the *chaddur* began to frequent hat shops; they came veiled and left veiled but were evidently anticipating and preparing for change. Many seemed to be waiting for some definite Government regulation against the veil. After the Shah's visit to Turkey in 1934 there was a rumour that unveiling in girls' schools would be made compulsory, but no such order was issued.

However, although no actual edict against the veil

appeared, the pressure exerted by the Ministry of Education has been practically mandatory. Following the order that no woman teacher would receive her salary, if she called for it, wearing her *chaddur* and *pecheh*, the women teachers in Government schools and inspectresses naturally unveiled. Many adopted as a uniform a dark blue dress with a white collar. Doubtless due to their example, the girls of the Normal School and of the new co-education primary schools, as well as many girls from private schools, discarded the veil. In the spring of 1935 the Ministry made unveiling practically compulsory through the regulation that no girls wearing the veil could receive school prizes or diplomas. The following autumn the girls, if veiled, were practically debarred from attending school.

In addition to the constant promotion of unveiling by the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of War also issued an effective order against the veil. Officers or Cadets were prohibited from promenading in Teheran on Lalezar or Istanbul streets (the main thoroughfares), accompanied by women wearing the *chaddur*, even though the veiled companion might be their mothers, wives or sisters.

These various regulations have been accepted without much discussion since they were in harmony with the general forward trend. Naturally the situation in Teheran has been in advance of other cities. The movement has gone more slowly and not without opposition in conservative centres like Meshed. But now the climax has been reached and unveiling has become a widely accepted fact. Doubtless in Iran, as in Turkey, the subject of women's emancipation from the veil will soon cease to have front-page newspaper publicity.

For a number of years in Iraq there has been a certain amount of discussion in the harem and elsewhere behind the scenes in regard to the *aba*, but no outward unveiling movement. The Moslem woman's face is practically covered, with only one eye peering out from the *aba*, the shapeless long robe like a sheet, which is drawn closely around the head and face and falls anywhere from the knee to the ankle. The surprisingly short skirts of the modern Baghdad woman in 1930, when short skirts were the style in the West,

were an interesting contrast to her enveloping upper garment. Formerly two *abas* were worn, now only one, which indicates a marked advance. Change behind the veil is being made along lines of Western imitation in clothes with a steady improvement in taste and more discrimination as to suitability in dress. The complete lack of social experience and unfamiliarity with Western styles, betrayed by the typical shut-in women of the harem are now being supplemented by the contact with the Turkish women in Baghdad, wives of officials, and with the young Syrian teachers from Beirut. These more socially advanced women from outside Baghdad have been a helpful influence in setting styles and standards. Social life within the harem now definitely follows the European model.

A large proportion of Baghdad women of the upper class families are eager to unveil, but there is, of course, a very conservative party which willingly accepts the veil and a very strict form of seclusion. This is, however, a diminishing number. The few pioneers are eagerly watched by the less courageous. Some time ago the wife of the Minister of Public Works appeared in a hat, but due to some pressure from the powers that be, she soon returned to the Turkish style of the veil, which, however, represents a decided step in advance beyond the *aba*. If her attempt had been successful, others would have followed. Baghdad women look with longing eyes at Turkey and are ready to seize the opportune moment for advance.

Although there is no concerted move to discard the veil, one is conscious of a very strong urge for freedom which is symbolized by unveiling. The spirit of nationalism is the strong dynamic force forward; the conservatism of the authorities is the main deterrent, as any definite outward movement to discard the veil would probably not be encouraged. This may explain why only two men in Baghdad have actively promoted the unveiling of their wives. An interesting evidence of a slightly more liberal official attitude however was offered at the yearly festival of the Boy Scouts, in 1934 by the provision of a special box for the Queen and the Princesses, as this was the first time the presence of the Queen had been officially recognized. The conservatism

of the palace retards the unveiling of teachers who, of course, have an important influence. A case in point is the fact that the young Turkish principal of the Girls' Normal School, an M.A. from Teachers' College, Columbia, after her return from America, resumed her veil, doubtless as a matter of policy. Schoolgirls wear the *aba* to and from school, but on picnic parties outside the city discard it.

Although there is little unveiling as individuals, there is a growth in freedom in collective unveiling; for example, at an educational gathering four years ago a large number of women sat unveiled in the front of the hall and faced the speaker, a man. At the meeting of the Women's Oriental Congress, held in Baghdad about the same time, men were admitted and women sat unveiled in the audience. This collective demonstration caused no unfavourable comment and also apparently had no permanent influence as the women all resumed their veils. Such social adventures, however, are probably not without some value. This comparative freedom of Baghdad is not typical either of Mosul or Basra which are more reactionary, whereas in the holy cities of Kerbela and Najaf, it would still be unsafe for a Moslem woman to go with face uncovered. The women of the Bedouin tribes, of course, have the advantage over women of Baghdad as to the veil, except the wives of the sheikh. For them the prestige of their husbands requires for them the penalty of strict segregation. In the opinion of one of the young modern educators in Iraq, it will take ten or fifteen years before the *aba* is discarded even in Baghdad, unless the fires of change can be more effectively lighted.

Strangely enough, there is less actual sense of movement to discard the veil in Syria than in Iraq, although in Syria there has been much more educational and cultural change among Moslem women behind the veil. The prevailing attitude in Syria impresses one as essentially conservative. There has been undoubtedly a definite change in the last ten years, but it has been a change toward variation in the wearing of the veil rather than toward a complete break with the custom. There are few Moslem women in Syria totally unveiled at all times, but there is an increasing

amount of part-time unveiling. Some of the educated Moslem women leaders who have retained the veil are beginning to discard it on certain occasions.

In the heart of the city of Beirut, the veil still remains so that even this very cosmopolitan centre made up of Syrian Christians, Jews, French, Americans and other foreigners, retains a certain *cachet oriental*. However, some advanced young Moslems discard the veil when they come down town, but when they go back into the Moslem section of the town, the face is covered, even though it may be a chiffon veil hanging down from a modish straw hat. Such an innovation would not have been tolerated a decade ago, when an attempt to modify the length and colour of the *charshaf* was opposed by some fanatics, who threw vitriolic acid at the wearer of the costume. To-day the orthodox are not concerned with the details of covering so long as the women are veiled. Between the Moslem section where women are all veiled, and Ras Beirut, where there is more freedom from the veil, there is almost as much difference as there would be between two different cities.

In Damascus which is a distinctly Moslem city there is not the variation in different sections as in Beirut. Moslem women are veiled throughout the city and until recently even Christian women, who are a distinct minority, sometimes veiled to avoid being conspicuous. Although only one or two very advanced women in Damascus have entirely unveiled, many of the *élite* wear very thin veils. Among these women of the upper class in Damascus there has been a much more conscious movement against the veil than among a similar group in Beirut. This difference may be due to the fact that Moslems in Damascus constitute a very large majority. Several unsuccessful attempts have been made to lift the veil in Damascus. Two years ago a large group of women appeared unveiled, but opposition almost amounting to violence forced them to resume their veils. Damascus as a religious and cultural centre of Islam is much more Moslem-conscious than Aleppo, which has always been a trading centre and less conservative. Moslem women are technically veiled in Aleppo and there is no

general movement to unveil, but there is a good deal of interest in the idea and therefore, they are sometimes veiled on one street and on another unveiled. In contrast to Aleppo, where the veil is fluctuating, the town of Hama remains the epitome of conservatism, as here even the Christian women are veiled.

Throughout Syria as also in Palestine the different types of veil reflect the various stages of the *charshaf* (literally a sheet) from the old-fashioned type, which resembles a bag tied in the middle to the modish pelerine and skirt. The old-fashioned *charshaf* worn by conservative older women and usually women of the lower class, is merely a cloth tied around the waist by a draw-string, the lower part falling to the ankles, the upper part drawn up over the head, completely covering the hair. A black veil, or disfiguring splotched coloured veil like a drop curtain, completes the costume. Very different is the later development—the skirt and pelerine, a cape and head covering in one piece, which is drawn in neatly at the neck, with a thin veil worn over the face. A still later stage before the veil disappears is now prevalent in Beirut and Damascus, a scarf headdress like a toque with a chiffon veil and worn with a stylish black silk coat. Similar to the evolution in the *charshaf* is the transition from the loose flat-heeled slippers to shoes with high French heels. Syrian women, except the elderly and conservative who naturally cling to the old costumes, follow very effectively the latest French styles both for the home and on the street, where a chic coat is always worn.

Because of the very modern cultural and educational development of Syrian women, especially those of Beirut, one has the feeling that the careful guarding of the veil, even though a very thin veil is anachronistic. Their whole *milieu* is so entirely different from that of Iraq or Iran that one would expect the Moslem women of Syria to be discarding the veil, and also the semblance of the veil, more rapidly than the women of the lands further to the East. But a composite of forces seems to block rapid advance. The power of religious conservatism which is deeply rooted, is strengthened by a cultural defence which is the result of the political situation. In Beirut, moreover, as in the rest

of the Lebanon, the consciousness of being a religious minority is an added influence for Moslems to maintain the *status quo*. The lifting of the veil in Syria seems to be, therefore, a slow evolutionary process brought about by the constant impact of modern life.

In Palestine Moslem women practically without exception are veiled according to Turkish style with different gradations. But there are evidences of change behind the veil even though very little outward change is visible. Only two or three women have entirely discarded the veil. A few young Moslem women in Jerusalem are freer about lifting the veil outside the city, but seem to have little idea of discarding it. One rather prominent Moslem woman who a little time ago considered unveiling has, for personal family reasons, resumed the veil. A former young Moslem leader of Beirut who was taking an advanced position there in regard to the veil, after her marriage in Jerusalem has followed the prevailing convention of the veil, lifting it very rarely. As elsewhere various degrees of conservatism are evident in different cities. Nablus and Hebron are most reactionary, Jaffa the least conservative because of its commercial character and large Zionist population. Jerusalem, the most exposed to modern influence offers more variety of thought but as a Sacred City of three great religious faiths, it is naturally a conservative centre.

There has been no concerted movement in Palestine against the veil. On the contrary even though some have recognized it as a handicap, Moslem women leaders in Jerusalem have felt that the veil is necessary as a cultural defence and an evidence that Arab customs are not giving way under the pressure of Zionism. As in Syria, so also in Palestine, nationalism thus tends to be a conservative influence rather than a factor promoting social change.

In two striking instances, however, the nationalist urge in Palestine led to the breaking down of social conservatism. In August 1929 during the Arab-Zionist crisis, a delegation of Moslem women appeared unveiled before the High Commissioner to protest against Zionism. Again in April 1934 at Easter, a large number of unveiled Arab women made a similar protest, detaining the High Commissioner

as he came out of the Holy Sepulchre Celebration of the Holy Fire, to upbraid him for allowing a new influx of German-Jewish refugees. After promising to consider the matter, the High Commissioner managed to withdraw. Comment was made on this incident in the British Parliament. The Grand Mufti had opposed their unveiling, but the women persisted, feeling that they could protest more effectively unveiled. Their collective unveiling, however, was only a temporary demonstration. But such exceptions may later become the rule.

In Trans-jordan as in Palestine there is little tendency to break with the veil. Modern ideas, however, are entering Amman through the small group of Turkish and Egyptian wives of officials. The presence of unveiled Bedouins from the desert also has a certain effect on the atmosphere of Amman. In contrast to Amman, the town of Es Salt prescribes the veil for Christians as well as Moslems.

Modern Egypt—that is, Cairo and Alexandria—is so entirely Europeanized that the trend away from the veil has come in the natural course of events and has required no special agitation. Madame Sharawi Pasha, the leading Moslem woman in Egypt, head of the Feminist Movement, with her niece Mlle Ceza Nebaraoui, the Editor of *L'Egyptienne*, unveiled in 1923, giving prestige to the whole movement. When Madame Sharawi discarded the veil, she assumed a charming toque style of headdress with folds of tulle which covered the hair and were brought around the throat. The idea of this style may be that it conforms with the original Islamic idea of the veil, as Madame Sharawi Pasha in the beginning was rather careful not to offend the religious conservatives. Other Egyptian women of the higher class followed her example and since then the number of unveiled women has steadily grown. A good many of this advanced higher class retained for a time the semblance of a veil, merely a piece of white chiffon worn in the Egyptian style of veiling across the face under the eyes. This was often a mere film, concealing nothing, but in fact giving an effect of heightened charm. Although not really a veil in any practical sense, however, it still had the meaning of the veil. This pretext of a veil

has now in Cairo been quite generally given up. The silk toque and long black coat which represented the next stage after the *charshaf* have also been replaced by ordinary hats and the prevailing European mode.

Unveiling is by no means confined to the upper-class social group in Cairo. The educated middle class, teachers, schoolgirls, women in professions, all wear hats. The uneducated classes have remained unchanged so that on the back streets in old Cairo, you would still find a fairly large proportion of veils. Outside of Cairo and Alexandria, the veil still holds quite generally in places like Tanta and Luxor, but in Assiut has practically disappeared—so much so in fact, that an American in Assiut desiring to buy a veil to bring home to America had difficulty in finding one. The servant reported after a search in the bazaar that veils were no longer sold there. Assiut is an interesting half-way stage socially between Cairo and Luxor.

In the conservative towns such as Tanta or Luxor even many of the Christians are still veiled, and Christians as well as Moslems wear the *habera*, the Egyptian garment like the *aba* in Iraq, drawn up over their heads with a veil across the face under the eyes. Some have adopted the Turkish *charshaf* and pelerine, but very few, the black silk coat and the toque with the veil. Formerly all Christians were veiled partly perhaps because of the need for protection, and partly because of the natural tendency of a minority to imitate the majority. Now the veiling of Christians in Egypt has practically ceased except in places like Tanta. The common people of town and country remain unchanged, still wearing their hand-made coarse crocheted veil with the gilded nose bar.

The fact that the Queen of Egypt is veiled has undoubtedly had a definite effect on the general situation. Following her example the women of some of the old aristocratic families have retained the veil for the sake of prestige. The conservatism of the court may have prevented the aggressive promotion of a movement against the veil, but there is, after all, a certain inevitability of progress in Egypt, especially in cities like Cairo and Alexandria, which makes a movement against the veil unnecessary. The whole atmo-

sphere is so permeated with modern ideas that the passing of seclusion is inevitable.

When Turkish beauties compete in a European beauty contest it is obvious that Turkey is emancipated from the veil. In 1930 the first Turkish girl entered the contest, and in 1932 the Turkish beauty queen was elected Miss Europe over all the other European beauty queens and, on her return to Istanbul, received a civic ovation comparable to the triumphs accorded to great national heroes. Such an event is a striking illustration of the ending by the new Republic of the old régime of social segregation.

The unveiling of Turkish women is often interpreted as a drastic social revolution by official order. Such was not the case. The lifting of the veil has been an evolutionary process which began in 1909 when Turkish women first began to unveil. Through the World War economic necessity brought women into various forms of public work, which necessitated freedom from the veil, so that in 1918 there were perhaps as many if not more women in Istanbul unveiled as elsewhere in the Near East to-day, with the exception of Egypt. But during the Allied occupation there were conflicting tendencies, more social freedom in certain circles and more conservatism in others, where a strong anti-foreign bias inspired a cultural defence. Until the New Republic the evolution was moving slowly, but the restrictions of the veil were still recognized; for example, women were not allowed to go to public restaurants. Special harem sections were curtained off on trains and boats. A man would not greet a Turkish woman acquaintance on the street, even though she might be unveiled.

The new régime marked a definite break with the past and a social revolution was steadily encouraged, but not compelled. Turkey in this respect followed a very different policy from that of Soviet Russia, where unveiling was made compulsory under penalty not to the Moslem woman, but to her husband, the penalty being expulsion from the Communist party. When ten years ago in Tashkent the order of emancipation was decreed, over 175,000 Moslem women are reported to have discarded their veils and thousands burned them in bonfires on Woman's Day, now

an annual celebration. Whatever may have been the reaction of men and women to this compulsory freedom from the veil, it has mattered little to Soviet Russia. The veil has been branded as "the birthmark of an enslaved past" and has no place in the Soviet Republics.¹

Turkey has dealt more wisely and more considerately with the veil, recognizing that the veil has a deeper meaning than the fez, which was banned by official orders that were drastically enforced. A prominent Turkish leader explained to me the reason for the different official policy regarding the veil and the fez. "You can compel men, but not women to obey an order," he said, "which may run contrary to public opinion." The Government did not therefore launch the reform of unveiling by issuing a Government decree but followed the skilful technique of encouraging women to unveil and of educating the public to the new idea. Although there was no general compulsion, women in official services, such as teaching, were required to unveil, and wives of officials were tacitly included in this category. Schools for girls were instructed to adopt uniforms and caps to replace the former scarf worn by Turkish schoolgirls. In order to reach the general public the policy of persuasion to discard the veil was occasionally given special force, as in Kayseri during the visit of Ismet Paşa in 1928 for the inauguration of the new railway. The cordon of soldiers surrounding the place for the celebration admitted only unveiled women to the enclosure. The veiled had to remain outside. When Turkish women were granted suffrage, women wearing veils were debarred from voting, a regulation which was accepted as entirely logical.

The idea that there has been no enforced lifting of the veil is shown by the fact that it has lingered even in Istanbul, especially in the more remote Turkish quarters. During an hour's observation of Galata Bridge in 1930, 58 veiled women in the *charshaf* passed out of a total of 508; whereas in Eyoub, a very conservative quarter, the proportion of veiled women was 62 out of 105. On my visit to Istanbul in April 1935, I saw only two veiled women in Eyoub in an hour's time, and although I observed Turkish women

¹ Cf. Anna Louise Strong, *The Red Flag in Samarkand*.

in the old-fashioned type of *charshaf* in old Stamboul and on Galata Bridge, the lowered veil was very rare.

To-day in Istanbul, as in Ankara and Izmir, the veil has practically been discarded. In these cities the transition from the modish *charshaf* with the veil thrown back, to the *başertusi*, scarf headdress, and black coat, and then later the self-conscious early stage of adopting the hat, has been completed. Hats in Turkey are now merely hats and no longer a new adventure for Turkish women. They may be more expensive and less intriguing than the veil or *başertusi*, but their adoption was a logical result of the social revolution. The younger generation has now advanced one step further and dispensed with hats, preferring to go with heads uncovered, even on the Grande Rue.

But there is a great difference between Istanbul and the typical cities of the Interior where social change has moved more slowly. In the towns off the railway line, perhaps a large majority and in a railway centre probably half of the women are still veiled. In all of these places there is, of course, the advanced minority, the so-called "foreign groups" of unveiled teachers, wives of officials and business men from Istanbul, who lead quite a separate social life. The prevailing atmosphere is conservative but the presence of this "foreign" group undoubtedly has its effect; for each year the number of veils in the Interior decreases. In the old city of Ankara, where formerly veiled women were the rule, recently I saw only two; and in Brussa, noted for its reactionary tendencies, I counted only four in a day's visit. Public opinion is indeed changing but in some places it has been deemed wise by the municipal authorities to speed up the process. In Adana an order to that effect was issued just before the Kurban Bayram, the Sacrifice Festival, March 1935, to the effect that no woman should appear on the streets in a veil or *charshaf*. In order to facilitate the adoption of coats instead of the *charshaf*, the municipality for a time sold coats and hats for women at a very low price.

It is rumoured that a general order to unveil may be passed but whether this be true or not, the famous injunction of Kamal Atatürk to the women of Turkey uttered in the early days of the Republic has already been widely

followed. *"Show your faces to the world, and look the world in the face."* The essential fact about the veil in Turkey to-day is not that some women still retain the veil but that wearing it has become entirely a matter of personal choice and hence it has lost its traditional significance.

The problem of the veil throughout the East, strictly speaking, affects only the women of towns and cities and not those of the rural population. This broad generalization may be safely made as to the situation of women in rural life, whether in India, Egypt, or Turkey. Although there is a very great difference in the level of life of the peasant woman of Turkey, the fellaheen of Egypt, and the village women of India, all alike are free from the veil. The exigencies of country life have made veiling obviously impossible and impracticable. Hence, everywhere rural women are free and unveiled, independently carrying on their labour on the land. In their freedom they enjoy an enviable position, compared with the closely curtained, secluded women of the towns. By their freedom, moreover, they are in no sense regarded as violating the teachings of the Prophet.

But although technically unveiled, the peasant woman in the Moslem world has very definitely the psychology of the veil. On the road she drops her eyes, or covers her face with a wisp of cloth or turns her back as the stranger passes. In the village she usually holds herself aloof from the general life; at the village festival women form a group apart. The conventions of the veil seem in many ways to have left their impress on the village woman's life, although there is no visible veil. Travelling through different parts of rural Asia I have always had the dominant impression that the peasant woman though unveiled is not without a certain sense of separation.

CHAPTER II

IN AND OUT OF PURDAH

"THIS is for me a vacation from purdah" an attractive young Moslem woman explained as we were having tea together on the spacious verandah of the Indian bungalow in Lahore that had been put at the disposal of the guests at the All India Women's Conference. "It is the first time I have ever travelled alone and had my face uncovered. Of course when I go back I must wear the *burqa*. At home I wouldn't dare go without it. But no one notices me here." She sighed deeply and added "Our town is so conservative. I wonder whether it will ever change."

Her phrase "vacation from purdah" well expresses the trend toward lifting the veil away from the home environment, that I have noticed with interesting variations throughout the East. The Moslem woman in Lucknow who is in close purdah at home, will break purdah in Bombay or perhaps in Kashmir. The Princess of Bhopal, completely veiled, went on board the steamer in Bombay, sailing for England. But as soon as they left the harbour, she discarded the *burqa* and was unveiled until she returned. Travelling from Marseilles to Alexandria some years ago I enjoyed very much meeting a charming Egyptian woman from Cairo, who moved about quite freely with her husband, played bridge and chatted freely with a group of Egyptian men. The night before we arrived in Alexandria she informed me that the next morning she would put on the veil, as her husband occupied an important position which made it necessary for her to conform to the established official régime. When I saw her leaving the ship, I realized that she had stepped back completely into the conventions of the East.

At Aleih, in the Lebanon mountains, I had tea with the wife and daughters of a wealthy Pasha from Baghdad, a very conservative man. In Baghdad they are all strictly veiled; in the Lebanons they go even without hats. Aleih is not only the out-of-bound zone for veils for women from

Baghdad, but also for some from Beirut, who discard their veils in Aleih, though only half an hour distant. Damascus women, closely veiled in Damascus, unveil in Beirut, and Beirut women do likewise in Damascus, Teheran women had begun to frequent a little resort a few miles in the foot hills for tea in a public restaurant before the same privilege was possible in Teheran. A young Moslem girl in Jerusalem, always veiled, went on a picnic to Emmaus with a mixed group, among them her fiancé, whom she was not supposed to see in Jerusalem. The Turkish woman from Kayseri, who still retains her veil and *charshaf* in Kayseri, moves about in Istanbul without *charshaf* and veil.

Not only does the Moslem woman often allow herself greater freedom in different places, but also in different parts of the same place. The Turkish woman of Istanbul who still retains the veil may often lift it in the market-place, but when she enters her own neighbourhood, down goes the veil. The Damascus women may wear thinner veils in Salahiyah, one of the suburbs where most of the foreign residents live, but dons an old-style *charshaf* and thick veil for the bazaar quarter in the old city. Similarly women in Jerusalem are quite casual about lowering the veil when in the outskirts in a foreign locality, but their faces are closely covered at the Jaffa Gate or in the walled city.

All of these illustrations show the tendency to unveil out of the ordinary environment. The basic principle involved is interesting as it is the same principle which always tends to make for greater freedom, social and otherwise, when one is away from home, not bound by the conventions of a permanent environment and not under the watchful and critical gaze of a familiar public. The Moslem woman follows the same line of action as the American woman who often enjoys a larger measure of social freedom in Paris than in her own home town.

In reference to the veil there are not only these interesting variations from purdah—the variations of veiling and unveiling according to the time and place—but also certain apparently illogical distinctions as to when a veil must be worn or when it may be discarded. Each country presents

interesting illustrations of this. Baghdad women who are veiled and never see a man have their photographs taken and hung in their drawing-rooms for men visitors to admire freely. According to the strict conventions of purdah, this would be impossible and still is in many places; for example, in India. Talking to men over the telephone seems to be allowed in Baghdad even though the veil would forbid meeting or conversing. The wife of a Cabinet Minister, a worthy sheikh, is said to converse freely with various ministers and political leaders, as she has a great interest in politics. She is, of course, veiled and could not meet these men personally. It is to be hoped that the development of television does not deprive her of her pastime. A ruling Arab Prince who is very conservative in regard to the veil, is said to have chatted informally over the telephone with the Prime Minister's wife, whom, of course, he could not meet since she is veiled, felicitating her on the birth of a daughter and joking about a possible marriage with his son.

Charming Moslem girl graduates who were not yet unveiled as a rule, have appeared at commencement at the American College in Cairo without the veil, for all the world to see. They did not, however, mingle freely in the reception afterwards and meet men. They arrived veiled, appeared unveiled, and departed veiled. It is needless to say that these commencements were an event of more than passing interest, especially for prospective young bridegrooms. Now that unveiling is more general the commencements have lost their special significance.

A very clever and advanced young Moslem woman in Beirut, always accustomed to the veil because of a very conservative father, delivered a public lecture at the university unveiled and on another occasion presented the prizes for an oratorical contest at the university. Neither of these occasions, however, determined her general attitude toward discarding the veil permanently, as one might have supposed. A Moslem schoolgirl in Cairo, although of a conservative family and hence, still veiled, decided when she went on a school excursion to Luxor to wear a hat in order to avoid being conspicuous, since all the rest of the group were unveiled. When women students in Turkey first

attended classes with men, they came to class veiled, lifted their veils during the class, and then lowered them afterwards. This was some years before co-education in the full sense of the term became the general rule in Turkey. An Egyptian principal of a girls' school in Assiut, who, at the time of my visit several years ago was still wearing the veil, explained that she received school officials at the school unveiled if they came on business but did not see these same men or others socially.

Sometimes the distinctions of purdah have an intriguing quality of interest. At the public meeting of the All-Asian Women's Conference in Lahore held in the University Convocation Hall, the address of welcome was delivered from behind a screen by a distinguished woman at that time still in purdah. The voice was amplified by loud-speakers, which gave anything but the impression of purdah. This fact had special significance since in India strict purdah has required that a woman's voice should not be heard out of the harem.

Some of these illustrations may seem to be entirely illogical, distinctions without a difference, but at least some are based on the rather fine distinction drawn between unveiling for business or impersonal reasons and unveiling as a purely social matter. In the first case, lifting the veil for official contacts seems logical because based on necessity. The present period in some countries is one of gradual evaluation between the so-called necessary unveiling and unveiling for merely personal reasons. But these various fine distinctions become more and more artificial and are at last ignored. Because of the many interesting exceptions to the uniform observance of the veil, it seems fair to conclude that after all, the restraint of the veil for the great majority is not a matter of religion but of custom. If it were a matter of religion, it would make no difference whether the Lucknow Begum were in Lucknow or Kashmir; or whether the Egyptian school principal were having a business conversation or a purely social visit. The veil would be retained in either case, regardless of place or extenuating circumstances, as religion has a certain permanent quality. Evidently, it is not religion, but the fear of public opinion

which prevents the lifting of the veil. The idea that "It just isn't done" seems to be the main deterrent.

As long as veiling is the conventional thing, unveiling will probably be regarded as not quite respectable, and perhaps even actually immoral, since the conventional always bears the seal of being respectable and moral, whereas the strange and unconventional act is regarded with suspicion. As yet the veil or purdah bears the badge of respectability quite generally in the Moslem world. This may explain, at least partially, why the lower class in each country is slower to change than the upper class, since the former always aspires to raising its social position, while the latter can always afford to take the social risk. In India, for example, having one's wife in purdah is regarded as a certain social distinction. The Indian cook aspires to the same degree of purdah for his wife as the butler can afford. Hence as soon as the cook gets a raise in wages from twenty to thirty rupees, he promptly puts his wife in purdah and feels that he has climbed up one rung on the social ladder. This idea that purdah is the mark of social distinction reaches far down in the social scale, and only stops at the lowest economic levels where it becomes impossible. Coming out of purdah, naturally and very fortunately, has begun in the upper class in each country and by the law of imitation is working down. Unveiling by all classes comes more easily if the style has been set at the top. Since this is the case, the importance in each country of unveiled leaders such as Madame Sharawi Pasha in Cairo, Begum Hamid Ali in Baroda, Mrs. Tyabji in Bombay and Lady Shafi and Lady Abdul Qadir in Lahore, is very great, since they represent wealth and social prestige, and hence, invite imitation.

As I have travelled in the East observing the emergence of Moslem women from behind the veil, I have been impressed not only with certain obvious contrasts as to the style of the veil and the rigidity or comparative laxity of the system in different countries, but also with a certain fundamental inner meaning, which seems to be inherent in the very idea of the veil. There is a world of difference between the mask-like, shapeless Indian *burqa* and the chic modernized *charshaf* and veil in Syria, or the alluring white

chiffon veil in Egypt which leaves the eyes entirely free. There is a corresponding difference in the freedom of personality which these different types of veiling permit. In all Moslem countries except India the veil has passed through various stages, which represent a gradual departure from the spirit as well as the letter of religious tradition and indicate a growing style consciousness or urge to display some feminine charm. The Indian *burqa* has offered no such satisfying possibilities as the modish pelerine, or filmy veil and draped toque. But even though these various forms of the veil differ widely in their degree of concealment, they all alike constitute a certain barrier between the woman and the outside world. Even though the *pecheh* in Iran has ceased entirely to cover the face and the Cairo chiffon could not be more revealing, the subtle nuance of separation remains.

This inner meaning of the veil a charming Moslem woman in Alexandria who had only recently unveiled sought to explain to me, "A veil, however high or low, thick or thin," she said, "remains a veil, with its full meaning until it disappears. It is never just a piece of black or white chiffon, or merely a special type of garment. It is never casually assumed or laid aside without reflection. It presents strange paradoxes. It is a restrictive emphasis on sex relationship, and also on moral protection; a sign of utter dependence and also of freedom from responsibility; a handicap to real progress and a symbol of special privilege. In a word the veil represents an entirely different social system. Discarding it, therefore, involves a whole change of psychology. As long as any vestige of the veil remains, the system has not changed." And then she added, "I suppose it is impossible for a Western woman to understand the meaning of the veil. It is so entirely foreign to you and so much a part of us."

One might perhaps imagine that all Moslem women are eager to lift the veil. But such is by no means the case with many Moslem women—especially those of the older generation. At a purdah club party in Bhopal a month after the Begum had unveiled at the state dinner, I heard a group of typical Indian purdah women anxiously discussing the

question as to whether the unveiling of the Queen would mean that they would have to unveil. Unveiling for them was feared as a real calamity. This group is typical of a large number of older Moslem women whose life and thought is centred in the purdah. Many of them, especially in India, regard the veil as a part of their religion. The religious element seems less vital elsewhere, but all through the Moslem East religion has coloured the thinking of the older generation. An even stronger reason for their aversion to unveiling is the sense of unfamiliarity which even the thought of unveiling gives them. They are entirely at home with the veil and mistress of the situation. Furthermore unveiling seems to them full of moral dangers, as their life has been centred on a morality based entirely on the protection of barriers. These older women represent a strong conservative opposition in each country against lifting the veil.

Some Moslem women, also of the older group, would hesitate to give up the veil or *charshaf* not merely because of the moral protection, the need for which is very much emphasized, but also because of freedom from responsibility afforded by the veil. Such freedom may seem paradoxical but it is true that a veiled woman is not a personality to be criticized for individual action, she is merely a masked figure whom no one recognizes. As a Teheran doctor said, "Veiled women oftentimes do things that other women could not do."

Aside from the older group who cling to the veil there is in every country a large number of women of the upper class who are more or less satisfied with the comfortable protected life of seclusion, free from responsibility, enjoying complete liberty in their own limited sphere, and a certain amount of prestige. Unveiling would involve a good deal of readjustment, a new technique of living. They prefer the familiar world to which they are accustomed. They have already adopted European clothes, have bobbed hair perhaps and even a marcel wave, and are satisfied with these measures of modernity. They may be intellectually prepared to unveil, but the veil does not seem a vital matter. There is no keen sense of what they have lacked and hence, no urge for change. They regard unveiling as a possibility

but on the whole are indifferent to change. A fairly large number of women, however, recognize a fundamental handicap in connection with the veil. Individually they would not decide to lift the veil and thus incur family opposition or public criticism, but they would welcome a general change. A good many Iranian women had hoped for an order from the Shah. In Iraq one heard frequently the wish for a Kamal Ataturk to end the system of the veil, before the rapid changes of the past winter.

Although the great majority of women are passive in their attitude concerning the veil, but willing to change eventually, there is an active minority of women who have unveiled and are working steadily against the veil. These regard it as a root evil, as a Moslem woman in Calcutta diagnosed it, "carbon monoxide, which causes slow death." An Iranian woman expressed the handicap of the veil as keeping women always "prisoners to sex." The younger generation, almost without exception, belong with this group. Perhaps many of the graduates of schools and colleges returning to their conservative homes may accept the veil without open revolt, because of the deferential attitude of youth for age in the East, but there is a deep sense of dissatisfaction. As a young schoolgirl in Tripoli said: "Our mothers and grandmothers are happy with the veil and harem, but with us it is different. We know that there is a different kind of life and will not be satisfied until we have it." Another young Moslem girl, eager for freedom, but living in a conservative atmosphere, said: "Every time we hear of the death of an old person, we praise God that there is one less conservative, Al-Hamdullah."

As to the attitude of men toward discarding the veil, the great majority is not committed to the idea. Education for girls has been accepted as necessary, but not unveiling. The masculine reaction to lifting the veil ranges from active opposition to indifference. The ultra-conservatives, especially religious leaders, base their opposition on religious principles, but one often has the feeling that few are really impelled by religion to oppose the veil. By far the greater number is actuated by a feeling of protective possession of the women in their families and satisfaction with the *status quo* which

ensures their authority. Often the highly protective attitude is explained on the basis of the moral insecurity of the unveiled Moslem woman. "The times are not yet ripe"; "men's morals are too low"; "the general public is not yet prepared for women's freedom," are the oft-repeated refrain. Doubtless there is much truth but also a good deal of alibi in these reasons given against unveiling. This idea of the need for protection I have often heard expressed by educated young Moslems, as for example, a recent university graduate in Nablus, who in speaking of his sister, a charming girl, said: "I cannot allow my beautiful sister to be exposed to the gaze of common people."

A good many men believe intellectually in freedom from the veil, but do not push it for their own families, perhaps in some cases because of the desire to save embarrassment to the women of their families who have not had modern education, or an exposure to Western social customs. This has been a real problem among the older group of women in Turkey for whom undoubtedly the adoption of new customs has been difficult. A conversation overheard on a train in the Interior gives an interesting "close up" of this typical personal problem. A Turkish officer was talking with a rather comely Turkish woman of uncertain age from Adana, who although with face unveiled still wore a scarf which rather closely concealed her hair. He was urging her to adopt a hat, as she was, he said, too good-looking to wear "that old-fashioned scarf." He admitted, of course, that it was difficult to understand how to select a hat; all veils are alike, but hats are different. Then he explained in detail how he had helped his wife buy her first hat. It had taken two days of shopping in Pera, but finally they found the right hat and now she seemed to understand the essential principle of hats. The woman seemed encouraged, but did not reveal whether she had an equally helpful husband.

In other countries than Turkey, where the general atmosphere is not conducive to social transition, one can easily understand why men do not promote social change for the women past middle age in their families. But the contrast between the theory and practice of many educated young

men is often surprising. They are in theory completely committed to a new social order and realize in their own experience the tragic lack of normal social life. But not infrequently when they marry, they keep their wives behind the veil, often for reasons of economic expediency, if in some public profession or Government service; sometimes from inertia to oppose established custom and from the necessity of upholding the prestige of a conservative family; or perhaps from a deep-seated fear that too great independence of women may develop an attitude of self-sufficiency. A young Syrian on a voyage across the Atlantic made the comment about a young American girl who was much in evidence that "She has too much the air of I-can-get-along-without-a-man." To the average Moslem man such an attitude is inexplicable and undesirable. Retaining the veil seems, therefore, a natural and safe course. There are, however, the exceptions among the young educated leaders, who take an aggressive forward step; as for example, two young Moslems recently married in Baghdad who have insisted that their wives unveil. Such individual examples will doubtless have an important influence. The attitude of men toward the question of the veil has very great significance, since a Moslem woman, however advanced she may be, does not discard the veil without the approval of the men of her family. Opposition from men inevitably blocks progress in the East—as also in the West.

It is fortunate, therefore, that a certain number of men in the East has advocated the elimination of the veil. To-day the spirit of active protest among men and women leaders is growing. In India the evils of purdah are constantly discussed in the Press and on the platform. The All-India Moslem Women's Association has repeatedly voiced its protest against purdah. The All-India Women's Conference, a very powerful force for affecting public opinion, and the All-India Social Congress annually include the abolition of purdah in their resolutions. The *Indian Social Reformer*, the leading journal of social reform, has consistently for a long period protested against purdah. The All-India Nationalist Congress has attacked purdah as a national handicap. Mahatma Gandhi has advocated the abolition of purdah

and the advancement of Indian women as a vital part of his social reform programme.

In Iran and Iraq the veil has been for several years a frequent subject for cartoons and discussions pro and con in the Press. The first and only aggressive protest against the veil in Iraq was made over twenty-five years ago when a noted Baghdad poet Jamil Sudki Azza Khawwy, delivered a speech in 1911 urging that the veil be torn away. As a result of this he was imprisoned for sedition. A book published in Syria some years ago by a young Druse girl, in which the veil was attacked as contrary to the spirit of Islam, aroused widespread public comment. It has not, however, been followed by further active protest against the veil, since both in Palestine and Syria full attention is focussed on the political and economic problem. Agitation for personal freedom from the veil would be, as one Moslem woman explained, unpatriotic. Secure political freedom first and social reforms will follow, is the prevailing attitude.

Egypt has had a number of outstanding advocates of unveiling. The agitation was begun by Kasim Bey Amin in his epoch-making book, *The Emancipation of Moslem Women*. Other outstanding leaders have at various times had an influence in promoting the freedom from the veil, among whom are Emil Zeidan, a prominent journalist and editor of *Al-Hilal*, and several professors of the Egyptian University, Dr. Mansour Fahmy, Dr. Tahir Husayn and Mustapha Abd el-Razik, who have not directly advocated the progress of women, but have advanced the cause through criticizing Islamic Foundations and attacking the conservatism of El Azhar. The leaders of the Feminist Union of Egypt have not made active protest, but have worked wisely and steadily to eradicate the evils of the veil. Through their personal example they have effectively promoted the idea of unveiling.

For the Moslem East as a whole Kamal Ataturk may be rightly considered the leading feminist. It is therefore not without reason that the International Suffrage Alliance, in its issue of stamps which commemorated the achievements of feminism at the time of the Istanbul Congress of the

Alliance included Kamal Ataturk. Through his fearless leadership he has not only attained his primary objective of social reforms for Turkey, but has also affected the social thought of the entire Moslem world and contributed greatly to the elevation of the status of Moslem women.

CHAPTER III

MILESTONES TO PROGRESS

LEADING up to the complete unveiling without distinction of time and place, which has now become for Turkish women entirely a matter of personal choice, there are many milestones of advance. It has been for me a fascinating study to see how the different parts of the East pass through the same general stages of little freedoms, in their approach to the final goal. The importance attached to each advance seems indeed strange to one accustomed to the freedom of the West. The eagerness with which a woman of Teheran told me in 1928 that she could now eat a dish of ice-cream in a public refreshment place opened before me the whole vista of her monotonous life behind the veil.

One of the first lines of change is greater freedom for Moslem women to move about. In Lahore the curtained conveyance required in India for purdah women has ceased to be the invariable rule. Even a number of years ago, I saw Moslem women in open *tongas* alone, or with the men of their families, usually wearing their *burqas*, but in certain open sections of the city occasionally even with their faces uncovered. Lahore is more advanced than other typical Moslem cities as the curtained conveyance for the Moslem woman is still required elsewhere in India, whether it be a shrouded bullock-cart in rural India, a carriage with flapping curtains or a limousine with silk shades in urban centres, or for the very poor Moslem woman, a small covered chair swung between two poles, carried by two bearers. But now more Moslem women than formerly leave at least the confines of their own *zenana* to attend purdah parties or visit in families outside their own relationship.

Train travel of Moslem women in India is also increasing in spite of the restriction of purdah, which necessitates an attendant. Moslem women from various parts of India, who are still in purdah, attend various women's conferences, travelling long distances. *En route* to Lahore to attend the All-India Women's Conference in 1931, I was joined in

my second-class compartment by several Moslem women on their way from Madras to the Conference. A few years earlier such a journey for them would not have been possible. Now not only the small number of educated Moslem women travel, but also the masses. The *zenana* third-class carriages are always crowded. The increase in bus service has brought hundreds of village women into easy access of the world. More Moslem women of the higher class than before travel to Europe, which was formerly out of bounds for a purdah woman but now is becoming much more the accepted idea. Money not tradition is to-day the main deterrent from a European trip. But for the Indian Moslem woman in strict purdah freedom of travel in her own city is unthinkable.

Due to the liberal policy of the Shah, complete freedom of movement has been granted to Iranian women. In September 1928 it was announced that women could ride in open carriages with their husbands. Before that they could ride only alone with the top of the carriage up and, of course, wearing the *chaddur*. Two years earlier a man had been arrested in Isfahan for walking with his wife in the street. To-day women ride freely alone, or accompanied, in an open or a closed carriage, with or without the *chaddur* as they choose, unless, as already mentioned, with a military officer, in which case the *chaddur* is taboo. Formerly in Isfahan women could not walk in the centre of the broad triple highway, the stately central avenue of the city, but were confined to one side; now there is no restriction. The widening of the streets in many towns in Iran by the Shah's orders, has increased the number of women in the streets and been conducive to more general freedom. A man may now speak to a woman in the street, whereas in the past this would have been considered an insult, and an offence punishable by the police.

The increase of automobile travel has opened up to women of Iran and Iraq, a world of which in the old days even men knew little because of the lack of railroads and the hazards and expense of journeys. Travel within Iran has greatly increased. Travel outside of Iran is possible, but still not common. In the old days travel abroad was a forbidden pleasure for the Iranian women. Back in the

gay nineties, which I judge were anything but gay in Iran, an adventurous sister of the Shah, as the story goes, ran away with another woman to Paris. How she managed the journey from Teheran to the coast by carriage with no Thomas Cook or American Express to facilitate her journey, it is hard to imagine. The Iranian Legation used their good offices and eventually her husband succeeded in getting her back from Paris to Teheran. Until 1925 no Iranian woman was allowed to travel abroad alone. At that time the first student desiring to study abroad received special permission from the Foreign Minister to leave for Paris, but she was detained at the frontier by the ever-watchful police until a telegram authorizing her departure could be received from the Shah. Women students from Iran to-day are able to go without difficulty to Europe. Travel for Iranian women abroad for sightseeing will probably increase, following the example of the Queen's trip to Europe two years ago.

In Iraq women travel much more freely than in Iran. Cars going across the desert are full of women, usually, but not necessarily accompanied by men. Wives of Baghdad officials commute every year to and from the Lebanon mountains. The freedom and frequency of travel for the Moslem women of Syria and Palestine is not such a new adventure but they usually travel between the two countries. The lack of travel abroad by Palestine women is in striking contrast to the constant flow of travel from Egypt to Europe. For some of the wealthy Egyptian women the yearly journey from Cairo to Paris is like a regular summer trip from New York to Maine. As an elderly woman in Cairo said: "In my day Moslem women rarely travelled except for the pilgrimage. Now Paris has taken the place of Mecca."

It is easy to understand why the pilgrimage which in the past was the great event of a lifetime has now lost something of its appeal. The change is not primarily due to a declining interest in religion. The Mecca pilgrimage offered the only opportunity for a Moslem woman to travel and see the world, as a woman's right to make the journey to Mecca, if she could afford it, was never questioned. It was her one great experience of social freedom. The companionship of

such a great company must have been a marvellous experience for a woman who lived her whole life behind the veil. Moreover, after the pilgrimage her prestige was established for a lifetime. Thereafter, she enjoyed a special title of distinction and was always the centre of attention in any gathering. Regardless of its religious meaning, which undoubtedly was very real, the Mecca pilgrimage had undoubtedly a unique social significance for Moslem women, which is largely lost in the present day of increased freedom of travel.

Turkish women have always enjoyed a greater degree of freedom to move about than other Moslem women but there was always adequate provision for privacy in travel. It is difficult to-day to realize that only a decade ago the tram-cars had a curtained-off harem part and behind these red curtains no man could go, even though the woman's section was all but empty. The ferry-boats with their women's apartments crowded with black-shrouded figures, their veils turned back, eating pistachio nuts or smoking cigarettes recall a memory of only a few years ago that now seems unreal.

Freedom in shopping constitutes another borderline of change. Customs in regard to shopping have varied in different places, but as a rule the conservative Moslem woman in the past did not do her own shopping. Many women in India, especially those who are strictly veiled, still have their husbands buy all their clothing for them, or have their servants bring goods from the bazaar. In some places in the Moslem East itinerant elderly saleswomen go about from house to house with *charshafs* or *abas* and other feminine necessities. For the women of the past, their lack of freedom for personal shopping was doubtless not regarded as an infringement on their liberty but a convenience. Turkish women, however, always went more freely to the bazaars than Moslem women in the Arab world.

To-day aside from the ultra-conservative, Moslem women everywhere do much more of their own shopping. The introduction of European styles into the harems of the Near East and the Middle East has brought more variety

which necessitates personal shopping to suit individual taste. An increasing freedom in lifting the veil in shopping I have noticed quite generally, whether in the native bazaars in Damascus or in the Orosdibach department store in Baghdad. Shopkeepers, I was told in Baghdad, have become well acquainted with their *clientèle* even though some of their customers keep up the form of concealment, lifting the veil just enough to see the goods. A good many Moslem women in Palestine do their own shopping, attracted by the many new speciality shops with European goods at very low prices, which have been opened by the German-Jewish refugees. Women of exclusive Moslem families, in Jerusalem, because of their prestige, cannot indulge in these new thrills of shopping unless, as sometimes is the case, they go in disguise wearing very old *abas*. Well-to-do Moslem women often wear their old *abas* or *charshafs* to avoid the appearance of wealth and thus secure a better bargain. There may be also some religious inhibition in the idea of escaping public notice, since the Koran teaches that a woman should not invite admiration of her appearance.

Along with the complete modernization of costume underneath the outside garment and veil, has come the imitation of the West in adopting bobbed hair, which is often a record of real achievement. Just as other changes have come slowly in different stages, bobbed hair has not always been accomplished by one snip of the scissors. I was intrigued and amused by the rather interesting and unique semi-long and semi-short style which I noticed first in a harem in Kadhimain and afterwards in various harems in Iran and the Near East. The explanation was that it was not a matter of having chosen this as a special style, but that it represented the half-way stage. The daughter or wife, ambitious for a bob, finds the father or husband very reactionary on the subject, so tries it out by degrees, cuts the sides first, then as he gradually becomes accustomed to that much, she tries a little more, until she is entirely bobbed. But to-day the number of only semi-bobbed is steadily decreasing. A great number of Moslem women, whether veiled or unveiled who have adopted European styles in clothes, have also bobbed their hair.

At the beginning, I learned, Moslem women often act as coiffeur for each other; then perhaps later after the first fatal act, the husband may serve as the barber. In the few places where there are women barbers in the East, they have become quite affluent. An Armenian woman in Baghdad, who was enterprising enough to take a course in Paris, has flourished. At first she had all the trade, but now some of the less conservative and especially the *élite* patronize Mustapha, the barber of Baghdad, who knows all about his clients, chats very freely *with* them and *about* them later on. Mustapha is always up to date as to the latest style of bob and marcel wave. For the Baghdad woman bobbed hair is certainly a great improvement over the old style of having the hair hang in small braids, which does not fit the European style of dress.

The shift to bobbed hair in Iran is easily dated. The first bobs appeared in 1925. The style grew slowly till 1928 when it was still considered advanced and formed a subject for many comments in the Press. A conservative article, opposing bobbed hair evoked the following defence: "One day it was the custom for women to have long hair and poets praised them for the beauty of their hair. To-day short hair is more praised and women should be allowed to cut their hair as they wish." Since 1933 the Press argument has ceased. Now for schoolgirls and younger women teachers, and social leaders especially, it is the established style.

In Palestine as elsewhere the upper class have made bobbed hair the accepted fashion. A man barber with an upstairs private shop for women is patronized by the majority in Jerusalem, although some still have the "home cut." Nablus, even though very conservative, some years ago adopted bobbed hair, but not the man barber. To attend a home bobbing party was quite an event at the time of my visit there in 1930. But the instinct for style proved stronger than Moslem conservatism. Before long some of the women from Nablus occasionally went to Tel Aviv or Jerusalem, had a bob by a good Jewish barber and brought back the latest mode—a unique type of community service. In Beirut the last few years have marked a

great increase in foreign beauty parlours, frequented by Moslem and Christian alike. Cairo and Alexandria are of course replicas of Europe as to styles in coiffures as well as dress in general. Moslem women go freely to men coiffeurs, as is entirely natural with the passing of the veil. The transition to bobbed hair is only significant where the veil still remains.

Perhaps there may be some relationship between the freedom of bobbed hair and the growth in photographs of Moslem women, for freedom to have a photograph taken is another of the cherished new measures of advance. I found that carrying a camera when visiting harems and *zenanas* was an interesting method by which to test conservatism. Where the veil still persists, Moslem women are as yet for the most part conservative about having their photographs taken. Usually younger Moslem women are very eager for a photograph but inhibited by the fear of some male member of the family. Therefore the consent of the father or husband was required. Sometimes with the ultra-conservative, if I promised to give them the film afterwards, I could meet their opposition, as that eliminated the idea of having the film developed and seen by a strange man. A woman photographer a few years ago had a very good field for work in Moslem countries and still would in places where photographs of women are as yet taboo. But in certain places, for some time past, women have patronized men photographers. A clever Baghdad photographer confided to me five years ago that his best clients were Moslem women who of course were all veiled. He seemed surprised that "for some reason or other" as he said, "they understand the art of posing."

Until recently it has been difficult and practically impossible to take photographs in girls' schools. Some of the group illustrations in this book required much persuasion and most meticulous care in securing the parental consent even of the girls behind the veil. To have a photograph of a group in the girls' Normal School in Baghdad the principal said she must get the sanction of the Minister of Education and the permission of the parents. But out of a class of thirty-two only five refused consent in 1934 whereas

a few years ago probably not five would have given consent. Among the uneducated, middle or lower class of Moslems, there is a very strong prejudice against photographs of women, because of a complex of tradition and religious scruples.

Until fairly recently Egypt and Turkey were the only Moslem countries in which women's photographs were featured freely in the Press. In India a few outstanding Moslem women leaders have had their photographs published but the pictures of non-Moslems constitute the majority of Press photographs of women. Within the last year Iran has begun to feature pictures of women and girls in connection with educational or social reform. To see in a recent Teheran newspaper a group photograph of school inspectresses with bobbed hair, in hats and uniforms, among whom I recognized my interpreter of 1930, who at that time was closely shrouded in her *chaddur* and dominated by the restraints of seclusion, has made vivid to me the whole atmosphere of change. The complete break with the past was shown by the Press publicity in Teheran which followed the opening of the Normal School by the Shah and the Queen in the winter of 1935. A women's issue of the *Iran* (January 12, 1936) appeared with pictures of His Majesty, the Queen and the Princesses in full European costume, and also pictures of prominent women throughout the world including Hollywood actresses.

A more fundamental line of change, however, than this indicated by the appearance of Moslem women's photographs in the Press is the increased provision for recreation for women, the need for which is everywhere apparent. Baghdad is a city of coffee-houses teeming with men. One asks constantly: "Where are the women?" "What recreation do they have?" Hama has pleasant gardens by the side of the river, where men may congregate but there is no place for women except on the windswept hill above the town, where one sees a crowd of black-robed veiled figures squatting on the ground enjoying the sunset. The main outside diversion of the week for many Moslem women of the middle class in the Near East in the past was their Friday afternoon excursion to the cemetery where they sat

in groups gossiping while the children played about among the tombstones. To-day however, there are evidences of new ideas of recreation for Moslem women other than chatting in such lugubrious surroundings. A number of significant beginnings show that a Moslem woman's normal desire for relaxation and outside pleasure is being realized.

A women's park in Baghdad and Teheran gives women a pleasant place where they can have an airing. Tea places are now open to Iranian women either alone or with men. The Chief of Police initiated this change in 1928 by taking his wife to a café in a summer resort near Teheran. A few progressives followed his example there and later in Teheran. Now it has become quite the custom for women to dine out. A very attractive new café in a pleasant park near the Parliament buildings with a special garden for women has become a popular place in Teheran, frequented by women as well as men. This also affords a place where a group of women can meet on special occasions. A few years ago the main Teheran hotel refused to plan a dinner for a party of teachers because it was not yet considered proper for a group of women to dine out. Lahore has opened certain gardens for women, and Old Delhi has provided a purdah garden for conservative Moslem women who live entirely apart from the modern life of New Delhi.

There is also to-day more provision for club recreation for women. In Aleppo several years ago the club-room of a mixed family club was set aside one day a week from four to eight o'clock for the exclusive use of Moslem women members of the families. The day that I visited the club many came early and stayed late, had refreshments, danced to the music of a phonograph and played cards. A few minutes before eight the warning bell indicated that the women's time was up, but even after the final bell, a few stayed on to finish a game of cards while the men waited impatiently for their turn. I wondered why the whole evening, since it was only once a week, could not be granted for the use of the women. But each concession is, of course, an increase in privilege.

Several years ago Moslem women began to learn to dance, not with men, but among themselves. Several times I was

invited to teas in private homes in Teheran, where the guests indulged in dancing, taking their entertainment very seriously, as a preparation, one felt, for the day when mixed dancing would be possible. About this time Groppis, the well-known tea-room in Cairo, had a series of Friday afternoon *thé dansants* for women only. Later these were discontinued, probably because the keen edge of enjoyment had worn off, or because they had served their purpose of giving women their chance to learn to dance. The fact that there was a large orchestra of men may also have led to the discontinuance of these dances. The popularity of At Homes in Jerusalem in the wealthy upper-class families is an interesting development of women's social recreation along modern lines. When I last visited Jerusalem these elaborate teas which resembled afternoon receptions anywhere, offered the main occasion for Moslem women to display their clothes, since there was no mixed social life.

The major chance for recreation and the most exciting social event for the Indian *pardahnashin* is the purdah club, which I have visited in many places in India. Even many small towns now have their women's club. These weekly meetings in some attractive bungalow or in a curtained garden secluded from the public gaze, represent for many "shut in" Moslem women a new world. To gather with other women, drink tea and chat, perhaps play badminton or tennis, and occasionally listen to a lecture has given the Indian woman a thrill which a Western woman can scarcely understand. The freedom of the purdah club, limited as it may seem, is far beyond the range of possibility of the thousands of purdah women whose seclusion is kept inviolate. Immured within the four walls of their own courtyard, not even seeing the neighbour next door, nor the street outside, their life means a virtual paralysis of all movement, a low level of bare physical existence.

The mild recreation of the purdah club, which is carefully shielded from the public gaze, is an interesting illustration of the changing attitude toward athletics and sports for women. This change has come slowly in the East as there has always been a prejudice against physical activity for girls and women, especially of the upper class. A few years

ago Moslem girls played tennis very little; to-day it is very popular. Schoolgirls in Iraq are beginning to play tennis in courts carefully sheltered from the public gaze. The girls of the Central Normal School in Baghdad also are keen about basket-ball and a group goes regularly to the palace to satisfy the enthusiasm of the princesses for the game. In India several years ago I was impressed by the eager response of Indian schoolgirls to athletic competitions, which at that time were held in purdah. The All-India Olympics have given an impetus to girls' athletics and distinctly short-circuited conservatism. A Moslem girl student from Isabella Thoburn College last year competed in the team in the required sports costume—blue shorts and a white skirt. Since then the costume has become very popular.

Public gymnastic demonstrations of schoolgirls led by Moslem teachers have become a commonplace in Cairo since the first one in 1929. Physical activity for women is also gaining in favour. "Before the nationalist movement," a Moslem woman in Cairo confided to me, "we kept it a secret if we played tennis." Now people are quite proud of the fact. Cairo represents the advance guard in women's sports. A number of women drive their own cars and are unnoticed but when the first Moslem woman began driving in 1929, she wore a hat to avoid publicity. In 1934 an Egyptian girl, Miss Lutfiya El Nadi, a graduate of the American Girls' College in Cairo, won distinction in a solo flight, the first aviatrice in the East.

Of more recent interest is the surprising change during the past year in the activities of women and girls in Teheran. The second Queen driving in her new stream-lined Chrysler is a spectacular high light. Of greater significance, however, and also not without a dramatic appeal, was the athletic exhibition (May 24, 1935) of several hundred Teheran schoolgirls in bloomers, held in the presence of a distinguished assemblage, including the Prime Minister, members of the Cabinet, military officers, and other dignitaries. For the first time in the history of Iran young girls paraded in public chanting the national anthem, and performed physical exercises and fascinating Iranian dances.

This emphasis on physical exercise for Eastern girls is

naturally producing a new ideal of feminine beauty. The Turkish beauty contest would not award the prize to the languorous girl of the Ottoman Empire period, who was suited to sit on a soft Turkish divan in a palace on the Bosphorus with lustrous eyes shadowed by kohl, a decorative figure from Pierre Loti's *Désenchantées*. The new standard would make quite different requirements for beauty of figure and bearing, characteristic of the modern athletic Turkish girl of the New Republic.

The most widespread change in the general recreational life for women is shown by the increase of attendance at cinemas. Only a few years ago marked the beginning of cinema privileges for women in the Moslem East. Official approval of the cinema was given to women in Iran in 1928 by the removal of police restrictions. Special days were set aside when they could attend the cinema, the popularity of which was evident at the end of the performance from the steady stream of black *chaddur* figures leaving. A most remarkable performance for a mixed audience was given in Teheran in November 1928, when for the first time an unveiled Moslem woman sang in evening dress before a public audience. Seats were sold out several days in advance. Police were stationed in the aisles to avoid any possible trouble. A large detachment of police was detailed to the environs of the cinema, a precaution which showed the unusual significance of the occasion. It was one of the great events of the winter, widely talked about all over Iran. Cinemas in Iran still have a woman's section, but women sit also in the mixed section, and enter veiled or unveiled. Even in a conservative centre such as Meshed women may attend the same cinema with men. An Iranian liberal newspaper made the interesting comment that having women sit with men at the cinema reduces the number of scenes in the streets and tends toward a higher moral tone. The opponents would of course challenge that statement.

In Baghdad, but not yet in Basra or Mosul, everybody goes to the cinema. "Open a schoolgirl's desk, and you will find on top of her books a movie magazine with pictures of Hollywood stars," the principal of the girls' high school in Baghdad said, in commenting on the present passion

for the cinema. The conservative women attend the special afternoon performances featured for them; others of prominent social position attend the mixed movies in the evening, with their husbands. They are technically veiled but from their box they look freely around the audience. The distinction between the special afternoon cinemas for women and the mixed evening cinemas holds also in Aleppo and Beirut. If Moslem women in Syria attend the mixed performances, they usually are unveiled in order to avoid being conspicuous, for although Moslem women go freely, there are always more men. In Damascus women began attending the cinema in 1930 when a large outdoor cinema was turned over to them once a week. The rule "For women only" was strictly observed; not even boys over twelve years were admitted. Crowds of women flocked to this popular weekly dissipation, almost as interested in seeing each other as in seeing the film, which, however, on the occasion of my visit was one of absorbing interest for the women of Damascus—the story of Saladin and the Crusades. Their keen reaction to the picture and enthusiasm over Saladin's exploits gave one a different idea of the Crusades from the usual Western point of view. The women in Amman Trans-jordan six years ago attended their first film, entering veiled but sitting on the front row unveiled. Cinema attendances of women in Cairo in now a commonplace. Women go unveiled with men or veiled alone, unveiling during the performance; they sit in boxes or with the audience, as they choose.

For the most part the cinema has not attracted the Moslem women of the lower class in Beirut or elsewhere as much as it has the upper class, since change in recreation, as in unveiling, begins at the top and works down. A woman in Beirut of this lower class whom I asked whether she ever attended a cinema, gave me an answer which seems typical of her social level. "We know the cinema by name, but have never seen one." But the different grades of cinemas and cheaper prices are beginning to make their appeal to this class also. Moreover the production of films portraying Eastern life in the language of the East and produced by Eastern players is bringing the cinema more into the life

of the uneducated women, to whom the unfamiliar Western scene makes less appeal than to those who have had some Western education. In Turkey since the first Turkish film with Turkish women performers was produced only a few years ago, the Turkish production has steadily increased and doubtless the appeal of the cinema has accordingly widened. The unrestricted cinema attendance of Turkish women, since the special harem days were discontinued early in the new régime, is only one of the many indications of the naturalness of everyday life in Turkey to-day.

Travel, bobbed hair, photographs, sports, recreation, going to the cinema, these many precious stages of advance for the still veiled or hesitantly unveiling woman elsewhere in the Moslem world, have all become for the Turkish woman merely a matter of personal choice. One is impressed to-day with the lack of all reference in the Press or in private conversation to these details of freedom, which are regarded to-day as a normal part of life. The idea of freedom of women has been so completely accepted that distinctions between men and women are now as little emphasized as they would be in the Western world. It is indeed difficult to realize that the grandfathers of the present free young Turkish girls might have paid the price of this freedom by exile or death. For to-day Turkish girls play tennis, dance, dine out if invited, swim, ride horseback, play bridge, patronize the beauty parlour, frequent the movies, travel if they can afford it—work, study and play just as girls do in France or America. There is of course at the present time between the life of Istanbul or Ankara and parts of Asia Minor not only a difference of degree, but also of the kind of social life. But there are no artificially imposed social conventions of the veil and eventually Istanbul or Ankara will differ from Konia or Sivas in much the same way as the life in New York or Washington differs from that of cities or towns in the south or middle west.

CHAPTER IV

A LIMITED SOCIAL LIFE

"THE lack of normal social relationships constitutes our most serious problem," a comment made by a thoughtful Moslem man in Baghdad, might have been made in any other city in the Moslem East except in modern Turkey. Whatever change there may be toward the lifting of the veil, or toward greater freedom of life behind the veil, the separation of men and women socially still tends to persist. Full freedom of mixed social life is scarcely possible unless, as in Turkey, the veil is completely discarded; for the veil, however it may be worn, remains always the symbol of the segregation of women. Modifications, however, even along the line of social relationships are beginning. These evidences of change are as yet in some places scarcely perceptible, but are no less significant as a preparation for the more normal social life of a later day.

Mixed social life in Cairo would probably develop rather rapidly if it were not deterred by the conservatism of the Court. In official life, which sets the general standard, mixed social life is not endorsed and Egyptian Moslem women are not received in official Egyptian society or in official foreign functions, and according to the protocol, wives of foreign diplomats do not call on the wives of Egyptian officials. The Queen, before the King's death, always lived a secluded life, never appearing in any public functions, held receptions for ladies only. Callers to the palace, men as well as women, signed two separate books—one for the Queen, one for the King. The Queen had no part in the life of modern Egypt. As long as the Queen remains entirely secluded, official society will probably not change.

There is, however, quite a little mixed social life in a quiet way between families and intimate groups of the upper class of Moslem women who are already unveiled, or still thinly veiled merely because of official expediency. In some other private circles there is also mixed social life, as for

instance, among some of the intelligentsia of the university circle. One of the university professors and his wife, both of whom have lived abroad, and realize the meaning of natural social relationships, have a weekly salon in which a small congenial group enjoy a social experience which is as yet very difficult to have in Egypt. In Alexandria society is on quite a cosmopolitan basis, Moslems being only one element, not the determining social factor. But Egypt as a whole has not broken down the idea of a divided society.

Elsewhere in the Near East—Palestine, Syria and Iraq—there is practically no mixed society even on an inter-family basis. There are of course a few isolated exceptions or apparent exceptions to the prevailing absence of mixed social life among Moslems. One or two educated young Arabs with their wives dine at Government House in Jerusalem. There is no attempt at concealment; on the contrary, their names appear in the Press, which gives added prestige. This group would also dine with other British friends but not with Moslems. This is the interesting distinction made quite often in the initial stages by those who are just breaking away from the old social traditions. In Beirut, the American University has exerted a certain liberalizing effect on the social life in the immediate university environment. The co-educational activities of the university are conducive to a certain amount of social relationships among men and women students.

In Baghdad the Turkish wives of Baghdad officials have introduced a new social outlook. In their own group the Syrian young men and women teachers have also demonstrated new social attitudes. It is interesting to note that their social life in Baghdad is freer than it might be at home in Beirut. A Jewish club and social circle, which is rather progressive, offers some social opportunities for young Moslem men but not for Moslem women. The number of Moslem women of Baghdad who ever meet men socially, according to a resident of Baghdad, could be counted on one hand. The wife and daughters in one family meet the brother's friends. The wife of a prominent political leader dines with her husband's friends occasionally and two young Moslem men whose wives are unveiled move about

freely. In Iraq as in Egypt, official conservatism prevents the development of mixed social life, which as yet can scarcely be said to have begun.

In contrast to the situation in Iraq and Egypt, mixed social life in Iran has been recently officially endorsed by the Shah. As a part of the effort last year (1935) to break down social conservatism, the Prime Minister gave an official tea at the Iran Club to which were invited Cabinet members and ranking officials with their wives, many of whom came, of course, unveiled. Before this event the Iran Club had been for some time the centre of a European type of social life for a small advanced group of military officers and their wives, most of whom were already unveiled, and for the foreign diplomatic circle. But the formal tea of the Prime Minister marks the official début of mixed social life in Iran, which has been followed by other similar occasions. The crowning event which has fully inaugurated new social life of Iran was the reception in the Parliament building which took place after the official endorsement of unveiling at the Normal School, and was attended by the Cabinet, the General Staff and General Headquarters Office—all with their wives. These official social events in Iran recall the events in Ankara in the early days of the social revolution over a decade ago.

In India there are a few outstanding examples of Moslem women well known all over India, who move freely in mixed social life. Several years ago they could have been easily counted but each year the number grows. There are perhaps more Moslem women in mixed social life in Delhi than elsewhere, as a certain number of Moslems in official positions have recognized that their wives are a social asset which they need. Most of this group have had little or no experience of mixed social life before coming to Delhi. In order to acquire more social ease some of these officials and their wives have started a Families' Club which meets at the Y.W.C.A. The object of the club, to afford opportunities for mixed social life, is strictly maintained. For example, a man who appears more than three times without his wife, forfeits his membership. The necessity for such a rule is an interesting evidence of the present social outlook.

Such a group as the Families' Club represents the small minority of women who can begin to participate in social life when the opportunity comes. One of the most interesting illustrations of the social contribution that a Moslem woman made to her husband's official career is that of Lady Shafi in Lahore, who did not break purdah until after Sir Mohammed Shafi was appointed to the Legislative Council. As I saw her in her home some years ago presiding with perfect poise over a large dinner party, I marvelled at her remarkable adaptability since I knew that she had been in purdah until well after middle age. She had made a complete social readjustment, learned English and met the varied demands of the mixed social life which her husband's official position entailed. Lady Shafi and her daughters, all out of purdah (one of them Begum Shah Nawaz, was a delegate at the Indian Round Table Conference in London), represent the advanced social life of Lahore. Lady Abdul Qadir who came out of purdah only a few years ago is another very distinguished social influence not only in Lahore but in India as a whole.

A mixed social club in Lahore, the Cosmopolitan Club, which antedates the Families' Club in Delhi, has been a progressive force for mixed social life. As also in Delhi, the Lahore Club does not allow a man to be a member unless he brings his wife or sister or some woman of his family. The thoroughly natural atmosphere of this club of Indian men and women of all communities, mingling freely in games and general social life as in any country club in the West, shows that social intercourse in India develops on the same basis as elsewhere if the purdah is broken. The few advanced Moslem women in Lahore, in Delhi and Lucknow and elsewhere scattered throughout India, who are mingling freely in social life are setting a social standard far above and beyond the great majority, but the majority will slowly follow their example.

Aside from this group already out of purdah in different parts of India there is a very small minority of highly cultivated Moslem women still behind the purdah for various reasons, who with their husbands enjoy a limited social contact with foreigners, but do not as yet meet freely with

other Moslems, as has already been mentioned in reference to Palestine. In India, however, it is very significant, because of the more rigid system of segregation, for a woman ordinarily in purdah to dine with English friends. For this reason more care is taken to ascertain whether other Moslem guests are invited. Moreover, where mixed social life between Moslems has begun, the greatest care is taken to prevent any Moslem from joining the group, who has not brought his wife out of purdah, since otherwise it would be a reflection on the other Moslem women in the company. For the overwhelming majority of Moslem women in India social contact seems very remote, basic education being the primary need before social liberty can be understood and wisely used. Progress seems always bounded by a vicious circle, since education is needed for breaking the purdah, but purdah is the greatest handicap to education.

The restricted social life of the East most seriously affects youth, first because of the natural desire and need of youth for normal social outlets and furthermore, because by a strange irony it is peculiarly difficult for the younger generation to break through the rigidity of the system. Whatever latitude may be possible seems to apply to young married couples. The opportunity for social acquaintance for youth on the basis of normal comradeship is practically nil. Such an idea is foreign to the East.

It is interesting to note that this lack of mixed social life is characteristic in most places in the East of Christians as well as Moslems. Of course, for Christians there is not the absolute bar of the veil to overcome, and therefore, opportunities for meeting are possible, but the casual social contacts and normal friendships of young people are almost unknown. The attention is always focussed on the main idea of marriage. A young Syrian business man in Beirut, a Christian, deplored the fact that there was not a single girl in Beirut that he could take to the nine o'clock pictures. "Of course, I might take the whole family," he said, "but who wants to do that? The afternoon show is impossible for a business man, furthermore, that's the special time for women." Then he explained the complexities of the situation. No girl of good family could be seen alone in the

streets at night with a man. She would have to go in a group of cousins or family friends, but not with an individual friend. Even a girl with whose family his own had been on intimate terms could not run the risk of going with him alone. It might start a scandal. Moreover being seen with him would probably damage her chances for marriage, as most Syrian men do not want to marry a girl who has received attention from anyone else. Furthermore, an invitation to the cinema or a call would suggest possible serious intentions. To make any social advance without such intentions would be scarcely honourable.

Such a social dilemma as this conversation in Beirut revealed may be regarded as typical of the situation of the younger generation in Christian communities in other places, although the life of the Christian community in Beirut is more advanced, and probably more socially free, since it is not a religious minority, as are the Christian groups elsewhere in the Near East. A few significant attempts have been made by different interested individuals, foreigners and others, in Beirut and Cairo to create more normal social contacts; such as, social gatherings for young men and women to meet informally; small private parties for dancing, and week-end excursions. Religious study circles for mixed groups sometimes serve a double purpose, which recalls life in certain communities in America in the early nineties, when religious gatherings offered the main opportunity for social contact. These mixed groups in the friendly atmosphere of a foreign home often discuss the vital question as to whether the time is fully ripe in Egypt for mixed social relations. Such efforts to promote social contact have been much appreciated by the younger generation, but have met with a good deal of criticism by a few foreigners as well as by the people of the country on the ground that the promotion of mixed social relations is unwise under present moral and social conditions.

For the younger generation of Moslems the lack of social life in the East is obviously a far more serious problem than for the Christian youth. The typical Moslem home and family relationship does not offer the background for social relationship. Moreover, the veil presents for Moslems an

absolute barrier to mixed social life. The most serious aspect of the completely divided social life is the impossibility of a normal basis for marriage. The old idea of marriage "sight unseen" entirely dependent upon the parents' choice does not satisfy modern educated Moslem youth. It would be wrong to conclude that the old method was entirely unsuccessful. The average of happy marriages arranged by parents might perhaps compare favourably with the marriages by individual choice. Doubtless the attitude of the wife had much to do with the success of the marriage. It was her fate and her responsibility therefore to make her marriage happy. The idea was entirely in harmony with the whole social system. But to-day the situation is reversed. Marriage is no longer on the basis of "marry and then perhaps love follows" but rather "love and then marriage follows." A possible basis for social intermingling is therefore a requisite for this new ideal. "Our parents choose our husbands but we have to live with them. Our ideas of what constitutes a desirable husband may be very different from theirs," the comment of a young Egyptian girl, is representative of the attitude of youth as a whole, confronted with this common problem of the East.

To this whole system of social segregation an interesting protest was made several years ago in Madras by a group of young Moslem men who pledged themselves to refuse to marry unless they could see the bride in advance, and be assured that her family would not require purdah. Such an active protest, however, is not typical and probably was not carried out, as the pressure of the environment is hard to resist. Loyalty to family tradition and deference to the parents' wishes usually dominate each individual situation. The drastic break with Moslem custom is rarely made. More often the educated young Moslem, perhaps a graduate from Columbia or Oxford, marries a wife of his parents' choice. His experience in America or England and his married life often remain in two separate compartments.

In spite of the lack of normal social opportunities, however, often through the kindness of some friend a meeting may be arranged by which a prospective bride and bridegroom may have an opportunity to meet. By chance one

morning I was present at such a meeting in the home of a Syrian friend. The young couple met quite normally as if on an ordinary occasion and not for the first time and for such an important purpose. They discussed casually various topics with some subjects of real significance injected into the conversation by the Syrian friend to sound out the views of the young man. It was an interesting bit of drama, especially when I realized its importance for the future. After this first meeting the decision for the marriage was made.

Sometimes a foreign bride offers the solution for this problem of lack of social contact in the East, which proves to be often a better solution for the man than for the foreign bride. What such a situation may mean I realized vividly through an experience in Syria. I was entertained at lunch by a young bridal couple, the bride a French girl, the groom, the son of a leading Syrian family, who had studied in Paris—hence the marriage. The bride was trying to settle into this very conservative old Moslem family of wealth and tradition, living in one part of the large patriarchal establishment, since her husband's economic situation made an independent home impossible. As long as they remained under the parental roof, conformity to custom was inevitable. Her situation was peculiarly difficult, as Christian women of that city as well as Moslems wear the veil. A greater contrast than the difference between the mores of her Syrian surroundings and those of Paris one could scarcely conceive. In Baghdad I heard of the unusual case of an educated Moslem with a Russian wife, who had assumed the veil and become identified with the Moslem system. In both cases the foreign wife was paying the heavy price of Moslem conservatism, whereas the husband gained the advantage of an intellectually congenial marriage, although one imagines that the emotional maladjustment of the bride would be scarcely conducive to a happy home.

But not all Moslem marriages with foreign brides are so unhappily conditioned. If the young couple can establish an independent home, and if the bride and groom have similar interests the situation is often quite different. A case

in point is a recent marriage of a prominent young man in Iraq to an American girl. Their home is the centre of progressive social educational influences in a conservative environment. One finds less isolated examples in such large international centres as Alexandria, where marriages of Egyptians and foreigners are so numerous that they have ceased to be a problem of individual couples, and constitute a distinct social group.

That these mixed marriages are a growing trend, which is not viewed entirely with favour, is shown by the official attitude in some countries. The Government of Egypt discontinues the scholarship funds of a Moslem man who marries a foreign wife. The Iraq Government has a regulation that a member of the diplomatic service cannot be married while abroad without the consent of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Such regulations may effectively curtail the number of these mixed marriages. The significance of these marriages, however, is not numerical as the number after all is relatively negligible. But as a social trend they may be regarded as of some importance, in that they represent one attempt, however unsuccessful, to solve a widespread, fundamental problem in the Eastern world—the need for natural social relationships between young men and women, which may make possible marriage based on individual choice, and thus lay the basis for a more normal home life.

In Turkey where the discarding of the veil has removed the artificial social barriers, social life has developed very rapidly along Western lines. Contrary to what perhaps might have been expected, this period of swift transition from the old to the new social basis, has been remarkably free from extremes of social freedom. The younger generation has availed itself of the new social opportunity on the whole without a loss of moral poise. Mixed clubs, joint student activities, dancing and mixed recreation of all kinds, individual friendships and co-ordinate interests in business as well as joint social relationships have made life in the main cities of Turkey in the last decade increasingly like the social life of cities in Europe or America.

Of the complete transition from the old to the new social

life of Istanbul the tenth Anniversary Ball at Dolma Bagtche Palace was a brilliant example. Many of the Turkish women in evening gowns dancing in the brilliantly lighted ballroom must have smiled inwardly as they remembered the Turkish woman of the earlier day, stifled behind the veil, conscious that any movement out of her "gilded cage" would mean police interference. Memories of the old may have made the new experience seem strangely unreal. But for the foreign guest there was nothing to suggest the unusual. The crowds of Turkish men and women dancing together, intermingling at the buffet, promenading on the moonlit palace terrace, presented a brilliant modern scene which suggested, however, Europe and not the Near East. That it could not take place in any other city in the Moslem East to-day shows the social transition of Turkey in a decade. "We have crowded a century of progress in a decade" the slogan of the 1933 Anniversary Celebration was not an empty boast.

But it would be a superficial view of social change in Turkey not to realize the inherent difficulties in the new social freedom, even though a normal social atmosphere has been achieved in such a remarkably short time. Thoughtful Turkish leaders recognize the need to supplement the lack of social experience with sound teaching of the new social codes. The average home based on the old social background offers as yet very little opportunity for training in the new technique of social freedom. Although there are no longer restrictions against social relationships, adequate opportunities are still lacking, which would be comparable to the many channels for social expression in the home and civic life of the West. Completely rebuilding the social life of a nation on a new basis requires more than a decade but the leaders of Turkey give evidence of the skill and courage ample for the task.

CHAPTER V

THE LATER MARRIAGE AGE

NATURALLY related to the new ideal of marriage, which is determined by the choice of the individual and not the arrangement of parents, is the definite trend toward a later marriage age for girls. As long as a marriage is arranged by the parents, early marriage is entirely logical. The ideal of marriage by individual choice naturally necessitates a later marriage age. A definite evidence that such a change is taking place and also one of the causes for the change is the longer attendance of girls in schools to-day than that of five or ten years ago. Educators in small towns as well as cities throughout the East call attention to this fact. It may mean in some cases longer education in a primary school; in some, a secondary school; elsewhere, a college or university. But in each case, the extension of the period of girls' education registers very definitely the ascending curve of the marriage age.

Although there are no official statistics to show the contrast between the marriage age of the present and of a preceding period—the East does not have a penchant for statistics—a number of interesting studies have been made by some of the universities and health agencies in the East that throw light on this subject. These studies and frequent observations made by private individuals acquainted with social conditions show certain uniform trends in the Near East and the Middle East. In the upper classes, especially among the educated, the age of marriage tends to be higher than in the lower classes. In villages the marriage of girls takes place at an earlier age than in cities, probably because of less education and perhaps also because of the need for moral protection, since village life is so congested that there is little chance for privacy. This reason was suggested particularly in reference to Egypt by an authority on the fellaheen.

In centres noted for general social or religious conservatism, girls are married at an early age; as for example,

Luxor, Egypt; Hebron and Nablus in Palestine; Hama, Syria; Kadhimein, Iraq; and Meshed, Iran. This is also generally true among conservatives in India and in the lower class. The lack of Western contact probably accounts for the lower marriage age in towns or cities off the main highway than in cities fully exposed to modern social and educational influences. But even where public opinion opposes progress, there are said to be some slight indications of change.

In the larger cities there are interesting evidences of the effect of modern ideas on the old customs. I attended a wedding in Teheran in which the bride, a schoolgirl of fifteen in the American Mission School, was celebrating her marriage with a young student in London. The absence of the groom made little difference, however, as the bride's celebration was limited to women. The bride intended to continue in school for two years until the groom should return. Then the final ceremonies of the marriage would be consummated. The party carried out many of the old customs, but most of the guests were in European style of dress, many in evening gowns although it was an afternoon affair. The whole event was an interesting *mélange* of the old and new.

Throughout the East public opinion is a powerful determinant in establishing and maintaining the marriage age that is customary in a given community. Parents, especially mothers, are always afraid that the daughter's marriage chances will be jeopardized if postponed beyond the usual custom of the country, whatever that age may be, and are always relieved when the daughter is engaged and the dowry agreed upon. Mothers of the upper class as well as the simpler and poorer type suffer this anxiety to have the great event settled, for marriage is the pivotal fact of life for the Moslem girl, the subject of absorbing interest, I found, in every harem visit. Of many such visits I remember three especially in homes in Aleppo where the mothers discussed with me the necessity for the early marriage of their daughters. The mothers in the first two cases were deeply relieved that the daughters, one thirteen and the other fourteen years old, were already engaged, and the

problem settled. But the third mother was very anxious as her daughter was already fifteen, and hence she feared already too old to make a good match. This would affect the amount of the dowry. They had set 200 Syrian pounds originally as the sum for her dowry, but had decided to reduce it to 150. The longer they waited, the more difficult would be the marriage and the lower the dowry.

In a home of a very different type in Doulatabad, Iran, I found the marriage of a daughter of fifteen years again the major topic of the mother's conversation and her chief anxiety. It was the wealthiest family in Doulatabad. The son had just graduated from the American University of Beirut, but the charming daughter of fifteen had not been allowed to return to the Hamadan Mission School for girls, as the mother felt that a marriage should be arranged, or at least that the daughter should "sit at home" until time for marriage; otherwise there might be public criticism and the daughter's chances of a good marriage endangered. The conflict in ideas between the conservative mother and the educated son and eager young girl who longed for more education was typical of the changing ideas of marriage and education throughout the East to-day.

Visits in many Indian homes, in hospitals and schools, and conversations with many different types of people revealed a general advance in the marriage age of Moslem girls in India. Among the educated class under Western influence the average is eighteen or nineteen, or even older. According to an American missionary in Lucknow, who is in constant touch with Moslem women and with whom I visited many *zenanas*, the age of marriage for girls is undoubtedly changing. "Ten years ago," she said, "the average was probably sixteen, whereas now eighteen is a usual age or even older." This represents the class that has been affected by education. One of the members of the Age of Consent Commission, which studied the problem all over India in 1929, found that for the lower and middle class the age of marriage is much younger, but the average age of Moslems of the lower class as a whole is higher than that of Hindus of the same social level. The different sections of

India vary slightly, perhaps within a year or two as to the age of marriage for Moslem girls.¹ Visits with health visitors and at the Infant Welfare Clinics verified the fact of frequent cases of marriage at fifteen or under in the lower classes, the usual type under public health care. This class which represents the masses of India shows little or no change and will probably be only very slowly affected by education and a changing public opinion.

In a number of countries, as a re-enforcement to the power of educated public opinion, which, after all, is the most effective influence for social reform, legislation on the age of marriage has been passed. A notable example of such legislation is the Child Marriage Restraint Act in India, commonly known as the Sarda Act, which was passed April 1930.² By this Act the minimum marriage age for girls is set at fourteen, and for boys at eighteen. Preliminary to passing this Act, a remarkable referendum of public opinion in India was made under the Government by the Age of Consent Commission (1928). This Commission, on which there were two women members, an English doctor and a prominent Hindu, travelled widely and felt the pulse of all India, gathering evidence from all classes and all religious faiths—from those educated in Western thought and those speaking only the vernacular, men and women, especially purdah women. The report, which is a mass of authoritative fact, shows conclusively that India has awakened to the menace of child marriage. Opposition to the new Bill came only from men. Women, some only just out of purdah, fearlessly registered their protest against child marriage and urged legislation. Against such a current of public opinion the opposition in the Legislative Assembly fought a losing battle. Every attempt at postponement or amendment was lost. Mohammedan opposition was par-

¹ The Report of the Age of Consent Commission states that the early marriage age applies to about thirty-seven per cent of the Moslems. The Hartog Education Commission Report (Simon Commission) records 1½ million Moslem girls out of a total of 8½ million Indian girls married before the age of fifteen.

² The Child Marriage Restraint Act was proposed and vigorously promoted by Rai Harbilas Sarda Bahadur; hence it is called the Sarda Act.

ticularly strong not because the regulation of child marriage primarily affected the practice of the Moslem community, but because social legislation challenges the validity of the Sharia, which is the social as well as the religious law. Although child marriage is more prevalent among Hindus than Moslems, the latter community is more widely affected by the new law than is generally supposed.

Just what effect the Sarda Act has had as yet on the child marriage problem it is difficult to say. Immediately preceding the date when the Act went into force, thousands of child marriages were performed. Since the Act became operative undoubtedly thousands of violations have occurred. The Act as it stands is ineffective since it does not provide adequate means of enforcement. The strengthening of the Sarda Act is, therefore, to-day one of the major drives of the All-India Women's Conference. The provincial branches of the All-India Conference have aggressively promoted enforcement. The national conference at Karachi in 1935 assumed as a major objective the improvement of the Sarda Act. To that end it has circularized the legislative body with a petition, urging, as a matter of life and death to thousands of little girls, the amendment of the Sarda Act, which would empower magistrates to prevent child marriages, to make them null and void, if performed, to provide for the care of the child bride or groom, and punish all parties responsible for the marriage. The continued aggressive agitation of the All-India Women's Conference, January 1936, at Trivandrum for the improvement of the provisions of the Sarda Act and its enforcement shows the awakened interest of Indian women in social reforms.

Opinion as to the value of the Sarda Act is divided. Some thoughtful English observers in India express the opinion that because of its utter ineffectiveness, its influence has not only been nil in reforming a social evil, but has been positively detrimental in that it has created a disrespect for law. This reminds one incidentally of the argument for the repeal of the Volsted Act in the United States. By others, familiar with the conditions in India, the Sarda Act, however ineffectively it may be administered, is considered a significant sign of progress, in that it establishes a goal of

social reform and gives support to an enlightened minority. It may also have significance as an example for other Eastern countries.

Legislation on the marriage age elsewhere in the East has not had such vital and widespread significance, although in some countries the subject has aroused increasing interest. In Egypt in 1923 the minimum age for girls was fixed at sixteen, for boys at eighteen. This legislation is far from effective, the great difficulty being the lack of accurate birth statistics. The Feminist Union has carried on an active campaign for this marriage law, and has energetically promoted law enforcement, advocating the urgency of compulsory birth registration. Palestine has no marriage law but a distinct tendency to promote the higher marriage age is seen in the regulations of the Grand Mufti. These follow in general the custom established by the Family Law under the former Turkish régime, which set seventeen as the age for girls and eighteen for boys, but allowed many exceptions made by the Kadi. The Supreme Moslem Council has recently made eighteen and twenty the marriage ages of girls and boys respectively and is giving more attention to the enforcement of this regulation. Although the general rule has many exceptions which are easily made, this regulation since it emanates from the highest religious authority is having some effect on Moslem public opinion. Cases are frequently referred to the Supreme Moslem Council by people interested in social welfare, by school teachers and others.

In this connection the comment of a Moslem doctor in Jaffa was interesting, to the effect that this regulation was regarded by the common people as practically a law, and hence, was followed to a large degree. For a marriage a document from the sheikh is necessary showing the age. If there is no birth certificate, then a certificate from a doctor as to age is required. A health certificate is also necessary and an examination for certain diseases, a regulation to which the better class object. The lower class, however, regard religious authority as equivalent to law. A very active Government welfare programme is carried on in Palestine, which constitutes a more positive official force for

the regulation of early marriage and general welfare than exists in any other country of the East. Using the Grand Mufti and the Supreme Moslem Council as an effective instrument for reform, the official health agencies are creating a public opinion against early marriage, and is, thus, effectively pushing up the marriage age.

Neither Syria nor Iraq has a definite force, legal or otherwise, promoting later marriage for girls, but in Beirut the very strong foreign influence and the educated public opinion definitely tend to advance the age of marriage. In 1933 Iran introduced a marriage age law, setting the age of girls at sixteen and for boys at eighteen, but the regulation was practically invalidated by the exception that allows for an earlier marriage age in case physical maturity could be attested by a sanitary certificate from a proper medical authority. The Parliament has approved some revision of the marriage law, which proposes eighteen as the legal marriage age for boys and sixteen for girls, no girl to be married under sixteen without her parents' consent. Where exceptions are allowed, the minimum age for boys is to be fifteen, and girls thirteen.

Although the strong opposition to the marriage legislation in 1931 in Iran prevented essential reform, the law is important because it evoked a widespread expression of enlightened public opinion. Certain progressive newspapers focussed special attention on the need for reform in the disparity of marriage between child brides and elderly men which was cited as "not an infrequent occurrence." The primary significance of the marriage law in Iran, as in all Moslem countries, is the fact that it represents the first legal attempt to change the Islamic law.

Turkey presented a striking contrast to the rest of the Moslem world in her drastic repudiation of the authority of Islamic law when she adopted the Swiss Civil Code (October 1926). This Code established the legal age of marriage for girls at seventeen and for boys at eighteen years of age. As far as cities were concerned, the new law did not represent a special advance since the prevailing city age of marriage in the educated classes for a number of years had been over sixteen. The Swiss Code thus merely confirmed

for the upper class the already marked upward trend. But for the Anatolian towns and villages the Swiss Code is a definite reform. The prevailing age of marriage for girls in the Interior previously was between twelve and fourteen, although here also a trend upward had begun. The new Turkish law allows for special exceptions; the civil marriage authority with the parents' consent may declare a girl of sixteen years capable of contracting marriage. Obviously rigid enforcement of the marriage age is not possible, especially in the Interior, as the inaccuracy or lack of birth registrations and the willingness of officials to waive the law make possible a good deal of laxity in its application. But the spread of education plus the needed reforms in registration should lead eventually to more complete law enforcement even in the less advanced areas.

An interesting marriage trend in Turkey, which is quite independent of the new legislation, is the fact that since 1925 there has been quite a definite number of marriages of young women between nineteen and twenty-four years of age, a fair number over twenty-four and some over thirty. Although there are no statistics to show the extent of change this represents, it is undoubtedly a new trend, which, it seems logical to assume, is related to the general education of women. Social equality, educational advantages and economic opportunity have doubtless postponed marriage for girls and also may tend to present marriage as an alternative rather than as the only career for women, which has always been the prevailing idea in the East.

A brief view of the situation in regard to the marriage age of girls in the Moslem world leaves the cumulative impression of a very distinct trend toward a later age. The constant features in this process of change in different countries are that the upper class shows uniformly a higher age and a more rapid rate of change, the lower classes both in town and country show an earlier marriage age, but especially the rural population, where there is only gradual change. The difference in the average marriage age prevailing in different countries seems to be in direct ratio to the degree of education and foreign contact. In certain countries the

increased marriage age is being stabilized by marriage legislation; in all countries of the East enlightened public opinion has been awakened to the necessity of giving girls an opportunity for fuller physical and mental development before marriage.

CHAPTER VI

FAMILY LIFE, OLD AND NEW

IN the modernization of the East, one of the most fundamental changes taking place is the transformation in family life. The patriarchal system, characteristic of the East, is being replaced by the small independent family unit of the West. In some countries this change in the foundations of family life has scarcely begun; in others, it is already clearly defined. Apparently it is an inevitable result of the re-fashioning of Eastern life in other respects along modern lines; the same forces which are leading away from the veil and polygamy are also ushering in a new ideal of home life.

There is no more potent factor in this process than the influence of modern education. "I cannot go back to my old life in our large family. I have my own profession and must earn my own living. It may not be possible in the same town, but even if it is in the same town, I will have my own home. What satisfies my father would no longer satisfy me." This is a typical expression of the educated young man in the East to-day, whether a Syrian or an Egyptian, an Indian or an Iraqi; for all alike agree that education, quite independently of any economic consideration, leads to the individual family idea. Modern education creates a dissatisfaction with the old system and demands a more individual type of living than is possible according to the old idea that when you marry, you marry a family. Moreover the joint family represents the concept of a divided society, which no longer meets the needs of the younger generation of educated men and women.

Visits to some of the old patriarchal homes in the East have left in my mind a vivid impression of the typical Oriental pattern of life, which already in some parts of the East belongs to a passing era. Each home of this type contained within its spacious courtyards a large community of sons with their wives and families, and many relatives, some of distant kinship, but all supported from a common

purse and under the control of the head of the family. This large community was divided into two distinct worlds—the world of men and that of women. As a guest I was often entertained by the men's group, which assumed the full honours of Eastern hospitality. Sometimes while dining I was conscious of being observed by someone not supposed to be seen, who was lifting a curtain to catch a glimpse of the strange visitor and carry word back to the harem. The separation of men and women was complete. Each group had its own distinctive social life. Each group dined apart and each had its own servants; if a family of strict conservatism, only women served in the women's quarter for no men could enter the harem. The children formed the link between these two worlds, especially the young sons who shuttled back and forth between the men's and women's quarters, the object of much affection from both. But there was little or no provision for the needs of children—no toys, nor books, nor games of childhood.

In visiting the harem and talking with the women I always had the impression that life had no meaning save marriage and marriage meant only children. The same questions, "How old are you, where is your husband, how many children have you?" which always prefaced every conversation, showed the singleness of focus in the harem life. The answers to this initial barrage always brought forth astonishment and sympathy and also assured a lively conversation of differences between the East and West. In these harem conversations the mother-in-law dominated; the young wife sat silently. I realized that she would have to wait patiently until the time came when she too could exercise her prerogatives as a mother-in-law. It was obvious that the harem was not without the diversions and endless little excitements—the gossip of brides and dowries and jewels, of births and midwives, of co-wives and divorce. There were tales of intrigue for favour and petty jealousies within the world behind the walls and there was often evidence of the sacrificial service of the women for each other living in their world apart. The quality of this harem life, of which I caught many glimpses, differed greatly between the spacious seclusion of the wealthy and the

crowded one-courtyard woman's quarter with little light or air, characteristic of the poorer home. The same motif of seclusion, however, controlled the details of each home whether of high or low degree. All these details made a common pattern. Granted early marriage, polygamy, and segregation of women, this type of home life seemed entirely logical. Marriage and the home representing the intimate companionship of the small family unit, husband, wife and children, was a foreign idea.

The Moslem woman still behind the veil would have been lonely in a "shut-in" individual home. The harem, at least to a certain extent, satisfied her social needs. The collective life meant mutual aid, as each helped the other. The child-bride would have been not only lonely but utterly helpless, by herself in a home of her own. For her the régime of the mother-in-law was a necessity, although I could see that it was often a source of tragic unhappiness. Even the lack of privacy in such a common life was natural, as the life of all was centred in a few major interests which all shared. But as the life of women moves away from the idea of seclusion, and modern education creates new desires and offers preparation for normal creative living, the segregated harem life of the old stereotype becomes impossible. From many visits to Oriental homes of widely different social and economic strata, the net impression therefore was always the same—the inevitability of change after modern influences have entered such an environment. For the educated young married couple, adjustment to the old divided home life is all but impossible. Education in its steady development away from the old customs of a Moslem social system has undermined the old family idea and set up an entirely new design for living.

This shifting of standards of family life is, however, not accomplished by the younger generation without strain. The forces of conservatism are strong and unyielding in their insistence on the patriarchal form of society. The desire for a different basis of living in harmony with a modern social conception very often meets with opposition. The separation of a large family into its smaller units is regarded as a reflection on the family, almost a disgrace. An interesting

illustration of this came to my attention in Doulatabad in a visit to an attractive young woman who had just moved into her own house. With great difficulty she had been able to realize her deep desire to establish her independent home. The husband, because economically dependent on the father, had not been able to change the situation, although also very eager for the separate home. Finally a legacy to the wife brought the solution. They had just moved into an entirely different section of the town from his father's home. This caused a great stir and much talk. If they had not been financially independent, it would have been utterly impossible. There was a note of deep satisfaction as the young wife narrated her triumph. It was interesting that this first pioneering effort was being followed by others in the same town but only on a half-way basis; some were establishing separate homes in the same compound, or perhaps with a separate garden, but with adjoining walls. Both stages represent a great advance over the old idea of a common kitchen and reception rooms, if a large household, with the mother-in-law always in charge of the whole establishment and the sons with their wives merely having their own rooms.

Sometimes the half-way stage between the old parental control and administration of the home and the new freedom in living is encouraged rather than opposed by a wise parent. A wealthy Begum in India with three sons in an English university discussed with me the problem of her sons' marriages. She feared that on their return to India after a long absence, it would be difficult for them to adjust to the old customs. She had, therefore, built a handsome new house in the same compound, which she proudly showed me. The spacious separate building with its three independent suites for the three sons and their brides represented in her mind a very modern idea, when she remembered her own married life of complete dependence under the ever-watchful eye of her mother-in-law. But the new plan provided only partial independence, as it had the old idea of parental supervision and economic dependence.

Not all adventures in a new type of living are as happily

conditioned. Some lead to serious difficulty. During a call in Jerusalem in a rather conservative middle-class family, the main topic of conversation was a divorce which had recently occurred because the wife had tried to insist on a separate home. The husband because of the economic question was not willing to break away from his family. Another attempt at an independent home which the group discussed had proved more successful. A young couple against the family's wish had established its own home. This had roused much opposition, but after a time the husband's family had been reconciled to the new idea.

The thought of the separate home seemed to be rather new in this particular circle of society in Palestine, whereas in some places the establishment of separate homes has become quite the accepted thing. In Baghdad for example there is a marked trend toward individual living. It has begun to be customary for the graduates of the secondary school, who are mostly of the middle class, to want their own homes. This group, since less bound by tradition, money or family prestige, than the upper class, is freer to break away from the old custom of living. In connection with this trend toward individual homes, it is interesting to note also the tendency to build homes outside the crowded narrow streets of Baghdad—along the river bank, where the air is freer from the binding social conventions of the city. These independent homes make possible a much higher level of living, as one of the young Baghdad Government officials explained. "It isn't a matter of money but ideas," he said. "We can pay more attention to hygiene and sanitation and be more sure that our children will live, if we have our own home. My father has plenty of money, but is conservative and opposes new ideas."

This appreciation of the value of the individual home and the need to break away from the larger group has naturally grown along with the differentiation in professions and economic pursuits, which makes it possible for this desire to be realized. The young Indian whom I met on the ship to India is a typical illustration. He was returning to India after some months in England where he had been

preparing to take a position as representative of an English firm, selling Frigidaire installations. He explained that he could have remained under the family roof-tree, supported by the family. But he preferred having his own work and his independent home. Moreover, his educated young wife was too unhappy and not free in the life with the whole family.

In this shifting of family life from the old collective type to the individual home, the educated wife, as in this illustration, is often the determining factor in change, since she is able to create the setting for an individual standard of life. Moreover, her adherence to the old plan of life is all but impossible. A radical change in the type of home seems less likely to occur if the decision is dependent entirely on the initiative of the husband. The fact that the educated man alone has not produced a widespread change in standards of living and family life was constantly borne in upon me. Often I found in various countries, but most strikingly in India, a highly educated, cultivated Moslem man, perhaps with an Oxford degree, occupying an important Government post and thus mingling freely in Western society, who had a family living behind the purdah entirely in Oriental fashion. The wife was illiterate and sometimes the daughter perhaps was not in school. The contrast was so striking it seems hard to understand. And yet the reasons may not be far to seek.

With an uneducated elderly wife the change in living standards is practically impossible, both because of the difficulty involved in her readjustment and because of the inherent conservatism of the uneducated older woman. If there is more than one wife, the shift in standards is even more impossible. Furthermore, the husband's mother will probably be opposed to change and can successfully block it, as the mother is a dominant force in the Indian home. Many major decisions in the man's life are conditioned by his mother's consent. There may be other reasons why the educated man does not insist on a home in harmony with his own degree of advance.

The urge to change may not be compelling for a man, because the weight of the old social system does not bear

down as heavily on the educated man as it does on an educated woman. His freedom is not curtailed by his type of life, for his life is merely divided into two compartments, both of which he controls. He leads an independent outside life which constitutes his major living, and the life spent inside his home and *zenana* after all is a small proportion of his time. The communal system of home life, moreover, gives him greater freedom as far as social responsibilities are concerned, aside from any economic considerations. It also relieves him of the full responsibility for his own family, which is less in a large group than if living in an individual home. A more individual type of home might mean greater freedom for the wife and with freedom might come new demands. Hence, for all of these reasons some men may feel there is a certain measure of wisdom in "letting well enough alone" and not modifying the basis of family life.

From these various considerations one may perhaps understand the reason why educated men of the older generation are not always able, or do not have a compelling urge, to modernize their family life. It is therefore the more remarkable, as has been pointed out in a previous chapter, when the change is made from the older type of living and one finds an elderly woman who has only recently discarded the *purdah*, presiding over a home of a modern style, even though her whole technique of living was formed on the basis of social segregation. But such a break with the past is only possible if the wife has the right background and a sufficient urge to make the difficult adjustment. The responsibility for change rests, therefore, very largely with the wife.

In the younger as well as the older generation, the educated man with an under-privileged wife very often follows the line of least resistance and accepts the established system with all of its social limitations. Often educated young Moslem men deplore the incompleteness of the divided life of Moslem society, but they do not seem strong enough alone to overcome the inertia of the *status quo* or combat the opposition. As long as the dualism of an educated manhood and an uneducated womanhood in the East persists, the dual family life will be the prevailing standard.

Only when the husband and wife share the same ideals of marriage and the home will there be the possibility for fundamental change.

This possibility for change depends, it seems, very largely on the influence of the educated wife. Since it is far more difficult for the educated wife than for the husband to make the adjustment to the old social order, her desire for change is more compelling. She cannot step in and out of the frame of the established Eastern system; her life is an integrated process. Her education, which has led her toward creative independence of thought, has unfitted her for such a limited life. She demands more privacy than the community life of the harem affords, for although the harem means segregation it is by no means private. Moreover for the modern young bride the watchful guidance of the conservative mother-in-law, however kindly and well-intentioned, produces constant inner conflict of ideals. The social chasm between the educated Moslem girl of to-day with the older generation of her family is more than the usual social cleavage between youth and age everywhere. It represents a difference, not merely of decades but of centuries. As one young Moslem girl said: "Our ideas about everything are different from those of our parents, whether it is a question of bathing and feeding the baby regularly or discarding the veil."

Constant adaptation to such a totally divergent way of life, therefore, presents an almost impossible problem. It means either sacrificing the results of an education with all of its new ideals or a constant conflict with the totally different ideals of the larger group. "We can't live happily with our parents as women used to do," an educated woman in Cairo explained to me in discussing her home life, "educated women want their own homes and a private life. Our marriage to-day must be on a different basis from that of the past." The truth of her statement is obvious. The development of a normal family life is scarcely possible under the surveillance of a large family group in an atmosphere of watchful conservatism. The present generation of educated young men and women in the East is building a new social ideal. This can be done successfully only in their

own homes, which afford full freedom for ventures in creative living.

In this shifting of types of home and family life there is an interplay of social and economic forces. Social conservatism of the older generation tends to stabilize the existing system; new educational and social ideals of the younger generation furnish the main dynamic force for change. Economic conditions in some countries retard the establishment of the individual home; in other countries the economic pressure of modern life becomes the determinant of social change. For example, in Egypt the joint family system still prevails in the wealthy upper class, probably not because of social conservatism, but because the wealth of Egypt is centred in large estates. The whole family in its widest sense depends upon a common purse. The sons are financially dependent and remain within the large patriarchal home. A certain number of the younger generation doubtless prefers to assume the financial responsibility for their own immediate family and establish an independent home, but this is a minority. The economic factor tends to maintain the old system in Egypt.

In other places where the central sources of family income have declined and the various members must assume their share of financial responsibility, naturally differentiation in economic pursuits follows with the result that the sons establish homes on the individual basis. The economic factor therefore often plays its part in changing the family life in the East from that of a large group under one roof-tree to the small intimate family.

Economic forces also affect this problem of the transfer in modes of living from the old to the new in another way. The insistent influx of the material goods of the West into the East, and the whole effect of economic penetration, is undermining the simplicity of Eastern life. As long as life in the East remained on a self-contained Oriental level with all of the members of the group on the same general level of economic requirements, the success of the joint family system was assured. The common purse supplied the common desires of the group, the same general types of clothing and food, furniture and amusements. Such a

centralized administration is an effective home economy. Under such conditions the collective family system of the East has persisted with little change through the centuries. But the increasing exposure of the East to modern life has introduced new standards of living. Life has become steadily more complex; the needs and the desires of the different members of the large family group have become differentiated. European fashions and new demands have entered the harem. The old simplicity and uniformity of needs has given place to the complex and diversified demands of modern life. The communal type of life based on the common level of desire of a whole group cannot meet the modern economic strain. The whole system of living must therefore be readjusted to fit the new situation.

This readjustment of the old and new systems of living has reached varying stages in different parts of the East, according to the relative interplay of economic and social forces. In Turkey this change in the basis of family life seems most complete. How fully the old has given place to the new in modern Turkey, especially in Istanbul and Ankara, one can judge by the increase of new apartments, some of them the latest word in modernistic architecture. In many of the cities of the Interior also the individual home is generally speaking now the established pattern. But changes in styles of living are not, of course, effected by legislation and undoubtedly in some places, due to social and economic reasons, the old-style spacious living in the larger group still lingers. These homes seem, however, out of the main current of modern Turkish life.

It would be a mistake, however, to think that the transition in Turkey from the former large-scale style of life to the individual home dates only from the new régime. Before the new Republic the same transition that is taking place elsewhere in the Moslem East to-day had already begun in Turkey due to a combination of economic and social causes. The possibility and desirability of the patriarchal style of living had already passed. With the new social revolution the individual home has of course become the entirely logical social pattern. The new freedom of women and the modernization of Turkish life would make any other type

of living an anachronism. The difference between Turkey and other parts of the Moslem East in this respect, as in others, is apparent. The same general trend which is noticeable in more or less degree throughout the East has been accelerated in Turkey and home and family life are being more rapidly refashioned on a new pattern.

CHAPTER VII

TRENDS CONCERNING POLYGAMY AND DIVORCE

"EVERYONE protests now against something which used to be considered quite respectable. My father, when quite an elderly man, married a young wife, and no one questioned it," was the conclusive statement of Esma Khanum, an elderly leader of Baghdad, apropos of a lively discussion on polygamy that had been carried on over the teacups in an exclusive harem circle. The immediate reason for the interest in the subject was a second marriage that had just taken place in upper-class Baghdad society. The husband who belonged to a very good family had married a second wife from Damascus, more "chic" and younger than the first wife. The reason for the marriage was not the lack of a son by his first wife, but apparently merely the fact that the husband had grown tired of his rather stodgy middle-aged wife, and had been attracted to the younger woman. The feminine circle of Baghdad was stirred with indignation. The second wife, evidently a very wise woman, conscious of the delicacy of her position, was remaining quietly in the background. The husband had settled the first wife in another house with exactly the same furniture. The word "exactly" was amplified in minute detail by the gossip of the harem. He had made absolutely equal provision, thus fulfilling the letter of the Koranic law to treat all wives alike. But even so, the first wife's friends were not satisfied.

This conversation reveals clearly the new attitude toward polygamy and the present trend toward its decline among the upper classes throughout the East to-day. Enlightened public opinion, whether in Iraq or Iran, Egypt or India, is decidedly against polygamy. The social studies made by classes in the American Universities in Beirut and Cairo which have been mentioned in reference to the changing marriage age, show the comparatively small percentage of from ten to fifteen per cent of families that practise polygamy. This represents the parent, not the student generation,

which it is fair to assume would be less. These two universities draw students from a wide area, and may be regarded as giving a fair cross-section of the educated upper, or upper middle class of Moslem society where public opinion is militating against polygamy. In some countries, for example, Iran, the trend may not be as apparent as in others, but one can safely generalize that the plural marriage to-day is tabooed in better-class society. The fact that polygamy is no longer *comme il faut* is a powerful leverage for reform. Self-respect craves public approval and shrinks from criticism. Under the pressure of adverse public criticism polygamy will steadily decline.

Repeatedly the writer has heard the verse from the Koran quoted, "Of other women who seem good in your eyes, marry but two or three or four; and if you still fear that you shall not act equitably, then one only." This is explained as meaning that Mohammed knew that no man would treat four wives equally; hence, he took this clever way of forbidding polygamy without antagonizing the people. Regardless of the validity of the argument, the fact that it is frequently made is very significant. It indicates that the modern Moslem who still adheres to Islam realizes that enlightened opinion is against polygamy. True to the Koran but accepting the modern standard which repudiates polygamy, he seeks, by his interpretation of the Koran, to effect a reconciliation between the two apparently contradictory points of view.

This pressure of progressive public opinion against polygamy, which is acting as a powerful factor in reducing the practice, is due undoubtedly, as are other lines of advance, to the influence of modern education and the exposure to modern ideas through Western contact. The educated young man cannot accept as satisfactory the polygamous marriage with its endless bickering and division and its total lack of home life and companionship. As a result of modern education and contact with the West, he has a different conception of marriage and family life, and demands an educated wife as a companion. But an educated wife precludes the idea of polygamy. The dissatisfaction with the old divided idea of married life and the desire for an entirely different

standard, these two dominant trends of thought in the Moslem East to-day due to modern education, are bound to undermine polygamy in the educated upper class.

Not only education but the economic factor plays an important role against polygamy, as a young Damascus doctor said, "I hesitate to marry one wife for fear I may not be able to support her adequately and educate my children. How could I think of marrying more than one? Of course, I wouldn't practise polygamy anyway, because it isn't done among educated people, but even if I wanted to do so, I couldn't because of the high cost of living." The economic factor acts as a deterrent against polygamy quite generally also among the middle class which is also increasingly affected by public opinion or education. The greater expense of living, the multiplication of demands constantly stimulated by Western economic penetration, the adoption of a more modern type of living—all these forces tend to decrease polygamy. Although the higher standard of living along certain lines may affect more especially the educated group, as is shown by the demand for bathtubs, and the increase in furniture, and household accessories, the life of the middle class is also becoming more complex through an increase in wants—the cinema and travel, the change in styles which makes a double establishment for rival wives increasingly difficult. The only security for the success of polygamy was the isolation of the harem. When it becomes impossible to provide separate quarters for the different wives, then polygamy begins to disappear.

Although in city and town life in the middle and upper classes, polygamy seems to be eventually doomed on economic grounds, it is surprising that among the poorer classes, in spite of their low economic level, polygamy often persists. It is, however, perhaps not strange since economic home planning is not a main consideration in the East. Polygamy, just as *purdah*, may be continued because of the idea that having more than one wife adds prestige. Whenever a man can afford it, therefore, he has more than one wife. Moreover the life of the poorer class has been less affected than has the life of the middle and upper classes by increased demands, and therefore an increase in the cost of living.

The level of the lower class is often already too near the margin of mere existence to register any change. Furthermore ignorance and conservatism are the constant factors in his life which determine for him the survival of retrogressive social practices such as polygamy. Thus by the irony of fate those who need the change most may be the last to be affected.

As far as the rural classes are concerned, the economic factor usually makes polygamy an asset rather than a liability. Even though the cost of living has increased, which for example for the Egyptian fellaheen some time ago was estimated at two piastres a day for two wives, and is now double that amount, the extra expense for the additional wife is probably still justified by the amount of labour she performs. If the initial marriage cost of wives increases from one cow to two, then polygamy may begin to decline. But if the yearly crops are good and the price of animals high, polygamy may increase. On the whole, polygamy may be regarded as an economic asset by the peasants of Asia and continues to be an established and entirely respectable practice.

Among the Bedouins, the sheikh always has more than one wife. The roaming tribal chief prides himself on the number of his wives just as on the number of his camels. To have only one wife would mean a loss in prestige. For the poorer Bedouin therefore more than one wife is a sign of distinction as well as an economic asset. It is natural that polygamy should persist on the desert, as this was the atmosphere in which the custom originated and the Bedouin has been little changed for hundreds of years. But changes are coming slowly in desert life as the nomadic Bedouin becomes semi-nomadic. I had a chance to observe the fact that semi-nomadic Bedouins to-day are beginning to curtail the number of their wives. On a visit with Sheikh Bani Hassan to his tribal centre about fifty miles from Baghdad, the sheikh discussed the number of his wives and explained that whereas his father had many more wives than he had, and, in fact, he himself might be expected to have more than four, he considered that this number was sufficient. This, I judged, was not a question of economy or of public opinion, but doubtless more the general result of the contact

with civilization that had been made very easy by his Ford car, in which he could rattle across the desert to Baghdad for a day's exposure to the news of the coffee-house and the bazaar, a dissipation far less frequent when the journey to the city had to be made by camel or on foot.

Aside from the main trends in regard to polygamy that are characteristic of the Moslem East as a whole, there are certain distinctive phases of the situation in different countries worthy of mention. In India, where the adherence to the customs of Islam tend to be more tenacious than in other countries, the extent and rigidity of the purdah, the earlier marriage age, the greater prevalence of polygamy are all evidence of the almost unquestioned power of tradition in Moslem social life. The decrease in polygamy among the educated class is evident as elsewhere, but there is perhaps less evidence of change in other classes. The responsibility for all Moslem reform falls, therefore, more heavily on the small educated minority of active men and women leaders.

The problem of polygamy in Iran is more serious than in any other Moslem country as it appears there in the double form; regular and temporary marriage as it is called, or the degree wives and the temporary wives. Temporary marriage, which is a much looser relationship than regular polygamy, is freely sanctioned by certain sects of Islam, and allows a marriage relationship to be assumed for any specified time from an hour to ninety-nine years. As the temporary marriage has no provision for divorce, temporary wives are without legal protection and on a lower status than regular wives. An ex-temporary wife usually contracts another temporary marriage in a descending scale of desirability, since her marriage value is decreased by this loose form of marriage. As temporary marriage is practically concubinage, the shift into prostitution from the temporary marriage is very common. Over seventy-five per cent of temporary wives, it is estimated, become prostitutes. Temporary marriages have evidently been practised among the higher class, as one occasionally meets a daughter of a temporary marriage in good society in Teheran. But to-day temporary marriage is condemned by public opinion in

Teheran and more rare among the upper class than regular polygamy, which, however, also is on the decline in Iran as elsewhere. In the lower classes in Teheran, according to the opinion of several Teheran physicians closely in touch with the situation, regular polygamy seems to be decreasing but the temporary marriage is quite prevalent, in a way replacing for economic reasons plural marriage on the regular basis.

The students in Alborz College, the American institution in Teheran, in studying the question of polygamy, report that throughout Iran there is evidence of a decrease, and that where polygamy is found it is in the father's not in the son's generation. By all thoughtful Iranians temporary marriage is regarded as the curse of Iran. Agitation against it has begun. Women are beginning in the Press to voice their condemnation of this evil which is undermining Iranian society. Youth is especially outspoken in its demands that it should be abolished. A graduating address against temporary marriage which was delivered recently by an Iranian girl from the American School for Girls created a great deal of public comment.

The new marriage law in Iran has not directly attacked polygamy but has stipulated that before contracting a marriage, the man must reveal whether he has other wives. Misrepresentation entitles the wife to cancel the marriage. The law further requires registration of temporary marriage, which represents an advance step, although by the progressives, the law is decried as being too hesitant. It may have a deterrent effect, since educated young men will hesitate to register, because of the strong public opinion against temporary marriage. An interesting argument is advanced in the Press by a modern Apologist of Islam that polygamy should be denied to all but the clergy, because it would be impossible for a layman to follow the Prophet's requirement of absolute equality for all wives. Only the clergy "in the light of their erudition and spiritual competence" could meet the Prophet's conditions.

Polygamy and especially temporary marriage are justified by the conservatives on the basis that both are preferable to prostitution as it exists in the West, since each recognizes

the rights of children born of a temporary marriage. Moreover, it is claimed that either prostitution or temporary marriage must be recognized as a necessary provision for the gratification of human desire. Since prostitution is the greater evil, the writer of this article in the Press urges "that the law should authorize both permanent and transient marriage in order that prostitution, which is making rapid progress in an ignominious way, should be stopped." It is usually admitted that there is an increase in prostitution in the East; young men in Eastern cities intrigued with cabaret life have their special mistresses, with an independent establishment. This type of young man instead of having two wives adopts what is considered to be a more modern idea. Evidently the growing contact of the East with the West in the post-war period seems to have been attended not only by an increase in motor cars, cinemas, the spread of modern education and higher health standards but also in some parts of the East by an increase in some social evils.

In the new law in Egypt (May 11, 1928) polygamy is very lightly touched in limiting polygamy to those who can live on good terms and care for "the family they already have charge of." This in no way runs counter to the teaching of the Koran and still makes polygamy permissible. Of course, there is a certain significance of change in the mere mention of a privilege which has always been taken for granted.

Moreover there are definite evidences of a change in the public attitude toward polygamy in Egypt. A striking illustration is the lecture given in the American University of Cairo in December 1935 by Madame Sharawi Pasha on the position of women. In this she emphasized the necessity for the restriction or abolition of polygamy. Scarcely was the word "polygamy" uttered before two white-turbaned sheikhs from El Azhar, of whom there were many in the audience, rose and shouted in protest "Long live polygamy," expecting the crowd to reverberate the answer "Long live polygamy," but there were no reverberations. Then they called out "Long live the law of Islam" and a few supporters repeated their shout. But it was evident that the crowd was with the speaker, not with the sheikhs, so that soon the

disturbance died down and Madame Sharawi continued. Such a challenge to Moslem law and custom would not have been accepted quietly a few years ago. Nor would it of course have been made by a Moslem woman at that time. But not only was this address received with enthusiasm in the university gathering, but was printed in full in a leading newspaper and thus widely circulated through the Arabic-speaking world.

In Turkey, as in Egypt, enlightened public opinion has repudiated polygamy. But Turkey has gone further than Egypt by reinforcing public opinion through legislation. The abolition of polygamy was regarded as one of the most important reforms to be effected by the adoption of the Swiss Code. Since polygamy was recognized as one of the most controversial issues, discussion of this and other danger-points was safeguarded by adopting the Swiss Code *en bloc*. "We could not afford to take chances on losing such a crucial reform" was the comment of Mahmud Essad Bey, the Minister of Justice, in 1926, who actively promoted this reform.

Before the new code was adopted, however, polygamy had already fallen into desuetude in Istanbul and other cities as cases were exceedingly rare, practically non-existent save in the older generation. It was, however, common in the Interior among the rural population. Regardless of the fact, however, as to whether polygamy was a common practice or not, the legal existence of polygamy was regarded as an affront to the position of women, a poison to society. Early in the days of the New Republic a mass meeting of five hundred Turkish women, headed by Halidé Edib and Bayan Nakiye, drew up a formal protest against polygamy with other social evils, demanding legal action. This vigorous expression of woman's opinion may not have been needed as a coercive measure since the new Government recognized the need of modernizing the State by adopting a modern code.

It is obvious that the legal abolition of polygamy could not entirely eradicate the practice in Turkey. The law was not made retroactive. Hence, the previous cases in the Interior and elsewhere still exist. Moreover, the law is

doubtless being constantly violated, since a certain number of the conservatives in the Interior still consider that the religious law holds. But since the marriage is not legally recognized and the second wife has no legal rights, her children pay the penalty. The problem of illegitimacy therefore comes as the inevitable result of the new law. The fact however that the second wife has no rights is probably a deterrent against the continued illegal practice of polygamy. The net benefit of the law is that the scales are weighted in favour of progress. A family is no longer under the necessity of giving the daughter in a second marriage under pressure of personal or family obligations. The essential thing is that polygamy as a recognized institution of Turkish society has been abolished.

As far as women are concerned the abolition of polygamy is the most important feature of the new code, and the most signal social advance under the new régime, since this definitely repudiates the traditional position of social inferiority of women. The news of the abolition of polygamy in Turkey by law has been received by Moslem women in other countries with deepest interest. Some doubtless anticipate the same advance. Others have less hope, but patiently accept their social handicaps. The attitude of women towards polygamy has been and will continue to be one of passive acquiescence to what has always been regarded as their *kismet*—and still is for the uneducated majority. Lack of sons or sterility they realize are the inevitable causes for the husband's second or third marriage. Every woman recognizes also the possibility of a co-wife, if the husband merely feels a desire for a change. The great majority have met their fate philosophically, since there was no other course possible; they have had no voice and no choice. But although acquiescing in their fate, Moslem women without exception condemn polygamy. In countless conversations with women of all types and all classes, highly educated leaders, secluded women behind the veil, princesses and simple peasant women, I have heard always the endless refrain of repudiation against the inequality and injustice of polygamy and have felt the heart-ache and insecurity of married women living under its shadow.

The masses of Moslem women will not be able to voice any protest or effect any change but conditions, primarily economic, are slowly altering the situation for them. For the educated few conditions are more favourable because of a more advanced public opinion and the general leavening influence of education. Educated Moslem men are repudiating polygamy in the desire for a single marriage and united family life. Though the masses of Moslem women are helpless and inarticulate, a small enlightened minority of Moslem women is becoming an increasing force against polygamy and other social evils.

Polygamy and divorce bear a close relationship in regard to the problem of change. Just as polygamy is no longer considered quite respectable, so the Moslem form of easy repudiation of the wife, simply by the husband's thrice-repeated formula "I divorce you," is regarded as distinctly beyond the pale. There are, however, frequently cases of divorce by repudiation even in the higher classes. According to a well-to-do Moslem woman in Damascus "Divorce comes too easily to the lips." But the fact that in better circles divorce, just as polygamy, has become a subject for adverse comment, means that it is distinctly on the wane. In the lower classes, there is no pressure of public opinion against the free-and-easy Moslem divorce, which still continues to be the accepted custom. In the practice of divorce, as also of polygamy, the difference between the upper and lower classes is largely due to the difference in education and modern contact.

The best place to gain an idea of the extent of polygamy and divorce in the lower classes is in health clinics and *zenana* hospitals. I have become weary of the constant repetition of Moslem women lamenting their fate of being already divorced, or living under the fear of divorce, which hangs like the sword of Damocles over their heads. The same causes provoke a divorce which produce polygamy, sterility, or the birth of only daughters, which explain probably well over seventy-five per cent of all the cases of both polygamy and divorce. One can easily understand the significance of the statement of a physician at the Zenana Hospital, Lucknow, that "a woman's success in life depends

so largely on child-bearing." There are also, of course, other less fundamental causes sufficient sometimes to provoke repudiation; such as the disobedience of the wife, or it is said, even her failure to cook according to her husband's taste. Moslem women accept divorce and polygamy as an ever-present possibility, and many seem to be in a state of constant uncertainty and tension.

Among the lower classes there is an interesting economic connection between polygamy and divorce. The decline of polygamy among them may logically have the effect of increasing divorce. The cost of an extra wife, as has been said, makes polygamy difficult. The cost of housing often necessitates living in much closer quarters to-day than formerly. Separate establishments for wives are too expensive and having two or three living in the same house is difficult, to say the least. Hence, a divorce offers a simpler and cheaper means of satisfying the desire for more variety in wives. Any decrease in polygamy in the lower classes may thus increase divorce. There are no statistics but opinions from very different sources point to this general trend.

Although the economic factor may cause divorce to increase as a cheap substitute for polygamy, strangely enough it also sometimes to a certain degree acts as a deterrent against divorce, because of the consideration of the dowry. According to Moslem custom the man pays a dowry; not all, however, is paid in advance or at the time of marriage. A certain portion stipulated in the contract is withheld as a provision for the wife in case of divorce. She may also stipulate that if her husband marries again, she will receive the reserve portion of the dowry. In a sense this serves as an insurance against divorce especially if a fairly large sum has been agreed upon as the reserved portion of the dowry. In this case, divorce is expensive and in case of economic depression, a luxury. Naturally, if there is a good deal of laxity in enforcing the payment of this sum, the question of the dowry will not be a deterrent against divorce.

In some places, however, the dowry payment is rigidly enforced; for example, in Palestine. If the man does not pay, he is put in jail. But apparently a good many take the chance as there are, according to the prosecuting attorney,

more prisoners for debt than for any other cause. It is difficult, however, to say how many are deterred from divorce either by the necessity to refund the dowry, or the fear of imprisonment. As in determining the marriage age the religious authorities in Palestine exert a certain pressure of influence on the lower classes to check divorce. The Grand Mufti, the Moslem Supreme Authority in Jerusalem, explained that religious leaders raise the question with the man as to the validity of his reasons for divorce. But how effective such a suggestion of religious pressure against divorce may be seems a question since, as the Grand Mufti said, in the last analysis there can be no real interference with the man's rights of repudiation. According to the law, "Divorce is a purely personal matter and personal rights cannot be questioned."

A young Iranian student, in discussing divorce, pointed out the fact that Shi'ah Islam requires a decision of a religious judge to make a divorce valid. "This might seem to be a hindrance, but practically is not, since divorce is, in any case, a man's prerogative, and there is little idea of his giving it up." Divorce would not seem to be a necessity in Iran because of the practice of temporary marriage, which is a loose relationship allowing the same advantages of change as a divorce. It is interesting to note, however, that divorce is said to be more frequent in the case of the *temporary* wife than of the *regular* wife, doubtless for the reason that there is no dowry provision in the temporary marriage.

Although divorce is quite prevalent among the lower and middle classes in Iran, there are at least slight signs of a decrease as shown by an American hospital study in Kermanshah, to which reference has already been made. Of the two groups studied, the one of Moslem men and women married over ten years, the other group of those married from one to ten years, there is a larger percentage of divorce in the former group. This is regarded as an evidence of a decline in divorce, although, of course, allowance must be made for the fact that divorce may be more likely to occur after ten years than before. Divorce is exceedingly rare for a very cogent reason among the Bedouins

according to a young Baghdad lawyer. If a man divorces his wife her male relatives will insist on knowing the reason, will fix the blame and then kill either the wife or husband. Hence, Bedouin divorce is not a light affair.

According to Islamic law, Moslem women have the right to include in the marriage contract certain conditions on which they may be granted a divorce. Few women, however, exercise their prerogatives, perhaps because of ignorance of their rights or because of dependence on others as to the marriage arrangements, or because of their general economic dependence. Hence, regardless of rights, the balance of power in divorce rests with men in Iran. There are, however, some evidences that Iranian women are beginning to be more assertive of the legal rights. An interesting illustration is given in a letter of 1935 from a woman doctor, a medical missionary, in a small town. "It is now possible for wives who have been ill-treated by their husbands to appeal against them to the Department of Justice, and many of them are taking advantage of this privilege. A number of these who have been beaten by their husbands, not 'wisely,' as one woman put it, who had nothing visible to show for it, but 'too well,' have been sent to me to catalogue their various bruises and other injuries."

Although enlightened public opinion is everywhere vocal against the Islamic divorce which gives the man the monopoly, legislation against divorce has been attempted only in Iran, Egypt and Turkey. The new marriage law in Iran (1931) makes an unusual kind of provision for a woman to include in her marriage contract her right to secure a divorce. As the idea is rather complicated it would take an intelligent woman to avail herself of the privilege, and the great majority of women therefore will not include this demand. According to this provision a Moslem woman may secure divorce by "acting as an attorney for her husband and securing a divorce *for him from him*." This is a round-about way of giving a woman her divorce rights without attacking the canon law. This is an evidence of the cautious movement on foot in Iran to replace the Shari'a, the religious laws, with a European code, following the example of Turkey.

In Egypt after a good deal of agitation for reform in the divorce system and the laws of Moslem personal status, a commission of learned sheikhs was appointed in 1927 to produce a new law. After delving in old Islamic documents and discussing the various legal interpretations of the Koran in all their endless permutations and commutations, the sheikhs brought forth a New Marriage and Divorce Law which was promulgated March 11, 1928. This lengthy document of 1,200 words, which of course applies only to Moslems, involves very little fundamental change. The crux of the divorce problem, the essential principle of the man's right to repudiation, is not touched.

The new Egyptian law provides an elaborate system of reconciliation between husband and wife; allows the wife annulment of marriage if the marriage contract is broken, and grants the right of divorce for desertion; declares illegitimate any child born more than a year after the absence, divorce, or death of the husband; and gives the mother longer guardianship over the children until nine and eleven years instead of seven and nine for boys and girls respectively. All these provisions do not modify the essential principles of the Islamic law. The new Egyptian Marriage and Divorce Law is therefore by many not considered of vital importance as an active legal reform, but is significant primarily as the first attempt to harmonize the Shari'a Law with the modern conceptions of personal status. It shows the force of public opinion which is undermining tradition and represents a step toward ultimate reform in Egypt. More fundamental changes in Islamic law in Egypt, according to well-informed opinion, are for the present not considered probable. Islam has been recognized by constitution as the religion of the State, both in the original constitution 1923, and in that of 1932. Any attack on the Islamic law is therefore practically treasonable. Any suggestion of drastic change which affects the Islamic law immediately arouses opposition.

An interesting incident of this occurred in Cairo several years ago. A Moslem doctor in a public lecture advocating equality of rights for women raised the question, "Shall men and women enjoy the same privileges as men?" Answering

his own question, he protested against the unequal inheritance laws for women. The audience, a mixed gathering of men and women, became highly excited and began to debate the question among themselves with increasing violence. With difficulty the disturbance was quelled. The lecturer was brought to trial on the charge of having cast aspersions on the Prophet; he was acquitted but tried again. Although finally acquitted, the lecturer lost heavily in his medical practice. The whole incident aroused a bitter religious controversy.

This incident illustrates the extreme sensitivity not only of the Moslem public in Egypt, but no less truly the Moslem world as a whole. It points out the contrast between the slow process of legislative reform in most Islamic countries and the rapidity of legal change in Turkey. The Turkish reform of the Moslem inheritance law, giving women equal rights, was received without question. Equality of inheritance and guardianship, equal divorce rights and the abolition of polygamy were regarded as logical parts of the general *en bloc* reform, incident to accepting the Swiss Civil Code. These laws are being enforced not only in Istanbul, where women are conscious of their right, but also in a place like Kayseri, a typical Interior town where there has been little urge for the new freedom.

In villages, the enforcement of the law is undoubtedly more difficult. Since divorce is no longer the easy verbal process as before, the new law, as one observer reports, has resulted in the trend toward dispensing with the formalities of marriage and divorce. Women are needed for the farm economy and a change in labour is often desirable. In any event whether marriage rests on the regular or more informal basis, the woman carries a heavy load. Under such a variation from the law, the number of children without legitimate rights would naturally increase, just as under the continued practice of polygamy. After polygamy has become illegal, such problems are inevitable in a period of drastic transition. That they are realized by Turkey is shown by the attempt to spread education and supplant old social practices with new social ideals.

Equal rights in divorce have probably resulted in a larger

number of divorces secured by women and produced a less fatalistic, more temporary attitude toward marriage. It is also said that marriage is regarded as less binding, but many people deplore the increase of divorce both by men and women. The lack of registration under the old law means that there is no accurate standard of comparison and makes it difficult to judge the problem fairly. At all events the present system of equality of divorce rights is producing in Turkey a more balanced society than was possible under the Islamic law. Reform in the status of women elsewhere in the Moslem world does not as yet have the benefit of the law to re-enforce public opinion. Among the upper classes social inequalities are being ameliorated by the growing pressure of public opinion. But the Moslem women of the masses seem destined to continue to suffer serious social handicaps as long as the authority of Islam to determine the social system is not questioned.

PART TWO

Education—The Key to Progress

CHAPTER VIII

THE EDUCATIONAL AWAKENING IN IRAQ

THE visitor to Baghdad to-day in search of the romance of the *Arabian Nights* and all the thrills which the *Thief of Baghdad* on the film-screen has led him to expect, will be sadly disillusioned. New Street of modern Baghdad with its bald and blatant modernism, its jumble of new glass-front stores, displaying automobile accessories and phonographs, is most disappointing from the tourist's point of view and anything but romantic. But there is romance in modern Baghdad, not found in New Street in its tawdry Western imitation, but in the spirit of the people. A renaissance in education is stirring Baghdad from a long Rip Van Winkle sleep, giving it new vitality and power. No change in the Eastern world, in this twentieth-century era of change, has more far-reaching or fundamental significance, not only for Eastern women but for Eastern society, than the growth in girls' education.

The widespread recognition of this new element of progress in the East is uppermost in countless conversations, as one travels in the East and asks the question: "Are there any changes in regard to women?" "Oh, yes, undoubtedly great changes," is the immediate reply. "To-day we have schools for girls and everyone believes that girls as well as boys should have an education." Sometimes it is the reply of a conservative mother or an even more conservative old grandmother, who herself perhaps had had no chance to learn more than to chant the Koran under the safe tutelage of a blind sheikh (blind sheikhs were always in demand for the little Koran schools for girls); or perhaps in rare cases she might have been taught writing also. This, however, was considered particularly dangerous, since if a girl knew how to write, she might write a love letter. Shades of the Prophet, beware! Safety first was the only wise course.

Sometimes the approving comment on the change in ideas about girls' education come even from a religious leader like a sheikh of Baghdad who explained to me that

people have misinterpreted the Koran in not allowing girls to be educated. "The Prophet in reality believed that women should be educated. The Koran does not teach inequality. We have to show the people the true meaning of the Koran." He pointed with pride to his family which, he said, was in one way the most remarkable family in Baghdad, with two daughters, pupils in the Central Girls' School and one other daughter, a teacher in the school, one of the first Moslem girls in Baghdad to teach in a school above the primary grade. "When the newspaper comes," he said, "everyone wants to read it. In most families only the men can read or care to know current happenings."

Often an unquestionable proof of the new acceptance of the value of education for girls comes from some Government official. "There is universal interest in girls' education—not one in a thousand would oppose it" was the statement of the Director of Girls' Education for Iraq. In speaking of the remarkable general progress of education for girls in Iraq several years ago one of the officials in the Ministry of Education summed up the great contrast between the present development and that under the Turkish régime. "Very little," he said, "was done for girls. The Central Girls' School in Baghdad which was established for the daughters of Turkish officials was like a foreign school, and did not benefit the girls of Baghdad. There were practically no foreign governesses, even in the better Baghdad families, such as you would have found in Istanbul or Cairo. Some few sent their daughters to the Catholic convent for a smattering of French and embroidery, but education for girls in the real sense did not begin until after the Mandate. At first it developed slowly, but now is going with a rush."

What is meant by a rush is evident from the fact that elementary schools are crowded in towns like Baghdad, Mosul and Basra, and each year brings an added demand for more girls' schools.¹ The number of girls, which is at present about one-third of the number of boys, is increasing

¹ In 1920, there were about a dozen girls' schools; in 1921, thirty-one girls' schools; in 1933, sixty-seven girls' schools with about 1,000 girls enrolled.—*Curriculum Construction in the Public Primary Schools of Iraq*. Matta Akrawi, Columbia University, 1934.

more rapidly than the number of boys in school. The actual number of girls entering school in 1932 was more than the number of boys entering. The enrolment of girls in primary education has increased 105 per cent. But even though the relative rate of increase of girls is greater than that of boys, there will be for a long time the disparity in the education of girls and boys that is characteristic of the East. The desire that eventually this should not be the case is evident from the new requests each year for more girls' schools. This urge for girls' education is passing out of the few cities exposed to modern ideas into the smaller towns, where to-day a girls' school attracts an increasing number. Even from Najaf and Kerbela, the two shrine cities of Shi'ah Islam, requests for girls' schools were sent several years ago to Baghdad, but the reactionary forces in these Shi'ah strongholds stirred up such an opposition that the requests were withdrawn.

More open to new ideas are the semi-nomadic tribes of the desert. Sheikh Bani Hassan, the Chief of a large tribe settled near Kadhimain, as he was driving me back to Baghdad in his Ford car after my day's visit at his tribal centre, discussed his plans for a girls' school for the tribe. "We have made our request to the Government for a teacher," he said, "and are waiting and hoping one will be sent. One teacher could cover the whole tribe by moving about. We want girls to learn to read and write and be intelligent mothers. The desert life is changing. The towns are nearer now. We must not be too far behind." The sheikh would like also to have not only an educated daughter, but an educated wife. "The four that I have are all ignorant," he said, "and cause me much trouble. I want one with whom I can talk. If I can find the right one, I might be willing to let her wear a hat," he added as a great concession, since the prestige of the sheikh requires the veiling of his wives. Not many Bedouin sheikhs have been exposed to modern civilization as fully as Sheikh Bani Hassan, thanks to his Ford.

Growth in education may be measured not only in geographical extension and in the larger number of schools and of girls enrolled, but also in the ascending level of

girls' education. It has moved steadily up from the little Koran school under the *mollah* to the primary school, then to intermediate and secondary schools.¹ The Central Girls' College in Baghdad has extended its course from eight to ten years, and now gives the most complete education for girls in Iraq. For the small town the new attitude toward girls' education is evident in the numbers in the primary school; in Baghdad the Central College is the index of the Moslem response to education for girls since over eighty per cent of the students are Moslem, and many do not live in Baghdad. The registration in this school each year exceeds the facilities so that a large number must be turned away.

In Iraq conservatism has been disarmed by promoting the education for girls within the sanctions of Islamic tradition. The Baghdad school is a good illustration of the general situation. Purdah conditions in this institution are carefully observed, the school following rather than directly promoting social change. But the atmosphere of the school is steadily becoming less purdah. At the beginning there was no man servant; now a young man janitor moves about the school freely. At first, no men visitors were allowed, not even the English Director of Education; now they are admitted but only with special permits from the Ministry of Education. When they were first admitted, all the girls veiled; now perhaps only one or two out of forty ever cover their faces before visitors. Although none of the older girls take part in the school exercises, there is a tendency for parents, proud of their daughters, to waive their conservatism and let them appear in public even after they are really past the age of veiling. For example, a well-known family still allows a talented daughter of fourteen to perform in public. She is rather small for her age, and passes without criticism.

The consciousness of the veil is still very evident, however, outside the school. Visit the Baghdad School near

¹ In 1931 three intermediate girls' schools were opened, the only girls' schools above primary grade except the two teachers' training schools in Baghdad and Mosul. In 1933 there were eight girls' intermediate schools and two girls' secondary schools.—*Curriculum Construction in the Public Primary Schools of Iraq*. Matta Akrawi, Columbia University, 1934.

closing time and you will find a group of old women, perhaps a few men, hovering about waiting to take the girls home. The older as well as the younger girls must have a special guardian, since according to Moslem custom, a veiled woman is helpless outside her own home. These caretakers are often disregarded by the girls; or perhaps "parked" somewhere while the girls manage to shop or go to the dressmaker on the way home. An extra gift or *bakshish* smooths the way for this surreptitious freedom and then the girl appears at home properly chaperoned. The elderly chaperone is required also to accompany the girls on the school excursion, a regular annual event for each class, and a great sign of advancing freedom. These excursions are an interesting illustration of the old and new. The girls go in motor cars, veiled, as far as the outskirts of the city, then up go the veils. Their regular attendants, a nurse or a chauffeur, or some old family retainer, enjoy watching the games and incidentally have a good exposure to modern ideas. "These caretakers," as the Principal of the school remarked, "are much more aware of the present-day school-girl's problems than are the girl's parents."

The slightest innovation in the Baghdad school, as in other schools in Iraq, must be carefully considered in reference to conservative opinion. The need for such care is illustrated by the protest which was made against having a lecture given at the Girls' College by a professor from the Men's Normal School. One of the students commented on having heard a very interesting lecture. The father, a reactionary Moslem, reported it to the Parliament and the Minister of Education. Since then, the further use of men speakers has not been possible. Indicative of progress, however, is the occasional attendance of a group from the Girls' Normal School at lectures, cinemas or special national celebrations at the Men's Normal School. The girls are, it is true, carefully chaperoned, and sit as a group in the balcony without any individual contact.

The limited social *milieu* of girls' education in Baghdad is determined not only by public opinion, but also by the attitude of the authorities. King Feisal was very definitely interested in girls' education, but believed that it should

be promoted within the social sanctions of Islam. King Ghazi has continued his father's policy. The advance of education, for girls, as for boys, will doubtless continue to receive the patronage of the Palace, but without any idea of changing social customs.

The change in the programme of girls' education along a number of lines indicates growth in effectiveness. Teachers are beginning to be aware that girls need other courses than the stereotyped programme required by an identical system for boys and girls. The difficulty of introducing new content in education becomes obvious from the fact that a girl in a civics class, working on a "Know your City" project, could not visit the post office, because girls are not supposed to go out and have no reason to see public buildings. In spite of difficulties new ideas are making headway. Physical education is progressing, even though slowly because of the veil. As I watched a basket-ball game in the secluded grounds of the Baghdad School, I realized the keenness of the girls' response. Physical education is now interpreted in the larger meaning as an emphasis on normal recreation—clubs, school excursions, and general creative activities. This represents an entirely new idea in education as a whole, but especially in the education of girls. The use of the school as the centre for entertainments, recreation, cinema and radio performance is being promoted. The old Oriental idea of the crowds being entertained by the storyteller furnishes perhaps the germ for the new community usefulness of the school.

Some teachers realize the need for vocational education for girls, but the time does not yet seem ripe for this emphasis. Differentiation in girls' education, however, is emphasized through courses in home sciences, including home-making, child care, sanitation and personal hygiene. With these new emphases the necessity for a closer relationship between the home and the school is obvious to thoughtful teachers, who realize that the real job of the modern school is social. The Principal of the Baghdad Central College summed up the problem of the difference between the teaching of the school and the home thus: "Every Moslem girl who goes to the Baghdad School is exposed to two streams of influence

which affect every act of her life—sleeping, dressing, and undressing at night (not the usual custom), eating, walking, and thinking. The school teaches physical and mental activity; the home, passivity and fatalism. The school must seek to bridge the gap between its influence and that of the home.”

This contrast between the ideals of home and school have led to a recognition of the need for adult education. There are some developments of adult education for the lower classes to raise the level of literacy (three per cent is the general literacy figure and that of the literacy of women is much lower), and also the higher level along the lines of social education. At the other extreme from adult education is the promotion of the modern kindergarten, an entirely new emphasis in Iraq. These kindergartens are in striking contrast to the *mollah* schools for little children, where they sat all huddled up together before an old sheikh or an uneducated elderly Moslem woman, chanting the Koran in high shrill voices, swaying back and forth in rhythmic accompaniment. The kindergarten in the Girls' School in Baghdad, which serves as a training centre for kindergarten teachers, would compare favourably in equipment with nine-tenths of modern American kindergartens.

Another problem about which educators for girls in Iraq express concern is the question of social relationships. Under the régime of the veil the school does not encourage social contact, but the content of the teaching, as has been shown, leads toward the idea of unveiling. Social change and education inevitably go together, since, as an Iraqi educator said, “You can't ‘stagger’ social advance” until the educational process is finished, and you cannot advance in education without some idea of social reform.

The major difficulty in promoting a programme of modern education or even education along conventional lines in Iraq has been the securing of teachers. The steady development of a staff of trained women teachers in a decade has been accomplished to a large extent by the importation of Syrian teachers. The salaries paid by the Iraqi Government to these Syrian teachers have been very high, in comparison with salaries in Syria, but the need was urgent. A real

pioneering spirit and keenness for adventure together with their technical preparation for teaching, have been required of these Syrian teachers, who have been building a school programme for girls in a new country. This group of young Syrians has established the teaching profession in Iraq on a high educational level, has given prestige to teaching as a career and made it worthy of even the most conservative upper class. Their influence however has not been limited to the schools but has permeated the social environment. Undoubtedly to the younger generation of Iraqi young men and women, the Syrian group of men and women teachers has presented, by their normal social relationships, a whole new way of life and inspired the desire in the younger generation of Iraq to be released from their traditional social restraints.

The heyday of the Syrian teacher's opportunity, both for men and women—for there have been many of each—has now passed. The Syrian women teachers are now only in secondary and normal schools and there much less than before. Eventually, perhaps in four or five years, they will be entirely replaced, as it is considered desirable, both because of national economy and national *amour-propre*, for Iraq to have her own teachers. The preparation of Iraqi girls for secondary schools is being accomplished by sending them abroad to Syria or elsewhere on Government scholarships.

The extension of Government subsidies to girls in itself signalizes progress in girls' education. Until 1928 these foreign scholarships were limited to men. Since 1928, when the first group of eight girls went to Syria, their number each year has steadily grown. Now thirty or more girls are studying abroad, mostly in Beirut at the American School for Girls and the British Syrian Training College, also in the American Junior College for Women and the American University of Beirut. Naturally, the problem of sending girls is more difficult than boys because of social conditions. Furthermore there is less certainty of direct benefit to the Department of Education, since educating girls is something of a lottery because of the high probability of their marriage. However, as an investment, not measured in

direct returns to the schools, but to the community as a whole, this system of foreign scholarships has had great value.

Especially worthy of note is the increase of Moslem girls on foreign scholarships. At first, only Christians were available, as Moslem parents could not think of sending their daughters abroad. The number of Moslem girls has increased; now about half the number or more are Moslems. The attitude of Moslem parents has distinctly changed. Now training abroad is becoming every year a more natural thing, although it must still make quite a stir in a Moslem family to send a daughter forth across the desert five hundred miles, for ten months' study each year for several years, in a Christian Mission School, since these are for the most part the schools best fitted to serve the purpose.

Moslem girls now go abroad for study not merely on Government scholarships, but also on private funds to gain a higher education, as a few Moslems as well as Christians have felt the urge for something beyond the Baghdad School. These Moslem girls from Iraq who are studying abroad are already exerting a social influence in their home environment. They come back from Beirut each spring with new ideas showing Anglo-Saxon influence in points of view and clothes of the French style. Often while abroad they have perhaps indulged in a vacation from the veil. All of these broader outside influences cannot fail to have their effects in Baghdad or in Mosul.

Up to the present time the needs for higher education both for men and women in Iraq have been met by study abroad, in very large measure in the American University of Beirut, which has become the university for the Arabic-speaking world. There has been some agitation in Baghdad for the establishment of a university but this is not considered probable for some time, since this would involve an unwarranted expense for the small number of students who are as yet ready or desirous of higher education. A medical college in Baghdad is, however, regarded as necessary to solve the most pressing national problem of health. The training of men and women in medical service is fundamental to the economic progress of Iraq and in the near future should be carried on in Iraq. The admission

of Moslem girls to the co-educational medical school in Baghdad would be an interesting parallel to the fact that the first university co-education in Egypt was for women medical students.

One of the special influences that has favoured the promotion of girls' education, especially in Baghdad, is the presence of a number of educated Turkish women, wives of prominent Iraqi officials. Their example has stimulated a spirit of competition in Baghdad mothers to have their daughters well educated and thus make a good marriage. The marriage motivation which is evident throughout the East in promoting girls' education, has thus an added force in Baghdad, because of the Turkish influence in the situation. The group of advanced Turkish women has created a desire among some of the Baghdad women for social progress. The contrast between the freedom of Turkey and the social conservatism of Iraq has made a special impression because the Turkish women are Moslems. The combined effect of the Turkish and Syrian groups has undoubtedly been influential in creating in Baghdad a certain dissatisfaction with existing social conditions and in stimulating the urge for change.

In the development of modern education in Iraq, Anglo-Saxon—British and American—influence has played an important role. British ideas furnished the basis of the educational system which was organized during the first years of the Mandate. American educational influence has been evident in the later developments in Iraq, largely due to the fact that most of the Syrian teachers were graduates from the American institutions in Beirut and a number of them also had studied in America. Moreover the majority of the Iraqi students on foreign scholarships have also studied in Beirut in the American schools and hold key positions in the educational system of Iraq. As a natural result of the predominance of Anglo-Saxon influence in Iraq, English is the second language.

Compared with other countries of the Near East and Middle East, the work of foreign educational institutions in Iraq has been very limited. Girls' education, however, has been directly affected by the three American Mission

Schools for girls in Baghdad, Mosul and Basra. These three institutions have contributed to a number of Moslem girls a sound educational preparation and have stimulated public appreciation of the value of girls' education.

The primary impetus for general progress in Iraq—and this, of course, affects the educational advance of women—has come through the vigorous spirit of nationalism awakened since the World War. The example of Turkish nationalism, strong, aggressive, successful has been undoubtedly a stimulant for Iraq. Leaders in Iraq repeatedly express the idea that the retarded development of women is a real handicap to the development of children and hence to the progress of the State. Iraq has adopted democratic institutions such as a constitution and Parliament, which are an anomaly in an illiterate country. Hence, the problem is to raise the whole educational level. The spirit of almost breathless nationalism of Iraq has stirred the public consciousness into a sense of need for education, and especially education for Moslem girls. A solid basis is thus being laid in Iraq for further social progress.

CHAPTER IX

THE BEGINNING OF GIRLS' EDUCATION IN IRAN

"A MEASURE to promote education is the one subject which passes in the Majlis without opposition. All other subjects, good or bad, invite political opposition. Even some of the *mollahs* favour education and what is still more remarkable, the education of girls." This statement of a noted Member of Parliament indicates the awakened desire for education in Iran to-day.

Contrast this statement with an incident in Isfahan over thirty years ago and one can visualize the change in mentality in Iran, which means a journey from the Middle Ages to a modern world. In 1898 a commission for public instruction was formed in Isfahan to open national schools for boys. In spite of systematic opposition by the *mollahs*, who resented the influence of the State, boys' schools were opened. A few timid members of the commission suggested establishing girls' schools also, but were overruled. Then one of the advocates of education for girls wrote a primary school text-book containing a simple little story that caused great excitement. A schoolboy, Ali Mohammed, comes home from school and tells his father about his progress and promotion to the next class. His little sister Melik hearing this, sighs and says "Oh, if only *we* could have a school!" The *mollahs* finding this apparently harmless story in the text-book, stirred up a great agitation; the extremists even counselled cutting off the right hand of the writer. However, nothing happened—except the slow germination of the idea. To-day the sisters of the Ali Mohammeds all over Iran are in school. The transition from the fanaticism of 1898, which opposed education for girls as a menace to society, and the liberalism of 1936, which votes in the Majlis for the promotion of girls' education, represents very clearly the change in Iran's national outlook during that period.

In causing this change, the efforts of two Iranian women leaders, who were determined to claim educational rights

for women, are noteworthy. Each of these two pioneers organized a private school and each is still actively identified with girls' education—Sadigeh Khanum Daulatabadee and Khanum Azamodeh.

As a young girl of fourteen Khanum Daulatabadee started in Isfahan the first girls' school in Iran. She was at that time the only Iranian girl or woman sufficiently educated to teach. Because her father had advanced ideas, she had received an education at school dressed as a boy, attending the boys' school with her brother, and in addition, had been taught at home. This education, unusual for her time, was the inspiration for starting a school. As the school entirely conformed to the requirements of religion, the conservatives found no harm in it, and some after a time even allowed their daughters to attend. Within a few years other private ventures were launched. Khanum Daulatabadee has seen girls' education develop from the simple beginnings of private schools into a national system, and is herself an inspector of girls' education for Iran under the Ministry of Public Instruction.

Quite in contrast to the youthful effort of Khanum Daulatabadee in Isfahan, Khanum Azamodeh's active interest in education for girls did not begin until she had become a widow after fifteen years of married life. Her husband, an Iranian general, a man of liberal ideas, had promoted education for Iranian girls and beginning with his own home, had continued the education of his young wife, who was married at thirteen and had never been to school, but had had the help at home of a father, brother and tutor. After the husband's death, it seemed natural to his widow to carry forward his idea but this seemed far from normal to the public, who regarded "sitting at home" as far more logical.

Khanum Azamodeh began her school in her own home with twenty little girls of her family relationship gathered into the privacy of the *anderun*. After several years, she asked to have the girls examined for the regular Government certificate. The privilege of examination was granted, but not the certificate. The *mollah*, who gave the examination from behind a curtain carefully cutting off the girls from view, made the comment that it was useless to grant a certificate

for *only girls*. "No one believes girls can learn." But eventually the right to the certificate was granted. The simple little group gathered on the floor around the teacher, has grown now into the Namus School of nearly 400 pupils with twenty teachers, two of whom are men, with a school course covering eleven years, and Government recognition, as one of the few middle schools for girls. In the early days Khanum Azamodeh avoided publicity, as the safety of the school depended on keeping out of the limelight. To-day she displays proudly her honorary badges for different degrees of service and the letter of appreciation from the Ministry of Education.

These two pioneer ventures in girls' education were followed by a mushroom growth of private schools so that by 1914 there were sixty schools for girls under private auspices.¹ In that year, girls' schools were brought under the same system of supervision by the Ministry of Public Instruction as that of boys' schools, but not until 1919 was girls' education officially incorporated into the public school system.² This advance was marked by an official gathering (December 1919) in which the wife of the Prime Minister gave to all primary school graduates a *bona fide* diploma bearing the seal of the State. This did not mean, however, the beginning of a vigorous Government promotion of education either for boys or girls. In 1919 a certain small amount of public funds was voted for education. Since 1926 when the Parliament voted one-half of one per cent of land revenues for public elementary education, there has been steady growth, but still not in proportion to the demand.³ Girls' education has naturally lagged behind.

¹ "New Woman in Persia" by Anne Stocking (Mrs. Arthur C. Boyce), *Moslem World*, October 1912.

² The growth in girls' education is shown by the following:

	<i>Number of Girls' Schools</i>	<i>Enrolment of Girls</i>
1910	41	2,167
1929	190	11,489
1933	870	50,000

Le Journal de Teheran, February 18, 1936.

³ From 1926 to 1930 the Government appropriation for education increased 300 per cent, but this still represents only 6.2 per cent of the total budget.—Issa Khan Sadiq, *Modern Persia and her Educational System*, Columbia University, 1931, p. 112.

The fact that education in Iran has always in the past been identified with religion, largely connected with the mosques and maintained by the clergy, created an unfavourable atmosphere for promoting the education of girls. The general public has always considered it useless to educate girls. The idea expressed in Iranian philosophy that education should be highly selective for those who can profit by it, has always been the current opinion and has debarred girls from educational privilege as expressed in the saying, "Where the innate capacity is good, education may make an impression, but no furbisher knows how to give a polish to bad iron."¹

Although the new spirit is overcoming the old prejudicial attitude toward girls' education, such a handicap is not soon overcome. The number of Government boys' schools, primary and secondary, is about four times the number of schools for girls, and the total enrolment of boys in all schools in Iran is slightly more than three times that of girls (1933-34).² More than half the education of girls in Iran is carried on by private schools, which have contributed also very greatly to boys' education.³ Teheran of course represents the high-water mark of interest in both girls'

¹ Issa Khan Sadiq, *Modern Persia and her Educational System*, p. 112, Columbia University, 1931, quoted from the poet Sadi.

² The relative extent of education for boys and girls, Government and private schools, was as follows in 1932-33:

Elementary schools	Elementary students
Boys 81 %; Girls 19 %	Boys 77 %; Girls 23 %
Secondary schools	Secondary students
Boys 67 %; Girls 33 %	Boys 79 %; Girls 21 %

Annual Report of the Ministry of Education, 1932-33.

³ The following comparison shows the large contribution of private schools to girls' education:

Elementary schools for girls	Secondary schools for girls
Government 100; Private 122	Government 10; Private 42
Enrolment of girls in elementary schools	
Government 14,883; Private 18,063	
	Enrolment of girls in secondary schools
	Government 698; Private 1,965

Annual Report of the Ministry of Education, 1932-33.

and boys' education.¹ Rural education receives little attention and girls' rural schools are practically nil. The opening of ten primary schools of three grades for boys and girls together (1935) represents not only a numerical advance in educational facilities but also social progress in adopting co-education. The teachers of these mixed primary schools are all women and over half the pupils are girls. Similar schools are planned for the provinces.

Education for the great majority of girls is limited to the elementary schools, which means a maximum of six years but often only a four years' course. There are only a few middle schools and a normal school for girls, offering an eleven years' course and about thirty private middle schools, also of eleven years. The American Mission institution for girls in Teheran, Nurbakush, with a course of twelve and sometimes thirteen years represents the top level of education for girls in Iran.² Girls' education in Iran of any kind is the product of only about two decades and education on anything like a modern basis is the result of only about a decade.

Viewed over a period of years there are distinct signs of advance. The fact that education for girls has begun is in itself the most hopeful evidence of progress.³ Aside from the growth in the extent of girls' education in Iran, it is worthy of notice also that education for girls has risen from the floor of the Koran school to the level of seats and desks of the modern primary school. From the dull, damp room connected with some mosque with its crowd of little boys and girls huddled together on a mat in an atmosphere of

¹ Teheran with only 3 % of the population of Iran has 27 % of all the elementary girls' schools in Iran, and 35 % of the girls enrolled; 57 % of the secondary girls' schools in Iran and 64 % of the girls enrolled.

Annual Report of the Ministry of Education, 1932-33.

² The name Nurbakush has been recently adopted to conform with the Government requirement that all schools should have Iranian names. This name Nurbakush includes the American Girls' School elementary and secondary, and Sage College, the Junior College.

³ In 1928 the first girls graduated from secondary schools. The number has increased from 1928—40 graduates—to 1933—235.

All Persia Annuaire, 1928.

Annual Report of the Ministry of Education, 1932-33.

disorder and all-talk-at-one-time casual heterogeneity under an old sheikh, whose method was to keep up an unbroken chanting of the Koran—from such a school it is a far cry to the present-day primary school with its well-ordered schoolroom, its maps and blackboard, its orderly atmosphere, and young teachers, such as one finds in most of the schools in Teheran to-day.

The fact, however, that some girls' schools are still held in private dwellings, ill-adapted for school use, and that many of the teachers are inexperienced, makes one realize that schools for girls, even in Teheran, are of recent origin. The eagerness of girls for education and the inadequacy of their facilities are also evident when one visits a Teheran primary school, as I did several years ago, and found three girls wedged tightly in each seat in a room with fifty children, which could not comfortably hold more than thirty or thirty-five.

With girls clamouring for places in school, it is easy to understand the statement that the Parliament does not disagree over the necessity to expand education for girls. It is safe also to affirm that there are no blasé schoolgirls in Iran. For not only in Teheran, but also in a smaller city like Doulatabad, which is off the beaten travel route to Teheran, education is prized as a golden opportunity. When the first girls' school was opened there, about ten years ago, a private venture of a wealthy Moslem woman, the grey-bearded city fathers raised a strong opposition. "Why should there be a school for girls?" they said. "Who believes that they can learn?" The answer to their protest was a model small town school, an attractive new building, very spacious playground, and an alert young teacher from Teheran, well trained according to the present standards. Any doubt as to whether girls can learn is dispelled by the bright-eyed little Iranian girls, one hundred or more, learning the elements of modern education, and also the useful vocation of carpet weaving, if they choose. The eager response of the girls must give deep satisfaction to the founder of the school, who herself is illiterate and therefore, perhaps, more keenly appreciates the value of education. She must feel that her annual expense for the school, the

entire income from one of her villages, is a sound investment. But the city fathers doubtless still shake their heads at such rank and futile extravagance.

In such a reactionary environment, modern education had been planted with great care, as I realized from a visit to this school in 1928. The high walled-in compound and the extreme caution of the young teacher, which made it impossible for me to take any photograph except that of an empty garden, was necessary to keep the school out of the limelight and allay in the mind of the reactionary public the fear of sending their daughters to school. Incidentally, the young teacher, accustomed to the greater freedom of Teheran, as she told me, had to tone down her ideas to meet the prejudices of a less advanced community, and since it was impossible for a young unmarried girl to live away from home, her mother had moved down from Teheran. Obviously shifting women teachers around in Iran is not without its complications.

Islam has always dictated a strong emphasis on religious teaching in Iran with not three but four R's constituting the basis of elementary education and the fourth "R," religion, considered quite essential. The emphasis on religious teaching in the Government schools, however, has recently been greatly reduced. Iranian boys and girls in the public schools are no longer taught to intone the Koran and perform the prescribed Arabic prayers. A book of quotations from the Koran has displaced the former meticulous religious teaching. This book plus a small book on the *Shari'a*, the Moslem law, prepares them to meet the requirements on religion included in the Government examinations at the end of the sixth year. In the secondary schools no religious teaching is required, but in the normal school Moslem law is included. One question, however, how long this may be a fixed requirement, as a modern spirit of inquiry is beginning to be evident.

Such a spirit was expressed by the young Teheran teacher, with whom I had visited a class in religion, where the Prophet's injunction on almsgiving was being interpreted. "Later we hope to have religion as such entirely eliminated and lines of ethical teaching substituted," she explained,

"but as yet, there is no secularizing tendency as in Turkey. We cannot move too fast." This is to-day a fairly typical point of view, which has found expression in changes in the curriculum, showing a definite trend away from religious instruction in the primary schools. The teachings of the Koran are no longer required: in the elementary schools the instruction is practically nil; in the secondary schools some attention is given to the Islamic law. Schools are given the choice between teaching religion and ethics. There seems to be a decided tendency to prefer the latter. There is a marked difference between the present attitude toward the teaching of Islam and the attitude of only a few years ago.

The outward conventions required by Islamic tradition—curtained inner and outer doorways and no men visitors or teachers—were always very carefully observed until the order from the Shah came in May 1935 suddenly abolishing the *chaddur*. Only girls who appeared unveiled could receive a diploma or school honours. Most of the young girls discarded the *chaddur*, many for the first time, but a few paid the penalty of their parents' conservatism. In Tabriz the winners of the first and second honours at the Normal School Celebration had to relinquish their prizes because they could not receive these awards unveiled. These regulations against the veil both for students and teachers, as has already been explained in a previous chapter, have played a leading part in the emancipation movement which reached its dramatic climax in the official endorsement of the Shah at the Normal School Celebration, now an historic event.

Perhaps more astonishing to the hundreds who have attended the graduation exercises of the Government schools in Teheran and Tabriz have been the gymnastic exhibitions, held within the last year, in which young Iranian girls in shorts engaged in active exercises and sports. The enforced freedom from the *chaddur* in girls' schools may mean a complete orientation in girls' education. But even before these recent events, in spite of the traditional inhibiting effect of Islam, Iranian girls entered with enthusiasm into games within the privacy of the school, as I realized on my visit to Teheran in 1928. The crowd of girls that I saw

pour out of the school at recess and immediately begin an active game of hop-scotch on a space marked off like the map of Iran, were completely uninhibited on their playground, which was an inside courtyard safely shielded from the public. To-day such privacy is no longer needed and recreation can develop without any of the restrictions of the veil. Such a drastic change is bringing new vitality into the whole programme.

In general the physical education programme of the schools has been developed along the more formal type of gymnastic exercise. The creative forms of recreation through various extra-curricular activities are scarcely known. New emphases, however, are being introduced by an American adviser to the Ministry of Education. A class of thirty-two young women in 1935 finished a course of three months in scouting as a preparation to develop this work in the girls' schools. Another group has been trained in sports to offset the programme of conventional calisthenics. An effort is also being made to introduce more social plays, and games, and especially music, all of which are innovations. The programme of athletics in girls' schools has been given a great deal of newspaper publicity through frequent pictures of Girl Guide troops and girls in active games and exercises. Thus the public is being effectively educated to this new idea of girlhood.

School hygiene is also receiving attention. A special medical officer visits the schools, inspects the sanitary conditions, examines the children and sends those needing special attention to the clinic or hospital where free treatment is given. But since these visits are not very frequent, perhaps only once a month, the regular teacher is expected to emphasize the fundamentals of health. Visiting schools with the chief inspectress in Teheran, I was interested in the very practical demonstration of school hygiene which she gave for the benefit of the teacher as well as the class. She produced from her handbag a spoon, a bottle of alcohol, and a box of matches. After carefully sterilizing the spoon, to the great interest of the pupils and also the teacher, she called up each child in turn and quickly examined the throat, then the eyes and teeth, meanwhile giving very

simple health suggestions. In all the schools that she visits, the inspectress gives these A B C health demonstrations and emphasizes the necessity for the teacher to know at least the fundamentals of health. The inspectress's special interest in health, I learned, was due to the fact that she had specialized on this subject during her years of study in Paris. Fortunately, her specialization had not deprived her of the capacity to use very direct practical methods of teaching. That such a concrete demonstration is necessary, of course, illustrates the fact that so little attention has hitherto been paid to health, and hence health care is badly needed in the schools in Iran to-day.

The Public Health Department in certain cities realizes this need as is shown by the rules for school health in Tabriz. Every child is required to undergo medical inspection each year three times, and annually present his vaccination slip. If the slip is lost, another vaccination is required. This rule is strictly enforced. The main emphasis of the school health programme in Tabriz as elsewhere is on vaccination. School children are also treated for trachoma and favus in the public health clinics.

For the promotion of girls' education along modern lines, the most obvious need in Iran as in Iraq, is better trained teachers. Each country has had to replace as rapidly as possible the untrained caretaker type of teacher in the Mosque school with trained teachers suitable for modern schools. Iraq has vigorously attacked the problem, as we have already shown, first by developing a splendid normal school in Baghdad for training elementary teachers; further by sending a number of Iraqi girls abroad on Government scholarship to prepare for teaching in secondary schools; and by paying equal salaries for men and women. The training of women teachers in Iran has received less emphasis. The woman teacher in Iran does not have equality of financial status with men, and the teaching profession for women is not yet regarded as a career but rather as a means of earning a livelihood in case of sheer economic necessity. The entrance of girls of the upper class into teaching in Iran is therefore a rare exception. Special attention, however, is now being given to the Girls' Normal

School in Teheran. In the appointment of teachers, the graduates from this school (1935, enrolment 279) are given precedence. The Shah's signal recognition of this school will undoubtedly react favourably on the public attitude toward teaching.

A distinctive feature of the teaching profession in Iran has been the work of the women inspectors. The system of having women inspectors, which was established when the private schools were brought under Government supervision, was necessitated by the fact that it was impossible because of the veil for men to visit girls' schools. Thus a social handicap has led to a constructive educational benefit. The women inspectors, many of whom are graduates of the American School for Girls in Teheran, represent a high type in the teaching profession. One of the best known of the women inspectors is Khanum Doulatabadee, the pioneer in girls' education already mentioned, who was one of the first women from Iran to study abroad. As Iranian girls at that time did not leave their own country alone, the ever-watchful police held up at the border this eager student on her way to Paris, until verification could be received from Teheran.

To-day Iranian women students as well as men pursue higher education abroad. But women students have not yet received Government scholarships for foreign study. For over eighty years Iranian boys have been sent abroad for foreign study. Practically all of the present leaders of Iran have studied in Europe, the large majority in France. An increasing number have been sent from the different ministries—Education, Health, Justice and others. Although some of the other Ministries are still sending students abroad the Ministry of Education has now discontinued these foreign scholarships, at least temporarily, and is concentrating on the development of stronger institutions of higher learning in Iran.

When a law was passed (1929) authorizing 100 foreign scholarships annually for five years for young men but making no provision for women students, the obvious inequality evoked a vigorous protest from some of the advocates of women's education. Ten to twenty scholarships

for teacher training were urged for women. The question became the subject of heated discussion carried on in the Press. The opponents argued on the basis of unpreparedness of girls and the danger of Western contamination, contending furthermore that Iran offered adequate training for girls. The advocates of foreign scholarships for girls, among whom were several women, cited as proof of the capacity of girls the number of successful candidates in Government examination, and maintained that women would be less contaminated morally than men have been by foreign contact. They emphasized the necessity of training in Europe because of the backward conditions in Iran, which make adequate training impossible. The discussion brought into sharp relief the conflict in Iran to-day between conservatism and progress. In spite of a strong tide in favour of foreign scholarships for girls, the opposition prevailed. No girls have been officially included on the Government lists, but a few, six or eight, have been partially helped by Government funds. However, quite a number of Iranian girls, perhaps sixty or more, are now studying abroad, mostly in Europe on private funds.

Recently, higher education in Iran for girls has been the subject of much public discussion. The conservatives in Iran as elsewhere East or West have advanced the argument that girls not only do not need advanced education but should not have it, since it unfits them for home life. But quite aside from the opposition against higher education for women, there seems to be as yet on the whole very little demand for it in Iran. Nurbakush, Sage College, meets the needs as yet of the small minority who desire to go beyond the secondary school. The Government University will be eventually opened to women students in all departments, beginning first with dentistry and pharmacy, for which courses several women students have already applied. But these are exceptional cases. The official endorsement of the Shah and the Queen, accorded recently to the girl graduates of the Normal School, may have its effect in promoting general higher education for girls as well as encouraging the profession of teaching.

The prevailing lack of urge for higher education up to

the present time is doubtless related to the fact that the interest in professional careers in Iran has not yet in any sense cut across the idea of marriage. Aside from teaching which, as has been said, is considered as an economic necessity rather than a career, there is practically no profession open to Moslem girls in Iran. Marriage is the main career. To ensure a good marriage, education up to a point is regarded as desirable. This explains in Iran as elsewhere the increasing number of girls in school beyond the primary and secondary stage. But higher education is not considered an additional marriage asset; perhaps this explains the lack of desire for it.

The fact that the education of girls is being extended, however, through the secondary stage is very important. The longer period of education and later marriage age point to the eventual solution of one of the major problems of Iran and of the East as a whole—the disparity between the literate husband and illiterate wife. Some few attempts are being made in private schools in Teheran to meet the problem of the present generation of illiterate wives, many of whom are pathetically eager to bridge the gap between themselves and their husbands. Some of them are beyond the schoolgirl stage and can only laboriously overcome the handicap of illiteracy. Many are still the age of schoolgirls and eager to attend the regular schools, which, however, are already overcrowded and cannot admit married women or girls. A few private schools for married women have been started such as, for example, the one carried on by a Women's Association in Iran. These schools are small but significant, showing what should be done on a much larger scale to meet this important social problem.

The growing consciousness of this problem—the disparity in education between men and women—is one of the main secrets of the present awakening of interest in education for girls and women in Iran, whether it finds expression in the primary or secondary schools or in meagre adult education efforts. A few years ago there was not as at present this poignant awareness of the fact that Iranian women without education are under a terrific handicap. The social and intellectual cleavage between men and women in Iran

was not questioned. But to-day there is a growing consciousness of a need for change. The younger generation of educated men want educated wives in Iran as elsewhere. The Iranian mother desires to see her daughter well married and enjoying an equality in marriage such as she, herself, has been denied. Perhaps, just as in Baghdad the increase of foreign wives in the higher circles has made some Teheran mothers realize the desirability of educating their daughters.

Doubtless, Moslem women in Iran, especially in Teheran, have been affected also by a comparison of their social and educational position with that of women in other communities. The Armenians, in giving up the *chaddur* a number of years ago and availing themselves freely of educational opportunity have furnished a progressive example. The Zoroastrian community with its freedom from social handicaps for women, and its active promotion of girls' schools may have also had an influence, although the forward movement of Zoroastrian women has produced no outstanding women leaders. More significant for Moslem women perhaps has been the example of the women of the Bahai community, who though still veiled, are quite free behind the veil, representing thus a half-way stage of progress. The fact that in many communities the Bahai Girls' School was the first and only school for a long time has undoubtedly stimulated Moslem educational effort, but the Bahaist influence is less important to-day than in the earlier period. The Moslem woman's desire for education and general advance has also been greatly affected by the social reforms in Turkey. "If women in Turkey are free and educated, why not Iranian women also?" is a natural question which I heard frequently asked by the women of Iran.

A direct influence on the educational progress of Moslem women has also come from the Anglo-Saxon schools, the British and American Mission girls' schools in different parts of Iran, and especially Nurbakush in Teheran. These institutions have effectively presented to the community the highest value of education for girls. Without discussing freedom or apparently promoting freedom for women, they produce an atmosphere in which freedom is the natural

result. At the commencement of Nurbakush in May 1929 for the first time the three Moslem graduates unveiled delivered their graduating addresses to an audience of eight hundred people, and were received with enthusiasm and applause. The Mission Schools for Girls in Tabriz and Hamadan have deeply affected a whole area. The Shiraz Girls' School, formerly a Mission institution but now under private auspices has been a distinctive influence for education along modern English lines. It represents an adaptation of Anglo-Saxon ideals. Alborz College in Teheran, the American College for Men, has without question been a great force for the social and educational progress of women, in that it has given to its large student body of young men from all over Iran new social ideals.

The increasing penetration of Anglo-Saxon ideas, as represented in the British and American schools in Iran, is an interesting evidence of the new trend in Iran away from the European model of life and thought. For over eighty years French influence has been dominant. French is the second language; the educational system is modelled on French lines; Paris has always been the Mecca for Iranian students. But in the present period of awakening, a migration from French to Anglo-Saxon influence is evident, which is having a pervasive effect on the social and educational advance of women.

Although foreign influences, French and English, are exerting a subtle force toward change in various phases of Iranian life, the impelling motive of the present renaissance, of which the advance of women is a part, in Iran as in Iraq, is the newly aroused spirit of nationalism. This has for Iran the special meaning of a growth in the consciousness of national unity and a new appreciation of Iranian culture. The building of roads has facilitated travel and brought hitherto isolated cities into closer contact. The divided provincial loyalties of the past are being supplanted by a national loyalty and pride, which demands that Iran should not have an inferior position in the East. "Iran has a deeper culture and more glorious past, why should it lag behind Turkey?" is an idea often expressed. There is a growing desire for national prestige "that it may again be

said of Iran as by the Prophet of Islam 'Were knowledge in the Pleiades some of the Persians would reach it.' ”¹

A few leaders in Iran recognize that the advance of women is a necessity for national progress and are therefore vigorously promoting girls' education. Even by the less thinking majority, education for girls is being accepted as a natural part of the new era. Iran has a long way to go before achieving an equal educational level for women and men, but a significant beginning has been made.

¹ Quoted by Issa Khan Sadiq, *Modern Persia and her Educational System*, Columbia University, 1931.

CHAPTER X

THE ROAD AHEAD IN GIRLS' EDUCATION IN INDIA

VIEWED in the stark reality of statistics there is no more depressing fact in India to-day than the extent of illiteracy of women and the disparity in educational advance between men and women, a disparity which is even greater for Moslem women. The census for 1931 shows the percentage of literacy for men was 11·7, for women 1·9 per cent, and for Moslem women 1·2 per cent. This means that less than twenty women in general out of every thousand and only about twelve Moslem women in a thousand, can read and write.¹ This appalling female illiteracy is understood when one realizes that only one girl out of every ten of school age attends school and two-thirds of all the girls in school go only one year, and hence have no chance of literacy; for permanent literacy is not possible under four years of primary education.²

The disparity in education between girls and boys is one of the most distressing features of the situation. In schools and colleges in India in 1931 there were about five times as many boys as girls. This educational disparity is even more marked in the case of Moslem girls.³ In the primary grade they represent a little less than one to three (29·1 per cent), in the middle grade one in twenty (5·1 per cent), and in the higher stages there is only about one Moslem girl to fifty Moslem boys (2·1 per cent). In collegiate education where the total number of women is very small

¹ *Statistical Abstract for British India from 1923-24 to 1932-33*, p. 30. Delhi, India, published in 1935.

² *Fact Finders' Reports, Laymen's Missions Inquiry*, p. 516. Harpers, 1933 (material drawn from R. Littlehailies, *Progress of Education in India*, vol. i, p. 157, and *Review of the Growth of Education in British India* by the Auxiliary Committee of the Indian Statutory Commission (Hartog Report)).

³ In 1932-33 there were 681,932 Moslem girls in comparison to 2,740,152 Moslem boys enrolled in schools and colleges in India. —*Statistical Abstract for British India from 1923-24 to 1932-33*, p. 424.

the number of Moslem women is even less.¹ In the mixed colleges there are practically no Moslem women students and also in training colleges very few Moslems. This fact has even greater significance in view of the special need in Moslem schools for women teachers. But by the tragic irony of facts, the same social custom that makes women teachers a necessity also prevents women from having the necessary preparation to become teachers.

The obvious reason for the lack of education among Moslem women is purdah and general Moslem conservatism, an interrelated cause and effect. Purdah lays a detaining hand on the Moslem girl's education. It interferes not only after the veil is assumed, which is usually not until the age of eleven or twelve years, but also before that age; for the prevailing purdah psychology often prevents even little girls, not yet veiled, from attending the primary school, which does not have a woman teacher. Because of the dearth of women teachers in the primary schools many Moslem girls never cross the threshold of a school. The direct effect of purdah on the number of girls in school is shown by the fact that in purdah-bound provinces like the Punjab and the United Provinces, the attendance of girls in school is lower than in other provinces.

Aside from the fact that purdah undoubtedly curtails the school privileges of Moslem girls, it presents very practical difficulties in education. The exigences of purdah observance have been made vividly clear to me on my visits to various Moslem girls' schools. At the opening or closing hour, I have seen in a city the motor buses, or in a smaller town like Bhopal, the covered bullock-carts lined up at the school door, and have watched the shrouded figures scuttle from the entrance of the school compound into the curtained safety of the conveyance. I was told by one Principal of a girls' school that the economic cost of the conveyances

¹ According to the Hartog Report in 1927 in four major provinces of India—Madras, Bengal, the United Provinces and the Punjab—out of 606 students in women's colleges there were only thirty-two Moslems; in Bombay, out of 382 women students, only one Moslem. Bombay has very little purdah, and therefore co-education. The lack of women's colleges in Bombay Presidency doubtless explains the absence of Moslem students.

required because a Moslem girl cannot walk to and from school, equals and at some times exceeds the amount paid for salaries for teachers. From Mrs. Hussein, a clever Moslem woman in charge of her own private school in Calcutta, I learned some years ago that she was spending 5,000 rupees a year for teachers, 7,000 rupees for conveyances and 2 rupees for a library. The contrast is striking between the cost for negative conservatism and positive progress. In addition to the purdah conveyance, the necessity for a female attendant to accompany the girl to see to it that purdah is not broken on the way to school, and the elaborate precautions necessary for preserving strict purdah in the school, for example requiring even the elimination of all male servants from girls' schools—these restrictions have vastly complicated school life for a Moslem girl in India.

Other social customs characteristic of India, but not peculiar to Moslems, have prevented Moslem girls, as well as Indian girls of other communities, from having full educational privileges. Although child marriage is especially associated with Hinduism, early marriage among the masses of Moslems is also quite common. We have already mentioned the fact that in 1921 out of eight and a half million brides under fifteen years of age one and a half million were Moslems.¹ This means that that number of girls were cut off from any education beyond the early primary grades. With attention concentrated on early marriage for their daughter, the Moslem parents' chief concern naturally is to find a suitable son-in-law. Hence, attendance of girls in the primary school seems unnecessary and in the middle school is obviously impossible. As girls are withdrawn from school just at the time when they begin to mature in mind as well as body, this not only cuts off the majority from ordinary education but reduces to a minimum the number of Moslem girls who might become teachers.

Furthermore the education of Moslem girls has been impeded not only by the specific handicaps of purdah and early marriage, but frequently by the conservatism of the Indian Moslem community. This conservatism has been

¹ Hartog Report.

strengthened by the Nationalist Movement. Moslem India in its fear of absorption by the Hindus, has shown a reaction similar to the attitude of the Moslem community in Palestine in reference to Zionism. Some Moslem leaders have always insisted on having special privileges in schools for Moslems, unwilling otherwise to avail themselves of the regular facilities of education in India. One of the Moslem leaders, an Oxford graduate, who spoke before the Education Commission of the Simon Commission, said: "We desire education for girls under proper Islamic discipline, but otherwise we would prefer to keep them out of school." The high cost of Moslem conservatism, as usual, falls most heavily on Moslem women.

Viewed over a long period, however, the general situation of education for Moslem girls shows a very slow but steady advance both in the number of schools for girls and of girls in schools. After 1920 the curve of elementary and secondary schools begins to ascend. This period marks also practically the beginning of higher education for Moslem girls, although the number of Moslem girls is still negligible.¹ Isabella Thoburn College in Lucknow, and Kinnaird College for Women in Lahore, which may be taken as valid criteria, show a steady increase of Moslems as also of girls from other communities.²

The few Moslem women who are well educated often hold positions of unusual prominence. A widely known Moslem woman in the Punjab, the first woman to take her doctorate, has an important post as an inspectress for girls' schools. She has maintained strict purdah and thus proved that in spite of the purdah, advance in education is possible. But it may also be questioned whether by such a policy she has not sacrificed an opportunity to exert greater influence

¹ In 1917 there were only six Moslem women students in Arts Colleges in India; in 1927, thirty.

² In 1921 the first Moslem girl graduated from Isabella Thoburn College; in 1925 there were five Moslem graduates from the regular course; one in Teachers' Training, and one M.A. In 1933 Isabella Thoburn College had ten Moslem students; in 1935, thirty. Kinnaird College when founded in 1920 had one Moslem student; in 1935, thirty-one.

for social advance, as the first highly educated Moslem woman in her part of India.

My frequent talks with Government inspectresses and women missionaries in India have called forth interesting illustrations of the new attitudes of the public toward the education of girls. An English inspectress of schools in the Punjab made the comment, "Education has been added as a requisite for a good match, to a knowledge of household work, docility and beauty." Even conservative mothers are willing now to have their daughters remain in school, since they feel that it ensures a better marriage. Public opinion is no longer hostile or apathetic, but is beginning to realize the value of girls' education, even though the Moslem community hinders rapid advance by its insistence on the purdah. The same inspectress called my attention to the marked increase in applications from Moslems for girls' schools, which are more than can be met. This fact, she felt, was especially significant for Peshawar and the North-west Frontier, where purdah has always been rigidly observed. The interest of the older women, who have not had any education, she considered also a most stimulating sign of change, as older women are often a deterrent to progress. "They come to the school" she said, "for special lessons, as the school is open to all. Self-consciousness is forgotten in their desire to learn. In the villages the women bombard the teacher out of school hours to teach them handwork and other things."

In an unforgettable visit with Her Highness, the late Begum of Bhopal, I caught some illuminating glimpses of the change in public opinion toward educating girls. She told me of her interest in building schools and hospitals, not splendid palaces and public edifices as her mother had done. To her had come the deep satisfaction of seeing the public attitude change from indifference to appreciation. I was deeply impressed by her feeling of achievement, which she measured in her mind not by handsome buildings, but by the awakening of her people through her efforts. "In the beginning I had to pay the parents to allow their daughters to attend my schools," the Queen said with a note of triumph in her voice, "now the parents ask to have

their daughters admitted and are willing to pay for the privilege."

Of the widespread desire of Moslem parents for the education of their daughters there is no question to-day; even more evident is the eager response of Moslem girls themselves to these new opportunities. During my visit to Lucknow, I saw every morning and in the late afternoon in the crowded streets, closely covered conveyances, oftentimes drawn by men, which were filled with little Moslem girls being taken to and from school. When I visited one of the schools one morning I found, as the girls passed from the purdah carriages through the curtained entrance, that suddenly they emerged from their *burqas*, like butterflies from a cocoon, and were all alive, throwing themselves into games with enthusiasm, and thrilled with the great adventure of being educated. Such a keenness of response I found in any of the half-dozen or more leading private high schools for Moslem girls in India that I visited—in Hyderabad Deccan, in Lucknow, in Aligarh, in Delhi, Bhopal and Lahore. My visits to these schools have left a composite impression of alert, responsive Moslem girls, who, as individuals, if given a chance, will not lag behind the girls of other communities, although the Moslem community as a whole may not be socially progressive. The keenness of the girls in the Aligarh Moslem Girls' School to hear my talk on Modern Turkish women, which was given before the Men's University Union, and their delight when their attendance was made possible by arranging a screened-in purdah section in the gallery, where they could listen unseen, demonstrated the fact that mental purdah has passed.

That these half-dozen or more distinctive private schools for better-class Moslem girls are developing education on up-to-date lines, is evident from the modern emphases in their programme. At Queen Mary's School in Lahore, sports are emphasized and enthusiastically welcomed by the girls, as was evident to me from the keenness of a group from this school participating in the badminton and drill competition with all the girls' schools in Lahore, which was held in the Y.W.C.A. compound, under careful purdah conditions. Some of the private schools are giving special

attention to Domestic Science and Household Arts, Home Nursing, and First Aid, preparing girls to become efficient home-makers. The importance of these few high-type girls' schools, which remind one of certain private schools in America or England, is out of all proportion to their number. The small minority of well-educated Moslem girls of wealth and family position who attend these institutions will answer the problem of at least a few of the high-class young Indian men who have been educated in England and are eager to have educated wives. In their future positions of influence, moreover, this group of highly privileged Moslem girls will have the responsibility of determining in no small measure the educational opportunity for the under-privileged majority.

But modern emphases in girls' education in India are not limited to the few high-class private schools. The renaissance in education is affecting not only the extent but also the character of the Government programme for girls' schools. Under the old system the few girls who entered college found themselves well prepared for equal competition with men in professional careers; but preparation for marriage, the primary career for the great majority in India, as elsewhere in the East, has received little attention. The regular Government schools and the majority of private girls' schools have been bound by the strait-jacket of the examination system. Home-making subjects, physical education, and hygiene have been only optional and difficult to promote, since the parents, as well as students, regard the school certificate based on the regular requirements as the final seal of education. There is, however, some loosening of the strait-jacket bonds, through the beginning of vocational training and home-making courses, and more physical education. In this connection the growth of the Girl Guide Movement is significant; there are in British India over 600 Companies and Flocks and over 10,000 Girl Guides and Bluebirds.

A certain amount of vocational education has been developed in connection with the regular schools. Some of the Mission schools¹ have pioneered in this field attempting

¹ *Laymen's Missions Inquiry Supplementary Series*, vol. iv, part ii. Chapter on Women's Interests and Activities in India.

to co-ordinate girls' education more closely with the needs of practical life. The most distinctive development in the Government system is the Government Zenana Industrial Schools in Lahore of which there are now fifteen.¹ In addition to regular elementary education these schools offer courses in home arts and crafts along very modern lines. Although these schools are open to girls and women of different religions, and social levels, and different ages (the students range from fourteen to thirty-five) they especially serve Moslems and offer particularly the uneducated *purdahnashin* a belated opportunity to overcome her lack of earlier educational development by the right type of useful vocational training.

The response of Moslem schoolgirls to education, keen as it is, perhaps is not as eager as is the desire of some young Moslem women, who were married at an early age and thus deprived of education. In one of the Mission day schools at Fategahr, I saw a young woman of this type, thirty years old, who came every day in her completely shrouded *tonga* to join the little children in the primary class. Her *purdah* was so strict that the *tonga* had to drive clear inside the compound, where no man enters. Kinnaird College has had several married women among their Moslem students who have found great satisfaction in their college course. But many married *purdahnashin* are not so fortunate. I caught a glimpse of what the unfulfilled desire for an education means when a young bride said wistfully, "If I could only see what is behind your eyes, but for me there will be no knowledge." Immured in the *zenana* under the watchful eye of a conservative mother-in-law, she knew that there would be little chance to satisfy her longing to know the world outside her four walls.

In contrast to the complete frustration of this Moslem bride is the satisfaction that comes to some more advanced Moslem girls, who, behind the *purdah* pursue their education independently, even through the university course. Scattered over India are these few *purdah* students, who carry on regular

¹ A highly trained young Indian woman, Miss Jamila Siradjuddin (Forman Christian College and London School of Economics), is the inspectress of these Zenana Industrial Schools.

courses in the safe seclusion of their own *zenana*, pass their examinations privately and are awarded their higher degree.

An interesting illustration of such girls in purdah taking a university course was the case of two Moslem sisters in Calcutta, whose double wedding I had the pleasure of attending. One had taken her law degree; the other was finishing her regular Arts Course. Both were marrying men they had never seen. The one with the law degree had wanted to practise, but since this was impossible she had consented to marry a young lawyer who did not insist on purdah. The marriage of the other was quite a lottery; but the bride hoped to be allowed to continue her studies and not be too closely in purdah. "It is very lonely studying on and on without having any chance for explanation," she said, "but it's the only way as long as we are in purdah. Perhaps our children will be able to study more freely." In Hyderabad I met a very intelligent young married woman, who had just achieved the honour of a degree *in absentia* from Aligarh University, the leading Moslem University in India which at that time had not admitted any women students. "Purdah is a great deal of trouble," she said, "a senseless system." She had taken up teaching in the girls' school in Hyderabad in order to have some way of filling her time. Having plenty of servants, the care of her home and her two children were not sufficient to keep her occupied and interested.

Delegates at the Istanbul Suffrage Congress, April 1935, were especially attracted to a young Moslem woman who arrived late at the Congress, as she had been detained in London by her final examinations for the M.A. degree, for which she had been studying for two years, while her son, twenty years old, was taking his B.A. degree. With interested delegates she shared freely her joy in her great adventure of an education. Brought up in strict purdah, she had had very little education before she was married at fourteen. As she was fortunate in having a liberal-minded husband, she had carried on her education after her marriage, and had finished the preparatory and college course. Her teacher, a man, taught her from behind a screen, as she was still in

purdah. She proudly displayed photographs of her husband and six children in Hyderabad—incidentally she was still only thirty-five years old—and her son in London. The most surprising thing about the whole story to me was the fact that the idea of leaving her husband at home with six children for two years while she took her M.A. seemed to her quite a natural idea. Furthermore, she was considering the possibility of accepting the position as the Head of a girls' school in a neighbouring city, which would mean a further absence from home. I found myself in the strange position of counselling conservatism to an Indian woman.

To conclude that such an avid interest in higher education and in a profession is typical would be, of course, far from the reality in India, but one is constantly surprised at the determination of some young Indian woman who overcomes the hazards against her securing further education. A case in point is that of a quiet young Moslem girl who insisted on being admitted to the Moslem University of Aligarh, a conservative institution not open to women. After much agitation and a good deal of adverse publicity, she was finally admitted to the M.Sc. laboratory, but not to the lectures which she takes with private tutors. These isolated examples of determined eagerness indicate what the power of many will be when Moslem girls can study in the normal way without the purdah.

As I have moved about India visiting schools, talking with schoolgirls and meeting women of all types in and out of purdah, I have been conscious not only of the growing desire for education but of the almost universal recognition of women's education as a major national need.¹ This general awakening of interest in girls' education is the result of a number of favourable influences, which have been present in India over a long period and have steadily led toward progress. The growing demand for more educa-

¹ The educational awakening has brought a steady increase in the registration of girls in schools and colleges.

In 1923-24 the total enrolment was 1,509,060.

In 1927-28 the total enrolment was 1,996,415.

In 1931-32 the total enrolment was 2,696,470.

tional facilities for Moslem girls to-day reflects in no small measure the effect of some of the non-Moslem communities. The Parsees because of their social freedom of women, the Brahmo Somaj community because of its aggressive social reforms, and the Christians because of their widespread facilities for education and the large number of Christian women pioneers in professional life have in different degrees helped to stimulate the social and educational advance of Moslem girls. A few outstanding Hindu reformers, men and women, have also undoubtedly exerted a strong influence in the advance of Indian women as a whole affecting Moslems as well as Hindus.

Undoubtedly one of the main forces that has steadily promoted the educational and social development of Indian women of all communities, has been the Christian institutions for girls. These schools were very often the first school for girls in a community, and to-day they still constitute a large part of girls' education in India. The study of progress in the education of girls and women in India, is virtually a study of the educational efforts of Missions. Certain institutions have had a special effect on the education of Moslem girls, notably the two Christian Colleges in North India already mentioned—Kinnaird College and Isabella Thoburn College, and the Women's Christian College in Madras.

The increase in Moslem students in Kinnaird College is a special indication of a breaking down of conservatism since the Government College observes purdah strictly. A growing number of Moslem fathers desire the more liberal type of education. In 1925 two Moslem girls, swathed in shroud-like white *burqas* were awarded their diplomas from Isabella Thoburn College which issues its diplomas at the convocation of the University of Lucknow. In 1929 three Moslem girls on the same platform received their diplomas, unveiled with all the other men and women students. Their names were read off in the alphabetical list and no one in the audience paid any attention to whether they were Hindu, Moslem, or Christian. Since that time all Moslem students have received their diplomas publicly in the Lucknow University. In the liberalizing atmosphere of

these colleges for women, such an advance is regarded as merely the natural result of a modern education.

Some of the men's colleges are also exerting a progressive influence on women's education. Forman Christian College in Lahore has admitted women students for a number of years. But only recently have Moslem girls availed themselves of the opportunity. To win over conservative parents is not always easy. Sometimes the family is divided on the subject, as in the case of the young Moslem co-ed, who attends Forman College with the consent of the father but without her mother's knowledge. Every morning she leaves home properly veiled and in a covered carriage, but at the entrance of the College steps out of purdah and attends classes unveiled.

Such a case may not be typical but is significant of the freer attitude toward education that is now growing in India. Foreign schools have played an important part in achieving this change. But there are other powerful forces, not foreign, which are having an effect on the advancing education for women. The increased pressure for social reform exerted through the Press, the efforts of individual leaders, and Indian organizations, social and political, are all definitely promoting as one cause—social reform and women's education. The two problems are in reality one problem. The Sarda Act establishing fourteen as the minimum marriage age for girls will help to prolong the education of girls and thus eventually decrease the growing disparity in education between men and women. Social reform efforts against purdah also directly promote the cause of education; for as long as purdah continues, education for Moslem girls labours under a heavy handicap. Only with the elimination of purdah can Moslem women reach the same educational level as that of women of other communities.

The major factor in the promotion of educational and social progress to-day is the influence exerted by Indian women themselves, both individually and through collective effort. A decade ago, only a few Indian women were conscious of their responsibility as a force for advance. To-day there is a growing number of educated leaders who are devoting themselves to the crusade of education for the

hundreds of thousands of uneducated women who, still behind the purdah, are voiceless to make known their needs.

In the small minority of highly cultivated leaders, who are advocates of education, one can single out from different parts of India the few outstanding Moslem leaders who are devoting themselves untiringly to the promotion of woman's education and social reform. Begum Shareefa Hamid Ali of Satara is working along many lines, one of which is an interesting plan for the education of village women in the Satara district. Mrs. Shuffi Tyabji as a member of the Bombay Board of Education has contributed very effectively to the development of schools in that city. In Northern India the pioneering educational work of Begum Abdullah, the founder of the Moslem Girls' School in Aligahr, is widely known. Through her quiet and determined effort she has raised this school to the status of an Intermediate College. These and other Moslem leaders, although a smaller group than the growing number of women leaders of other communities—Hindus, Christians, Parsecs—are playing a no less important role promoting educational advance. In order to make their work more effective, Indian women, as women elsewhere, have recognized the necessity for co-ordinating their work. A number of women's organizations in India have as their primary objective education and social reform, and through collective effort are influencing public opinion and official policy.

Viewed in the light of statistics, the appalling illiteracy of Indian women, the comparatively small number of girls in schools, the withdrawal from school of many girls after but one year, the growing disparity in education between men and women, the dearth of women teachers—and with all of these facts intensified in reference to Moslem women—the situation does indeed seem depressing. But the upward curve in the education of girls, Moslems as well as others, has begun. Official and private agencies are increasing the educational facilities for girls. The general public, including even the conservatives, has awakened to the need to educate girls as well as boys. The eager response of girls to these new opportunities is everywhere evident. Progressive influences, foreign and Indian, are working unitedly on this

common problem of education for girls. The most hopeful sign of advance of which Indian women themselves must be keenly conscious, is the fact that Indian women who a few years ago were behind the purdah, to-day individually and collectively through the Press and on the public platform, plead the cause of women's education.

CHAPTER XI

NEW EDUCATIONAL IDEALS OF MODERN EGYPT

THE visitor to Cairo is greeted on his arrival, as he passes out of the station, by a statue on the Station Square called *The Awakening of Egypt*. On his departure from Cairo this statue remains his last impression. *The Awakening of Egypt* is typified by an Egyptian peasant woman, a tall, commanding figure, and a sphinx. The woman has her right arm on the headdress of the sphinx, the left holds back from her face the lifted veil; her eyes are fixed on the future. This statue is a powerful representation of Egypt in transition. It represents an ideal rather than a reality, since Egyptian women as a whole are not yet prepared for the role which the dominant figure in stone suggests. The process of preparation, however, is being effected through the education of Egyptian women, which had a belated beginning, but is now steadily moving forward.

Due to the slow development of education, Egyptian women did not begin to emerge from illiteracy until after a spirit of nationalism asserted itself in 1919. Popular education, properly speaking, either for boys or girls, had its beginning in Egypt after that date. The previous unimportant position of education in Egyptian policy is shown by the fact that Lord Milner's book *England in Egypt* devotes only a few pages to education and the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* gives it barely a page in small type. Up to this time popular education meant for the most part native schools, largely under untrained and even illiterate teachers, whose main qualification was their ability to chant the Koran.

Under these conditions the figures for illiteracy (1920—male illiteracy 92 per cent; female illiteracy 99 per cent) and the disparity in education between girls and boys, are not surprising.¹ Many of the women teachers could neither

¹ *The Economic and Fiscal Requirements of Universal Education in the Kingdom of Egypt*, by Charles Partridge Russell, University of Chicago.

In 1920 there were only about 70,000 girls in all schools, Government

read nor write. Anything above elementary schools for girls was obviously not considered. The Government in 1920 had only five primary girls' schools with 843 pupils.

Since that time there has been a definite forward movement in education. The new Constitution of Egypt, proclaimed in 1923, provided for free and compulsory primary education, with 1935 set as the objective date for realizing this educational aim. Obviously this achievement has not been possible in such a limited period, but the country is moving toward that goal.¹ A comparison of the first decade from 1919 to 1929 shows an increase all along the line. To sum this up briefly, there were in 1929 in contrast to 1919 almost twice as many elementary schools, and more than twice as many girls in elementary schools; almost three times as many higher elementary schools with almost three times as many higher elementary students; nine times as many schools for teachers' training for elementary schools with a little less than six times the increase in students; three times as many kindergarten schools and seven times the number of children; four times as many primary schools and four times the number of primary pupils.²

This period marked also the beginning of secondary education for girls and the addition of a special college for girls; the transition from the old style *maktab* school, often held in a mere hovel and taught by an illiterate teacher, to a well-organized modern school under a trained teacher; and the introduction of modern kindergartens on the Froebel model. But the most significant progress of this first decade lies in the fact that it marks the beginning of modern education for girls and its advance from the elementary grade

and private; only 45 girls' schools out of a total of 3,600.—*The Egyptian Problem*, by Sir Valentine Chirol.

¹ Literacy in Egypt is slowly rising.

General literacy per 1,000 in 1917 was 118; in 1927, 197.

Female literacy per 1,000 in 1917 was 18; in 1927, 40.

² 1933-34 marks a continued increase in schools and pupils enrolled but there is still a marked disparity between girls' and boys' Government education; boys' primary schools, 54 schools and 14,439 students, compared with 19 girls' primary schools and 2,137 students.

Special Report of the Director of Girls' Education in Egypt, April 1929.
Egyptian Government Almanac, 1935.

to the college and university level. The real landmark as regards girls' education is the year 1925 when girls' secondary education was officially established.

Before 1925 a great gulf divided the status of boys' and girls' education. The fact that lower standards were required for teaching in girls' primary schools than in boys' schools, illustrated the inferiority of girls' education. Teachers for the boys' schools had to complete their secondary education before being admitted for teachers' training; whereas women teachers for girls' schools obtained the primary certificate after only four years' study in primary schools, and in addition the four years' course of a training college. Graduates of unusual ability were sent to England, but few won this opportunity, because of their short period of training and limited scope of knowledge. Girls not desirous of teaching suffered from the lack of general cultural values in the course. Egyptian leaders, however, have recognized the inadequacy of the preparation for teachers of girls' schools and the resultant inequality of the educational status of boys and girls, and have accordingly promoted the addition of secondary schools for girls.

To serve the two types of girls—those of the leisure class, desiring general education, and those preparing to teach—secondary education was differentiated into two types of courses. The Giza College was established for the former group and the Amira Fawzia School (1935), known as the Shoubrah School for the latter.¹ The addition of girls' secondary education was regarded as a doubtful experiment by conservatives, who questioned the capacity of girls to profit from equal education with boys. The examination results, however, not only have proved the equal ability, but often the superiority of girls. Later other secondary schools were established. These higher educational standards of girls' schools have forced up the level of the training of women teachers. The highest stage of women's education

¹ 1935—Secondary schools for girls: four in Cairo and one at Alexandria, a secondary section at both Assiut and Tanta. Number of pupils 1933-34: 1,420. The Girls' College at Giza in 1933-34 had 158 students and 55 in the kindergarten.—*Egyptian Government Almanac*, '935.

was reached when the Egyptian University was opened to women students. The first group of six entered the Medical Faculty in 1928; others later entered the Faculties of Arts, Law and Sciences. In 1932 the first three women graduates received their university degrees. This represents, since 1920, the progress from facilities for merely primary education for girls to the University on an equal basis with men. Higher education for girls is also provided in the Higher School of Fine Arts and the Institute of Education, which prepares girls for positions in primary and secondary schools.

Not the least significant feature of this marked educational advance in Egypt as elsewhere is the awakened desire of parents for their daughters, as well as their sons, to be educated. The value of education for girls as a basis for economic independence has been recognized in Egypt especially by the middle classes, more than in any other Moslem country except Turkey. The cultural and social values of girls' education, with reference to marriage, has also been appreciated; hence, the longer attendance in school has postponed marriage. Upper Egypt as a whole and towns like Zagazig, or Tanta in Lower Egypt have not yet passed through the full gamut of change which is so evident in the two great cosmopolitan cities of Cairo and Alexandria. The first period in Egypt as a whole has been largely concentrated on equalizing the education opportunities for girls with those for boys. The further growth in girls' education in Egypt will probably be measured more definitely by the criteria of the improvement in the content of education. The present emphasis and trends are an indication of this second stage of progress.

Some of the educators who are directing the policy of girls' education in Egypt, recognize the desirability of more differentiation in girls' education, especially in the secondary schools. The objectives of education for girls are not adequately met by the prescribed curriculum which was built to serve the needs of boys. Education of boys has been directed largely toward a Government job and therefore based on the "white collar and clean hands" idea of education. Such a system, which no longer fits the needs of boys,

is obviously unsuited for girls. The difficulty of achieving differentiation in girls' education, however, is obvious because of the hide-bound examination system. If equality in education for girls and boys means identical standards then differentiation in the girls' programme is impossible.

The important question is whether the special needs of girls can be met without sacrificing the principle of true equality. Opinion is divided on this subject. Some teachers advocate more attention to vocational education such as the industrial arts. An Industrial Arts Course is offered in the Elementary Teachers' Training Schools, but as a whole general vocational training is not yet considered necessary since the usual vocational lines, which constitute in the West the means of economic livelihood for the masses, do not exist for the Moslem girls. The girls' schools of Egypt are, of course, primarily geared to the needs of Moslems, because of the very large proportion of Moslems in the population. Commenting on the question as to the need for vocational training for girls, the Director of Girls' Education some years ago said: "The public is not ready for economic liberty for women. It will be another twenty-five years before women will be in many professions in Egypt. We are pushing vocational training for boys, of course, as an economic necessity."

A gymnastics exhibition of two thousand primary school-girls under the supervision of the Egyptian Directress of Physical Education, which I attended in Cairo several years ago, illustrated the development of physical education for girls in Egypt. The complete freedom of the Egyptian girls at that time seemed refreshing in contrast with the veil-restricted life of schoolgirls in most of the other Moslem countries that I had just been visiting. This exhibition, the Second Annual Exhibition of the Physical Education Department in Cairo was held in the Gezireh sports grounds before a very large and representative gathering. The children, with complete abandon and schoolgirl enthusiasm, carried out the varied programme, which showed incidentally the influence of the Supervisor's training in England—relay races and games, English country dances, drills and

marches. The Moslem Director was assisted by a group of teachers, all Moslems, a fact which one recognized by their neatly bound scarf headdress, which to the casual observer did not suggest a special Moslem style but gave only the impression of a distinctive fashion worn in preference to the hat. There was no suggestion of the veil or the psychology of the veil in their manner. And yet, one knew that it could not have happened a few years earlier in Cairo and at that time was possible in no other Moslem country except Turkey. To-day Iran, as we have said, also endorses this full measure of freedom. A few weeks later I attended the Annual Exhibition of an Assiut primary school, which was held under careful conditions of privacy in the school garden for an audience limited to women. But the enthusiasm of the crowd showed how completely the prejudice against physical activity for girls has been broken down by modern education, even though the veil still prevailed at that time in Assiut.

Although the Islamic social customs have greatly changed, modernism in Egypt has not meant secularism in the schools. The teaching of Islam in the girls' schools is still being carried on but in a modern way by young teachers trained in the tenets of their religion. The modern method of teaching religion in the Egyptian schools is appreciated in other countries. Palestine has occasionally turned to Egypt for a trained woman teacher of religion. The religious teaching in the training schools is given by sheikhs, not the elderly type as formerly, but often young sheikhs, some of whom have been trained in Europe. These younger sheikhs are the products of the new reforms of Al Azhar, the great intellectual centre of the Moslem world. The study of science and comparative religions in Europe can scarcely fail to have its effect. To-day the inclusion of the teaching of Islam in the school programme is a formal recognition of religion, one feels, rather than a vital endorsement of Islam, such as would characterize Moslem teaching in India. Girls in Normal School have always been supposed to keep their heads covered in classes taught by men, but this is no longer observed. Moreover, they do not now have the attitude of passive acquiescent deference before the sheikh

as in the past. Sometimes the sheikhs have to call in a woman teacher to help in discipline.

The freedom of the Moslem schools of Cairo to-day is in striking contrast to the general conditions fifteen or twenty years ago, as related by one of the English inspectresses, who had taught for a number of years in a private school in Lower Egypt. "Formerly the girls were always brought to school in covered conveyances; men clerks could not be employed. The girls were all closely veiled, visited very little even in the homes of girls with whom they had been special friends in school, and after their marriage rarely saw each other. There was no need for more than primary schools as early marriage was the rule. Contact with foreigners was very slight; in fact, the Egyptians were afraid of foreigners." This, she explained, was not true of Cairo, but of Zagazig, a typical large town in Lower Egypt. "When I opened the Girls' School in Zagazig twenty years ago," she continued, "the little girls were very much frightened. One little girl especially would not allow me to do anything for her for three days. Then when she finally allowed me to undo the little Koran amulet to wash her neck, I knew that her fear had been broken."

What a striking contrast to that day of seclusion and fear of contact one finds in modern Egypt to-day with its crowded primary and secondary schools and its public gymnastics exhibitions. The social conservatism of the authorities does not in any way seem to retard the educational development of girls. The schools remain technically in the frame of Islam, but each year the frame is widened. The modern spirit dominates in spite of the adherence to certain traditions.

Quite an interesting exception to the general lack of purdah atmosphere in Cairo schools is offered by Giza College, as I saw several years ago at a charming annual prize-giving, where no men guests were allowed. The very exclusive audience of women represented the *élite* of Cairo and the Palace, as several princesses attended, but not the Queen, who never goes out. All the conditions of purdah were meticulously observed. The reason was obvious in view of the high-class *clientèle* in close relationship with the Palace; the school enjoys the royal patronage and naturally

reflects the strictness of the Court. The prize-giving event, with its purdah atmosphere, reminded the writer of a similar event at Queen Mary's School for high-class Moslem girls in Lahore. But there was this difference—the next day the writer saw one of the charming purdah girls from Giza College on Sharia Soliman Pasha driving her own car and wearing a hat. Evidently the school does not induce the purdah mentality, although the illusion of the purdah atmosphere the day before had been quite complete.

This college for the aristocracy of Cairo, representing as it does the attempt of the Government to meet the needs of the leisured class, holds a unique position. It substitutes the group education of a first-class finishing school along very modern lines for the highly individualized private-governess type of education which a small upper-class group in Egypt and Turkey received in the pre-war period. While distinctly European in many ways, it stresses Arabic culture. Although emphasizing the cultural values in education, Giza College follows a modern concept of education in giving considerable attention to practical life subjects—civics, physical education, hygiene, child care, and domestic economy. This institution offers an interesting variation from the typical school which must meet the pressure of a fixed academic standard, and is making a distinctive contribution in giving preparation for efficient living to a number of girls of potential influence.

Another excellent girls' school in Cairo, also especially designed for the needs of the leisured upper-class group, but primarily for Coptic girls, was started a few years ago by private initiative. The programme is less of the type of a finishing school. Aside from these two distinctive institutions of the private-school type, education for girls in Egypt has been directed primarily toward the needs of girls of the middle-class urban population. As elsewhere in the East, education in Egypt, as far as girls are concerned, has not yet reached the rural area.

Visiting the villages along the Nile in Upper Egypt I found little evidence of change. The ideal of Ismail that Egypt should become a part of Europe may seem more or less a reality on Sharia Soliman Pasha in Cairo or even

more in Alexandria, but not in villages such as I saw near Assiut, which are unmistakably Africa, and trace their direct lineage from Ancient Egypt. Education has begun to touch the boys of the village and lure them away to the towns, but girls have not yet been affected by schools. The status of village women will remain unchanged long after the middle class in the cities has advanced, unless they can have some education. But only by a very slow process education is filtering into the villages, as the Nile mud seems to be an unyielding medium, which makes the separation of town and village in Egypt complete.

Undoubtedly, one of the greatest difficulties in promoting rural education in Egypt is the placement of teachers. As in India and elsewhere the difference in living standards and in social *mores* makes it practically impossible for young women teachers to live in backward village areas. Furthermore trained women teachers are reluctant to leave the interests and amusements of the large city. There are few special inducements offered for rural service; quite the contrary, in fact, as positions in Cairo are often given as the reward for merit and students of lower scholarship are sent to villages. This problem is a subject for serious consideration.

The most noteworthy advance in girls' education in Egypt during the last decade and a half has been the successful establishment of a trained teaching staff. The growth from two training colleges for women elementary teachers in 1920 to fifteen in 1934 with an increase in students from 447 to 1,132 shows that women teachers have been poured out in increasing volume.¹ In spite of the rapidity of the process a high standard of training has been maintained by the English supervisors and English principals of the training colleges. The teaching profession has been made especially desirable. Egyptian women students in the training schools have received free board, and free tuition and sometimes even a stipend; whereas men in training have had only free tuition. Women teachers have received better salaries in Egypt than teachers in any other part of the Near East, and often better than men in

¹ *Special Report of the Director of Girls' Education in Egypt*, April 1929; *Egyptian Government Almanac*, 1935.

Government service. As a result, the supply has caught up with the demand, and in the elementary colleges even exceeded it.

The definite Government endorsement of teaching has undoubtedly encouraged Moslem girls to enter the profession. Women have been given more official recognition in education than in any other field. A Moslem woman teacher some years ago was on the Government Education Board. One of the inspectresses of women's education recently commented on the number of women teachers in evidence at the Ministry of Education and called attention especially to their complete freedom of expression. "There is no feeling of inhibition before the Director of Education; in fact, most of the women teachers would be quite free to express an opinion even to the Minister of Education." The self-assurance and spirit of independence of Moslem women teachers in Egypt is especially worthy of comment because of the fact that Egyptian women have so recently entered professional life. Such an attitude is in sharp contrast to the hesitant attitude which is often characteristic of Moslem women of the old-fashioned type. The woman teacher typifies this new freedom of Egyptian women.

In the establishment of the teaching profession for women, the system of foreign scholarships has been an important factor. From 1922 to 1930 the number of scholarships for women increased from ten to forty. The increase of applicants (in 1930 there were 110 applications for only eight new places) has made possible more careful selection, first from each school, then from the best from all the schools. Moslems, because of their larger number of applicants, have a practical though not theoretical preference. Various lines of training are followed—Froebel kindergarten courses, Domestic Science, Art, Physical Training, and regular courses for the B.A. degree. These students are naturally sent to England because of the language and the general English basis on which education in Egypt is being developed. English headmistresses are now being replaced by Egyptian headmistresses, of whom a number have been chosen since the appointment of the first Egyptian headmistress, Mme Mansour Fahmy, a widely known educator.

One of the distinctive forces promoting educational advance for women in Egypt is the Feminist Union of Cairo which, from its inception, has promoted as one of its primary aims, equality of educational opportunity for girls, requesting first the opening of girls' secondary schools, later the admission of women into the university, and the granting of foreign scholarships to girls. Through lectures, a woman's magazine, and in various other ways the Feminist Union has sought to promote the intellectual and moral advance of women as a necessary preparation for political and social equality. The Feminist Union is also carrying on an interesting educational project—an industrial school where two hundred girls of the poorer class are given a general education, also domestic science, needlework and carpet making, as a means of earning a livelihood.

There have been some interesting developments in adult education in Egypt. Several years ago a very ambitious programme of lectures for women was promoted by a movement called the Reconstruction Education Movement. We have already referred to the lecture on the advance of women given by Madame Hoda Sharawi Pasha at the American University of Cairo. Lectures of this type are a regular part of the programme of the University Extension Department, which has as its objective the education of the public along lines that are of national interest. There can be little question of the educational and social influence of having a Moslem woman deliver an address on the status of women before a mixed audience of perhaps a thousand people with two hundred women and a large number of white-turbaned sheikhs.

Foreign influence has had a more pervasive effect on educational and social advance in modern Egypt than in any other country of the Near East, exerting its influence with less shock. "We are constantly changing our worlds shifting from East to West and back again" the Mayor of Alexandria said to me, as he hung up the telephone which had interrupted his conversation with me four times within ten minutes, and to which he had replied in Arabic, English, French and again in Arabic. It was typical of the *mélange* of foreign influences in Egypt. But French influence

has been dominant ever since Mehmet Ali imported the body of French savants and Ismail followed a policy of conscious exposure of Egypt to French culture. The second language is French, the atmosphere and prevailing culture is French. As far as women are concerned, the upper class especially has been greatly influenced by French styles and French culture through private education, social contact and travel.

It is interesting that British culture has not been the dominant influence in Egypt in view of the long period of occupation. At the present time, however, there is a distinct increase in English influence, which is exerted primarily through the public school. English specialists in education, English methods of education, Egyptian students studying in England, the general use of English in the schools—all these are significant evidences and causes of the increase in English cultural influence. The Anglo-Saxon influence has been, in general, very favourable to a growth in social freedom and the educational advance of women.

Anglo-Saxon influence has affected Egypt not only through English, but also through American channels, especially through the American Mission schools. Many of these institutions antedate the Government schools and have been an outstanding educational force over a long period. The first girls' school in Egypt was opened by an American Mission (1856) seventeen years before the first Government school for girls was established by Ismail (1873). The Assiut Mission School through educating a large number of Coptic women as well as a smaller number of Moslems had made education for girls in Assiut recognized as a necessity. The American College for Girls in Cairo, a junior college, the most advanced institution for girls in Egypt, has demonstrated the value of higher education and prepared leaders for various professional careers and for lives of general usefulness. The College has for a long period had a large proportion of Moslem students. The American institutions for men, Assiut College and the American University at Cairo, which admits women to its courses, have played an important part in promoting the advance

of women by educating young Egyptian men to a proper understanding of the position of women in society.

One can scarcely speak of Syrian influence as foreign in relation to Egypt because of the cultural unity between the two countries established through the language, but as an outside influence coming into Egypt, Syria has played an important part. A number of early Syrian leaders, who have contributed greatly to the thought life of Egypt, have now become entirely identified with Egypt. Syrian influence is recognized as a definite element of progress. An outstanding Syrian woman leader, a well-known writer, Mlle May Ziade, through her writing and speaking, has exerted a very constructive influence on the advancement of Egyptian women. The effect of modern Turkey on progress in Egypt, especially on promoting the development of women, has been less direct and obvious than in Iraq or Persia. Although the Turkish reforms have not been taken as a goal in Egypt as in other countries, there is, however, little question of the indirect effect of Turkey, as an example of a progressive Moslem country.

The day has passed in Egypt when foreign influence is needed to promote either directly, or by example, the appreciation of girls' education. On this question conservatives and progressives unite. National pride actuates modernists and reactionaries alike to promote education for girls as well as for boys as part of the programme of progress. Nationalism in Egypt is not merely a political passion. It has had the deeper meaning of a birth of national consciousness. This new spirit has generated the dynamic power for national advance. But unlike Turkey, Egypt has not considered advancement of woman as a *sine qua non* of national progress. Yet improvement in the status of women has been accepted as a natural part of the whole forward movement. The result is that an educated middle class of Egyptian women is being formed between the highly cultured rich Europeanized minority and the great unlettered masses of the fellaheen. The statue of the woman of the fellaheen typifying the Awakening of Egypt may eventually become more than a mere symbol.

CHAPTER XII

THE NEW ERA OF GIRLS' EDUCATION IN PALESTINE AND TRANS-JORDAN

WHATEVER may have been the troubled course of events in Palestine since 1919 with the attendant benefits and evils to different racial groups, education for Moslem girls has moved steadily forward. The same period may not show such marked social change, but the present conditions of education in Palestine compared with conditions in 1919 mark a very definite gain.

Under the Turkish régime very little attention was given to the education of Moslem girls. Some improvement began after 1908 with the opening of a few girls' schools by the Government. But as the language of the schools was Turkish, they had a limited effect in an Arabic-speaking country. For the great majority of Moslem girls education was confined as elsewhere to the very heterogeneous Koran schools. A few girls of the upper classes received from the convent schools a somewhat sketchy education, consisting of a smattering of French, and a bit of handwork and embroidery. A smaller number was given instruction of sorts at home, but the foreign governess did not play as important a role in Palestine, as in Egypt and Turkey, in bringing the education and culture of the West into the harem. Hence, comparatively few of the higher class Moslem girls in Palestine had any educational advantages.

The situation for Christian girls was quite different because of the large number of Mission institutions in Palestine. These Mission institutions practically left untouched the Moslem communities; hence, there was a great contrast in the educational advancement of Moslem and Christian women of the pre-war generation. This explains the fact that the literacy of women of the Christian community is approximately eighty per cent in contrast to five per cent for Moslem women. There is a similar difference in the literacy of Christian and Moslem men, of ninety per cent for Christians and ten per cent for Moslems.

The post-war period marks the beginning of the new régime in education for all, but especially for Moslem girls. Since that time a Government programme has been vigorously promoted and the Moslem community also has undertaken education for girls as well as for boys. The growth through the Government programme is clearly shown by the steady increase in the number of girls in attendance in schools since 1919. More than twice as many girls were in the Arabic public schools, the Government system, in 1932-33 as in 1920.¹ This increase in the girls in Government schools marks primarily an increase in Moslem girls who are being educated, since the great majority of Christians attend private institutions.

The lack of education for Moslem girls, however, is shown by the contrast between the number of Christian and Moslem girls in school. In 1932 a little less than half of the total number of girls in schools of Palestine, both public and private were Moslems, a fact which has special meaning since seventy per cent of the population of Palestine is Moslem.² A further evidence of the lack of education for Moslem girls is the difference in the number of schools for Moslem girls and boys, and also in the enrolment of each sex. In 1932-33 there were almost ten times as many schools for boys as for girls in the Arab public system, and in rural Palestine, one girls' school for thirty boys' schools. As to the enrolment the total number of Moslem boys in school in both public and private institutions, was four times that of Moslem girls in schools of all kinds.³ The difference between the education of Moslem girls and of Moslem boys

¹ *Palestine Department of Education Annual Report*, 1927-28.

1919. Boys enrolled in Arab public system: 8,419; Girls 2,243.

1932-33. Boys enrolled in Arab public system: 21,202; Girls 5,489. *Palestine Department of Education Annual Report*, 1932-33. All statistics quoted in this chapter are from this source.

² 1932-33	<i>Arab Schools</i>	<i>Christian Schools</i>	<i>Moslem Schools</i>	<i>Total</i>
Number of Moslem girls	4,321	1,211	1,679	7,211
Number of Christian girls	1,088	7,015	—	8,103
³ Number of boys' schools	270;	Girls' schools	29	
Number of boys' rural schools	244;	Girls' rural schools	7	

offers a significant contrast to the situation in the Christian community where there is practical equality in education for boys and girls.¹

Education for girls in Palestine is still in the primary stage. The Government policy has been to promote primary schools throughout Palestine for the masses before raising the level of education for the few, who may be ready for the higher grades. In carrying out this policy of promoting primary education, the Government is developing village schools as rapidly as the villages will assume the cost of buildings. The rural programme will benefit Moslems especially, as the rural population is very largely Arab. The great majority of rural schools, however, are as yet for boys. Moslem girls would receive more education if social conditions made possible co-education.

The policy of developing education in harmony with general needs is shown by the emphasis on practical subjects. There is as yet no vocational training except courses in domestic arts and home-making. In several places practical instruction in infant welfare is provided through visits of the students to the infant welfare clinic under the supervision of the doctor and trained nurse. In connection with the teaching of handwork and needlework, I was struck with the attempt being made to stem the tide of imitation of lurid designs in the worst style of the West and to emphasize the characteristic and beautiful patterns of Arabic art. Such teaching has a real social value as it may lead away from the wholesale imitation of the West in other things, and inculcate a proper appreciation of Eastern values. In addition to the Government programme, some private enterprises, such as the American Colony Industrial School, teach sewing and embroidery.

Emphasis in the Government schools is also given to physical education, singing and games, and drill. Inter-scholastic netball matches are held every year. All of this has met with a keen response on the part of the girls of Palestine judging by a very interesting exhibition of gymnastics that was given on short notice in a school that I

¹ Enrolment of Moslem boys in school . 28,990; Girls, 7,211
Enrolment of Christian boys in all schools 8,726; Girls, 8,110

visited in Ramleh. Detained for an hour by an automobile repair while on the way to Jaffa, I strolled unannounced into the village school. Visitors are evidently not an everyday occurrence, and having someone drop in on them unexpectedly was something of an event. The young teacher, a very attractive recent graduate from the Teachers' Training College in Jerusalem, had the children quickly put on their new drill uniforms, and stage a very vigorous demonstration. Their enthusiasm entirely refuted the idea that Moslem girls are not keen on activities.

The Girl Guide Movement has been very popular in Palestine. There are over one thousand Guides—guiders, brownies and rangers. All of the companies except the Y.W.C.A. companies, are connected with schools. The Girl Guide displays and prize-giving programmes are limited to women and must be carried on under careful harem restrictions. This curtails the out-of-door activities, but within the seclusion of the school the Guides are very active, as was illustrated at a Moslem school exhibition that I attended in which the Girl Guides in their picturesque Arab Guide headdress, the flowing *kafiyah*, were busily ushering, showing visitors the handwork exhibition, serving tea and displaying their general usefulness.

Training camps for leaders and small groups of girls which are held every year, make a marked appeal. A Western visitor to one of these camps finds it especially interesting to watch the arrival of Moslem Guides at camp; they arrive black-veiled and black-clothed and reappear from their tents completely different in their grey uniforms and picturesque white headdresses. This transformation is a symbol of the effect of the Girl Guide Movement, which unites girls of different religions and gives them all a wider, freer outlook.

In developing the general system of education for girls, Palestine faced the common problem of the East—the dearth of trained teachers. In 1932-33 there were only 172 women teachers in a total of 827 teachers in the Government schools. The special importance of the Teachers' Training College is, therefore, obvious and the growth of this college is an index of the steadily ascending curve of

girls' education. This institution, which has always had an English Principal, has shown a continuous increase in the number of students and especially in the proportion of Moslem girls (1919—total 23, 7 Moslems; 1935—total 63, 45 Moslems).

Some years ago it was necessary to take the Moslem girls free of charge. Only girls of the middle class, and those merely because of economic necessity, were willing to enter. To-day the inducement of free tuition is no longer necessary; the applicants for admission include daughters of some of the best families in Jerusalem. Hitherto teaching has been considered as a respectable profession, but in the general public mind no girl would enter teaching except as an economic necessity, and certainly no girl of social position would teach. The Training College is successfully changing this idea. In the beginning trained Egyptian and Syrian teachers were enlisted for service in Palestine. Now they are being replaced by graduates from the Training College. The need for primary teachers was so urgent that the requirements at the beginning could not be too high nor the selection of candidates too rigid, but now higher standards for admission are required and greater care can be taken in selecting candidates for training. A more advanced course has also been developed, in addition to the regular teachers' training, in order to meet the need for a secondary school for paying pupils.

In promoting this programme of steady growth the Teachers' Training College has been very careful to stay within the conventions of the veil, which are still widely observed in Palestine. There are of course Christian students who do not observe Moslem customs but the general atmosphere of the school is in harmony with Moslem ideas. By its distinctly harem conditions the Training College has achieved its primary objective of winning the confidence of even conservative Moslem parents, and attracting Moslem girls for training. Aside from the Director of Education, who visits the school freely, no men are allowed. But when the Director later visits the schools where the training students teach, often the teachers veil. This is an interesting contrast between Egypt and Palestine, as Egyptian

teachers have never veiled before the Directors on their visits to the schools. When other men visitors come to the Training College, the girls are told in advance and given the opportunity of veiling. The girls are not allowed to receive any male visitors except the immediate family or relatives. The commencement exercises, sports, contests, and other school gatherings have only women audiences.

For the classes in the Koran the girls all have their faces covered even though the sheikh is often an elderly man. In the Training College these elderly religious leaders have not been replaced by young sheikhs as in Cairo. But some of the girls' schools now have women teachers. It is safe to surmise that no ethical teachings along modern lines are injected into these Moslem classes in religion. Although the Training College carefully avoids promoting modern social or religious ideas, it is steadily laying the foundation for a future social freedom which seems inevitable. The impact of modern ideas is irresistible so that the individual girl is unconsciously being led toward social change.

In order that the excellent training given at the College may not be lost, a careful plan of supervision during the first year of teaching is followed and the final certificate is withheld until after that apprenticeship is satisfactorily completed. The allocation of graduates from the Training College to their teaching posts presents in Palestine as elsewhere a serious problem. Prevailing social attitudes make it difficult and often impossible for a girl to teach outside of her own village. Christian as well as Moslem teachers insist on teaching at home, or perhaps the parents insist. For example, the parents of a girl living in Safed were unwilling to have her teach in Tiberias, less than an hour's distance away. Moslem communities that are especially reactionary such as Hebron and Nablus, demand a Moslem teacher but social conditions make it difficult for a Moslem woman from outside to live in these places. Christian teachers often find difficulties in teaching in an entirely Moslem town where social conventions make life very restricted. For what might pass as harmless in Jerusalem is often considered to be questionable morals in a centre of greater conservatism.

To meet the need for teachers in the village schools, the Training College in Jerusalem has established a Rural Training Centre in Ramallah which is about twelve miles from Jerusalem. The curriculum includes mainly practical subjects—Domestic Science, Needlework, Gardening and Care of Poultry. All of the students for the first year, thirteen in number, are Moslems. The standard of living in the school is that of a village, with the same type of convenience but with an emphasis on health and cleanliness.

The Department of Education has established a small number of foreign scholarships for girls. Several have had training in Egypt, in the American University of Beirut, and in England. Palestine has not, however, promoted the foreign scholarship plan as vigorously as have Iraq and Egypt. The major task has been the training of women teachers for the primary schools, which is being achieved in the Training College in Jerusalem. Secondary education has not been undertaken and therefore the preparation of secondary teachers by training abroad has not yet been promoted. The suggestion that a Moslem girl should attend the American University at Beirut called forth from a prominent religious leader the shocked response: "God forbid! May I never live to see that day." However, a Moslem woman student has graduated from this co-educational university since that time and another will graduate in 1937.

In spite of evidences of conservatism, which one finds with interesting variation in different places, and in reference to different questions related to girls' education, there is to-day a general acceptance of the idea of education for girls as well as boys. Even in reactionary centres like Hebron a distinct change is evident as the demand stage had already begun in 1930, when the pressure for a new school was being felt. As the Hebron teacher explained to me on my visit to the school in that year, "Hitherto due to the very early marriage custom it has been difficult to keep girls in school for the whole course (two years' kindergarten and three years' primary), but this year eight girls are finishing," and she pointed with pride to the small group taking their final examinations. They had shyly drawn the scarf

over their faces as I was accompanied by the medical officer, the only man who was allowed in the school. Three of the group were taking the examination for entrance to the Teachers' Training College. The one chosen would be the first Moslem girl from Hebron to take up teaching.

The keen interest in girls' education in Jerusalem represents the other end of the scale from Hebron. The Directress of the Mamuniya School, a Syrian Christian, commented on the increase of Moslem girls in the upper grades, as shown in this leading Moslem girls' school in Jerusalem. "Not only is there a general desire evident to have girls in schools, but parents are beginning to show more actual interest in what education means," she said. "Formerly the girl came the first day and paid her fee; now the father or mother comes, pays the fee, asks all sorts of questions and wants to meet the daughter's teacher. Parents also show a keener interest in the exhibition days than before. Now crowds of fathers and mothers come, but, of course, on different days, as the harem idea is strictly observed."

Interest is also growing in education for girls beyond the elementary stage. As has been said the Government has not as yet provided secondary schools for girls. But the Teachers' Training College has a two years' course and the Jerusalem College for Girls and also the Friends' School at Ramallah offer secondary education. These two institutions represent Christian effort of a very high type; the Friends' School is a Mission institution, the Jerusalem College for Girls, a private Christian enterprise with missionary co-operation, and some Government support. The latter, founded in 1918, is the highest institution for girls in Palestine, offering a fourteen years' course, which extends from the kindergarten through the secondary grade to teachers' training and the first year of university. The American Friends' School for Girls in Ramallah, the first school for girls in Palestine, which was founded in 1869, has been a most convincing argument for girls' education. As a boarding school with girls from all over Palestine, its influence has been widespread and very beneficial.

Obviously these two private schools cannot long satisfy the demand for secondary education of girls in Palestine.

In the last decade of Government primary schools the number of Christians who have attended Government primary schools has increased and therefore the demand for free secondary education has grown steadily. Through the Government schools, moreover, an entirely new Moslem *clientèle* for girls' primary and therefore also for secondary schools has been created. To-day Palestine has passed beyond the period in which private schools can adequately meet the needs for girls' education. The growing demand for both primary and secondary schools is the real criterion of progress in girls' education in Palestine.

Aside from the educational facilities for girls, provided by Government schools and private Christian agencies, girls' education in the elementary stage is also being advanced by the Supreme Moslem Council, through funds from the mosque endowments.¹ More money is expended for boys' schools, but the necessity for girls' education is recognized, and also the need for education on modern lines, which is shown by the effort to secure well-trained Moslem and Christian teachers from Syria. In addition to the regular Government programme these schools of the Supreme Moslem Council stress especially Arabic and Islamic teaching. The objective in these schools, both for boys and girls, is to strengthen the Moslem influence and safeguard Islamic culture, which Moslem leaders have felt to be endangered by the Zionist influx since the Mandate. "Strictly Moslem education is necessary," as the secretary of the Supreme Moslem Council explained, "because the Government cannot give the Arabic language adequate emphasis; nor Moslem tradition its full value."

Although the veil is carefully maintained in these Moslem schools under the Supreme Council, the need for a modern programme and for modern methods of education is fully realized. Perhaps the realization of this need may be due to the consciousness of competition with modern aggressive non-Moslem elements, or to the effect of their example.

¹ 1932-33.

Boys enrolled in the schools of the Supreme Moslem Council, 8,919.

Girls enrolled in the schools of the Supreme Moslem Council, 1,679.

This includes 20 Christians (17 boys, 3 girls), 28 Druses (girls), 1 Jew.

Whatever may be the reason, well-trained teachers are employed in these Moslem schools; games, Guide activities, dramatics are all encouraged as a part of the programme. The Supreme Moslem Council has also taken a very advanced step in establishing a number of foreign scholarships for Moslem girls; four in Helouan Training College in Cairo, and one in the Sidon Mission School for Household Economics in Syria, the only school of its kind in the Near East. In addition to these foreign scholarships, a scholarship has been granted for nurses' training in the Jerusalem hospital.

The influences which are producing an active interest in girls' education on the part of Moslem leaders are an interesting complex of conflicting tendencies. Undoubtedly the presence of an aggressive Zionist minority, which is increasing in numbers and power, has affected the Moslem attitude and strangely enough along two opposing lines. The necessity for competition on an equal basis and consciousness of a lack of education and general Moslem lag, have spurred the Moslem community to progress. The contrast between the educational development of Moslem women with that of the women from other communities, also furnishes the urge to promote education for Moslem girls as a necessary part of their general advance. On the other hand, the presence of an entirely different civilization—nothing could be more different than the conservative Moslem and the modern Zionist—has aroused a fear of absorption, and has therefore produced a defence psychology that tenaciously protects Arab and Islamic culture; hence the extreme social conservatism of the Arab community in Palestine, which adversely affects the position of women.

A leading citizen of Jerusalem who voices the policy of the Supreme Moslem Council expressed very clearly this double motivation of progress and conservatism: "Zionism brought an awakening of national consciousness and a sense of necessity for social uplift which must affect women. To oppose Zionism we have realized the necessity for the same weapons that the Zionists have. The Jews maintain a high educational level both for men and women. Hence, to bring up the Arab level we must educate Moslem women.

But the Mandate power in giving protection to the Jews has made it necessary for us to safeguard Moslem traditions. The awakening of Arab interest has led us to re-examine the Arab religious sources and to keep the true idea of the veil."

The inner life of Palestine, until after the World War, was singularly unaffected by foreign influence. The Christian groups from abroad which were concentrated in Jerusalem did not fuse into the life of the country as a whole. The very fact that Jerusalem is the sacred city of three great faiths has always divided the community into compartments. The adherents of each religion leading segregated lives, Moslems and naturally most of all Moslem women, were quite isolated from the other currents of life, practically cut off from contact with the outside world. But the post-war period has brought Palestine as a whole, and especially Arab life, sharply into contact with modern forces. The impact of foreign influence has not aroused as keen a desire for change as in Iraq. But the insistent exposure to modern life is undoubtedly having its effect. The promotion of schools for girls as for boys by the Government has presented the opportunity and thus stimulated the desire of the Moslem community to advance. Education for girls will doubtless develop more slowly than boys' education, but the forward movement seems assured.

In Trans-jordan the fact that education is the third item in the Government expenditure is an evidence that it is of primary interest in this newly formed political entity but very old country. Schools in Trans-jordan under the Turkish régime were few and far between—seventeen schools for boys, four for girls, the traditional Koran schools. Practically all that remains of the Turkish school system now is the war-wreck of a rather good school building in Kerak, the former Turkish seat of government. The rest of the country seems to have been untouched by education save for a few Mission schools, which were and are very meagre in comparison with Mission schools elsewhere.

But the post-war period has brought to Trans-jordan, along with cinemas and automobiles, the development of education both for boys and girls. For girls especially, the

present period represents a clear gain over the pre-war period, and steady progress in overcoming the disparity between girls' and boys' education. Equal educational advancement of boys and girls is the aim of the Trans-jordan Ministry of Education—a difficult aim to achieve, as I learned in a conversation in 1930 with Adib Wahby, the Director of Education in Trans-jordan: "We realize that equality in education is necessary for the building of homes and the nation," he said, "but in a backward nation education for boys, because of its economic value, makes the main appeal."

Fortunately Adib Wahby has remained Director of Education for a number of years and has been able to witness the results of his efforts. In 1930 there were eight times as many boys' primary schools as primary schools for girls; to-day the proportion is three to one. There is as yet, however, no girls' secondary school but four for boys. In the beginning it was necessary to import women teachers from Syria and Palestine and pay them higher salaries than were paid to men teachers. The lure of the desert—Amman is just on the edge of the desert—did not appeal to the girl from Beirut or Jerusalem, accustomed to more "civilization." To-day over half the women teachers are from Trans-jordan, and their salaries are no longer higher than those of men. Progress in education has equalized the salary standards so that the women teachers have lost their advantage.

To attract Trans-jordan girls of the better class into teaching has apparently not been very difficult, as there is less prejudice to break down in this breezy town of Amman on the desert's edge than in many more sophisticated cities. Moreover the well-paid young teachers from outside, representing the latest styles of Beirut or Jerusalem, doubtless have made the teaching profession singularly attractive and *comme il faut* for girls of the first families. The difficulty in training Trans-jordan girls has been, until the present time, solved by scholarships in Jerusalem or Syria. Six girls are now (1935) studying in Jerusalem. But eventually there will doubtless be a training school for women teachers in Trans-jordan.

The danger of a purely academic education, unrelated

to the simple environment of Trans-jordan girls, is recognized. But a special Arts and Crafts school for girls, corresponding to the very modern Trade School for Boys, although frequently discussed, has not yet been achieved. Obviously the need for vocational training for boys is more clearly understood than home arts and vocational training for girls. Even though there is no special Arts school for girls, a creative interest in home arts is evident. The question as to whether in the embroidery and handwork classes Western models or Oriental Art should be developed, was uppermost in the Director's mind at the time of my visit. He had heard a criticism that the lurid, inartistic designs copied from the West are crowding out the Oriental patterns. "Of course, we all want the new things," he said, "and realize the necessity for modern improvements. Many things of the Orient no longer serve our needs. Still we can't afford to lose our own values. Our whole trouble in copying the West is that we have no proper models." Being asked my opinion I, naturally, expressed a strong preference for the Eastern models. The Director then commented on the fact that the West evidently appreciated Eastern embroidery, as he noticed my colourful handbag made of a strip of embroidery from a Bethlehem woman's costume. "Perhaps we can find adaptations of Eastern Art like that, suited for modern use," was his final remark.

Interest in education for Trans-jordan is not limited to Amman. Even in the very conservative town of Es Salt there is a general eagerness for education for girls. To the tourist to-day who makes a detour from the main highway between Jericho and Amman and visits Es Salt, there is little evidence of advance, as even many of the Christian women are veiled. But if one measures in terms of present and past contrasts, one finds signs that Es Salt has begun to respond to modern influences. "Formerly, it was considered utterly useless to educate girls," Dr. Purnell, for many years a missionary in Es Salt said. "Parents who educated their daughters were regarded as queer and were always asked the question, 'What do you expect your daughter to become—a clerk? Why should she know more than how to read? How can it help her in her home?'"

Moslems and Christians in Es Salt had much the same attitude."

Just as Sheikh Bani Hassan comes to Baghdad in his Ford and is infected with the idea that education may be a good thing even for a wife, so the Bedouins of Trans-jordan ride into Amman frequently, buy shoes, attend the movies and—request education; perhaps these are not unrelated ideas. A scheme of peripatetic teaching for the desert has been worked out, but is not yet applicable for women teachers. Following a nomadic tribe from one grazing spot to another with a portable school offers a unique opportunity for a new experiment in education. It will be interesting to see whether it leads the Bedouin more quickly to adopt a permanent abode. As the sons of the Bedouins come to Amman and learn to make furniture and shoes, or become teachers, they will undoubtedly be lost to the tribe and gradually the picturesque tribal life of the desert will change. One gain—though some may differ as to whether it is a gain or not—will be that the daughters of the desert will doubtless come in for more of their share of education.

In the promotion of the new educational programme Trans-jordan presents an interesting contrast to Palestine. In Trans-jordan the programme depends entirely on local initiative. The English Adviser for Trans-jordan has no direct relationship to internal affairs; such as, health and education. The primary interest of the Mandate in Trans-jordan is in the problem of security, without which, of course, there could be no constructive development along any line. The attention of the Mandate is centred in the air over Trans-jordan, rather than on the land itself, as the maintenance of the air route across the desert through Trans-jordan and Iraq is vital to the route to India. The English Adviser, although personally interested, assumes no direct responsibility for social or educational developments. In Palestine, education is directly promoted and administered by the Mandate under a more direct foreign administration than in any other country of the Near East. Efficiency of method and speed in promotion are the result. The desire of the people, however, under the direct foreign promotion

in Palestine is no keener than in Trans-jordan. To see girls' schools in out of-the-way spots in Trans-jordan and hear the Moslem Director of Education with such enthusiasm assert his belief in their necessity, makes one confident that the basis of social welfare is being well laid even on the rim of the Syrian desert.

CHAPTER XIII

MANY INFLUENCES PROMOTE GIRLS' EDUCATION IN SYRIA

"OUR greatest need is a national system of schools. Without this we can never be a nation," was the thoughtful comment of one of the young Moslem women leaders in Beirut. In Syria there is a lack of any united system of education and therefore a divergence of cultures and educational trends.¹ This means that there is not merely a difference between the backward and progressive sections as in other countries, but also a distinct variation in the type of education and culture in different parts of the country and even in the different communities in the same section. The Lebanon is different from the rest of Syria, and since a veritable *mélange* of foreign influences, it is thus highly divided in itself, with a difference between the Christian majority and the Moslem minority. Tripoli, Aleppo and Damascus are distinctly a Moslem world, very little touched by foreign contact. All of these differences in environment naturally have conditioned the educational development of Moslem women.

The lack of a single educational system has retarded the education of Moslem women much more than the Christian, especially in the Lebanon, since Moslem girls for the most part have not taken advantage of the many Christian schools. Before the war, a few Moslem girls of the upper class in the Catholic convent schools and the Protestant schools, were the great exception. Since the war the number of Moslem girls in foreign schools and in Moslem schools has increased but they represent a selected class, which are less conservative and not averse to foreign influence. The great middle class of Christians as well as Moslems has felt a lack of free public education, since the middle class in any

¹ The term *Syria* is used throughout to indicate the entire mandated territory. The term thus includes the Republic of the Lebanon, the State of Latakia, the State of Syria, Djebel Druze and Alexandretta.

country is cut off from educational advantages as long as there is no public system.

During the war, an interesting attempt was made to lay the foundation for a school system on definite national lines. The leading educator from Istanbul, Halidé Edib, was sent to Syria with a staff of fifty or more teachers to establish primary, secondary and normal education for girls. Schools were opened in Beirut and Damascus on very modern lines, with Arabic as the basis for instruction and French and Turkish as additional languages. This excellent effort, however, was brought to an abrupt close by the fortunes of war, but has left permanent results, as the present Government system is based on these schools.

Under the French Mandate, schools have been promoted through the local governments, on French and Arabic lines. An attempt is being made to standardize courses and certificates according to the French system. There has been no interference with the programme of foreign schools, although it is to the advantage of their students that the foreign schools meet the requirements of the French school certificates for different grades. The foreign schools have remained practically autonomous and constitute as a whole the major educational influence in Syria. The Government schools do not compete with the foreign schools; the main value of the Government system consists in its extension of education to the masses. The Moslem Philanthropic Educational Society has been recently developing facilities for secondary education of girls. Thus education on modern lines is reaching down further into Syrian life. Moslem girls especially are profiting from the development of Government schools. It is estimated that at least ninety-five per cent of the girls in Government schools are Moslems; since the girls and also boys of the Christian population, especially in the Lebanon, are educated in the various Christian schools, local and foreign. Hence the Government schools have had their primary benefit in reaching the Moslem community.

That this extension of education for Moslem girls is greatly needed, is obvious. Although the Moslem population of Syria is over one-half the total, the proportion of Moslem

girls in schools was only a little more than one-fourth of the total enrolment in 1928.¹ The hopeful feature in the situation, however, is the trend of increase. The number of Moslem girls in both the Government and private schools is practically a clear gain in view of the meagre pre-war Government facilities and small pre-war attendance of girls in private or public schools.² A distinctly constructive new factor in the situation is the active promotion of girls' education, both primary and secondary by the Moslem Philanthropic Education Society.

In addition to promoting primary education for girls, the Government has provided a certain amount of secondary and higher education for girls; in the Lebanon the New School with secondary grades and two years of normal training; in Damascus, a normal school and the Syrian University open to women; in Aleppo, a secondary school and normal school. Secondary education for girls in Syria is largely provided by foreign institutions, the majority of which are in Beirut. The beginning of secondary education in the Government school in Beirut is a hopeful trend, as it is primarily intended to provide secondary education for girls of the middle or poorer class, who cannot afford the private school.

The Government schools for girls in Syria give the impression of a decided mixture of French and Arabic. The atmosphere is distinctly French with Arabic as a second language and culture. In the kindergarten the picture of a French kitchen, a French home, a French barnyard, build up the child's vocabulary in a French atmosphere. The group of little five-year-olds sing with great enthusiasm *C'est la musique du Moulin*. But they also sing with equal

¹ 1928: total enrolment of girls in schools in all Syria	54,145
enrolment of Moslem girls	14,208
enrolment of Christian girls	39,937
Total population of Syria	2,139,182
Moslem population of Syria	1,593,000

Bulletin Annuaire for Syria, Premier Trimestiel, 1929.

² 1928: enrolment of Moslem girls in Government schools was	13,228.
enrolment of Moslem girls in non-Governmental schools,	1,920.

Statistical information secured from the French Inspectress of Girls' Schools.

fervour the anthem of the Lebanese Republic, a good example of Syrian adaptability.

The Moslem community in Beirut has shown definite interest in education for girls in establishing (1926) the Moslem Girls' College, which is a privately supported primary and secondary school, designed to give a thoroughly Arabic education with less emphasis on French. The first Principal was a graduate of the British Syrian Training College in Beirut. Under the present leadership of the Syrian Principal, Miss Alice Kandeleft, who was formerly the Principal of the Baghdad Central College for Women, the Moslem Girls' School has the benefit of American educational methods, as Miss Kandeleft has pursued graduate studies at Columbia.

This school is specially interesting because of its infusion of new life into a conservative atmosphere. The Moslem tradition of seclusion is carefully observed; all the older, and even some quite young girls are veiled and men visitors are not admitted. But this institution does not follow conventional lines. When I had a brief glimpse of the school several years ago at a recess period, the atmosphere seemed charged with vitality. The playground was alive with Moslem girls absorbed in play. The departure from the educational tradition centring around classical literature, and the emphasis on an education for richer living is very significant. The interest in group activities was obvious in the attitude of the girls. The courses in Household Arts include in addition to the usual domestic science, subjects of modern emphases; such as, Physics of the Household, Home Management and Home Budgeting, Interior Decoration, Dress and Social Mathematics. It is interesting to note that in addition to the special course in Household Arts the school has carried the regular curriculum and met the French secondary school requirements, achieving a high record through the success of its students in the Government examinations. The steady growth in the school since the beginning shows the very favourable response of the Moslem community of the middle and upper class to modern education for girls.

The alumnae association of the school, recently organized,

is carrying over into the community the educational value of the school. Such an association serves a special purpose in view of the fact that Moslem girls after leaving school, which is usually not later than the fifth grade, are cut off from any educational influences. The eager and grateful appreciation of some of these ex-primary schoolgirls throws light on the empty veiled leisure of the average Moslem girl's life.

Another private school organized on Syrian initiative, which has contributed modern values to the education of girls, is the Syrian National School. This school was organized by a very capable Syrian woman, Miss Marie Kassab, and is largely supported by a Syrian Christian group. Although the *clientèle* of this school has been primarily Christian, there have always been a number of Moslem girls, not only from Syria, but from Palestine. This was especially true before other facilities for the education of Moslem girls were available. The *raison d'être* of this school is to give a thoroughly Syrian education based on Arabic and developing an appreciation of national as well as foreign culture. The present Principal, Miss Wadad Khuri, a graduate of the American University of Beirut, has had graduate study in America.

The schools of Beirut both under Syrian and foreign leadership, are not typical of Syria as a whole. Damascus and Aleppo, cities of fairly equal size, and Hama and Tripoli, two smaller places, offer a typical composite picture of the present status of education for Moslem women in these other parts of Syria, where education for Moslem women has not received special attention. In Damascus with its rich legacy of Arabic culture and pride as a treasure city of Islam, girls' education must be developed within the restrictions of the veil, sedately limited to ladylike activities and under the surveillance of a strict public. The extension of the range of girls' education to include normal school and university privileges indicates progress, as does also the number of Moslem girls able to avail themselves of these educational opportunities.¹ A further advance

¹ 1935.—In the University of Damascus three Moslem women students are studying medicine; one is studying dentistry; there are none in the law school; over half in the midwifery school are Moslems.

in women's education is the fact that foreign scholarships are now available for Moslem women as well as men. A Moslem graduate from the Damascus Normal School was sent several years ago to France to the Sèvres Teachers' Training School for a three years' course.

Unlike Damascus, Aleppo has no cultural traditions of Islam to safeguard and as has been said is more receptive to change. The actual educational situation, however, differs very little from that of Damascus. There is a distressing lack of education as a whole and especially a lack of education for girls, as this is usually an afterthought.¹ The meagre provision for education heightens the significance of any signs of change. The post-war period in Aleppo from 1919 to 1929 shows a continuous growth in girls' education, which is signalized by the opening of a number of primary schools and a girls' *lycée*, an increase in normal school graduates, and the entrance of girls of very good families into the teaching profession. A Moslem woman student from Aleppo was sent to France (1929) on a Government scholarship to take teachers' training.

The comparative freedom from the veil in girls' schools indicates a modern tendency in Aleppo which is quite different from that in Damascus. Because of the lack of women teachers for secondary schools, the *lycée* has only men teachers. This has not, I was told, interfered with the attendance of Moslem girls. During a conversation with the Director of Education in Aleppo, a Moslem teacher called unveiled and discussed very freely her special school problem with him. Commenting on the absence of the veil, I was told that in the wearing of the veil, a distinction has been drawn, both for students and teachers, between the official business character of the school and purely personal outside social relationships, so that the veil is freely discarded in the school but often still retained in private life.

In striking contrast to the atmosphere of freedom in

¹ In 1930 out of a population of 600,000 living in 1,200 towns and villages there were less than 19,000 in school, including the city of Aleppo. Only about half of these school children were Arabs, the rest were Armenians.

Information from the Director of Education for the Aleppo Area.

girls' schools in Aleppo, the prevailing atmosphere of curtailed seclusion in Hama allows no latitude for schools as to the veil. Even Christian women as well as Moslem have always veiled at all times until recently. Naturally education for girls has been greatly affected by such extreme conservatism. But even here some change is evident. A few years ago there was only one inferior school for girls with an untrained teacher; now there are several with very good teachers, graduates from the Damascus Normal School. A school recently opened by the nuns has among its sixty students several Moslem girls of eighteen years, which for Hama is most remarkable. But apparently education has had little, if any effect on the veil. A veiled teacher in Hama supervising a kindergarten playground made a lasting impression on me, but to a citizen of Hama this seemed merely an inevitable part of the accepted custom of the veil.

Tripoli, which is half-way between Hama and Beirut geographically speaking, is much nearer Hama in general attitude. The Christian as well as the Moslem community is under the restraint of a conservative environment which is illustrated by the fact that Christian girls in a Y.W.C.A. Reserve Club from the Mission School cannot be in the streets alone as late as seven o'clock. There are, however, quivers of change in Tripoli, which one sees registered in certain small happenings at the American Mission School for Girls, which was for many years the only girls' school in Tripoli. Moslem men are beginning to realize the inadequacy of an uneducated wife, want their daughters to be different and, therefore, enrol them in the school. A Moslem graduate of 1925, bored with the prospect of idly "sitting at home," volunteered to teach, which was not unlike dropping a bomb in such a conventional atmosphere. Some married graduates of the school now call occasionally at the school with their husbands, a great advance since formerly a woman could not be seen in the street with a man. Such insignificant details of change are merely like faint ripples on a broad stream, but even such faint hints of new attitudes show the permeative influence of a modern school. Recently Tripoli has been exposed to modern

influences through the economic development of the Iraq oil pipe-line. Eventually this will doubtless cause a change in the conservative social atmosphere.

Those who are in touch with the problem of girls' education in various parts of Syria, it is interesting to note, find certain similar signs of progress, however different the actual situation may be. The growing interest of Moslem parents and the eagerness of Moslem girls and women for more education are the main criteria of change throughout Syria, just as elsewhere in the East.

A Moslem Principal of a Government primary school attended by many children of the lower middle class, summed up for me her interesting impressions of hopeful recent changes in education mentioning especially the new attitude of the parents. "They send their children, not to get rid of them," she said, "as was formerly the case, but because they are really concerned about the child's welfare. Parents visit the school, are eager to discuss their children with the teacher, and co-operate with the school in promoting the child's welfare. Formerly, many parents were a handicap to the child and to the school because of the irregularity of home life in matters of food, hours for sleep, and lack of discipline. Now more of the parents appreciate the value of regular habits for children, are also interested in the appearance of their children, and even complain to the school if the children come home less cleanly than when they left. Formerly we sometimes had to send children of the poorer families home because of lack of cleanliness. Parents are also beginning to appreciate kindergartens and modern nursery schools, and are willing to pay fees for these opportunities."

A Moslem teacher in a Government school called attention to the fact that girls are not satisfied to leave school at an early age and "sit at home" waiting for marriage, as was formerly the case, but insist on going through the four or five years' course, and then ask for more. A Principal of a private school for girls, a Syrian Christian, in close contact with the Moslem community, told me that she had been deeply impressed by the persistence of certain older Moslem girls to attend school, in spite of the fact that their

families were very reactionary. One girl of twenty-five, who had been taken from school at eleven, came to ask if she could enter the school. As it was necessary for her to come without her father's knowledge, she came late, after he had gone to business; left early, and on Friday, the Moslem Sunday, was always absent, as the father remained at home on that day. The rest of the family and the neighbours kept her secret. At first she was ashamed to expose her ignorance as she had to begin her A B C's in a class of little children, but in her eagerness to learn, she soon forgot her embarrassment. Her steady progress in acquiring Arabic education and some knowledge of English has given her a great sense of achievement. The father is still out of the secret. "Why tell him?" she says. "He has an old mind which cannot change."

Another illustration of the eagerness of a young Moslem woman for a belated education was cited, which reminded me of other parts of the Moslem East, especially India. A young married woman entered the school to learn to read, eager to make up the disparity in education between herself and her husband. Fortunately, he had the same desire and gave her money for her education. Her course was interrupted by pregnancy, but then resumed, and continued until she had achieved an elementary education. This meant not only a personal satisfaction but also allayed her fear of a divorce. "My husband," she said, "might have grown tired of an illiterate wife."

A bird's-eye view of girls' education in Syria leaves a cumulative impression of foreign influence. There is little question that the best educational facilities for girls in all stages—primary, secondary and college—are afforded by foreign institutions. Before the war these schools were largely attended by girls of the Christian community; since the war there has been a marked increase in the attendance of Moslems.¹

Through these foreign schools two broad streams of

¹ In 1928 the number of Moslem girls in all foreign schools was about 2,000—in French convent schools 874, in American schools 301, in English and Danish each 183.

Information from the French Inspectress of Schools.

influence are shaping the lives of Syrian girls, which together with the parallel influence dominating men's education have developed two very distinct cultural divisions—the Latin, primarily French, but also Italian, and the Anglo-Saxon, English and American. Unlike any other country of the Near East, Syria, especially the Lebanon, offers a complete choice of influence; Beirut is a rich emporium of foreign education with its corresponding cultural effect. The Syrian parent has only to pay his money and take his choice as to whether he desires his son or daughter to dress, think and act in French or Anglo-Saxon fashion. This cleavage in culture among the different elements in Syrian life presents a serious danger of disintegrated personality both for the individual and for national life. It is for this reason that the American University of Beirut and a number of mission and private schools are opening up new courses to train Lebanese students for their Government examinations.

Before the war, the majority of Moslem parents sent their daughters to foreign schools, primarily the French convents. Since the war, American and English schools have also been popular with the Moslem community. The increase in the numbers of Moslem girls in schools other than the convents, indicates a marked shift in the type of influence to which girls are exposed in the formative adolescent period. In general the convent gives little scope for the development of initiative and maintains the seclusion of girls, preserving the atmosphere of a harem. The numerous Anglo-Saxon schools, whether American or British, with their emphasis on individual and group activity, and wholesome outdoor sport and with their general atmosphere of freedom, open up another world. The attendance of Moslem girls in such schools since the war is therefore of more than passing interest.

Two Anglo-Saxon schools in Beirut which have had an especially widespread influence over a long period are the British Syrian Training College and the American School for Girls of the Presbyterian Mission Board. Both of these schools have been primarily identified with the Christian community but recently have contributed more definitely

to the education of Moslem girls.¹ The range of the influence of these schools has in recent years been greatly widened in that the Iraq and Palestine Governments send practically all of their scholarship students for teacher training to these two institutions.

Schools such as these offer an interesting index of the present attitude toward secondary education for girls. According to one of the teachers at the American school, the marked change in the parents' attitude toward their daughters' education, is shown by the fact that there is much less of the "she's yours" attitude, which was formerly a common expression when a Moslem girl was brought to the school. The keener interest shown by educated brothers toward their sisters' education is also interesting. Perhaps, however, not all brothers are as solicitous for their sisters' welfare as one student at the American University of Beirut, an Iranian from Abadeh, in the heart of Iran. On returning from his first summer vacation, he brought his sister back with him, threw away her veil, bought her a hat, had her hair bobbed, and then turned her over to the American school to teach her English and complete the modernization process. The results were highly satisfying to the brother and sister, as she completed the Mission school course, also the Nurses' Training Course at the American University Hospital and has now returned to Iran for useful service.

In the field of practical home art education, the American Mission School at Sidon is making an interesting demonstration, the most distinctive institution of its kind in the Near East, excluding Turkey. Because of its emphasis on the preparation for home-making rather than for a professional career, the Sidon school since its opening (1927) has made a special appeal to the Moslem community.

¹ The British Syrian School between 1925 and 1930 had ten Moslem graduates out of a total of ninety-four. The American Mission School had its first Moslem graduate in 1909; no other Moslem graduates nor Moslem students till after the war. In 1928 there were twenty-one Moslem girls, or about one-quarter of the total enrolment.

Information from the Principal.

1933-34.—The American Girls' School had forty-one girls on foreign scholarship, a number of whom were Moslems.

Information from the Principal.

Moslem girls average over one-third of the total number in the school. The Supreme Moslem Council in Jerusalem has sent a Moslem girl on scholarship to this Mission School.

Quite a different type of educational influence in the Lebanon is the social and character-building programme for women and girls which is being carried on by the Y.W.C.A. in Beirut. American in its initiative and under American direction through the formative period, the Beirut institution has now become domiciled in Syria, and represents a co-operation of Syrian and American leadership. Its distinctive educational approach consists in its programme of informal education, presented through classes and activities of various types. Its definite emphasis on group relationships has distinct values in character development, especially needed for the Syrian girl, whose life has been highly individualized. Supplementing and building on the basis of the Mission schools, the Y.W.C.A. offers girls a closer knowledge of the community and opens up new channels of creative self-expression and social service. Although its primary objective is to develop Christian leadership, the Y.W.C.A. is not limited to the Christian community, as Moslem girls participate in the activities. The Y.W.C.A. has close contact with the different Syrian schools as well as those under French and Anglo-Saxon influence in Beirut, and in its outreach also touches schools in other parts of Syria—Damascus, Aleppo, and Tripoli.

The need for higher education for girls, Christian and Moslem, is being met by the American Junior College for Girls, and by co-education in the American University of Beirut. Originally a part of the American Girls' School, the Junior College is now an independent institution, preparing girls to enter the Junior Year of the University of Beirut. Its influence is steadily increasing.¹ As the highest institution for girls in the Arabic-speaking countries, exclusive of Egypt, the Junior College attracts students from Iraq and Palestine on Government scholarship and also

¹ The Junior College enrolment in 1925, the first year, was seven; in 1934, ninety including thirteen Moslem girls. The Junior College in 1934 had twenty scholarship students from Iraq and Palestine.

Information from the Principal of the College.

on private support. Of the twenty-five Moslem graduates from the Junior College, a number are holding important teaching positions.

Aside from the regular academic college course, the Junior College stresses home-making, health, recreation and community service, such as a special club project for a group of forty to fifty homeless Moslem boys. Summer programmes of village welfare carried on in the Lebanon villages, by groups of Moslem and Christian students under faculty supervision, illustrate a creative approach to major problems of rural education. Such attempts to bring students in direct contact with backward village life, may have a helpful bearing on the problem which is caused by the growing cleavage between the educated urban minority and the under-privileged rural population, one of the critical problems of the East as a whole.

Co-education at the American University of Beirut has met with a favourable response as is shown by the increase in numbers each year, although the demand for higher education for women is still very limited. Of the twenty-eight women students in 1934, two were Moslems. The first Moslem woman graduated in 1929, Madame Ihsan Shakir el Kousy, an Egyptian, whose example doubtless encouraged other Moslem women students to enter a co-educational university. The fact that she was studying with her husband, prevented any adverse reaction to the idea of an unveiled Moslem woman attending classes with men. Co-education for Moslem girls is still distinctly in the pioneering stage in Syria. There is perhaps little awareness of its significance; in some quarters there may be active opposition. But the student body has accepted co-education as an established fact, recognizing women students on an equal basis, as members of the same classes with men, and in the normal relationships of study and discussion group contacts. Women share also in student activities and also hold student offices; for example, a woman student, the only one in a class of fifty, recently was elected class president.

Under the aegis of the American University of Beirut there is a certain amount of mixed social life, as yet an unfamiliar experience to most of the students, both Christian

and Moslem. It is, however, easily accepted without question that the co-eds—Moslems as well as Christians—use the University tennis courts and other recreational advantages. Moslem girls are more on the fringes of mixed social life than the Christian students for whom co-education represents a much less radical break with past tradition. Through the normal growth of co-education in the University, the student body as a whole is benefiting from the gradual development of a new social code under very favourable conditions. The American University of Beirut is without question one of the great constructive educational and social forces in the East, benefiting the cause of Moslem women by the constructive influence which it exerts on students from all over the Arabic world. With a student body of over twelve hundred drawn from Egypt and Palestine, Transjordan and Iraq, and even Iran and Bahrein in the Persian Gulf outside of the Arabic area, an institution such as the American University of Beirut, based as it is on sound scholarship and high ideals, cannot fail to have a far-reaching effect.

Viewing the present situation of education in Syria with special reference to Moslem girls, one is conscious of a general awakening of interest, not only in advanced but in backward areas, and a slow but sure advance from the primary school to the university. Foreign influences have played a larger part in this advance in certain areas of Syria than in any other Eastern country. The absence of foreign contact in some parts explains perhaps in large measure the greater divergence in Syria in the development of different sections than is characteristic of other countries of the East.

The same personal motives as elsewhere are impelling the Moslem community in Syria to desire education for girls. The growing awareness of the disparity in education between men and women; the marriage motif, which causes parents to realize the impossibility of their daughters' making a good marriage unless educated; the presence of the more advanced educated Christian community, especially in the Lebanon, which stimulates in Moslem girls and women the desire for progress; the urge to adopt modern ideas, due

to the irresistible pressure of Western life; and finally the spirit of keen nationalistic self-determination and aroused self-respect—these are the conscious and unconscious motivations for progress in Syria. A composite of progressive influences and personal desires is thus actively operating in favour of the educational advance of Moslem women of Syria.

The forces for education are not, however, *pari passu* leading to an immediate social transition as symbolized by unveiling. Nationalism under a Mandate Power is driven back into itself and seeks defence for its own traditions. The assertion of self-determination which is politically discouraged finds its outlet in the insistence on its own social conventions. The Moslem community in Syria and Palestine, in the presence of foreign influences, tends to become socially conservative; and social conservatism in Islam is not conducive to a change in the social status of Moslem women. Although the social reforms are not being actively promoted in Syria the present forward movement in education, it seems safe to believe, will be the necessary prelude to social advance.

CHAPTER XIV

TURKEY ACHIEVES MODERN EDUCATION FOR GIRLS

ON the second anniversary of the entrance of the victorious Turkish army after the evacuation of the Allied Armies in 1923, the long and impressive military procession of seasoned war veterans was followed by a very different procession, no less impressive and no less enthusiastically cheered by the thousands that lined the streets—the procession of hundreds of schoolboys and girls, and students from the university. The significant feature of this second procession was the fact that these long lines of schoolgirls headed by their teachers, appeared publicly as a part of a great national demonstration, wearing for the first time school caps or hats, and not the scarf headdress of the old régime. As I watched from our balcony in Taksim Square these two processions in unbroken line, the one merged in the other, it seemed to me a striking symbol of the part that girls and women play in modern Turkey and the importance of education in fitting them for their new role.

It would be a fallacy, however, to believe that education for girls in Turkey was the sudden product of the new régime. The almost passionate drive to educate the masses is the distinct result of the new republic, but a period of preparation came before. A few Turkish women of the upper class began to receive the private cultural education of the home soon after Turkish men came under the influence of French ideas, even as far back as Mahmud the Great (1809-39). Later, during the period of the *Tanzimat* reforms (1839-79) foreign governesses were introduced into the harem for the privileged few. Even the severity of Abdul Hamid could not stop the flow of Western influence, although it dammed up the outlet and made the open acceptance of Western ideas and attendance at Western schools difficult, especially for girls. But the few pioneers, like Halidé Edib, persisted secretly and oftentimes at real personal danger.

For the great majority of Turkish women, however, aside from the Koran schools and a girls' normal school for training elementary teachers, attended primarily by orphans and poorer girls, there was no real educational provision for girls, until after the Constitution in 1909. The first serious efforts at more than mere elementary education for girls came in 1913 with the establishment of a co-educational or secondary school for girls by Bayan Nakiye Elgün, for over thirty years the outstanding educational leader of Turkey, now a Deputy in the Grand National Assembly. The extension of primary education followed, and also the reorganization of the *Evkaff* (Mosque Foundation) schools was undertaken and effectively carried out by Halidé Edib and Bayan Nakiye. These schools were consolidated in 1916 under the Ministry of Public Instruction.

The adverse fortunes of the World War, the period of despair and defeat that followed, the Allied Occupation, the Turkish struggle and triumph in the Greek War constitute the all-absorbing later sequence of events, in which the interest in education was lost in major issues. Then came the birth of the New Nation, and the realization of the necessity for strengthening its foundations. Under the new régime, education has been assumed as a vital national responsibility; and, as a consistent part of the promotion of general education, girls' education has moved steadily forward. The decade between 1913 and 1923 shows a gradual development and improvement of girls' education but with no distinctive change in direction.¹ The next decade between 1923 and 1933 reflects not only the strenuous drive for increasing girls' education, but also the introduction of co-education. Most of the elementary education for Turkish girls is now provided through mixed schools.

✓The increase of girls in schools in the decade from 1923 to

¹ 1913 to 1923 shows an increase of one-third in girls' elementary schools; and one-third in enrolment of girls in elementary schools; the addition of a girls' *lycée* and a normal school for women; and a small increase in women teachers. Information from a member of the Council of Education, Ankara.

1933 is remarkable,¹ as is also the fact that the rate of increase of girls in the elementary schools has been greater than the rate of increase of boys; and, in the secondary stage, the growth in the number of boys and girls has been practically equal. The increase in school attendance, as marked as it has been, does not, however, represent adequate school provision; for a school population of at least one and a half million, there are only school facilities for a little over half a million.

Furthermore, the fact that the rate of increase of the girls' enrolment has compared favourably with that of boys does not mean that the education of girls and boys has been equalized.² In 1933-34 there were two boys for each girl in the elementary schools; three boys for each girl in the intermediate schools, and five boys for each girl in the *lycées*. Because of this disparity between boys and girls' education in Turkey as elsewhere in the East, although in Turkey the disparity is much less—the real task of education is not merely to provide equal facilities for boys and girls but more for girls. This fact has been clearly recognized. As the former Minister of Public Instruction, Husni Bey, said in discussing this problem: "It cannot be a question as in the past of providing for girls *after* the needs of boys have been met. If there is any question of *after* in Turkey to-day, it must be the boys after the girls."

As a primary means of solving this tremendous problem of the disparity in the education of girls and boys, Turkey adopted co-education in 1925, beginning with the elementary

¹ The first decade of the New Republic shows a marked growth in the education of girls from the primary grade through the university.

<i>Girls attending schools</i>		
	1923-24	1933-34
Primary	62,954	205,922
Secondary	2,072	11,376
<i>Lycées</i>	612 (1924-25)	2,321
University	285	933
Vocational Schools	592	990
Normal School for Primary Teachers	782	2,537

Information from Basvekalet Istatistik Umum, Mudurlugu-Maarif Istatikleri, 1933-34, Ankara, Devlet Matbaası, Istanbul.

² Information from the Ministry of Education, Ankara.

schools, later introducing it to a certain extent in other stages. The success of co-education, as a national programme is shown by the rapid increase of girls in primary schools, an achievement which would have been obviously impossible under the system of separate schools because of the double expense as well as the lack of teachers. In the adoption of co-education Turkey differs from all other Eastern countries, which have not yet cut the Gordian knot of their difficulty in promoting general education and especially education of girls. A trip through Asia Minor from Marash to Marsovan several years ago revealed how widely co-education is being extended. Very often in the villages and towns of the Interior, my attention was caught by a brand new white building—the new school. To-day, new schools, rather than new mosques, are being built everywhere in Turkey. These represent increased facilities for girls' schools, as for boys', and also new centres of community life. The rapid extension of these mixed schools is a major pre-occupation of modern Turkey.

• Strangely enough or perhaps naturally enough, co-education has been introduced especially in the Interior rather than in Istanbul. The primary reason is doubtless economic. The only possibility of extending education has been through the economy of mixed schools. Hence, not only primary but also some middle schools and *lycées* in the Interior are co-educational; whereas in Istanbul there are separate girls' middle schools and *lycées*, and co-education has not replaced the already well-established system. But if new schools are built in Istanbul as elsewhere they will doubtless be co-educational.

In addition to its economic value, co-education is serving a definite purpose as a leverage in lifting social conditions, especially in the Interior. Since one still sees veiled women in Asia Minor, the idea of co-education may seem strangely incongruous, but the very fact that the veil has not entirely disappeared in the Interior is a logical social reason for co-education. The present generation of women in Asia Minor may not all discard the veil, although there are indications that unveiling may be more aggressively promoted. At all events it is essential that the younger generation

be adequately prepared for social freedom and that the present social differences in various parts of Turkey should be obliterated. The backgrounds of the future generation are being well established to-day. Girls brought up in an atmosphere of co-education will not assume the veil and will know nothing of the old psychology which it symbolizes. If there were separate girls' schools, they would doubtless be preferred by many parents. Some parents in conservative sections perhaps would keep their daughters out of school rather than allow them to attend a co-educational school. The special objection to the mixed middle school and *lycée*, since they include older girls of the veiling age, has been particularly strong; hence, co-education at this stage has not been widely introduced. But conservative attitudes are being changed under the pressure of progress. A new social convention is being established. After the majority have entered the co-educational school, it becomes the custom and is generally accepted.

In order, however, that the best social as well as educational values may be safeguarded in the co-education system, certain wise precautions are being taken. Only mixed activities that belong properly to the school programme are encouraged. Mixed dramatics and mixed recreation are under careful guidance and subject to certain restrictions; for example, in school plays no girls can take boys' parts, or vice versa. Moreover, care is taken that teachers shall not present extremes in modern social customs. Rouge and lipstick and lurid finger-nails are frowned upon, and a frown often equals an order. Teachers, moreover, are not allowed to enter the Turkish beauty contest. The need for careful social guidance of co-education in order to meet its inherent difficulties and avoid possible social dangers, is fully recognized by thoughtful Turkish teachers in mixed schools. However, a number of them, although conscious of the gravity of the problem, have expressed to me their belief in the value of the system, as a means of promoting girls' education and normal social advance, especially in less advanced areas.

In the extension of schools in rural areas, one of the major problems in Turkey obviously is the provision of

trained teachers. To allocate an individual teacher to rural schools is always difficult, because of the social adjustment to an isolated village life. This problem is being met in some places in Turkey by the appointment of a married couple to a village. The married couple conducts the school on modern lines, creates a modern home, which invites imitation, and adds greatly to the general community life. As a further effective use of teachers in rural areas, to facilitate the spread of rural education, the idea is being developed of establishing a school with a number of teachers and a boarding home for students in a central village, perhaps also a clinic and small hospital, the whole unit thus serving the needs of the surrounding area. The boarding school is required as a modification of the usual consolidated school because of the lack of bus lines and the great distances between the villages.

A very interesting demonstration of this concentrated plan of rural reconstruction in education and health has already been achieved in Etemetsu, a model village half an hour's distance from Ankara. To see the very up-to-date, small, but adequately equipped hospital with a keen young doctor in charge, and an attractive midwife, and to visit the modern school and boarding home near by, staffed by several young married couples, was like catching a glimpse into the future of rural Turkey, if such a plan could be carried out more widely. The alternation of the regular school programme with practical work for boys, several hours each day in the garden and fields, and for the girls, the same amount of time spent in weaving and sewing, showed that this modern school was avoiding the danger of educating village children away from village life. The boarding home for more than a hundred children, some of them under the special support of the Child Welfare Society, showed that the influence of the school was extended into villages beyond walking distance.

Adjoining the school, but with a separate entrance and a small garden, was an attractive building for the teachers, in which each married couple had a little private apartment. Such a plan undoubtedly ensured the continuity of the teaching staff and their full contribution to the com-

munity life. Between this small group of teachers and the people of the village evidently there is an intimate contact, as a visit to several homes clearly showed. The way one of the young mothers proudly displayed her baby to the midwife for her approval was an evidence that the home and hospital are closely related.

The promotion of education in the new Turkey has meant the modernization of the whole educational programme. Of central importance in this process of building Turkish education on a modern basis is the policy of secularization of schools. The starting-point for all of the reforms in education was the elimination of the power of the ecclesiastic authorities. For example, co-education, which has increased especially the education of girls, could scarcely have been accomplished under the old régime, when schools were dominated by religion. One of the modern Turkish leaders, in an interview with me in Ankara some years ago, said: "Other attempts at social reform in Turkey have failed because they did not assert complete independence over religion. Lay education is the only basis of success."

Following out this policy, the schools have been completely secularized. The Turkish girls of to-day, therefore, have no formal religious instruction in the school. The chanting of the Koran, the teaching of the Islamic formula, the proper ritual and prayers, as far as the schools are concerned, are all things of the past, since definite religious instruction is regarded as the function of the home, not the school. Religion as such is not repudiated, but is regarded as an entirely individual matter. Whether the home will assume the responsibility is a question for the individual home to answer. The State no longer fulfils this function. What will finally result from the elimination of religion from the school only time will tell. Such questions as these are sometimes raised in the Press: "Is it necessary to give importance to moral and spiritual education in view of the need of strength and power in times of misfortune?" or "Can moral strength be imparted to children entirely within the circle of secularism?"¹

Not only in reference to religious teaching but in general

¹ *Hizmet*, November 28, 1930.

there is a distinct trend in education away from the old traditional ideas. One of the most important developments is the introduction of physical education on modern lines, given by well-trained teachers. Observing a crowd of Turkish girls playing on the school playground, which is now a vital part of every school, or watching a basket-ball game of a Turkish girls' *lycée* at recess, which, incidentally in Turkey is given between every class, I was impressed with the contrast in the vitality of the present-day physical education programme with the anaemic type of physical exercise given in the schools a few years ago. Mild calisthenics directed by the regular class teacher in high-heeled shoes, giving her commands passively in a colourless voice, constituted the physical education of the earlier period. To-day one finds a vigorous young Turkish Physical Director, well trained, conducting her class in a regular uniform and flat-heeled shoes, issuing commands in vibrant tones and actively leading the gymnastic exercises. An exhibition some years ago of several thousand girls from all of the Istanbul schools, in which they carried out a difficult series of physical exercises in perfect unison, gave me, as I witnessed it, a tremendous collective impression of the strength of Turkish girlhood being developed under the freedom and force of the new régime.

The present teachers of Physical Education are graduates of the course given in Ankara at the Men's Normal School, or at the Istanbul Normal School. The course in Ankara is one of the most recent developments in co-education. The lectures in theory for men and women students are held together; the courses in practical gymnastics are separate. The men and women students use the same gymnasium, but at different times. At one end are the dressing-rooms and showers for men; at the other, those for the women. The freedom of this joint physical education training course for men and women is the natural result of the new social attitude in Turkey. It contrasts strikingly with other countries, where the shadow of the veil darkens any such prospect for co-education.

Another significant emphasis in the education of Turkish girls is the promotion of vocational education. A number

of excellent vocational schools have been established to teach practical arts, as their name *Sanat* schools signifies. The İsmet Paşa Institute in Ankara serves as a model for the rest of Turkey for schools of this type, with its fine modernistic building, its excellent class-rooms and laboratories, its splendid equipment, adequate dormitory facilities, and well-trained staff.

In addition to regular middle school subjects—a primary certificate is required for entrance—two main courses are offered, household economics and a clerical course. The Household Economics Course is very complete, including home arts, sewing, tailoring, embroidery, cooking, laundry and millinery, which has a rather special interest in Turkey, because of the discarding of the veil. As the veil was less expensive than the hat, there is a distinct economic value in having Turkish girls learn millinery. Also, this offers a very good commercial opening for Turkish girls, as one of the students explained to me. Two enterprising graduates of the school have set up hat shops in Ankara and are doing a flourishing business. The Clerical Course also meets a timely need in view of the recent entrance of Turkish girls into business life. In addition to one of these two special courses, Home Economics or Clerical Training, all of the students have a simple course in Home-making and Child Care, taught by a well-known young Turkish woman doctor, a specialist in child welfare. A further special feature of the İsmet Paşa Institute is the night school for married women. Between two and three hundred women come every evening for practical courses in home subjects, home hygiene and child care and the simple education courses.

This Institute offers an interesting illustration of the consistent year-by-year growth of education in Turkey. In a five-year period it has become established in its very spacious new building. The French Directress has been replaced by a Turkish Director, with a Turkish woman assistant, both of whom have studied in Europe. Turkish teachers, several trained abroad, have replaced all of the foreign teachers except one, the French specialist in millinery.

In addition to the clerical course at the İsmet Paşa Institute, training along commercial lines is offered for girls in

the very up-to-date Ankara Commercial School, a co-educational institution under a Russian Principal. This school has a number of modern emphases in education; such as student co-operatives, student savings department, a student shop and the student management of the library.

In the development of Turkish education along modern lines, the problem of the training of women teachers is receiving serious consideration. Training for primary teachers is provided in a number of normal schools throughout Turkey; training for secondary teachers is given in the Higher Normal School in Istanbul, connected with Istanbul University. The requirements for teaching have been advanced: to teach in a *lycée*, a diploma from the university is necessary; for the primary or secondary grade, a normal school certificate.

The relationship of the teacher to the community is for Turkey to-day a vital question. The young normal-school graduates from Istanbul, fully emancipated young Turkish women wearing hats, fond of dancing and a normal social life, face a difficult problem of social adjustment when they find themselves planted in backward communities, where perhaps some of the women are still veiled and old social customs are still observed. Moreover these young teachers in the Interior have the responsibility of interpreting by their own example the meaning of social freedom. For all this they must be adequately prepared. Hence, the task of the normal schools is not merely to give academic training in methods of teaching, but to socialize education and interpret the career of teaching on a very high moral level. Some of the directors of the normal schools and teachers have grasped the significance of the problem, and are working creatively to develop in every way possible the social values in education. The young graduates, on their part, eagerly take advantage of all opportunities, especially extra-curriculum activities, such as folk-dances and games for recreation, in order to prepare themselves for the varied demands of teaching service in the Interior.

In addition to the regular training courses in normal schools, which are given on a Government scholarship for a contract of five years' obligatory service in the Interior,

the plan of short-term summer training courses, especially designed for the untrained village teachers, of whom there are still many, has been developed within the last few years. Several thousand men and women teachers take these courses every year. A visit to one of these co-educational Summer Training Courses near Talas gave me an interesting close-up of some of these very simple untrained village teachers and showed what a serious attempt is being made to improve the teaching profession.

For foreign scholarships to prepare for teaching along special lines, women students compete on equal terms with men. The competition for foreign scholarships is open primarily to *lycée* students both boys and girls, but in some special cases, students in the *orta mektep*, junior high school, also compete. The principle of equality of boys and girls for foreign scholarships does not necessarily mean that the same number of Turkish men and women students receive foreign scholarships. The needs of Turkey for special types of service naturally have a direct bearing on the situation. For example, a large number of Turkish men students have been sent recently to the United States to study rural welfare. As this is considered in Turkey largely a man's field, these particular scholarships were not open to women. Several Turkish women students, however, are studying in America on Government scholarship along other lines. In addition to these Government students, there are a number of Turkish women students in America and elsewhere abroad, studying on non-Government scholarships or on their own private funds.

Higher education in all lines in Turkey is open to women on a basis of full equality with men. Women were admitted to the university in 1915 during the World War, but attended at first as quite a separate section; the men's classes were held in the morning, the women's classes in the afternoon. This involved a duplication of time and effort on the part of the Faculty, and hence a double expense. In the summer season of 1921 accordingly mixed classes were begun, with men and women students on different sides of the room and with no contact outside of classes. The women students entered the classes veiled, raised their veils during the class,

and lowered them when leaving. The fact that this first group of pioneer women students was in a conspicuous and difficult position, was shown by their extreme care in the details of veiling. These early days of co-education in Turkey are typical of the present situation in some countries in the Moslem East, where co-education is regarded as a doubtful social experiment.

After 1923 all distinctions between men and women students in the classroom were discontinued, and the sense of segregation of women soon ceased. Visiting the University of Istanbul recently, and seeing men and women studying together and freely associating with each other, inside and outside of the classroom, in the same atmosphere of unconscious freedom that is characteristic of any co-educational university in Europe or America, I had difficulty in imagining the restraint and separation of university co-education in the earlier days. Turkish women students now participate very freely in all student activities, hold offices in the Student Union, are prominent in class organizations and assume responsibility in university student publications. In all of their university relationships women have taken their place naturally and in this short period have become intimately related to university life.

Since 1922, when the Medical Faculty was opened for women, there has been a continuous increase in the number of Turkish women in the University of Istanbul, studying law, science, letters, medicine, dentistry, pharmacy, and even engineering. In 1934 the total number of women students was over one-fourth the number of men students.¹

¹ The following statistics of Istanbul University are of interest:

1928. Total enrolment 2,500; women students 230

1934. Total enrolment 3,148; women students 934

1934. Women students were divided as follows:

Faculty of Letters	209	Pharmacy	28
Science	288	Midwifery	62
Medicine	66	Engineering	6
Dentistry	44	Commerce	50
Law	181		

1924. First graduates in law 3

1927. First graduates in medicine 6

From the Ministry of Education, Ankara.

An interesting evidence of the increasing response of Turkish girls to the opportunity of a higher education is the number of out-of-town students now attending Istanbul University. It is a distinctly new development for a hundred or more Turkish women students to come from the Interior to Istanbul for higher education. Many of these non-resident women students live with relatives or friends, but soon a regular dormitory provision for them will doubtless be needed.

The question as to whether women students are fitted for higher education, would scarcely be raised in Turkey to-day. The presence now on the university faculty of several young Turkish women assistant professors is certainly one answer to the question. The scholarship of the women students is another. In the Ankara law school graduating class of 110 students in 1929, a woman student took first honours. "Women are on the average more conscientious than men and regard their opportunity for higher education as a personal responsibility to excel" was the interesting opinion expressed by Adil Bey, formerly a professor in the Law Faculty. A German professor, Dr. Freundlich, a noted astronomer formerly associated with Einstein, now on the faculty of Istanbul University, expressed his appreciation of the quality of Turkish women students. "They have a certain finesse in their manner and can always be depended upon for thoughtful effort. Their presence adds greatly to the university classroom."

An interesting counterpart to this opinion about women students is the expression of a woman medical student, on the general position of women in the university. "We are considered not merely as individuals, good, bad, or indifferent, like men, but as representing women as a whole. We cannot afford to fail; it would be considered that higher education for women is a failure. If we succeed it means that we have advanced the whole idea of women's ability."

Aside from the opportunities for higher education offered at the university, facilities for cultural studies are provided in special schools in which women students are registered together with men. A Government school for the training of teachers of music in Ankara usually has an equal number

of men and women. This School of Music is of interest because it shows the present effort being made to Westernize the music of Turkey. The students from this school will fill positions in teaching music all over Turkey. The study of art, also on Western models, is offered in the Beaux-Arts School in Istanbul, situated in one of the palaces on the Bosphorus, which shows the way the old régime serves the new. There is a fair proportion of women students in the various departments. Girls from the *lycées* compete for entrance. Commercial art, poster making, interior design are all given special attention.

In addition to promoting regular education in all its phases, Turkey has vigorously attacked the problem of general adult education. The illiteracy of Turkey some years ago was estimated at eighty-five per cent; the general illiteracy of women was higher than men, as is usually the case. The adoption of the new Turkish script in 1928 presented the opportunity and drastic necessity for a nationwide drive for literacy. The change from the old to the new letters meant for the time being that the whole nation was reduced to the level of illiteracy. It was immediately necessary for all—the learned and the unlearned—to go to school. Consequently, a campaign for literacy, unparalleled perhaps in world history, was launched. In October 1928 the nation's schooling began, including Kamal Atatürk, Cabinet ministers, officials, teachers, peasants, men, women, and children of all classes.

Attendance at these National Schools the first year was compulsory for everyone between the ages of sixteen and forty. As soon as the student learned to read and write and could pass an examination, a certificate was issued which served as exemption from further study. Enforcement of the law was vigorously prosecuted by the Turkish police. The course was taught by regular teachers, who received a small supplementary salary for this extra teaching. School buildings and other public buildings were utilized. The courses were held outside of regular school hours, classes for women for the most part in the daytime; for men, at night. Over 800,000 received certificates.¹ The courses

¹ *Statistical Annuaire*, 1930.

during the second year were of two types: the simple course for literacy, and a more advanced course including geography, higher arithmetic, additional reading, letter-writing and civics.

Women constituted over half of the million students in the National Adult Schools, which were established in September 1928, when the new language was officially adopted, and continued during two years. According to reports, women made equal progress with men. Women of all classes took advantage of the opportunity to learn to read, even mothers attending classes with babies in their arms. The upper class of women, highly educated in the old Turkish language, entered into this pursuit of literacy in new Turkish with zest as in a game, studied at home or in one of the national schools, passed their public examinations along with the masses, and proudly received their diplomas with their pictures attached as on a passport. The women of the people especially have profited by this drive for learning the new letters. Illiterate before, with little thought of ever learning to read and write, they have suddenly, through the national schools, been awakened to an idea of their ability, hitherto unknown. The number of women reading newspapers on the trams and boats is a visible proof of their new literacy.

Adult Education along other lines also has been promoted by the Government and semi-official agencies. The *Halk Evi*, Peoples' House, is one of the main agencies for adult education, offering various courses to all of which women are eligible. A marked trend is the emphasis on foreign languages, English, German and French. The present promotion of the study of foreign languages not for a select intelligentsia but for the general public is one of many indications that Turkey has turned Westward in her thought. The increasing stress on English and German, furthermore, indicates a distinct cultural shift, as French hitherto has always been promoted as the second language.

In Turkey as in other countries of the East, foreign influence has permeated the life and thought of the country. We have already mentioned the French and English govern-
 nesses in the home of wealthy pashas. Through these isolated

individuals, the West first entered the Turkish woman's life. It is difficult to estimate what was the full measure of this foreign influence silently pervading the Turkish harem, and bringing glimpses of a different world, for such subtle influences are not summed up in statistics. In the later period foreign schools began to play their part in the education of Turkish women. Throughout the Interior of Turkey the American Mission Board has had a chain of girls' schools for a considerable time, until recently when their number has been reduced and their influence concentrated in a few selected centres. Although these schools have been attended primarily by girls of the non-Moslem population, they have undoubtedly benefited the cause of education in Turkey as a whole, giving a successful demonstration of modern girls' schools at a time when the need for education for girls was not generally recognized. The French and Italian convents have contributed primarily to the education of girls of their religious community with also a limited contact with the Turkish population. The influence of the convent schools has been directly mainly along the lines of home-training and culture.

None of the foreign institutions perhaps has exerted a greater influence on the education of girls over a longer period than Istanbul Women's College, which was founded as a high school in 1875 and became a college in 1910. Through its general influence and through the individual example of some of its distinguished graduates, this college represents one of the major educational forces which has prepared for the forward movement of the Turkish women.¹ The last decade shows an increased number of Turkish women students in the College, a fact which indicates the growing interest in higher education for Turkish women. The Turkish graduates and former students at the College are contributing in many ways to the life of Turkey; as home-makers, women in business and professional life, in public affairs, and more recently in the Councils of the

¹ 1890. First Turkish graduate when Istanbul Women's College was still a high school.

1935. 148 Turkish graduates and 205 Turkish girls had attended without graduating.

State, as the recently elected group of Turkish women deputies includes several graduates of the College. In the promotion of higher education for women, Istanbul Women's College has exerted an influence not only in Turkey but widely throughout the East. In relationship to the work of Istanbul Women's College, Robert College for men has had a direct effect on the education of women in Turkey, through creating an understanding of modern social values and an appreciation for the necessity of a higher educational and social status of women.

A very different type of educational influence in Turkey has been exerted through an informal educational centre, known as the American Service Centre. This represents the interest of the American Y.W.C.A. in a distinctive Turkish project, developed entirely on Turkish lines. Although foreign in its inception and inspiration, the Service Centre is now primarily under Turkish leadership and is recognized as a Turkish institution. Its primary significance lies in its emphasis on the social values in education, developed through group activities, community contacts and social service. Its programme of informal education includes courses in home-making, vocational training, and general culture. Through a summer camp on the Bosphorus, the first girls' camp in the Near East, and through the supervision of several summer playgrounds in Istanbul as well as through a regular Physical Education programme, the Service Centre has furnished a needed emphasis on creative recreation for girls. In the diversity of its programme the Service Centre has wide contacts with Turkish life, with school principals and university students, with women in business and professions, with schoolgirls and women of leisure. Its varied relationships indicate its potential range of influence. Supplementing the influence of the Service Centre on the development of Turkish girls is the parallel work of the Y.M.C.A., which in its programme is affecting the general attitudes of Turkish youth and aiding in the general educational and social advance. This parallel social development of men and women is peculiarly needed in present-day Turkish life.

All of the various expressions of foreign educational

influence in Turkey are working in close relationship with the Turkish Ministry of Public Instruction, seeking to make their distinctive contribution in accordance with the educational policy and ideals of Modern Turkey. The national system of Turkish education, highly centralized and closely integrated in all of its branches, determines the general trends as well as specific emphases of the present programme.

In its general attitude toward foreign influences, Turkey differs from other countries in the East. In contrast to the *laissez-faire* attitude in Syria, or the unconscious absorption and assimilation of foreign influence in Egypt, or the acquiescent acceptance of foreign educational benefits in Palestine, the New Republic follows a policy of careful selectivity and appraisal of foreign influences. There is little question that Turkey recognizes certain values in the educational systems in Europe and America. The presence of foreign educators in the Turkish school system is ample proof of this fact; for example, an American woman specialist in primary education, made a practical demonstration of modern methods in a Turkish primary school; an American specialist in teaching English to foreigners gave a series of courses to Turkish teachers of English; several American teachers of English are at present in Ankara schools, and a few in Istanbul. A large group of noted German professors are aiding in the re-establishment of the University of Istanbul on advanced modern lines. French and Russian specialists are contributing in their special technical and cultural fields to the educational development of Turkey on modern Western lines.

But modern Turkey to-day does her own shopping for education and culture and for scientific progress—it may be in Berlin, or Paris, Moscow, London, or New York. It has been of special significance to the education of girls that this process of selecting foreign values has indicated a definite interest in Anglo-Saxon and perhaps especially in American methods. In speaking of European culture and education, a former Minister of Public Instruction said in a personal conversation that “the culture of Europe was more suited to the old régime than the new. Turkish girls have come out of the harem and need now an education

of practical emphasis and social value, so that they may be better fitted for civic and national responsibility."

It is important, however, that one should remember that the choice of foreign values is only a means to an end. The primary basis of Turkish education and culture is not foreign but Turkish. The sense of direction in Turkish education as in Turkish life is singularly clear. A vibrant spirit of nationalism is the force motivating all social reform and progress. Woman's education has definitely benefited by being regarded as a necessity for building a strong nation. The passion for nation-building has been followed with a swiftness and sureness of aim which has counted no sacrifice too great, no reform too drastic. Secularization of schools, co-education, equality of opportunity for boys and girls from the primary school through the university, emphasis on vocational courses for girls, equality of salaries for men and women teachers, a new language, education of the masses, the use of foreign experts, a deepening of the Turkish consciousness are all steps in the general educational process which has definitely raised the intellectual level of Turkish women.

PART THREE

The New Economic Role of Moslem Women

CHAPTER XV

CROSSING THE THRESHOLD OF PROFESSIONAL LIFE

SINCE life in the East as in the West is a synthesis of change, it is not surprising to find that the social awakening of Eastern women is closely related to the movement toward economic independence. A basic change in one area of a woman's life is reflected in a corresponding change in all of her relationships. It is difficult to disentangle the finely woven threads of cause and effect. The sequence, however, is not always uniform; economic changes often condition social independence; sometimes the process is the reverse. But broadly speaking social advance has been the necessary prelude to the economic progress of Moslem women. The lifting of the veil, which we have said, is the barometer of social freedom registers also the economic advance of Moslem women. If the veil had not been discarded in Turkey, a full measure of economic participation for Turkish women would not have been possible. Although social change is the primary condition of economic change in the Eastern woman's life, it is, however, true that the social awakening of the East as a whole has been in very large measure due to the effect of world economic forces which have impinged on Eastern life and caused its fundamental transformation. The changing economic status of Moslem women is merely an integral part of this larger interplay of social and economic influences in the changing East.

In its main outlines the economic position of Eastern women in different countries has been practically the same. Eastern society as a whole, not only the Islamic system, has assigned to women a position of economic dependence as regards their earning a livelihood. The Eastern man has always assumed the responsibility for the support of all the women in his family, and guarded this responsibility as a matter of personal honour and pride. Hence, the idea of having a woman earn her own living has been considered a direct reflection on the husband or brother or father,

whoever may be responsible for her support. If a man could not support the women of his family, this has always indicated that he had sunk very low in the social or economic scale. A woman under the established social order of the East, therefore, has never been regarded as an independent member of society, but always as a part of a home group. A woman's sole sphere has been her home; any departure from it, except as a necessity, has been regarded with disfavour. As the Mayor of Ramleh, a fairly conservative town in Palestine, said, "There is no need for a girl to earn her living unless her parents are poor, or she is lame and otherwise physically unfit, so that a marriage cannot possibly be arranged for her."

In Islamic society the Moslem woman's position of economic dependence was stabilized by the law of inheritance which allows to a woman only one-half the portion of a man, since he is responsible for her support. In this connection it must be noted however that the Moslem woman legally enjoys the complete control of her income and the full liberty to dispose of her property. These legal rights, if applied, ensure to Moslem women a measure of economic independence greater than that of some other Eastern women, for example, Hindus, and also in excess of the rights of women in some Western countries. It may, however, be questioned as to how much a Moslem woman actually does control her income. Often she is ignorant of her rights. Furthermore the degree of her independent power over her resources will depend upon her family relationships. But often the Eastern woman has complete control, not only of her own resources but also of the family purse for home expenditures. The older woman of the upper class at the head of a large harem in the old régime, before the passing of this spacious style of living, showed remarkable executive ability and power of organization. In Turkey particularly, where the veil was much less restrictive than elsewhere, women carried on a great deal of their business independently, from behind the veil doing their own banking and transacting their affairs with the outside world.

But this management of personal business affairs and varying degrees of financial control did not affect the

question of a Moslem woman's freedom to augment her income by earning her living. From this she has been practically debarred by the social tradition of the East. Added to this general Eastern prejudice against a woman's earning her living, which affected women as a whole, the Moslem woman has had the handicap of the veil, which has made it exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to enter wage-earning pursuits.

To-day this traditional position of economic dependence of Moslem women is being gradually modified. A general trend toward a greater freedom for women to earn a living is evident in all classes of society; among the upper and middle classes of Moslem girls and women, who are entering professions, and also the lower class in industry. A general movement toward social freedom is opening the doors of economic opportunity. Education is giving the basic preparation needed for this advance of women in business and professional life. Throughout the East there are evidences of a general movement toward economic life behind the veil, and likewise an evidence of the direct ratio between the disappearance of the veil and the extension of economic opportunity for women. Prevailing social attitudes and social conditions in each country determine the rate of advance toward economic independence. The different fields of economic effort—business, professional life, and industry—all register some evidence of the change in the economic status of women.

Throughout the Near East, the Middle East and India, the one profession which has long been accepted for women is teaching. Someone has said of Persia that there are three professions open to Persian women: marriage, concubinage and teaching, concubinage being especially characteristic of Iran because of the temporary marriage evil. Certainly from Egypt to India marriage and teaching have been, and still are, the only unquestioned avenues for a woman's activity. The Moslem world, because of the veil, has afforded special opportunities for women in the teaching profession, since girls could not be taught by a man except perhaps the chanting of the Koran might be carried on under the direction of an elderly sheikh.

The significant change during the last decade or so in the profession of teaching is that it is being recognized as a profession for which careful training is needed. It is indeed a far cry from the old type of Moslem woman teacher, perhaps an elderly widow, herself scarcely able to read and write, chanting the Koran with her little group of girls, to the alert young woman trained in modern methods, teaching her class of keen young girls in a modern school. In the earlier days, teaching was regarded as a means for needy widows or girls of the lower class to earn a living, but was not considered a real career to be chosen for its own merits. However, in the last decade throughout the East, as we have already shown, a number of changes have been taking place in the teaching profession. The increased demand for teachers, the emphasis on better training, the improved financial status, the establishment in some countries of foreign scholarships for girls, and the entrance of girls of the higher class into teaching—these are all evidences that the general level of the profession is everywhere being raised.

The fact that public opinion has put the stamp of social approval on teaching, is true quite generally, and in certain places is especially marked. For example, in Baghdad girls even of the highest families, the city's "four hundred," have been attracted to teaching, not out of financial necessity but as an escape from the boredom and utter vacuity of a harem life. They are still secluded as far as being veiled in the streets; but in the atmosphere of the school, the walls of the mental harem disappear. A jaded American school teacher, for whom perhaps, because of overwork and lack of public appreciation, teaching may have lost its zest, would be surprised and doubtless stimulated, as I was, to hear a Baghdad pasha's daughter speak of her teaching as a great adventure—almost a dissipation. Since she was the first of her social group to break into a profession, it undoubtedly required some persuasion to overcome the family opposition. But as the veil could still be retained, and since teaching in Iraq has gained favourable recognition, the pasha gave his consent.

In other countries also I found the same type of well-to-do

Moslem girl turning to the career of teaching for a more creative life than the empty leisure of the home could offer. In Palestine, Egypt and Syria, there is a distinct increase in the number of girls of the better class entering the profession, but in Iran only a scattered few have been able to break down the barriers of conservatism which prevent an independent life for women. Although the number of these young teachers of the leisured group is increasing, they still represent only a small minority. As a Cairo educator said "In Egypt marriage is still considered an ordained certainty and economic dependence on the husband is unquestioned." But the entrance of even a small number of girls of the higher social group is very important for the teaching profession. Moreover, their example in the teaching career helps to create a favourable public opinion toward the entrance of women into other economic pursuits.

The majority of Moslem girls who are preparing to teach is from the middle class—in Iraq, and Syria, Palestine and Egypt. Economic necessity is for them the determining factor. For the increasing number of girls who face the need to earn their own livelihood and share in the support of the family, teaching is the logical and practically the only possible choice as long as the veil persists. The social conservatism of the middle class, which has always been opposed to the idea of having a woman support herself, is being undermined by economic necessity. Moreover, teaching, especially in some countries, for example Egypt and Palestine, has gained a certain social prestige because of the Government promotion of girls' education. Foreign scholarships and good salaries give the teaching profession for women a definite status, which sets up a strong counter force to social tradition.

The entrance of trained Moslem women into the teaching profession in India has lagged behind that of Christians and Hindus. This is a natural result of the retarded educational development of Moslem girls as a whole which as we have shown is largely due to purdah. Until a few years ago, there were no Moslem girls in teachers' training courses. In 1925 Isabella Thoburn College in Lucknow, which, as we have said, may be taken as the general index of the

situation among Moslems, had its first Moslem graduates in teachers' training. In Calcutta in 1928 there were twelve Moslem women students in teachers' training schools compared with forty-nine Hindus. Madras had its first Moslem woman graduate in 1923.

We have already mentioned in an earlier chapter the fact that an outstanding Moslem woman teacher, the first Moslem graduate in the Punjab, has remained in strict purdah. She represents therefore an interesting illustration of the fact that the entrance of Moslem women in the teaching profession does not necessarily mean a break with social tradition. The situation of India is significant of the beginning of professional progress behind the purdah. The need for women teachers in India is greater than in any other country because of the rigidity of the purdah system, which makes it impossible to have men teachers in girls' schools. The recognition of this need and the special promotion of education for Moslem girls at the present time will lead to a steady increase in the number of Moslem women teachers.

Indian women have unusual opportunities for the higher educational posts, as principals and inspectresses, since social tradition debar men from any positions in girls' schools. The very lack of social equality in the East thus has been the major factor in promoting professional equality. In this respect the women of the Moslem world present an interesting contrast to the women of Japan, who although advanced educationally and labouring under no social handicap such as the veil, still save for only a few exceptions have not held the higher educational positions as principals and supervisors.

At a time when the rights of married women to salaried employment are being challenged in a number of Western countries, it is a noteworthy fact that married women in some countries in the East occupy a very favourable position. In India there are many married women in professional life, some holding important positions, such as principals and inspectresses of schools. Indian married women have a distinct natural advantage over single women in professional life due to the fact that under existing social con-

ditions, it is easier for a married woman to carry on an independent career. In some socially conservative communities, especially in rural areas, an unmarried professional woman does not have an established social status. Here the married woman is practically essential. Marriage is therefore considered in India an advantage for earning a living, if it can be carried on without a sacrifice of essential home duties.

| A keen observer in Iran comments on the fact that marriage and employment can be successfully combined. "Married women," she says, "keep steadily at work and merely take off a little time when the babies are born. Servants are easily found, and the wet-nurse, an ancient institution among wealthy people, is always available, so that the outside life of a married teacher has not made a reconstruction of her home life necessary."

Egypt and Palestine, in contrast to India and Iran, have restricted the employment of married women teachers, but exceptions have been made for headmistresses of unusual qualifications. For these exceptional cases maternity benefits are allowed. The general rule in Egypt, however, is that marriage means discontinuance of service and students on foreign scholarships forfeit the Government grants in case of marriage. Syria, on the other hand, recognizes the desirability of having married teachers. In Aleppo if a man and his wife both teach, the Government arranges to allocate them to the same place. Two Moslem graduates from the Junior College in Beirut are teaching in the same schools with their husbands.

A study of the reason for the difference in attitude toward married women teachers in different countries would reveal economic as well as social causes. Where the supply of trained unmarried women teachers is beginning to meet the demand as in Egypt, the married woman teacher probably is not regarded as necessary. In India on the other hand, where the paucity of trained teachers is tragic, and an increase in teaching must be promoted by every method possible, the married woman teacher is an important asset.

As has already been mentioned a very good index of the recognition accorded to women teachers and an evidence

of the need for their services is their economic compensation. In response to my query as to whether women in Trans-jordan receive equal salaries with men, the immediate reply, "Certainly not!" from the Director of Education made me feel conscious of having asked a foolish question. The surprise, however, came when he explained that women in Trans-jordan received quite a little more than men, as they are more needed and harder to secure. This conversation however took place in 1929. Since then the supply of women teachers has been increased and their salaries scaled down to an equality with the salaries of men teachers. Similarly in Egypt women teachers a few years ago received higher salaries than many men in Government service; sometimes a married woman teacher received more than her husband. When the aggressive promotion of girls' education began over a decade and a half ago unusual inducements were offered in order to attract Egyptian women into the teaching profession. As one inspectress said, "The Government has practically bribed women to become teachers." Teaching in Egypt still continues to be a very lucrative profession, but not to the same degree. In India, also, because of the law of supply and demand, especially in parts of North India in purdah-bound provinces, women often receive higher salaries than men. For village schools, because of the difficulty in securing women teachers of the right type, in view of the prejudicial social customs, a larger salary for women than men was recommended by Sir Philip Hartog in the Education Report of the Simon Commission.

The same question that I asked in Trans-jordan as to the relative salaries of men and women evoked the same reply in Teheran "Certainly not!" but the meaning was quite the reverse from the response in Trans-jordan, as women teachers in Iran receive about one-half the salary of men. In Palestine the salary balance is also in favour of men, but there is not a very great difference between the salary scales of men and women teachers. Syria recognizes the principle of equal salary for equal types of positions, as does Iraq, where women in exceptional cases hold as high positions as men receiving the same salary. In the promotion

of education in Iraq along modern lines, the basis of equal salaries seems to have been accepted as part of a modern system.

The fact that women teachers have received equal salaries with men in a number of countries, even better salaries in some places, and adequate salaries even where the principle of equality was not followed, has set the stage favourably for this beginning period, when women have just been entering the teaching profession. The law of supply and demand, however, may later cease to operate so favourably on women's salaries as the number of women teachers increases.

The progress in the field of teaching during the last decade is the forerunner of the general advance of Moslem women toward economic independence. Since it does not necessitate the elimination of the veil, the teaching profession has been regarded as entirely within the bounds of Moslem conventions. Since accepted as the logical field for women, teaching is steadily driving a wedge into the old traditional concept of marriage and the home as the only career for Moslem women. Or to use an Eastern simile the entrance of women into the profession of teaching is like the nose of the camel in the tent. Eventually the entire camel will be inside. But as yet the camel is not moving in very rapidly. Aside from teaching, the development of professional life of Moslem women is still practically nil. There are, however, in some other professions also, at least the beginnings of advance.

The career of medicine offers an unusual opportunity for women in the East, because of the very urgent needs in the field of medicine, which only women can meet, since the exigencies of the purdah still very generally preclude the idea of Moslem women's receiving medical care from men. India, where this is peculiarly true, affords an unusual field for women doctors. In other Moslem countries women have also a very distinctive although not exclusive field. It has been possible in India even for Moslem women who were still veiled to take up medical service because of the *zenana* hospitals which strictly observe purdah. Only a few Indian Moslem women, however, have entered the medical pro-

fession. Probably to-day there are not more than forty to fifty Moslem women doctors in India. This number of Moslems in contrast with the number of non-Moslem women doctors, Hindus and Christians is a striking proof of the effect of purdah. However, in other countries of the Moslem areas, where there are fewer purdah hospitals, one can still count perhaps on both hands the number of Moslem women doctors; a year ago there were three in Persia, two of whom come from Istanbul; none in Iraq; one in Beirut and no women medical students; none in Palestine.¹ In Egypt there are several Moslem medical graduates in clinics, one Moslem woman doctor in private practice, and several recent medical graduates, the first group that entered the Egyptian University Medical Course seven years ago. The present number of Moslem women doctors in the whole area, small as it is, however, indicates progress in view of the fact that in 1928 there was not a single Moslem doctor or student from Cairo to Teheran. Slowly the number of pioneers is growing. The public attitude toward the medical profession as such is not adverse, but the persistence of the veil blocks the way.

The attitude toward other lines of health service, nursing and midwifery, as has been said, is distinctly prejudicial. The social stigma not the veil is the main deterrent, as these professions throughout the East are regarded on a very low level, both socially and morally. In some countries, for example in Egypt, midwifery has a much higher status than nursing; in other countries the situation is the reverse. But the promotion of both services as a career for well-trained, educated Moslem girls is an uphill task. Slow but definite progress is being made through the collective influence of Christian hospitals, Government health programmes and the private efforts of Eastern leaders.

In India there are fewer trained Moslem nurses and mid-

¹ In 1928-29 the total number of women medical students in schools and colleges was 683 as compared with 630 in 1927, cf. *Fact Finders' Report, Laymen's Missions Inquiry*, chapter on Women's Interests, p. 504. Harpers, 1933.

Of this total number in 1928-29, perhaps there were twenty Moslems, although the exact number was not ascertainable. Each year marks an increase in Moslem women medical students.

wives than Moslem doctors. The number of Moslem women in Iran in both careers in 1929 was under thirty. Iraq at that time had one Moslem trained nurse, an orphan brought up in a Government hospital, and no Moslem midwives. A special course for nurses opened in the Government hospitals in 1933 has attracted a few Moslem girls of lower middle class. Since the first Moslem midwife finished the course in 1924, in Palestine a few new trained midwives are added each year. Four Moslem nurses represented the total for Palestine in 1930. Trans-jordan shows a zero as to Moslem women in medical and health service. Syria has probably fifty trained Moslem midwives and half a dozen Moslem nurses, but Moslem girls of the better class have not yet entered any of the health services. In contrast with the rest of the Moslem East, and also the rest of Egypt, Cairo has a fair number of Moslem midwives and nurses, mostly employed in Government service and well paid. The salary may be the reason why Moslem girls of a slightly better class in Egypt than in other countries have been attracted to these two professions. The general social and educational advance of Cairo is doubtless also a determining factor. Luxor, however, presents a definite contrast to Cairo in its decided conservatism concerning midwifery and nursing.

Teaching, medicine, nursing and midwifery close the list of public professions, which are at the present time easily available for Moslem women in the Islamic world as a whole, as these are considered the only professions distinctly requiring women and the only ones possible within the limits of the veil. Other professions show here and there an individual pioneer. A scattered few have studied law in India behind the purdah, privately, but have not been able to practise. There are no Moslem women lawyers in Palestine or Iraq. Two Moslem girls from Palestine graduated in law from Damascus in 1932 but are not practising. One Moslem woman has been studying at the French University of Saint Joseph in Beirut. The first Moslem woman law student in Egypt graduated from the Egyptian University in 1932. In 1934 a young Moslem woman of Teheran took her law degree in France and

returned to Iran.¹ Exclusive of Turkey, the Near East has less than half a dozen Moslem women graduates in law.

Journalism which can be carried on behind the veil, has attracted a certain number of young Moslem women, especially in Cairo, but not as a full-time means of earning a livelihood. Clerical and private secretarial pursuits for Moslem women are very exceptional. A Syrian Moslem girl who is employed in a Beirut bank is unveiled at the bank during business hours, but is always veiled in the street. She is one of the very few Moslem women in Beirut in a business position. But of three hundred girls in clerical positions in the centre of Beirut, according to a recent study made by the Y.W.C.A., there were only two Moslems. It is interesting to note that about a dozen Moslem girls are employed in the National Bank in Teheran and several in the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, but all of these girls have discarded the *chaddur*. In India Moslem women have not yet begun to enter other professions than teaching and medical service. Moslem trained social workers have not as yet made their appearance in any part of the East. Social work as a profession, whether for men or women, is not yet generally understood. There is, however, as we have said, a steady growth in social work by volunteers among Moslems as well as others throughout the East, especially in India and Egypt.

The concert stage, cinema and theatre have a few pioneers: one in Iran whose initial appearance five years ago has already been mentioned, and several singers in Cairo are well known through phonograph records. There are also several cinema actresses in Cairo. For Moslem women to take up these lines of public entertainment represents a definite breaking of Islamic tradition, since people engaged for public amusement hitherto were of a rather low social class. No respectable Moslem woman of good family in the past would have dreamed of being a professional entertainer. The radio offers another new field for women, which has made a distinct appeal in Cairo; one young Moslem

¹ Khadijeh Kechavarz, LL.D., Faculty of Law, University of Toulouse. Thesis on "La Protection du Travail des Femmes et des Enfants en Perse," 1934.

woman in Cairo speaks regularly over the radio; another has become a radio announcer, and a number of Moslem women speak occasionally. The fact that the Moslem woman whose talking in public was considered a sin yesterday may contribute to the entertainment and edification of the world to-day, shows indeed a striking change in the attitude toward women.

But such a public appearance of Moslem girls would not yet meet with favour in other countries less advanced than Egypt, where the idea of seclusion not only prescribes the veil but also prevents a girl's voice from being heard publicly. An interesting case in point was the request made by the Director of the Telephone Company in Baghdad several years ago that a number of girls from the girls' Normal College should be recruited to go into the telephone service. This would be, he said, "just the place for Moslem girls." The Principal of the School did not feel, however, that the time was ripe to promote this idea as it would run counter to the conventions of the veil.

As I have seen the economic life of Moslem women slowly developing in different countries, I have been impressed with the fact that it presents few spectacular evidences of advance but rather a general outward movement from the home toward some measure of participation in business and professional life. In some places and along certain lines the signs of change are quite definite; in others, scarcely perceptible, merely like straws that show which way the wind blows. This movement toward economic independence has affected principally the educated upper middle classes, and is slowly producing a type similar to the business and professional women in the West. But as yet there are practically no changes among the less well-educated classes of girls, whom one would expect to find in the many types of employment which constitute in the Western world the great majority of employed women and girls. In all of these fields of women's work Moslem women are conspicuous for their absence, such as shops, all kinds of offices, beauty parlours, telegraph and telephone offices, restaurants and theatres—in fact the hundred and one ordinary types of women's work. From all of these lines of employment the

veil successfully debars Moslem women of the middle and lower class.

It is probably because education and social change are usually more retarded in these classes than in the upper class, that the economic status of these groups is also changing more slowly. But the general spirit of conservatism in the East in regard to women in employment is slowly giving way, so that each year the field of employment widens for the non-Moslem women. Change for the Moslem women is taking place within the limits of the veil, but until the veil lifts, one can scarcely expect a full and natural measure of economic life. In the meantime just as water dropping steadily on a stone gradually wears down the surface, each individual Moslem woman entering a new profession slowly wears down in her community the traditional Moslem prejudice against economic independence for women.

CHAPTER XVI

TURKISH WOMEN AND THEIR NEW ECONOMIC INDEPENDENCE

ANYONE who has seen the streams of Turkish women and girls pour out of the ferry boats at the Galata bridge every morning on the way to their day's work in Istanbul, realizes that any prejudice against the economic independence of women in Turkey is a thing of the past. The complete co-ordination of social freedom and economic participation of women marks the transfer of Turkey from the Eastern to the Western world. Whereas elsewhere in the Moslem East there are merely definite trends of change toward the fuller economic participation of women, in Turkey the full process of change has already been accomplished under the new régime.

Even before the new Republic was established (1923), Turkish women had already advanced as far in the economic field as the women of some countries in the Moslem East to-day. Aside from many women teachers, there were Turkish telephone operators and girls in shops to a limited degree. Teaching had scarcely begun to attract the educated girls of the upper class, but a few Turkish women held important positions in this field. A very small number were employed in Government offices, working in separate offices from men and carefully retaining the *charshaf*. At that time no professions, aside from teaching, were really open to women; for although the veil was already passing in Istanbul, it still successfully deterred Turkish women from complete economic freedom. A goodly number of Turkish women, however, were educationally prepared and psychologically ready for a larger measure of progress. Therefore when the new Republic removed all artificial restrictions of the veil, Turkish women were able to move rapidly forward. Encouraged by the Government they have entered many new professions and new fields of endeavour and, in a little over a decade, have passed the stage of self-conscious newness. Economic life in Turkey moves to-day along the

normal lines of a work-a-day world in which men and women assume equally their rights and responsibilities. A glance at the field of business and professions in Turkey shows what their rapid advance means in the life of the new Republic.

In Turkey as elsewhere, the teaching professions still attracts the largest number of women entering professional life. Women teachers constitute over half the teaching staff in Turkey, and occupy positions in the full range of the profession as teachers, principals, supervisors and inspectors, in the Government Council of Education, in the special institutes of various kinds, in the normal training schools and in the University of Istanbul. Recognizing the urgent need for trained teachers in order to achieve a primary national goal of universal education, the Government has especially encouraged women to enter teaching and established an equal basis of salaries for men and women teachers. There is no discrimination against married women in the profession; the presence of married women teachers is assumed as perfectly natural, so that they are found through the entire school system. In village schools the value of the married couple is particularly recognized and definite provision made for the placement of men and women teachers in the same school.

The entrance of Turkish women into the medical profession dates from the new régime. The first Turkish woman doctor, who had studied in Germany, began her practice in Istanbul in 1922; a second Turkish woman doctor, who had studied in England, began the following year. With the first group of six Turkish women graduates from the University in 1927 (the Medical Faculty of Istanbul University was opened to women in 1922) the medical profession for Turkish women began on a Turkish foundation. Since that date each year has added to the number of Turkish women doctors. One is impressed with the professional promise of these young Turkish women, who are already effectively carrying on their medical careers.

In Istanbul three women surgeons have established themselves successfully and become well known. One of these, who is not yet twenty-five years of age, has moved to Rome

and attracted special attention and Press publicity because of her very successful surgery. Ankara has half a dozen young Turkish women doctors. One of these, a specialist in maternal and child care, commented to me on the steady growth in public confidence. She counts in her *clientèle* a number of the foreign residents in Ankara. Frequently summoned on cases at night, she calls a taxi and in complete security makes her visit, wherever it may be. Her husband is also a physician. The two carry on their professions quite independently. "It is an advantage," she said, "to be married to a doctor, as my hours are so irregular it might be hard for a husband in some other profession to understand."

Women doctors hold an enviable position in Turkey, and have been given unusual recognition; the first medical Director of School Hygiene was a woman doctor; a young woman surgeon only twenty-six years of age is the Head of the Children's Hospital in Istanbul. Regarded by the public as professionally equal to men and received on a basis of cordial equality by their colleagues, the Turkish women doctors have made their entrance into the profession under much more favourable conditions than those faced by the women pioneers in medicine in the West. As the number of women doctors is still negligible, there is as yet no real question of competition between men and women doctors. This small pioneering group of Turkish women doctors has merited the favourable position they have already gained. They represent a high type of well-educated Turkish girls of good families and fine moral character; only such a type in fact could stand the arduous six years' period of medical preparation, and face the problems inherent in entering a new career.

A surprising number of Turkish women have prepared for the legal profession in the brief period since the University of Istanbul admitted women. Two years ago in 1934-35 out of a total of about 1,200 students in the Faculty of Law there were 181 women. The first women law students, three in number, graduated in 1924. Practising in Turkey to-day are perhaps forty women lawyers. Four women have been appointed judges. The first two, who were

appointed in 1930, received special recognition in being assigned to high communal courts in Ankara and Istanbul. This is indeed a strange contrast to the days, not so long ago, when under the old law two women witnesses were required to equal the testimony of one man. The women judges have been especially interested in prison reforms, and have advocated the establishment of a juvenile court.

The number of Turkish women who have entered the legal profession in such a short period seems unusual, in view of the fact that this profession for women has developed rather slowly in the West. There may be several reasons for the marked interest of Turkish women in the law. Perhaps a certain number of them were drawn to the legal profession because of the inherent attraction to something new. Therefore, the law made a stronger appeal than teaching. Moreover, to some perhaps, in comparison with teaching, the law seemed to have more social distinction. The law may have been preferred to medicine also because of the much shorter period of training required for law. Furthermore, since it took less time to finish the law course, a certain number took law in order to secure a university degree quickly and thus qualify for teaching. Quite a number of law graduates have entered teaching. But perhaps the choice of the legal profession by so many Turkish girls may be simply due to their recognition of the special opportunity for women to-day in this field. The abolition of the Shari'a and the adoption of the Swiss Code has to a certain extent equalized the field for women just entering the legal profession with lawyers already established, since all alike have to learn the new code. Moreover, the change in the code creates a special opportunity for women lawyers to interpret and apply the new legal rights for women.

Turkish women lawyers have not, however, limited their field to cases particularly affecting women. They represent men as well as women clients successfully in the courts. A very enterprising young woman has handled important cases of business firms and has gained the confidence of business men in her ability. The complete and unself-conscious freedom of these young Turkish women appearing publicly, pleading their cases forcefully, and demonstrating

their capacity to compete successfully with men, makes it hard to believe that the mothers of these vigorous young lawyers were all brought up behind the veil.

Aside from teaching, medicine and the law, professions in which the majority of Turkish women have found their careers, pharmacy and dentistry have also attracted a large number. Even engineering has made its appeal to a few. Three have graduated from the University of Istanbul, two of whom are employed as city engineers. This diversity of the professional life of Turkish women is one of the striking contrasts between modern Turkey and the past, as also between Turkey and other Moslem countries to-day.

For the less well-educated Turkish girl of the middle or lower-middle class, nursing and midwifery furnish the outlet corresponding to the other professional careers for the upper educational level. Trained nursing has not yet received the recognition of a profession and does not yet attract the better educated Turkish girl of good family. The Government, however, is trying to raise the status of nursing by developing higher professional standards in the training of nurses. An improvement in the type of students entering the Red Crescent Nurses' Training School in Istanbul, which originally recruited almost entirely from orphanages, is being effected slowly and with difficulty, because of the prevailing Eastern attitude toward nursing.

Through this school since its opening a substantial group of girls of the middle class (119 graduates through 1935) have been equipped for earning a livelihood in useful service. The fact that these young nurses are sent to the Interior for hospital service illustrates the new atmosphere of social freedom in Turkey. Incidentally, the training which a nurse receives, often proves to be a distinct marriage asset; in fact, the nurses are considered such desirable brides, that the loss of trained nurses through marriage has become a real problem. To quote from Dr. Refik, the Minister of Health, "We must find some solution for these marriage casualties. It is uneconomic to train nurses for marriage, when nurses are needed in hospitals all over Turkey."

Midwifery, in Turkey as in Egypt, has always been con-

sidered on a distinctly higher level than nursing. Since the village midwife very largely took the place of a doctor before there were any women doctors, midwifery has something like the status of a woman doctor. Trained midwifery in Turkey antedates the new Republic, as a training school for midwifery in connection with the University of Istanbul was founded forty or more years ago. Every year there are about fifty graduates from this Government institution who enter the field of service. On the whole these two fields of nursing and midwifery present a situation in Turkey that is quite similar to the situation in the same lines of work in other countries in the Near East; for example, Egypt, where the training of midwives is given a great deal of attention.

In very marked contrast to the rest of the East, however, is the rapid advance of Turkish women in the business field. In 1923 there was not a single Turkish stenographer in Turkey. The clerical field was occupied entirely by Greek, Armenian and Jewish girls. Since that time, the number of Turkish typists and stenographers has steadily multiplied. The demand has far exceeded the supply of Turkish girls for business positions, especially for stenographic posts, as there are many more typists than stenographers. The passing of the veil naturally explains this rapid influx of Turkish women into clerical work. The adoption of the new alphabet in 1929 was, however, also a major factor since this made possible Western business methods and increased the need for women. The banks, the foreign and Turkish commercial firms and Government offices to-day all have a clerical staff of Turkish girls.

J Turkish girls fill not only positions as typists, stenographers and file clerks, but also responsible posts as confidential private secretaries. "We have a new director who depends a good deal on me for his background on the present situation" the statement made by a capable Turkish secretary in an Istanbul bank would have been unthinkable ten years ago. A few Turkish women occupy positions of heavy responsibility. For example the manager of one of the branches of the Banque d'Affaires in Istanbul is a very clever Turkish woman, Hatije Refik, the first woman to

enter the banking field eight years ago. Incidentally she carries the main support of her husband and six children.

Turkish women have also qualified as business executives and have started their own independent ventures. Two new hat shops in Ankara, which we have already mentioned, carried on by recent graduates of the Ismet Paşa Institute for practical arts, are doing a flourishing business. Their business enterprise made possible by the passing of the veil offers an interesting illustration of the close connection between social and economic change. In all the minor miscellaneous types of employment—in shops, in beauty parlours, in theatres as ushers and ticket collectors, Turkish girls have made their appearance. A Turkish woman taxi-driver and a woman tram-conductor are isolated examples of women in a new field. A number of Turkish college graduates with a knowledge of one or more foreign languages have taken up part-time employment as tourist guides, a very lucrative field. To qualify for the necessary certificate a course of lectures on Istanbul is required.

On the stage and on the screen Turkish women are bringing the drama and the arts of music and dancing to a higher level. Efforts in these fields are especially encouraged. A school for ballet dancing has been recently established in Ankara. Western style of music is being definitely promoted to replace the old Oriental type. In the School of Beaux Arts, Turkish women are preparing to enter various careers in the fine arts and also have taken up commercial art, especially poster designing. Turkish women to-day speak regularly "on the air" in amusement and educational programmes, especially the latter, giving talks on Health and Thrift and general subjects. At the request of the British Broadcasting Corporation a Turkish woman was sent to London recently to broadcast on the social and political situation in Turkey. Turkish women have distinguished themselves "on the air" and have now begun to try their skill "in the air." A young Egyptian aviatrix holds the record as the first woman air pilot in the East. A Turkish woman, the wife of an Army aviator, has established with her husband a private school of aviation. She has her own private plane and gives instruction in flying.

In the last few years Turkish women have entered official life. Immediately after the municipal vote was granted, women were appointed members of municipal councils in various parts of Turkey. Istanbul had six women in a total of sixty-six and a woman member of the executive council on full-time service. In a town in the Interior a woman was elected mayor. Following the extension of full suffrage to women in December 1934, seventeen women were elected deputies to the Ankara Grand National Assembly. Seven Turkish women are registered at the present time in the School of Diplomacy at Yildiz Palace, which incidentally offers an interesting setting for such a school. One young Turkish woman has passed the examination and served in the Foreign Office at Ankara. Quite a recent development of women in public service is the appointment of police women. Twenty-three Turkish women are working in the police department as ordinary police and police commissioners. A young Turkish woman, twenty years of age, has served as Assistant Police Commissioner of Istanbul. The majority of the Turkish women in police service are in Istanbul (18); others are employed in Izmir, Seyhan and Ankara.

In contrast to the marked increase in the number of Turkish women in business and professional life and in public service in Istanbul and Ankara and in a few other cities, one finds in the Interior a much slower movement of women toward independent careers and much less diversity in types of employment. Turkish girls of the Interior have been attracted by the profession of teaching, and to a certain extent nursing and midwifery, but with a few exceptions have not entered clerical pursuits, or the other miscellaneous lines of employment. The slower development of women in economic life in Asia Minor is the logical result of the more gradual process of social change in the country than in the city. There has been less exposure to new ideas, bringing the urge for independent activity. The general social prejudice against the idea of a girl of the better class earning her livelihood still persists. Marriage continues to be regarded as the obvious career. The social and economic progress of Turkish women and girls in the

Interior is, however, undoubtedly being stimulated by the example of well-educated young Turkish women from the larger cities who come to the Interior and successfully carry on their independent professional life.

As one sees the steady increase of young women in the East entering the college and university to prepare for a professional career, or entering the business world, the question naturally arises as to whether this is definitely setting up a counter ideal to marriage. Undoubtedly to-day marriage is ceasing, throughout the East, to be the only avenue to the Eastern girl's future. Turkish girls have the advantage of the most unlimited choice of a profession. The desirability of preparing for a career is undoubtedly in the minds of many Eastern schoolgirls and women students in the university. The career, however, is not necessarily regarded as an alternative to marriage, but very often is considered rather as preliminary to marriage or as a useful service to be continued afterwards, which is extremely logical, since there is no prejudicial attitude against married women in professions in the East. Although many Turkish girls and Eastern girls in general are attracted for a time to some form of employment as a channel of self-expression, only a small minority in Turkey as elsewhere in the East choose a professional career definitely as their life work. For the great majority there is no real competition between marriage and a profession, in the East, as also perhaps to a large extent in the West. But as to marriage and a career, another phase of the subject than merely the matter of personal choice must be considered.

To-day in the East as in the West, it has become the part of wisdom, if not also a practical necessity, for young women to be prepared to earn their own livelihood. The changing social *mores* of the East as well as economic necessity have brought to the Eastern girl the same problems as those that the Western girl has long faced. The problem, although apparent throughout the East, is naturally more sharply defined in Turkey. When marriage becomes a question of individual choice and not a matter of parental agreement, it is no longer guaranteed for all girls. The decline of polygamy, moreover, has introduced a new factor in the

social situation, which means the practical certainty of an increasing number of unmarried women. Naturally the educated Moslem girl of to-day would not prefer the old system of polygamy, which assured marriage, or at least half a marriage, for everyone. But in her choice of a modern idea, she faces the practical question of her own reduced possibility of marriage. This is a problem of genuine concern to many young women, who represent the first generation of unmarried women in the Near East. They want to be married, and create homes, but there are not enough men. For these young unmarried women in the East the present pioneer period has its inherent difficulties. The new social system of Turkey has not only made it possible but also inevitable that a certain number of women will not be married and will turn toward some career or useful occupation. A similar situation is developing, or will probably develop, elsewhere in the Moslem world.

Viewing the movement toward the economic independence of women through the East as a whole, I have had the impression that an interplay of influence is determining the personal choice of women to enter economic life. Of the pioneering group in each country many have been actuated by the definite desire for creative service. Others have been impelled by the general urge for a freer personal outlet, the natural result of the new unfolding social freedom. The mere idea of economic independence has given a certain flavour of adventuring in a new field. This group, mostly well-educated girls of the higher social class, has felt very little or no economic pressure and probably, in the beginning, as has been suggested, has thought of their careers as a variation of a life of leisure. The half-time basis of professional life, as a matter of fact, is also a rather distinctive characteristic of the professional life of a number of the more serious-minded Turkish women, who have not been under the absolute necessity of a full-time job.

For an increasing number of the better class and probably for the large majority of the middle class, however, economic necessity has been a determining factor leading to a career. This has been particularly true during the last three or four years of economic crisis, which has affected the East as

also the West. But whether economic necessity is the determining factor or not, one has the impression that the economic life of women in the East to-day is taking on a deeper note. Entering a profession has already ceased to be anything unusual in Turkey; and in other countries also economic independence for women is rapidly losing its romantic halo. Eastern women to-day are carrying on their business and professional life in an atmosphere of wholesome realism, earning their own livelihood and making a very valuable contribution to national life.

CHAPTER XVII

MOSLEM WOMEN IN INDUSTRY—HOME AND FACTORY

ALTHOUGH there are signs of change in the economic position of Moslem women in the upper and middle classes, who have been touched by modern influences, there is little evidence of any change in the economic life of women of the lower levels. The great majority of this group of Moslem women have not been independent wage-earners, but working behind the veil have always contributed to the income of the family. The type of home work carried on by Moslem women differs in the different countries, according to the kind of goods peculiar to the customs of the country. In Syria women home workers produce fine hand-embroidery and machine work, stocking, silk weaving and spinning. In Egypt they make belts, small caps worn under the fez, drawn work veils and heavy tinselled scarfs; in Iran principally rugs, as almost every home has a rug on the loom; in India, gold and silver thread embroidery, fancy caps, baskets, wedding decorations and a variety of things.

In all these lines of work the Moslem woman is undoubtedly an economic asset to the home, but not economically independent. Oftentimes her work is part of the work of the whole family; as for example in rug weaving, in which all members of the family share. Otherwise if she works quite independently, as on embroidery pieces on various individual articles, she cannot freely market her work but must always deal through her husband or a woman agent. The veil is an undoubted economic liability even though there are ways of earning money behind the veil. However hard she may work, the Moslem woman home worker does not have any measure of economic independence.

Aside from this great majority of Moslem women who are engaged at home in some form of wage-earning occupation, or merely in the care of the home, a certain small number of Moslem women, for the most part widows or married women with their husbands, have entered industry.

Broad generalizations as to the restricted character of their work are true wherever Moslem women are thus employed, for the observance of the veil remains a fixed factor, even in this lower social level, and therefore demands a carefully restricted field of activity. Harem conditions are observed in factories where Moslem women work, which means that the women work apart from the men, and have no contact except what is absolutely required for the job. For example, in that section of the ginning factories in the Punjab, where Moslem women work, only two men enter, one to bring in the cotton and the other to remove it. The Moslem women workers themselves insist on having these harem conditions observed. In the Hamadan Oriental Carpet Factory, as I learned from the manager, not even the supervisors for a time were allowed to enter the factory while the women were there. Later, they agreed to allow one man to come in, but only one—the head supervisor. Although the general attitude of Moslem women in industry as a group, especially compared with other groups, is very much the same throughout the Moslem countries, there are certain interesting variations in the industrial situation as related to women.

Moslem women in India constitute a very small proportion of the women factory workers, a fact which is undoubtedly the definite result of social customs. The Hindu of the lower class has no restrictions of purdah and naturally often takes his wife with him to the factory. Moslems, as we have seen, even in the lower economic strata, very often religiously observe purdah. Furthermore, many Moslem workers are weavers, and receive a higher wage than the Hindu workers; accordingly the former have less necessity for the wife to work in the factory. The Moslem man usually keeps his wife at home where she perhaps engages in some subsidiary occupation. The proportion of Moslem women to the total number of women workers in India shows to what a limited extent they have entered factory employment.¹

¹ In Ahmedabad of 6,500 women workers in factories there are only 500 Moslems; Bombay has 2,000 Moslems out of 28,000 women, Bihar and Orissa 300 Moslems out of 6,000 women. In the Punjab, which is distinctly a Moslem area, Moslem women constitute only about one

Moslem women, according to the opinion of several Factory Inspectors with whom I talked are a very different type from the articulate, aggressive Hindu women, some of whom take part in labour unions and show a good deal of initiative. The Moslems are much less independent; often they have an attitude of inferiority and impress one with their listless fatalism. A conversation which I once had through an interpreter with a Moslem woman in a ginning factory in Amritsar, is probably typical of the Moslem woman factory worker. It ran as follows:

"How long do you work?" "All day."

"When do you stop?" "When the engine stops."

"Do you stop for lunch?" "Sometimes."

"When do you stop for lunch?" "When the whistle blows."

Of course, the fear of giving information may explain the non-committal attitude. But it doubtless reflects also the usual spirit of passive acquiescence; for the Moslem woman accepts what comes without question and with little independent thought or desire.

Labour legislation in India is following general Western lines of development, covering among other provisions limited hours of labour; prohibition of women from night work and dangerous trades; a minimum child labour age of twelve years; regulation of conditions of labour; and factory inspection. Maternity benefits have not been prescribed by law but are provided for in a number of industries by private schemes. More significant than the advanced labour legislation is the awakening consciousness in India concerning labour protection. Labour leaders are urging that women inspectors of factories should be appointed and a Health Service of women doctors established. The need for measures to provide for education and organization of women workers is also urged by labour leaders. The All-India Women's Conference, after having a commission carefully study the question in 1935, officially protested against women working in mines.

Moslem women play a relatively more important role per cent of the total. Calcutta in its large number of women workers has more Moslems than are found in any other area. Data for 1929 assembled from Government Reports.

in industry in Iran than India, both in the small local rug factories and in the larger foreign corporations. In some places Moslem women are the major labour asset and have a virtual monopoly on the labour market, successfully keeping out non-Moslem workers. Quite unlike the Moslem women workers in India who are fatalistic and passive, some workers in Iran, judging by the conditions which I saw several years ago at the Hamadan Oriental Carpet Factory, are an energetic group, actively safeguarding their rights. They practically controlled at that time the hiring and "firing," not only of the labour supply, but even of the supervisors. Any change had to be made gingerly by the management; the factory could not dismiss the supervisor, but if unsatisfactory he had to be persuaded to resign and the successor was very carefully installed. The Iranian women, such as this Hamadan group, are not technically organized, but bound by a strong Moslem group loyalty and very articulate as a group. Although many of the Iranian factory workers are married—all over twenty years are married—there seems to be less restriction than in India on unmarried girls working, judging from the number I saw in evidence. Occasionally a Moslem man is unwilling to have his wife continue in the factory after marriage, but this is the exception rather than the rule, and quite the reverse of India.

According to the usual system of labour in carpet factories in Iran, one head weaver works at each loom, a very clever worker, who has under her half a dozen little girls of any age, even as young as five, since there is no child labour legislation. By a conservative estimate perhaps one-fifth or more of the workers are under ten years, which may well arouse anxiety as to what the next generation of Iranian women of this class will be physically. Many of the children have spent most of their lives in the factory, brought in as infants and "parked" all day by the mothers' looms. In order not to interfere with the speed of the mother, since her wage depends on her speed, the child is usually half-drugged. A bundle stirring by one of the looms, which attracted my attention, proved to be a baby less than a month old, sleeping all day without interruption.

This practice of drugging children is no more prevalent, in fact probably less so, in Iran than in India, where it is estimated that ninety-eight per cent of the children of industrial workers are constantly drugged whether at home or in the factory.¹ In India there is a law against bringing children into the factory. But in spite of the regulations made under the Indian Factories Act many a baby wrapped in a gunny sack by the worker's feet escapes detection.² The mother's defence, if you should remonstrate with her for causing the baby to sleep away its life under the effect of opium, would be merely a hopeless answer in a dull voice, "What else can I do? There is no one to take care of the baby at home."

Conditions in most of the factories under Iranian owners violate all the laws of health. The factories are dark, damp and cold; with the looms crowded in back to back, and the workers crouched on a wooden plank shelf or scaffolding. The scaffold is moved up with the progress of the rug. Children on the scaffold are often so small that they have to be lifted down at the end of the day. This is a more or less typical picture of a number of small factories, which average from six to fourteen looms with five workers at a loom. Some of the factories are doubtless even worse.

The conditions in the Oriental Carpet Company Factory at Hamadan are better, as it has larger buildings, better ventilation and sunlight, and more space. Because of these better working conditions, this company controls the local labour market as women prefer to work there, rather than in the small local factories. Gradually the smaller carpet factories are being crowded out because unable to compete with highly organized foreign industry. Moslem women industrial workers profit by this process, as their employment in the foreign factory is on the whole better than in

¹ Mrs. Vera Anstey, *Economic Development of India*, p. 90. Longmans, Green & Company, New York; 1929.

² The present law forbids the presence of children between the ages of six and fourteen years of age. There is also provision for the provinces to make rules excluding children under six years. Bombay has had the rule for many years; Bengal (since 1931) and Madras enforce this rule. Infants are much less than formerly in factories except in the seasonal ones.

the small local factories. The two types of factories in the Hamadan centre of rug making may be taken as fairly characteristic of other centres in Iran. The establishment in Teheran of a stocking factory and one for knitted goods, where women are employed under modern healthful conditions, illustrates a hopeful trend. Such factories as these and the Hamadan Oriental Carpet Factory show the new type of industrial development, the modern factory in contrast to the old type of small, utterly unregulated, private factories.

The total lack of national labour legislation in Iran means that hours, wages and the conditions of labour, and exploitation of children, are entirely subject to the individual factory owner. The foreign carpet industry has as a rule introduced better labour conditions but has not adopted the labour regulations of the West; such as protective machines, maternity benefits, etc. The reason given is that foreign industry, if modern regulations are adopted, cannot compete with unregulated Iranian industry. But according to the foreman of the Hamadan Oriental Carpet Factories there are signs of a new trend. "Eventually Western firms will have to conform to labour regulations," he said, "Iranians themselves are learning from Europe and will demand modern labour legislation." Some local labour legislation (December 17, 1923) has been passed, as at Kerman, the result of an agitation for industrial reform which was promoted by an English missionary. One can scarcely imagine that such advanced labour legislation—eight-hour day, Friday and Sunday holidays, minimum child labour age, eight for boys and ten for girls, harem provisions, medical inspection and general sanitation—can be enforced effectively in Iran, even in a small area. But the need for such legislation is obvious,¹ to prevent the exploitation of a large number of Moslem women and children.

¹ A labour law which will include regulations concerning women and children is now being discussed and labour legislation of other countries is being studied. "*La Protection du Travail des Femmes et des Enfants en Perse*," University of Toulouse, by Khadijeh Kechavarz, is perhaps the best treatment of the conditions of labour of women and children in Iran.

In Syria modern industry is just beginning. Most of the industrial effort is centred in the family groups, in small shop factories, or in groups carried on in the old paternalistic style. Women are, of course, a primary labour asset in these small industrial undertakings, but are less important for large industry. A certain number of Moslem girls and women are found also in the various small industries, such as box making, stocking weaving and tobacco manipulation. Moslem women have always worked in the large Régie Tobacco Factory, situated in the heart of Beirut, attracted to this factory by the need for employment and the better conditions of labour than those which prevail in the small tobacco factories on the outskirts of the city. The introduction of more modern machinery in the larger factory within the last two years, it was feared, would cause a distinct decrease of Moslem women workers, but such has not been in reality the result. A more sweeping change has been caused recently by the formation of a monopoly of all the tobacco industry including also the making of cigarette boxes. This monopoly has crowded out some of the many small concerns, which are unable to compete against big machinery. It is often said that the monopoly of the tobacco industry would result in a large amount of employment of women in the smaller concerns which are crowded out by the monopoly. This statement is questioned, however, by someone who is well informed on industrial problems. The increase in production through the monopoly has increased a need for more workers, rather than depriving them of work.

New labour legislation in the Lebanon has recently been passed which includes a number of regulations affecting the labour of women and children. A visit to various factories in Syria reveals conditions which made the enforcement of the new law urgent—long hours, usually from sunrise to sunset, irregularity of payment, a large amount of child labour (especially in Damascus), poor sanitation and lack of ventilation. Labour is entirely unprotected, without organization and dominated by the fear of losing employment. The ameliorating feature of the situation is the lack of labour pressure, since industry is on a small scale and offers a good deal of freedom to the worker. Syria is not

yet industrialized and women workers are not yet a cog in an insistent machine. There is as yet no provision for industrial welfare work in factories. The Y.W.C.A. in Beirut, which has contact with many industrial girls, promotes an interesting educational and social programme. Public consciousness on industrial questions is just being awakened. Preceding the passing of the recent labour legislation for the Lebanon Republic, some of the women's groups were active in promoting protective labour regulations. Their efforts will now need to be directed toward the application of the new law.

The activities of Moslem women in Palestine are limited to a very small amount of home work, less than in many countries, embroidery, basket making and tent weaving. Moslem women are practically unrelated to the industrial problem, which is primarily Jewish. Palestine presents a contrast to the rest of the Near East and Middle East in having a more definite programme of social and industrial welfare promoted by the Government with a woman welfare supervisor in charge. Labour legislation along modern lines has been in force in Palestine for a number of years. A good deal of co-operative effort has been carried on by local and foreign groups to promote industrial welfare.

Labour legislation in the Lebanon Republic and in Palestine follows similar lines. The major regulations affecting women and children are: minimum child labour age—Syria 13 years, Palestine 12 years; prohibition of women and children from work at night and in dangerous trades; regulation of the hours of labour and the rest intervals of women and children, the provision in Syria of maternity leave, and in Palestine the provision for women factory inspectors. The Lebanon labour regulations provides that children shall work only six hours a day with fifteen minutes rest at stated intervals.

In Egypt the large majority of Moslem women carry on home industries but a certain number of women of the lower class is in factory employment. There is as yet no labour legislation in Egypt. However, a Government Labour Commission has worked out a project for a labour law on modern lines, which has called forth a great deal of dis-

cussion, showing both the appreciation of the need for labour regulations and also a spirit of opposition to any restrictions. Conditions in Egypt are similar to the rest of the Near East, where industry is developing without special labour protection and where slowly, along with the simple home handicraft, the modern type of larger industrial undertaking is being introduced.

In Turkey the development of modern industry is being aggressively promoted by the Government as a vital factor in the new economic programme. The Five-Year Plan which is directed specifically toward the increase of national production, particularly the development of the Turkish cotton textile industry, as well as the establishment of other industrial plants, will provide work for a considerable number of women and children. The special value of women's labour in certain of these industries is greatly appreciated and therefore eagerly sought.

These new developments do not, however, mean a radical change in respect to women, as they have been for some years engaged in various types of handicrafts and factories—in carpets, textiles, knitted goods, raw silk preparation and silk weaving, tobacco manipulation and cigarette making. Some of this production has been carried on by the individual family, a large proportion in small group enterprises, and a certain amount in modern factories. The promotion of modern industry has not yet appreciably affected the simpler types of industrial production.

No special labour legislation affecting women and children has as yet been enacted in Turkey. A proposed law concerning general labour conditions has been presented to the National Assembly. This legislation would cover limitations of hours of work, child labour restrictions and certain other modern protective measures for women and children. There is no more collective labour consciousness among Turkish women than among other Eastern women. The highly individualized character of industrial development in the East has precluded the idea of the participation of women in labour organization. Nor has there been, in fact, save for a number of labour guilds, any growth of labour organization for men in Turkey. This situation with

the exception of a certain development of the labour movement in India characterizes Asia as a whole.

Although there is a trend toward the development of industry in different parts of Asia—most consciously promoted in Turkey but evident elsewhere—a complete industrialization of the East seems improbable for years to come, if in fact this ever occurs. The population of Asia is primarily rural, not urban; the assets of Asia are those of a rural economy. Undoubtedly one of the major economic assets of the East, although perhaps not often classified as such, is the peasant woman. She bears the major burden of the home and shares equally with her husband in the labour of the fields, freed by necessity from the restrictions of the veil. The economic life of rural Asia in no small measure depends upon the endless toil of the village woman.

These peasant women of Asia, although an economic asset, do not have real economic equality or independence. The contribution of their farm labour is made to the family income, without any recognition of any fixed amount for their share as wage-earners. Their economic equality is, as we have shown, further undermined by adverse religious and social customs—polygamy, divorce and unequal inheritance. It would be a fallacy to conclude, however, that peasant women, though without economic rights of equality, are without economic power. As is the case with women of the upper class, so also the village woman often controls the family purse. She determines, in no small measure, the family expenditure, which in some countries, notably India, means an excessive outlay for the observance of costly social customs—funerals, weddings and religious ceremonials; and also for jewellery—anklets, necklaces and bracelets, of which every peasant woman, however poor, must have her quota.

The extent of the financial power of village women over the family purse differs in various countries from "equally with the men," or "entirely," to "some" or "very little," as I have learned from numerous conversations in different parts of Asia. But whatever may be the degree of their control in the family, no one who has seen these sturdy peasant women of the East can fail to realize that they are the economic foundation of life in rural Asia.

PART FOUR

Health Standards Old and New

CHAPTER XVIII

HAZARDS TO HEALTH

"How old is your little girl?" I asked a Moslem mother in a village in North India and was greeted by a chorus of laughter from the other women who had gathered in the courtyard to view the stranger. And then someone explained that the child was a boy, although with long hair and dressed as a girl, to fool the evil spirit that had already caused the death of two previous sons. To fool the evil spirit is an ever-present necessity in the village woman's life. The thoughtful visitor should not admire a child too obviously as it might attract the evil eye, or if she expresses admiration, she should immediately say *Mashallah*, the wish for the blessings of Allah. Otherwise, if anything should happen it would undoubtedly be attributed to the fact that the child had been unduly admired.

In a simple home in Iran where I was calling with an American missionary doctor, the mother was in great grief over the death of her son, who had died a few days before, as she believed, from the effect of the evil eye. "In the morning," she explained, "he was all right, went out with a servant, a woman met the child and the servant, commented on his looks and his size, which was unusual for his age, and the next night fever came to the child and also to another. Both were taken away. Undoubtedly it was due to the evil spirit." Unsanitary living conditions, impure water, contaminated food, none of these things had any meaning for her. There was in her mind only the stark reality of death caused by the evil eye.

It may seem strange as one visits a fellaheen village on the Nile that the Egyptian mother does not brush the flies from the baby's face, which is sometimes all but completely covered. One wonders whether it is because the flies are so thick that it would be hopeless, but that is not the answer. If the baby's eyes were free from flies and its face clean, the evil eye might be immediately attracted to it. Neglect of the baby, of course, means terribly diseased eyes, but keeps

it safe from attracting an evil spirit. Hence, millions of babies born every year in Egypt see the world through bleared vision. "Why don't they die?" I asked the nurse with whom I was visiting one of these villages, swarming with flies and filled with children with diseased eyes. "Many of them do," was the laconic reply. "However, they have a high immunity. Those who live simply represent the survival of the fittest." Not always is such a drastic method required to ward off the evil eye. The blue bead on the babies' caps, or an amulet and scraps of cloth or coins sewed on their dresses—everywhere these charms for the evil eye are an inevitable part of the babies' costume. The belief in their efficacy is unquestioned.

Such beliefs are deeply embedded in the life of the East, not the development merely of decades but the survival of past centuries. They may be different to-day in form, but not in their essential meaning nor in their influence on the health level of the East. In a modern child welfare clinic in Cairo, my attention was attracted to a picture showing the amulets which had been found in a tomb of the time of the Pharaohs. Below the picture was a glass case full of a remarkable assortment of amulets, which the clever nurses in charge of the clinic had persuaded the women who came with their babies to relinquish. There was a striking resemblance between the old and the new collection of charms. But the really significant thing about the exhibit was not the similarity of superstitions practised in Ancient and Modern Egypt, but the fact that modern medical care was undermining the tenacity of such old superstitions. "We regard this glass case as one of our best signs of progress," the nurse in charge of the clinic explained. "It takes time but gradually we manage to persuade the mothers to leave their charms. When they leave their charms, then it means that the mother has to rely more on us than on the blue bead or the amulet."

Sometimes these superstitious practices are definitely related to religion. Then, of course, they are overcome with much greater difficulty. In Persia and Iraq, which are under the power of Shi'ah Islam, there is the fear of being contaminated by contact with a non-believer, especially a Christian;

hence Moslem women are cut off from foreign women doctors, as well as from men doctors. The American nurse in Kermanshah told the writer of having been called a few days before to a Moslem home where the mother was in child-birth. The family was intelligent enough to want foreign help, but when the nurse arrived, she found the woman already in the hands of the midwife. It was impossible for her to touch the patient. The family's Shi'ah belief in contamination was stronger than the desire for a modern nurse.

But in some cases where religious superstitions and modern science are in conflict, science gains the day. Illustrative of this fact is an interesting incident which occurred during my visit in a small town in Iran. The missionary doctor, the only woman physician in the town, one evening was called to attend a child-birth case in the family of a very reactionary *Sayyid*, the class set apart as the religious *élite*, descendants from the Prophet. On arriving the doctor found that she had been called only after the midwife had exerted her gentle art to the limit and the doctor therefore immediately advised the forceps. Thereupon the family raised an objection. Some of the friends who had gathered to assist—such events are never private—were more advanced in their ideas than the family, and a son insisted that the doctor should go ahead. After an argument it was decided that she should consult the *Mujtahid*, the special religious leader whom each Shi'ah family has for final counsel in important matters. Word was sent to see if he could receive her, and when an affirmative came back, the doctor left her patient in a critical condition and went to his house.

After a long discussion he concluded that he must "do the *istikhara*," "cut the Koran," a method of deciding questions by opening the Koran at random, reading the first verse on which the eye falls, and then interpreting its meaning in the light of the present case. When the incense was lighted and the Koran was ready, the friends began to hesitate, raising the question as to whether the woman's life should be endangered by a possibly bad "cut." They appealed to the *Mujtahid* again saying that if the Koran were "cut" he could not go contrary to the Koran, but the

woman might die. Would it not be better for him to decide himself, since he had the power? Finally after a long involved discussion, the *Mujtahid* consented, and granted permission for the forceps to be used. The doctor went back to the case and at length after this delay of several hours she operated. Fortunately for modern science, as well as for the woman, the operation was successful. If it had not been, no other women in this fanatical group would have been allowed even the chance of having the "Koran cut" to decide whether they should have an operation.

This case caused great interest throughout the whole town. News travels fast in an Iranian town. Why have a newspaper or know how to read? The next day when the doctor and I were calling at a wealthy home, the confinement case was the subject of absorbing interest to the large family group in the *anderun*—a number of friends had come when they learned of the doctor's visit—which had gathered to hear all the details. As they sat in a semicircle on cushions on the floor in the usual Iranian style, the pros and cons were eagerly debated for over two hours. The guests were about evenly divided *for* and *against* the *Mujtahid* for causing such a delay. The whole incident gave me a revealing glimpse of the heavy odds against a Moslem woman's life when custom and superstition are allied against her. The fact that the progressive members of the family had prevailed on the fanatical members and called the doctor, and that the *Mujtahid* had allowed the operation to be performed showed real progress, as a few years before, the doctor said, there would have been no debate. The midwife's power would not have been called in question.

Such an incident shows the controlling power of superstition in the East over child life from the hour of birth. Every detail of living is determined not by the normal laws of health, but by strange ideas that are a composite of the influences of superstitions. The actual belief may be different in different countries but the total effect is a remarkable similarity in customs and ideas of child care. Bathing is considered by the elder generation and the uneducated masses in general to be the height of folly and even dangerous, as there is a prevailing superstition against the strange modern

idea that a baby should be bathed, or weighed or have its clothes removed. Moslem women will insist that any one of these things might invite the evil eye. The Director of the Haifa Clinic made a special drive on having the babies wear napkins. "Many mothers at first," she said, "were most unwilling to have their babies' clothes removed because of the evil eye, but to-day there is no difficulty." To promote the diaper idea, a prize was offered for the mother whose baby had a clean napkin at twelve successive attendances. Competition apparently applies to diapers as to other things as a number of prizes have been awarded.

Such ideas as to baby care are not limited to the poorer class, for lack of education rather than economic status is the major cause of bad health practices. "My daughter-in-law washes the baby's face too much" was the comment of a venerable well-to-do old Moslem lady in Mosul, a character of considerable distinction in the town, as she had several times made the Mecca pilgrimage. Therefore, her word was more than law in most cases, but apparently not entirely with the young daughter-in-law, who had been "contaminated" by enough education to give her other ideas about child care. "Of course, the baby will die," the old lady continued, "washing the baby's face and mouth makes it sore. What she should do is to cover its face with black ointment, which is better than any amount of water." With such a powerful force for the old ideas, I wondered at the young mother's persistence.

In an interval when the mother-in-law left to say her afternoon prayers, as she was very religious, the daughter-in-law told us of her desperate struggle to put into practice, in spite of her mother-in-law's opposition, some of the things she had learned at school. "They have no idea of cleanliness," she said, "and furthermore, insist on feeding the baby anything and everything whenever it cries. I've tried not binding the baby in swaddling clothes, but in this I've had to submit." However, she went on to explain she did not keep the baby wrapped up tightly all day, without ever making the necessary changes; and then just as the mother-in-law returned, she summed up the situation philosophically. "At least whatever I am able to do about my baby will make

it easier for the next daughter-in-law in the family." After that, being a well-trained and wise young wife, she lapsed into silence and the mother-in-law continued to air her views.

Her next topic of interest was "wet and dry constitution." One of the women in the group spoke of not being very well and of having a "wet constitution." Therefore she couldn't take much fruit. Probably she had eaten too much lettuce just before the birth of her last child, as a result of which damp had entered her bones. The old *Hadjia* from Mecca promptly gave her diagnosis that the woman had drunk too much water and not eaten enough clarified butter. The daughter-in-law lifted her eyes for a second, passed a meaningful glance at me, and then dropped them again. Such a glimpse of old entrenched superstitions and new ideals of health struggling for assertion gives a typical situation that might be duplicated in any country of the East to-day. Not always does the young mother hold to what she has learned, but slowly the new ideas are seeping into many an Eastern home.

Another current practice in child care which runs counter to modern ideas is the constant nursing of a baby whenever it cries. Regular feeding and letting the baby cry is considered an unheard-of cruelty. A long period of nursing, two years for a girl and longer for a boy, seems to be a prevalent custom among the lower class. The general lack of discipline with older children is in keeping with the idea of "never letting the baby cry." A nurse remonstrating with a mother for letting the child have whatever food he chooses, will usually receive the reply, "But what can I do if he wants it?" This attitude explains the prevalent lack of regularity in food and hours of sleeping with the inevitable deleterious effect on childhood.

Ignorance and superstition determine for the great uneducated masses in the East their ideas of food, of clothing for the child, of cleanliness, of general living; and a fatalistic attitude towards life makes it a virtue to accept death and disease as the will of God. Such prevailing health attitudes and customs menace the lives of children in the East, especially in their earlier years; and in addition to all this, girls in the East from the hour they are born labour

under a special handicap. In a village in India I saw the brass band waiting for the village celebration after the birth of the village headman's new child. Suddenly after the event had taken place, the band was dismissed in silence. It seemed strange to me but not to the rest of the village. "Who would celebrate the birth of a girl with a brass band?" Throughout the East the birth of a boy is the occasion for gifts and great rejoicing, but no one celebrates the birth of a girl. One rupee for a boy, eight annas for a girl, the current price that the midwife receives for a delivery in India, reflects the eternal fact of the East—the higher value of a boy. The rate may be higher in the higher economic strata, as in Aleppo where formerly, according to a Syrian doctor, the regular fee was one gold pound for the birth of a girl and two or three for a boy. The cost of living may change but the relative value of the boy and girl remains the same. The Syrian doctor, however, commented on the fact that the attitude was changing as the education of girls is bringing a higher appreciation of their value. Without education there is little change.

Visiting some of the poorer homes in Hebron with the well-trained health visitor from Jerusalem, I found in one home a woman with twins, each in a crude cradle on either side of the mother, who sat on the floor working and rocking, first one cradle and then the other by pulling a rope attached to her toe. I noticed, however, that the mother rocked one cradle very little, and through the midwife interpreter I asked the reason. "Oh, it's a girl," was the reply. "Why bother? One of the twins must die anyway"—there is a common belief that twins are not supposed to live—"it might as well be the girl. My husband hasn't paid any attention to it." Her conclusion that one would die did not seem to be based on mere supposition as she had had eight children and lost four.

Another Hebron woman, whom we visited the same day, told the health visitor of her great relief when her fifth child proved to be a boy. She had had four girls and was afraid to present her husband with a *fifth*. She had almost decided to do away with it if the fifth had been a girl. Another daughter would certainly have meant a divorce.

There was pathos in her deep sense of relief. Constantly the greater value of a son is registered in the Eastern woman's fear of divorce, if only daughters are born. Nothing is more tragic than a constant succession of daughters, since it is commonly recognized that divorce or a co-wife, either one or the other, is justifiable if there is no son.

The complete acceptance by Eastern mothers of the fact that half the children die is one of the most tragic evidences of the wastage of life in the East. So completely do they accept the loss of half the children or even more, that when they are asked the number of their children, they often give the number of the living and make no reference to those they have lost. By common acceptance in Iran the first child dies, or as the proverb runs: "The first baby belongs to the crow." Another grim Iranian proverb, "Count your children after the smallpox" indicates this same blind acceptance of fate. An Iranian woman, and she is typical of the East, as a whole, will say, "After all, Allah takes away and Allah will bring again." *Min Allah* as the Arab woman in Hebron said, from *Allah* the death rather than the life of children seems to be expected. Such a spirit of fatalism born of ignorance and superstition presents the greatest problem which the constructive forces of rebuilding the East must meet to-day.

Perhaps the utter fatalism of the Eastern woman's attitude towards the death of her children is due to the fact that child-bearing is regarded as all in the day's work. In the East, especially in the village home, there is always a new baby. As soon as the latest baby is able to take care of itself, there is a new arrival to claim the mother's attention. In a few years the older child has tumbled up and graduated into the distinction of looking after the younger brother or sister, which explains why in Indian villages children always seem to have a baby astride their hips. With this ever-present fact of child-birth in the Eastern woman's life, it is not strange that the all-absorbing topic of conversation in the Eastern harem, is always the last confinement or the next. It is also not strange that the first question always asked of the stranger is, How many children do you have?

Life without marriage or marriage without children are

alike incomprehensible to the Eastern woman. "Two years without pregnancies is a long interval"; this statement made by the best-known doctor in Jerusalem applies not merely to Palestine; and this is also true of her further comment, "A woman of thirty in the East begins to be old. She has already had a number of children, and if she hasn't then she feels disgraced. Sterility is an entirely justifiable cause for divorce." Incidentally this idea does not apply merely to Islam, as I was told by a Jewish doctor in Jerusalem that orthodox Jews automatically secure a divorce if after two years there are no children. This idea that child-bearing is the *raison d'être* of marriage, Eastern women have never questioned as the law of life.

But evidences of a changing attitude are beginning to be apparent. Birth control in some countries is beginning, not among the orthodox and not among the lower classes, but among the middle class of all religions. Abortion is also reported as growing among the upper classes, as shown by requests made to some of the hospitals. That this may be due to a certain extent to economic conditions, and also may be interpreted as a protest against constant child-bearing, was the opinion expressed by a leading Iranian doctor in Teheran. In small places where hitherto it was unknown, abortion is also beginning. In a small Iranian town the cause was interpreted by the foreign doctor in the town to be economic conditions rather than a change in the woman's attitude towards such frequent pregnancy. Economic conditions, however, do not seem to be the deterrent in the Indian village. Grinding poverty does not prevent this frequent child-bearing for "it is the will of Allah; Allah the sustainer of all life will provide" the Moslem woman will say, or the Hindu woman will say it is her *Karma*. But even though fatalism as to size of families is dominant, there is occasionally a faint glimmer of change even among the simpler people. "Too much rain reduces the crop; too many sons bring reproach," quoted by a Sikh peasant represents the new attitude beginning slowly to encroach upon the old.¹ Among the educated groups in

¹ Malcolm Lyall Darling, *Rusticus Loquitur*, p. 39. Oxford University Press, London, 1929.

all countries there is a growing recognition of the need to study the question of birth control and to furnish intelligent guidance. The fact that last year's All-India Women's Conference (Trivandrum, 1936) had Mrs. Margaret Sanger, the leader of the Birth Control Movement in the United States, as their special speaker, indicates the concern of Indian women over the subject of birth control.

The practice of early marriage, which is always earlier in the lower classes in the economic scale and in the uneducated class of every strata, undoubtedly is one of the major causes of maternal ill-health and mortality and the high infantile birth rate. Studies made by the Public Health Department in Palestine have summed up the direct effect of early marriage, as evidenced by various doctors in Palestine in the following terms: "anatomical injuries to genital organs and interference with complete development," "general debilitation and increase in abortions due to youthful ignorance of the hygiene of pregnancy," and "nervous disorders and hysteria." The harmful effect of early marriage and early child birth on the health of children seems beyond the shadow of doubt. The child as well as the youthful mother pays the penalty of child marriage in actual physical weakness and stunted growth. Moreover, the ignorance of the young mother as to the care of babies—their feeding, clothing and health habits predisposes the child to disease.

How prevalent child marriage and early child birth are, it is often difficult to say, because of the general lack of statistics and also because of the casual attitude of Eastern women toward their age, which strikes one as quite different from the usual attitude of women in the West toward such a crucial question as age. Rarely do women in Iran have an exact idea of their age. "Put down whatever you think" is a common answer. But there is little question of the fact of early marriage. One needs only to see, as I did in a clinic in Teheran, a young woman of twenty, mature in face and figure, who had been married at twelve and already had had five children with only two still living, to realize the full meaning of the physical as well as moral and spiritual effects of early marriage.

No country in the East has suffered from the evils of child marriage as has India, and in no country of the East has there been such an unequivocal indictment of the wrongs of such a practice. Indian leaders, men and women alike, realize that the future health of India as a whole is conditioned in no small measure by the abolition of child marriage, since this affects the population of India more widely than any of the other social customs that are deleterious to health.

Undoubtedly the greatest hazard that the women of all countries must meet is the village midwife, or *dai*, the name she bears in India. Untrained, ignorant, old, often blind or half-blind, always filthy and always of the lowest class, since child-birth bears the stigma of contamination, the village midwife is for thousands of Eastern women and children the harbinger of disease and death. A frequent attendant in the family, as children come in regular succession and the overwhelming majority of women never darken the doors of a hospital, the midwife exerts a dire power over the village home. This power is jealously guarded. Although ignorant, the midwife is often very clever, knowing how to exploit the people's superstition in favour of her own security. Often midwives are chosen by dreams; and a midwife, thus chosen, becomes an established tradition in a family, officiating not only at births but on all other occasions of family importance. The encroachments of modern science in her special province the midwife bitterly resents and often aggressively opposes. For example, a vigorous old midwife in Mosul carried on an active and successful propaganda a few years ago against the hospital there, choosing wisely the one place where harem women gather, the bath, which since privacy is not a requisite of the Oriental bath, fills all the functions of the ladies' club, and is the favourite gathering place for gossip and amusement. It also offers as in this case, an unusual opportunity for health or anti-health propaganda.

The mere sight of a midwife with her primitive implements, her rusty scissors or knife, are eloquent evidence of her ignorance and malpractice. I have found endless proof of this in clinics and hospitals across Asia, and have

heard from doctors and nurses the constantly repeated refrain that bad midwifery has brought its inevitable toll of maternal and child mortality. The old typical midwifery, the curse of every country in the East, and the new trained midwifery, which is the goal of all health effort in the East are strikingly presented in visual contrast in two pictures in the model clinic in Cairo, to which reference has already been made. The one picture shows the primitive bearing stool, the dishevelled figure of a midwife beside it and the rusty tools of her trade; the other, a bed with clean white covering, and a midwife in white cap and uniform with shining clean instruments. "The women in the clinic come to see this picture very often," the trained midwife told me. "It interests them very much." The details of the picture of the old midwife in different countries, as for instance in the health posters used widely in India, may differ, but the central idea of ignorance and uncleanness makes the picture typical of the traditional practice of midwifery in Asia as a whole. The modern clinic and trained midwife are also characteristic of the widespread effort that modern science is making in Asia to overcome this primary danger in the life of Eastern women.

All of these powerful factors in the health conditions of the East—ignorance, superstition and fatalism, early marriage and recurrent child-bearing, and the crowning evil of all—bad midwifery, wage a successful allied campaign against the lives of all Eastern women and children, regardless of religious communities, although often religion adds to the force of ignorance and superstition. With such heavy odds against human life in the East, one ceases to wonder at high infantile and maternal death rates, and the ever-present evidence of disease. One marvels rather at the miracle of life, which overcomes such terrific hazards of health and makes survival possible.

CHAPTER XIX

THE EFFECT OF SOCIAL CUSTOMS ON HEALTH

IN addition to the baneful effects of superstition and ignorance, a fatal alliance that threatens the health and well-being of the East as a whole, Moslem women must also combat the insidious dangers to health inherent in certain social customs which have been considered to be sanctioned by Islam—purdah and polygamy. Medical science has borne its evidence against these social practices so that their indictment as a menace to health is not based on speculation but on well-established facts.

Concerning the deleterious effects of purdah, Dr. Suhrawardy, a Moslem specialist in child welfare in Calcutta, makes the following statement:¹ "Statistics show that infant mortality is greater among Moslems than Hindus, and the same is true also of tuberculosis, which has claimed more victims from among Moslem women than from those of any other Indian community. The causes are lowered vitality with no power of resistance against infection, due to living under purdah conditions in small, dark, ill-ventilated houses." The fact that purdah is a special cause of osteomalacia, is the conclusion drawn by Dr. Vaughan in a research study based on her long medical practice in Kashmir, the population of which is predominantly Moslem. To quote only one of many passages: "It is necessary to point out to those in authority that the purdah system by depriving girls and women of sunlight is directly responsible for the osteomalacia, gross pelvic deformity, and the deaths of thousands of mothers and children in child-birth annually."² It is significant to note that although purdah is not confined to the Moslem community especially in India, where many Hindu

¹ *Mother and Infant Welfare for India*, p. 21, by Hassan Suhrawardy, M.D., formerly Chief Medical Officer, Bengal Railway.

² *The Purdah System and its Effect on Motherhood*, p. 38, by Kathleen Olga Vaughan, M.B. (London), former Superintendent of Zenana Hospital, Srinagar, Kashmir.

women are in purdah, the fact that purdah is regarded as sanctioned by religion makes it a special menace to the health of Moslem women. Studies on maternity of the different Indian communities made by Dr. Balfour of the Heffkine Institute in Bombay, show also the effect of purdah on Moslem mothers.¹ In the comparison of the three diseases causing the largest number of maternal deaths, osteomalacia, eclampsia, and anaemia, the ratio of all diseases is highest in Moslems and lowest among Christians.

An American doctor in Iran calls attention to the increase in tuberculosis especially among women, the cause of which he considers to be the constant re-breathing in of germs behind the veil. The Medical Officer of Health for Iraq in his Health Report for 1922 also attributes the high incidence of tuberculosis among the women of Baghdad to purdah conditions, especially as the highest incidence is not in the poorest classes in the worst quarters of the city, but in the middle- and upper-class homes, where purdah is most rigidly observed.

One does not need to multiply quotations of health officials to realize the relationship between purdah and tuberculosis. It requires no imagination to understand why tuberculosis is rife in Baghdad. Leave New Street, the main artery of Baghdad, and penetrate on foot—few streets are wide enough for a carriage—into the heart of the city. High windows, blank walls, narrow winding lanes, houses in solid mass formation joined back to back with no space between, closed doorways, debarring air and sunshine alike—this is the real Baghdad of which New Street is only the very garish modern façade. If by chance some day you are fortunate and gain admittance behind one of the forbidding doorways, you will find yourself after passing through a dark entry-way in a shut-in compound. A verandah above and below encircles the courtyard, with rooms opening into it. The lower basement floor is very deeply built, serving in the hot weather as the main living place for the family. The small open courtyard

¹ Dr. Margaret Balfour, C.B.E., M.B., "Diseases of Pregnancy and Labour in India with Special Reference to Community," reprinted from Volume I. *Transactions of the Far Eastern Association of Tropical Medicine*, Seventh Congress in India, 1927.

sometimes bare, sometimes with trees and vines, is the centre of the stage for the life of many Moslem women of the most conservative upper class, and offers their sole place of recreation. The houses of the middle class follow the same general plan differing only in quality, with inferior buildings, often in sad disrepair, with less air and light, in the courtyards which are usually unpaved and offer less chance for exercise. The lower class homes are often mere mud brick, rude shelters enclosed in courtyards if possible, but often built on any available ruins or unoccupied foot-hold of land. The fact that these poorer homes have more air probably explains why the records show less tuberculosis in these homes than in those of the upper class.

A hopeful sign of change in the life of the better class in Baghdad which lives in closer seclusion is the movement out of the congested city to the suburb on the Tigris, where charming new houses are being built facing the river, entirely open to the street without any walled-in compound, with windows on all sides, a front verandah and an entrance from the walk along the river front. Such homes will give more light and air, more freedom of movement, thus not only a wider physical horizon but a mental outreach, which doubtless will mean better health and more normal living.

Visit Nablus in Palestine and you will find an interesting parallel to the crowded sections of Baghdad, with its prevalence of tuberculosis among women and children. The closely built compact city of Nablus with its dark, narrow, sunless streets, and cold stone houses in which the women live in close purdah could not fail to furnish a fertile field for tuberculosis. But it is interesting that there is also in Nablus as in Baghdad a new quarter outside the city, one of the results of the earthquake, I was told, which several years ago destroyed the congested sections and led to rebuilding in the area outside the city. Thus *la force majeure* has benefited the Moslem women of Nablus, who, the mayor of the city said, "can walk about more freely and sniff the air," as the Arabic picturesquely expresses it.

The old historic walled city of Jerusalem, which has remained practically unchanged for centuries, means much to the pilgrim to the Holy City, who would not have it

changed. But for the secluded Moslem women of Jerusalem, the lack of sunshine and crowded homes have another meaning. Moslem women of all classes live inactive, shut-in lives within the city walls and suffer greatly from crowded unsanitary conditions. Some of the better class well-to-do families in Jerusalem, as elsewhere, are moving outside the walls, where life is freer from the purdah and more wholesome. One Moslem woman living outside showed me with great pride her garden, a new venture for a Jerusalem woman. Perhaps garden clubs in the future may flourish in Palestine as in America.

In some Eastern cities, however, Moslem women of the upper class have been more fortunate than those in Baghdad or Jerusalem. Homes of the better class in Damascus, which have kept their Oriental atmosphere—inside courtyards, charm and beauty, fountains and flowers—or homes in Iran with their far-famed gardens, or the spacious compounds of some high-class cultivated Moslem home in India, do not give the impression of a seclusion in physically cramped conditions which undermines the health of women. In fact, to a dweller in an apartment in New York City such secluded and spacious leisure might even seem strangely attractive—at least for a time before the circumscribed mental horizon had begun to pall. But such purdah settings give no idea of what in those same cities the health life of the woman of the middle class must be, who in her single narrow courtyard is bound by the same conventions as is the more favourably situated woman of wealth in her wider home orbit of freedom.

To realize the difference in health implicit in these different strata of life, one needs only contrast two types of life in a city like Lahore—the old closely built city of high houses, where many a Moslem woman has no outside space for recreation unless perhaps a shielded part of a roof, with some of the beautiful homes surrounded by their lovely compounds in the newer city, where the woman of wealth has little sense of curtailed freedom. For a wealthy Moslem woman in one of these spacious homes, it is doubtless difficult to understand the real meaning of purdah, in its effect on the health and well-being of the great majority.

As a charming young girl of a conservative family in Lahore, who had never been in that other section of Lahore, said, "Perhaps, if I could see what purdah means to some of the girls inside the old city, then I might realize why we ought to try harder to discard the purdah; for after all, we are responsible, since people of that other class always follow our example."

Aside from the increased susceptibility of Moslem women to tuberculosis which doctors attribute to close seclusion, another type of deleterious effect of purdah is often mentioned. According to a Syrian doctor in Aleppo with a large private practice among Moslem women, hysteria and neurasthenia are very common among Moslem women, the cause for which he believes is the suppression of normal outlets because of their secluded manner of living. It is interesting, however, that one hears sometimes quite a different opinion on this same point. For example, the Aleppo Director of Public Health, also a Moslem, expressed quite the opposite view. In his opinion the life of seclusion of women in the past, since more tranquil, caused far less nervous disease among women than the freer life which modern Moslem women are now adopting. Women's life before, he felt, was without desires that could not be satisfied, and hence, without disappointment. This opinion is often given especially by conservative Moslems but is not usually supported by a basis of medical experience. Both opinions may be true however without flatly contradicting each other. The conflict period of transition, during which women are on the verge of freedom but not yet free, might naturally be more conducive to nervous disorders than the period before any change began. The first Aleppo doctor in his private practice sees a good many Moslem women of the modern type, whereas the public health official was speaking perhaps more of the lower or middle class, who are doubtless much less aware of conflict and suppressed desires.

The opinion of the public health official at all events does not conform with the experience of an Eastern educator in a girls' school, who has been in close touch with some of the higher class Moslem families in her city. In her opinion there is a great deal of nervous instability not only

in the modern group but among the older women, who have been brought up entirely under the old régime and known no other life than tranquil seclusion. They suffer, she feels, from the completely unbalanced life of the Moslem East, where the outside world is overweighted with men, and the life inside the harem entirely overweighted with women. Neither life is normal. The woman's life especially is abnormal, offering no adequate outlets for expression. The over-emphasis on the repression of normal desires leads often to very special problems inherent in the harem situation.

She further expressed the opinion that, although the situation exists in the older comparatively little educated group, it is much more serious for the younger generation, which is still veiled but has been exposed to modern education. Inevitably through education, natural desires are awakened which cannot be satisfied under the existing social system. This often leads to difficult personal maladjustment and serious nervous disorders. In this connection the school Principal commented on the probable relation between the increase of physical education for girls and the decrease in nervous hysteria among her students. Similarly for the older women behind the veil the increased freedom of exercise of to-day in comparison to the past has been beneficial. The greater freedom to go to the public parks, drive and walk about more freely, attend the cinema and as the Mayor of Nablus said, "sniff the air" of the outside world—all of this increase in freedom of movement doubtless has a beneficial influence in counteracting the unwholesome effects, physical and mental, resulting from the unnatural system of segregation.

The restricted life of the veil is not only deleterious in its effects on the physical and mental health of Moslem women, but constitutes also the main hindrance to their medical care. A factor conducive to disease, *purdah* is also a factor preventing relief from disease and thus in a double sense is a health handicap. Eastern women as a whole have been averse to being treated by male doctors, but for Moslem women the veil has made it even more difficult and for many practically impossible. In India Moslem women

would be without medical care if there were no *zenana* hospitals staffed by women doctors, as the convention prevails that *purdah* women cannot be treated by a male doctor.

Iran offers a contrast to India in that the last few years have brought marked changes in respect to having a male physician. In many cases the break through conservatism came first through seeing a foreign doctor. Then slowly there was a greater freedom to see Iranian doctors. Most Moslem women, however, still have a preference for a woman doctor for certain specific diseases. The evidence of change mentioned by a well-known doctor in Teheran is the fact that women now come alone for examination, whereas ten years ago they were accompanied by a male member of the family. This indicates not only less conservatism of the women, but also less jealousy and suspicion of men, since formerly they would not trust a physician. In Kermanshah in the heart of the city I visited the clinic of the leading Moslem physician, of that city, a very progressive graduate of the American University of Beirut, and found the waiting-room literally black with *chaddur*-clad women, waiting their turn for treatment. No husbands were in evidence. The women were all veiled but they unveiled for the doctor's examination. That they had come without their husbands and to a Moslem doctor rather than to a foreign doctor were signs of real advance, especially in Kermanshah where public opinion is less advanced than in Teheran.

Such a scene as the clinic in Kermanshah would be even more worthy of note in Iraq, as the Moslem women of Iraq seem to be more conservative in securing medical attention freely from male physicians. The great majority in Iraq still will not see a man doctor but the situation is changing. Only a few years ago in the Baghdad Hospital the pulse had to be taken through the *aba*, and the stethoscope was useless since it could not be used through the folds of the clothing. The greatest handicap for the doctor in Iraq, I was told, is that in most cases the husband insists on staying in the room for the examination, and women are averse to having the examination in the presence of their husbands.

Sometimes an English doctor can prevail on the husband to leave or, if not, can simply refuse to make the examination unless allowed to do so freely. For an Iranian doctor, however, to insist on having the husband leave is very difficult. The general conservatism is indicated by the fact that the families of the girls in the Normal School in Baghdad, when advised that the daughter needs medical attention, very often send back word, "We'll take her to our doctor," which paraphrased means, "We don't want her to see a doctor." The girls are always embarrassed by the parents' excuses, regarding such conservatism with a sense of shame. As the Principal of the Normal School said, their embarrassment is a hopeful sign for the future.

Although Baghdad as a whole is more advanced than elsewhere in Iraq, one still finds extremes of purdah restriction which seem to belong to the past rather than the present. Calling one day on a family which prides itself on being the leading family of the religious "four hundred," since claiming direct descent from the Prophet, I found a young girl aged about fifteen with her face bandaged, nursing a bad toothache. The whole family group—mother, sister and elderly aunt—were in solemn conclave. The girl was in great pain. It was necessary to have the dentist, but impossible for the girl to unveil. Finally they decided the girl could remain entirely veiled, except her mouth, and then they called the dentist. Having the girl go to the dentist's office was not even considered, as it was apparently quite outside the range of possibility.

In Kadhimain only a few years ago, according to the Public Health Officer, all diagnosis had to be made by the pulse only; now a good many women will unveil, but any complete examination is refused until often too late. The crowd in the clinic waiting treatment seemed to indicate a great response to medical care, but the doctor explained that only about a third were ill, the rest were moral attendants to put the seal of respectability on the visit. In Mosul which is less conservative than Kadhimain but more so than Baghdad, although unveiling before the doctor is still refused by many, a Syrian doctor has quite a good *clientèle* of Moslem women. They, however, usually come with some

male relative and permit only a partial examination. This marks a great advance from the situation of an earlier period, when the handkerchief over the wrist was necessary for taking the pulse.

The attitude of Moslem women in the countries bordering on the Mediterranean—Syria, Palestine, and Egypt—is in general much more advanced in reference to the freedom of consulting a doctor. In Syria, aside from Hama and Tripoli, the freedom of having examinations of various kinds is quite general; sometimes women come with their husbands, usually by preference alone. This freedom seems to be equally characteristic of Aleppo and Damascus. The leading doctor in both cities has a large *clientèle* of Moslem women. The question of “seeing a doctor” has graduated from the stage of discussion or argument and become now, as one Syrian woman said, almost a social experience. For this reason, and not because of any greater degree of confidence in the professional skill of men, she said, Moslem women prefer men doctors to women doctors. Consulting a man physician gives them the satisfaction of contact with some man outside their own families. Moreover it is rather a pleasure to discuss their ailments with a sympathetic listener. Such a measure of freedom is, however, by no means in accord with the Hama custom where the prejudice against being unveiled still persists. But occasionally some of the wealthy Moslem women from Hama go to Aleppo and Beirut for medical consultation.

More advanced perhaps than Hama, but not like Damascus, is Deir-ez-zor, a windswept town in the desert, half-way between Aleppo and Mosul, where the very good mission hospital is an outpost of civilization. According to the doctor in charge, the women of the town come to see him, well accompanied by men, a husband or brother or both. But these are only older women; a young girl would *never* be allowed to come. Women will not, however, permit all types of examinations. The fact that one woman comes always brings another. They take pride in saying, “The doctor did for me such and such a thing.”

Women in Jerusalem for a long time have consulted a doctor in cases of absolute necessity; now there is a steady

increase in normal cases. While visiting a school in Jaffa with the Director of Education, several of the teachers dropped their veils before him, but were unveiled before the medical officer, who at the time, was making an inspection, moving about quite freely. The doctor apparently is regarded as being in a special category.

In Trans-jordan to-day conservatism is the exception rather than the rule, in connection with ordinary examination or consultation of a doctor. In spite of the fact that only a little over a decade ago, in Trans-jordan the health official could vaccinate a Moslem woman only through a hole cut in her sleeve. Such a restriction would be very unusual. This degree of change in such a short time in an ancient desert land seems to refute the law of the eternal changelessness of the desert.

Veiling before a doctor in Egypt now belongs to the past except in a few centres. An interesting contrast between the present and the former situation was cited by the head of the American Hospital in Assiut. Twenty or thirty years ago a doctor, attending a woman in a certain very conservative family could only see the patient's tongue through a hole in the sheet. A member of that same family now might have a full examination at the hospital. Only a few families in Assiut now require a male member of the family to be present at a consultation. In Tanta also, with a few exceptions, having a doctor is the established thing and, in fact, carries a certain measure of distinction. In Egypt as also throughout the Moslem world it is evident that there is a general movement toward greater freedom among Moslem women to avail themselves of medical consultation with male physicians.

The bad effects of polygamy on the health of women and children cannot be as conclusively shown as the deleterious results of purdah. The opinion however is often expressed that polygamy is a cause of general ill-health, and that it tends towards less attention to the care of children. An interesting study, which bears out this opinion, was made in the American hospital at Kermanshah. It compared a certain number of cases of Moslem men and women in two age groups, one grouping of marriages of over ten

years, the other less than ten years. The younger ten years' group, which registered a decline in polygamy, showed also a marked decline in infant mortality. Undoubtedly, one of the bad effects of polygamy is the nervous instability it produces. The constant fear of a co-wife and sense of insecurity, it is said by some medical authorities leave their impress on the health of the Moslem woman and her children. As temporary marriage, the special form of polygamy in Iran, legalizes sex relationships without affording women any of the binding rights accorded to them in the regular form of polygamy, temporary marriage therefore has an even more adverse effect than regular polygamy on the nervous stability of the Moslem woman.

Some advocates of polygamy advance the argument that it is not deleterious to women's health in that it divides the strain of wifehood among the different wives. But judging by the usual strong reaction of women against polygamy and the tension in Moslem homes caused by the endless friction between co-wives, it would seem that the general nervous strain is greatly increased even though the burden of child-bearing may be divided. "Two wives in a household always cause trouble" is a common saying, the truth of which seems verified by glimpses of Moslem homes.

And yet, one finds occasionally the rare exception which might seem to bear out the idea of dividing the strain. While visiting in Hebron with a health visitor, I found in a rude lean-to shed of a house, an older woman fondling a baby in her arms in a grandmotherly fashion, chatting pleasantly with a very attractive young girl, who wore a heavy necklace of gold coins around her neck. I inferred that the girl was the daughter of the older woman. But in conversation with the older woman, the health visitor soon discovered that the young girl was the second wife, who had been married a year and a half before. The first wife was entirely satisfied, was very fond of the baby, and glad to assume its entire care. They all lived in the one dirt-floor room which was almost barren. The first wife had her section over in one corner behind a low mud wall partition. The older woman explained that she had lived ten years with her husband quite happily; incidentally, she was prob-

ably much younger than she looked, had borne six children, four boys and two girls, and only one child was living—a girl. She was very pleased to have the young wife enter the home—in fact, had urged her husband to take another wife. After all, as she said, she had had six children. For the last two years she had not had any, and was very glad to have a rest. The whole situation seemed to her so entirely natural that she wondered why the health visitor and I were so interested and asked so many questions. Such a close-up of an unusual case of polygamy certainly gave no evidence of tension and seemed to verify the opinion of the advocate of polygamy, that it often is a benefit in dividing the physical burden of marriage. But such a justification after all is specious, based as it is on an idea of marriage on a very low level of life, which the enlightened Eastern public has already repudiated.

Another argument frequently advanced for polygamy, which directly bears on the health problem, is that polygamy is needed to protect society and, furthermore, that morality is higher and venereal disease less prevalent under polygamy than under monogamy. A Turkish health official does not sustain this view, but holds that social disease is not of recent origin, but has always been present in the East. Moreover, it is in his opinion a debatable question that the abolition of polygamy causes an increase in venereal disease and prostitution. The increase of prostitution is unquestioned, but is doubtless to be attributed to other causes than the decline of polygamy. The fact that the word *frengy*, foreign, is the common term used for venereal disease incidentally gives food for reflection. A prominent young educator in Baghdad recalls that before the World War, there was only one case of venereal disease in Mosul, to-day there are many cases and the disease is increasing.

In the preceding discussion of the health conditions of women in the Moslem East, little reference has been made to Turkey. Much that has been said as to the general health situation and health problems applies also to the Asia Minor background of Modern Turkey. Although the New Republic has turned its eyes toward the West, the health background of a country cannot be changed overnight. Aside from the

people of Istanbul, Ismir and modern Ankara, the great majority of the people still think in the health terms of Asia. Hence, there is a remarkable similarity between health conditions and health needs in Turkey and elsewhere in the Near East; for example, in Syria and Palestine.

But one does not forget that the Asia of modern Turkey is still truly an Asia Minor; and that there is a difference between Asia Minor and the rest of Asia, and a real distinction between the Turkish and the Arab points of view. Climatic and racial differences undoubtedly play an important role. The fact that Islam was a borrowed social system for the Turk has tended to modify its force. The Islamic concept of seclusion never exerted on Turkish women the same pressure as in other Islamic countries, and hence never had the same deleterious effect on the health of women. But allowing for differences of climate, race and modified social practice, there are certain dominant factors of health which belong to Asia as a whole and hence to the great majority in Turkey as well. Superstition as the hand-book to health and protection against disease, ignorance of the laws of sanitation, and a fatalistic outlook which accepts whatever comes as Allah's will, have been, in Turkey as elsewhere, the main forces which have determined the general health environment of women. Eastern methods of child care have prevailed, and the untrained midwife has presented a major problem in Turkey as elsewhere. The larger cities have, of course, shown rapid change in standards, but the Interior inevitably has lagged behind.

The significant thing, however, is not the similarity of health conditions and problems in Turkey to conditions elsewhere in the Near East, but the complete freedom of Turkey to make a direct attack on these problems. Fatalism and ignorance are aggressively combated as a menace to national welfare. These forces in Turkey have lost their ally of religion and therefore, are losing their power over the people. In repudiating the authority of Islam to determine social customs, Turkey has cut loose from some of the main hindrances to general health, and especially to the health of women. The veil, early marriage, polygamy cease to be determining factors. Social legislation is now on the

side of better health practices. One would scarcely claim that legislative reform affects immediately a miracle of health change uniformly throughout the country. But legislation has eliminated the conflict between the old religious control over social custom and the efforts of modern science to promote health welfare. Thus Turkey has a freer field than other countries in the Moslem East to build a progressive health programme.

As to the effect of social freedom in contrast to the effect of social seclusion on health, Turkey presents an interesting difference from the rest of the Moslem East. Whereas in other countries the lack of social freedom presents often a serious health problem, in Turkey the acquisition of social freedom is considered by some to have had a deleterious effect on individual Turkish women, and on general moral conditions. Conservative opinion probably avers that the repudiation of old social customs and the adoption of the freedom of the West has had a disintegrating effect on individuals and has increased nervous disorders among women. No complete statistical evidence is available, but according to various sources there has been no general increase in nervous diseases, hysteria and neurasthenia in Turkey which would differentiate it from other countries.

As to the effect of social freedom on morals, it is probably true that the first few years of the new freedom were characterized by difficult personal adjustments, which resulted in a certain inevitable amount of serious moral casualties. The transition period, however, is rapidly passing or has already passed in the larger cities, where social life has settled into the normal social atmosphere of a European city. The younger generation now in the schools and university will not have to meet the same problem, which the present post-college generation has met in the advent of social freedom without adequate social experience.

But in this connection one must remember that the new freedom in Turkey was not as drastic a break with the past, or as complete a right-about face as is usually supposed. This common mistake which is made in the West, leads to a misunderstanding of the Turkish situation. In Turkey there had been a continuous preparation for freedom since

1908, so that in 1923 Turkish women were much more socially advanced than are the Moslem women in a number of the other countries in the East to-day. Hence, unveiling and the realization of complete freedom did not bring the nervous shock of a sudden plunge into freedom. It was more like the natural end of a process, as it were, passing through the last door to freedom which was already ajar ready to be opened wide for Turkish women by the New Republic.

CHAPTER XX

INDIA SEEKS BETTER HEALTH STANDARDS

As one views the health situation in the East, one is conscious not only of the enormity of the problem, which in some countries especially seems almost hopeless, but also of the active forces at work in each country trying to combat the wastage of human life. There is great diversity in the extent and effectiveness of these health agencies but throughout the East within the past decade there has been a definite growth in the effort to handle the health problem. National leaders in Eastern countries determining government policy to-day recognize general health, and especially the health of women and children, as vital factors in nation building. A brief view of the field shows to what extent the different countries of the East are attempting to solve one of their most difficult problems—that of health.

The gravity of the health problem in India is comparable to no other country, not merely because of the size of India, a sub-continent of teeming millions, but because ignorance and superstition common to the masses in other countries are more strongly entrenched in India by social customs sanctioned by religion. In perhaps no country of the East, therefore, is the need for medical care of women and children greater than in India, and in no other Eastern country have efforts to meet this need been exerted over a longer period. In no other country also has there been such an unusual development of special hospitals for women. Since the opening of the first women's hospital in India at Bareilly, a Methodist Mission hospital (1875), the development of women's hospitals has been continuous. Without these *zenana* hospitals of which there were 183 in 1927, thousands of Indian women, especially Moslems, would have been deprived of all medical care, since the purdah system has precluded attendance at a general hospital. Aside from the increase in *zenana* hospitals, there has been also a steady increase of hospitals of all kinds.

The special health programme for women and children

is being promoted by three co-ordinated agencies, the *Dufferin Fund* for medical aid, the *Victoria Scholarship Fund* for training *dais*, the native midwives, and for raising the standard of midwifery, and the *Lady Chelmsford League* for Child Welfare and Maternity. The co-ordination of these agencies shows the unity of the problem of maternal and child welfare. The programme of general child welfare and health visitors is not limited to British India, but has been promoted in the Indian States under feudatory rulers, a very hopeful sign. Her Royal Highness, the former Begum of Bhopal, during her lifetime showed very keen interest in raising health standards in Bhopal, supporting a *zenana* hospital under an English doctor and a child welfare and maternity centre with training and supervision of midwives and health visitors. The fact that the Begum instituted compulsory training and supervision of midwives is significant, since registration has not yet been considered possible in India as a whole.

My first visit to India seventeen years ago left no outstanding impression of efforts along the line of health propaganda and education of the general public. But, at a tea which I attended in an Indian home in Bombay just after Christmas 1928, the sole topic of conversation was the organization of the next Baby Week. Since its inception at the Delhi Maternity and Child Welfare Exhibition in 1920, the Baby Week Movement has had a remarkable growth. In 1926 over four hundred cities celebrated Baby Week. These celebrations took place all over India, organized independently but promoted by the National Baby Week Council, which advises as to methods, supplies posters and literature, and lends a travelling exhibition. At the Baby Show in Delhi, 1928, seven thousand women came early and stayed late on the purdah day. The emphasis of the Baby Week has now changed into Health Weeks. The period of rapid development seems to have passed but there is a steady increase in public support of health projects.

General Health propaganda has been more effectively carried on in India than in any other country in the East. The Delhi Health Exhibition in 1920, the first health demonstration in India, which was the inspiration of later

child welfare programmes, brought together a remarkable assembly of over fifty thousand people—Ruling Princes, health officers, nurses, doctors, rural and city dwellers, educated and uneducated, purdah and non-purdah women—all concentrated on the subject of health. Since that first public health demonstration health propaganda has been carried out with such success all over India that the requests from the public for magic-lantern slides and cinematograph have overtaxed various Provincial Health departments trying to keep pace with the public demands. In the land of the ox-cart mass health education is being carried on also by radio lectures sponsored by the Indian Broadcasting Company, which brings the world to purdah women who cannot yet go out into the world.

Health education in schools is being promoted in different parts of India; in some places by regular school medical and health inspectors, in others by schemes for training teachers in health principles. In certain districts in the United Provinces there are night schools for health classes. These scattered Government efforts at school health teaching are supplemented by the work of voluntary organizations, such as health visitors' talks in schools. Legislation is being demanded for a programme of school health education on a national basis, but the lack of funds for the promotion of schools to meet the bare bedrock necessities of education probably precludes the idea of much definite development of health instruction in schools.

A very interesting form of health education outside of schools, which has made a very special appeal to women behind the purdah, is the classes carried on in first-aid and home nursing by the St. John Ambulance Association.

At a meeting of the Purdah Club in Bhopal, which was started under the special patronage of Her late Highness the Begum Sultan Jahan, some of the elderly guests crowded eagerly around me to display their badges awarded to them by the St. John Ambulance Association, which they wore proudly and conspicuously on their chests, a veritable decoration of honour.

One very colourful old Begum in brilliant magenta silk

pyjamas and a loose purple shirt with a bright red *chaddur*¹ over her head as the crowning touch in her colourful costume, kept pushing back the *chaddur* to reveal her string of medals, indicating that she had taken several different courses in first aid and home nursing. Through an interpreter she explained the quite unique examination process which seemed entirely natural to her. The examiner, she said, sat on one side of the curtain and the women on the other, with a little boy "shuffling" back and forth to see that the right person was answering and also to serve as the demonstration for bandages of different styles, as one after another of the elderly Begum students bandaged the boy's head or leg and sent him around the curtain for inspection. The old Begum's delight and joy in her achievement was a rare sight—an orthodox purdah woman, very aristocratic, hence shut in all her life, rejoicing over her medals like a child with a new doll. "Not that we expect to do nursing," she said, "but now we know how to take care of our own families and make better homes." Of definite value in the development of better health is the growing emphasis on recreation and physical exercises for girls and women. Through schools and voluntary organizations, such as the Girl Guide Movement and Y.W.C.A., the idea of positive health through exercise and recreation is being effectively promoted.

In meeting the health needs of Indian women and children the greatest problem in India and elsewhere in the East is the training of women for the various types of medical service—doctors, nurses, midwives, health visitors. Under great difficulties, because of hampering social customs, progress is being made in all of these various fields. Starting below the level of the trained worker, India has promoted the training of *dais* since 1903 when the Victoria Memorial Scholarship Fund for training *dais* was established. To meet the problem of trained supervision of *dais*, without which training of *dais* is futile, a number of Health Schools

¹ For the Moslem woman in India the *chaddur* is a shawl or scarf worn indoors, different from the *chaddur* the outdoor garment of the woman in Iran, but similar to the indoor garment the *namaz chaddur*. The word *namaz* means prayer.

for training supervisors of midwifery have been established. The first of these, the opening of the Lady Reading Health School in Delhi, was followed by the establishment of six other health schools in main centres of India. These schools serve as a demonstration for other countries where this type of training has been slow to develop.

The function of the health visitor trained in these schools is supervision and training of *dais*, visitation in homes after child-birth, organization of health centres for ante-natal clinics, and general health education in the community. The selection of students for training as health visitors is carefully made on the basis of general education, physical fitness and moral character. One of the instructions issued by the Punjab Health School to local communities employing a health visitor shows how the moral tone of the work is safeguarded. "The health visitor must, if living alone, be given quarters in a hospital compound or with reliable people of her own religion. In no case should she be expected to live alone in the city, though her centre should be as near her work as possible." The necessity for such a regulation indicates that social conditions do not afford Indian women a free field professionally; hence it is very difficult to recruit health visitors of the higher class, even though adequate salaries are paid. It is not strange that practically no Moslems have entered for training. Out of one hundred women in the Punjab Health School (until 1929) there were only two Moslems, neither of whom have practised the profession. On the whole the profession of health visitor has a higher status than nursing, perhaps because a newer profession without any traditional reputation to overcome and also because of the more independent type of work.

The public attitude toward nursing, hitherto always unfavourable, is slowly changing as a result of the increasing number of trained nurses and the attempt made by the Trained Nurses' Association and other agencies to establish better professional standards. A significant advance is the establishment of three nurses' training schools of higher type with more advanced educational requirements: the Lady Hardinge Medical College Nursing Course, Delhi; the Lady Reading Hospital, Simla, and the Lady Atchinson

Hospital, Lahore. Aside from these special courses, the training of nurses has been largely carried on in the Mission hospitals and in other *zenana* hospitals; only a few Government hospitals, such as the Calcutta and Bombay hospitals, have training schools for nurses. The majority of nurses are Christians, which is doubtless due to the Mission influence and also to the greater social freedom of the Christian community. Because of the purdah and the prevailing attitude toward nursing, there are practically no Moslem nurses.

The medical profession for women marks a steady increase which means the beginning of the replacement of foreign women doctors with Indians. Since the pioneer beginning at the Ludhiana Medical School, 1894, the facilities for medical education for women have grown until they include at present three women's medical schools (one Mission and two Government) and two women's medical colleges, the Lady Hardinge Government College in Delhi and the Missionary Medical School at Vellore. The number of women medical students shows a steady upward curve.¹ A significant trend to-day is the growing number of Indian women in co-educational institutions for medical training opened to women in 1875. About one-third of the total number of women medical students are in co-educational institutions, the largest number of whom are Christians and Parsees with also some Hindus, but no Moslems. As in other professions, the number of Moslem women is practically nil. In 1928 there were estimated to be under twenty-five Moslem women medical students in all India. Out of forty-seven graduates up to 1928, the Lady Hardinge Medical College had had only one Moslem graduate. There were, however, at that time ten Moslem students. This indicated the beginning of an advance.

Meeting with this fine group of keen attractive Moslem girls at the Lady Hardinge College, I was impressed with their significance to the Moslem community in India. Widely representative of India they constitute a very great

¹ In 1928 women students were about eight per cent of the total number of medical students (683 women and 8,937 men). *Fact Finders' Report, Laymen's Foreign Mission Inquiry*, volume on India. Harpers, 1933.

potential influence for the future and face a common problem of how to meet the convention of the purdah—whether to break it completely or to compromise for the sake of the older generation and their influence in the community with conservatives, a social and professional issue worthy of the brains and character of a fine pioneering group.

Perhaps the most hopeful trend in India, in reference to the improvement of health conditions, is the steady increase in voluntary organizations and societies under Indian initiative and leadership. Having spent a winter in Bombay in 1917 when there was comparatively little in the line of social welfare, it was nothing short of a revelation to me to find the development that had taken place in ten years. The Bombay Directory of Social Agencies is bewildering to-day in its variety of agencies for the welfare of women and children, a large number of which are promoted by Indian women. Many Indian women are as actively interested and as intensely occupied in social work as are many women in the West who give themselves to social causes.

The major efforts in the health field are directed toward child welfare. The Anti-tuberculosis Society has also called forth a special response because of the high incidence of tuberculosis among purdah women. The promotion of social hygiene has also made a strong appeal in different cities where a vigorous anti-prostitution campaign has been carried on. At the present time the question of birth control is receiving a good deal of attention. The All-India Women's Conference passed a resolution at Karachi (1935) to the effect that "on account of the low standard of physique of women, high infant mortality, and increasing poverty of the country, instruction in methods of birth control through recognized clinics is a necessity." Following this resolution the All-India Women's Conference invited Mrs. Margaret Sanger to attend the 1936 Conference at Trivandrum where the subject of birth control received major attention. After very heated discussion the following resolution was passed: "This conference reiterates its former resolution supporting the necessity for instruction in methods of birth control through recognized clinics and calls upon the constituencies to make a special effort to induce municipalities and other

organizations for maternity and child welfare to open centres to impart such knowledge to those who stand in need of it."

The promotion of health interests in India, which in the beginning was largely the special concern of foreign agencies and medical societies, such as the Women's Medical Association, has now been assumed as the joint effort of foreign and Indian leaders, the latter carrying an increasing measure of the responsibility. It may be noted in this connection that Moslems as a whole have lagged behind in general social service, and Moslem organizations for health and general welfare are few and far between. Individual Moslems, men and women, however, have shown a very keen interest. An example worth mentioning is the Red Cross Maternity Home in Sind, initiated and carried on by Madame Hamid Ali, to whom reference has already been made. Women of all the different communities are not only privately promoting schemes for child welfare, but publicly endorsing it through co-operative effort. The All-India Women's Conference has played a leading role in this whole movement for better health conditions in India.

Viewing the general situation of health as it affects Indian women and children to-day, in comparison with the last few decades, the answer to the question "Are there forces at work in India causing a change in health conditions of Indian women?" is certainly an affirmative. The increase in women's hospitals, the training and supervision of native *dais*, the programme of health centres with ante-natal clinics, home visitation and health lectures, the growth in health education in schools and the widespread promotion of health propaganda, the recognition of the need for wholesome recreation and physical exercise, the increasing number of women in the various fields of health and medical service and the multiplication of voluntary agencies for maternal health and child welfare—all this shows a concentration of effort to ameliorate health conditions for the women of India.

CHAPTER XXI

IRAQ AND IRAN BEGIN A PUBLIC HEALTH PROGRAMME

THE development of the health programme of Iraq and Iran offers an interesting basis for comparison. In climate, and racial and cultural background, as well as in the economic level of life, the two countries differ greatly. These factors in Iran are all more advantageous for a higher health standard than in Iraq. However, the dominating factor controlling social customs in Iraq and Iran is the same—Shi'ah Islam. This influence in Iran is intensified by the large proportion of Moslems (ninety per cent of the population) and the predominance of Shi'ah Islam. But the fact that several of the shrine centres of Shi'ah Islam are in Iraq contributes to its strength in that country. As religious superstitions play a large part in determining health customs, there is a great similarity in the health attitudes of the masses in these two countries. The high percentage of illiteracy, the absence of a socially awakened public conscience, and, until recently, the general Government attitude of *laissez-faire*—these common factors have kept health standards of both countries at a very low level.

It is significant that the past decade marks in both Iraq and Iran the beginning of a modern health programme, a change in both countries which is the result of a shift in the political situation. In Iraq, the programme began with the British Occupation, was developed under the Mandate and is now being carried on under the Iraq Government. In Iran the accession of Riza Shah Pahlavi in 1925 ushered in modern developments in health as well as advance along other lines. The motivation in each country is the same; namely, the rebuilding of old countries as modern nations for which national health is a necessity. The methods and technique in the promotion of the health programme are, however, different. The model followed in Iraq is Anglo-Saxon, primarily British, as there is less American influence in health than in the educational programme. In Iran, the

model for health development as for education is primarily French, with, however, undoubtedly an Anglo-Saxon influence exerted through a number of British and American Mission hospitals.

In Iraq during the post-war period a sound health organization has been established under British leadership. In the health programme there are still more British officials than in any of the other national services. Sanitation in the larger towns has been improved; and an active campaign has been carried on to promote inoculation against cholera and plague.

Until 1922 there was no Government programme of child welfare. At that time a supervisor of maternity and child welfare, an English nurse, was appointed; and four health centres in different quarters of the city of Baghdad were opened with local untrained health visitors, under the English supervisor. Each health centre held a daily consultation clinic for women and children and carried on a programme of house visiting, following up birth registrations by advice on the mothers' welfare and on general infant care.

I needed to spend only a little time in one of these health centres in a very poor quarter of Baghdad and watch the crowd of women waiting their turn in the open court below, to realize that the usefulness of the clinic was being appreciated. When the mothers, one by one in rapid succession were admitted and treated with clocklike rapidity by the English nurse and her assistant, I had the feeling of an endless succession of women and children of all ages needing help. After seeing one young Moslem mother's fright, when she saw her baby divested of its tight swaddling bands and given a bath by the health visitor, I could appreciate the difficulty of carrying on child welfare in Baghdad. The endless repetition of eye cases treated in the centre was what I would have expected after five minutes' observation on any street corner in Baghdad, as at least four out of every five people that pass have some eye disease. Baghdad and Cairo are counterparts in this respect, except that the number of flies in Cairo is greater. But flies in both cities are a major health menace.

The registration and inspection of native midwives is

attempted, although such efforts are rendered very difficult by inadequate birth registration, prevailing public ignorance or conservatism and often the active opposition of the native midwives. The Government Public Health officers give elementary instruction in midwifery, inspect the native midwife's primitive instruments and furnish simple new equipment. The Government Hospitals in Baghdad, Basra and Mosul offer regular courses in midwifery and also simple instruction for the native midwives, which, however, as has been already stated, are often boycotted. The qualified midwives receive a certificate; the others after a course of simple training receive their licences and are registered.

In the post-war period, as there were no nurses, British nurses were imported and used for a time. Now there are a number of local nurses, but not of high standard. There is not a single qualified nurse in Iraq, nor are any being trained. There are also no Iraqi women doctors and also none in training. The Health and Medical service as a whole is devoid of women, who are badly needed since the great majority of women in Iraq are quite averse to being treated by a man. The greatest deterrent in meeting this need is an adverse public opinion. Midwifery is considered as little better than prostitution; nursing is also regarded as a low calling but slightly better than midwifery. Only one Moslem girl had entered nursing in Iraq before 1930. The type of training given by the English nurses in the hospital has, of course, been fully modern but the nursing material inadequate.

The only private effort to promote child welfare or better health conditions is a clinic in Baghdad, established largely by the initiative of a young Moslem man who formerly studied in America, and supported by a group of Moslems, mostly men with only a small number of Moslem women. The lack of welfare interest on the part of women in Baghdad is in striking contrast to the growing interest of women in India or Egypt. It indicates, however, the general stage of advance of the Moslem women in Iraq, as there has not been a sufficient base of education for the awakening of an active social consciousness.

The hospital facilities of Iraq are extremely limited.

There are no specialized hospitals and no women's hospitals, a striking difference from India, and no sanitarium for tuberculosis. The lack of foreign non-Government hospitals presents a marked contrast to Iran and India. One American and one French Mission and two Jewish hospitals are the only foreign medical agencies in Iran. The Baghdad Royal Government Hospital, the most modern hospital in Iraq, is overcrowded, showing the urgent need for more hospital accommodation.

The most hopeful feature of the health situation in Iraq is the active promotion of health through the public schools. "Each of the eight hundred school children in Mosul," said an official in the Health Department, "acts for the health department, putting into practice the health teaching of the schools." The following interesting question on health included in the examination of the women's Training Colleges in Baghdad and Mosul shows the constructive emphasis on health given in schools. "Infant mortality is higher in Iraq than in many countries. Mention some of the bad habits and practices in the bringing up of children, which cause a high rate of infant mortality and show how these practices can be combated in the schools." This question called forth a total of seventy three different bad health habits. Another constructive approach to health was made in the training schools through a study of each student's weekly diet.

Another hopeful evidence of progress toward better health is the fact that a number of doctors can now earn a living by children's practice, which would have been impossible before. In 1919 when the first private practitioner in Mosul began his practice, people were sure that he would starve to death without a Government job. But on the contrary he has been very successful. Another sign of a new attitude toward health is the fact that some of the flowing robed sheikhs of the desert are beginning to clamour for clinics, which is perhaps the salutary effect of a representative Parliament in which the town dweller and roaming sons of the desert have an equal voice. If clinics and hospitals supported by public funds are good for Mosul and Baghdad, why not also for the sheikh and his tribe?

Summing up the results of the post-war period in Iraq, undoubtedly progress has been made in attacking the health problem, through laying the foundation of a health service and demonstrating its value. This should lead in the next period to the development of a trained personnel of women health workers, nurses and doctors. A favourable factor for the future improvement of the economic situation of Iraq is through the new pipe lines for oil flowing out from Mosul to Haifa and Tripoli. Promoting health programmes in Iraq would seem to be almost futile unless the people of the country can be lifted above the bare level of existence, which to day constitutes the standard of living for the great majority.

In Iran the promotion of a public health service began even later than in Iraq, as it is not related to the immediate political aftermath of the World War as in Iraq, but to the internal change in the Iranian Government through the accession of the Shah to the throne in 1925. Since that time the reorganization of the municipal health service of certain cities has been effected, but the central Government service is not comparable to that of most other countries. A study of health development in Iran is therefore largely a study of individual cities.

From the Government Department of Health in Teheran men are sent out to organize the work in other cities under local governments, but the lack of first-class trained doctors hinders the development of an efficient programme. How serious is the paucity of doctors in Iran is obvious from the fact that Iran has the lowest number of doctors (2.5 physicians per 100,000 population) of forty-one countries.¹ As inadequate as the Government health service is, however, the present situation shows distinct progress over a few years ago. One of the special efforts of the health service has been the successful and widespread inoculation of the people to prevent typhoid. This represents a real forward step, in view of the extreme aversion of the masses in Iran to inoculations. Some interesting indications of public improvements that have a bearing on health are the widening of roads, new street lighting, attention to street cleanli-

¹ *Journal of American Medical Association*, August 16, 1930.

ness, and new public conveyances. All of these tend toward a general higher level of life.

In Teheran where the public health service is better organized than elsewhere in Iran a distinctive feature of the programme is an increase in attention to child welfare and maternity. Provision in these two lines includes a clinic in the city hospital, a small maternity home with six beds, and adjoining it a foundling crèche for forty children, and a woman's hospital with a training school for medical assistants.

The maternity home and the foundling crèche offer a good demonstration of what provision should be made more widely for maternal and infant welfare. The maternity home, which is well arranged and well equipped, is attractively situated with a sunny inside garden on which the hospital verandah opens on three sides. One of the two women assistants, a Moslem, recently graduated from the three years' medical training course at the Teheran Women's Hospital, was in charge at the time of my visit. Her shy attitude as she talked to the Public Health doctor, pulling her *namaz chaddur*, the drapery worn indoors, over her face, and turning her head, indicated that she was distinctly unaccustomed to men and that professional life for Moslem women of Iran is just beginning. The foundling home adjoining, the first and only one of its kind in Teheran, serves as a combination of an institution for child care and a demonstration centre for mothers. Although very small, only accommodating forty children, it is quite modern in its plan and equipment. The walls of the receiving room are covered with health posters showing propaganda on mothers' feeding, cleanliness, the menace of flies, and value of freer clothing for infants. The children are kept in this home till four years of age and then transferred to the Government orphanages.

The training of women for health service in Iran is still in the beginning stage. The Government Hospital for women in Teheran, established ten years ago, serves as a centre for training midwives and medical assistants. The three years' course in this hospital, which is the highest medical training for women offered in Iran, is connected with the school of

medicine. From this hospital course about seventy students have graduated, including several Moslems. In Iran there has been no attempt to train the ignorant midwife. In Teheran some attempt has been made to regulate midwifery but the power of the primitive midwife is still practically unchanged. Some of the trained midwives are effectively carrying on private practice. For example a graduate of the American Mission Hospital Training Course in Tabriz and the American University of Beirut Course in Midwifery, has a very successful private clinic in Tabriz.

The training of nurses in Iran until recently has been given only in the Mission hospitals. But in 1928 the first nurses' training centre outside of Mission hospitals was opened in connection with the small maternity home in Teheran. The training of visiting nurses is the main objective of this two years' course, which requires for entrance three years' secondary education. It is planned that a number in each group completing the course will be sent to France or England, according to the language previously studied. These Iranian girls, who will study nursing and public health visiting abroad, present a hopeful outlook for the future public health programme in Teheran, as they may help to raise the status of nursing and encourage Moslem girls of good class to enter the service. As yet Moslem girls have not taken up nursing, the only trained nurses being Christian girls trained in the Mission hospitals. A recent constructive development in nurses' training is the special preparatory course given in Nurbakush for better educated girls who are being encouraged to enter the career of nursing.

The general attitude of the public toward the trained nurse and midwife is shown in a letter from a graduate nurse of one of the American hospitals, the first Iranian girl to enter nursing, as only Armenians had up till that time, in 1919, taken the course. "The women of Meshed were afraid of me at first. My clean uniform and bag of instruments were all rather formidable. They often called the untrained midwives first and then later, only if in danger, the trained nurse."

Another midwife nurse, an Armenian, in the Church

Missionary Society, working in maternity welfare work in Kerman, narrates a similar experience of breaking down popular prejudice and establishing herself on a professional basis in a conservative community. "The fact of our being called midwives only and not doctors, was a great surprise to the people, as their own midwives belong to the poorest, lowest, and most ignorant class of people. Now they have grown quite accustomed to us, and as we go about in the streets, we constantly hear them saying: 'These are midwives.' Of course, it took them some time to get used to having us for the confinement. At first, we were only called in for very difficult cases, or only for the lower class, the carpet-weavers. The people had an idea that we were for difficult cases only; consequently, they did not like having us for ordinary cases, because other people would think that they were either carpet-weavers or very difficult cases, to both of which they greatly objected. Now, however, they have become accustomed to having us and even engage us beforehand."

There is as yet very little official health propaganda in Iran, although its importance is being realized. The need for more health education in the schools has been strongly urged by school inspectors and other Iranian leaders, deeply concerned over the health situation. The need for education of the home to higher standards of health and general welfare has been frequently advocated in the Teheran Press, as the ignorant home is prejudicial to the success of any health programme.

A significant contribution to the health welfare of Iran is being made by the Mission hospitals, which before the recent period of reorganization constituted the major health facilities for Iran. Mission effort is divided between the American hospitals in the north and west—Kermanshah, Hamadan, Tabriz, Teheran and Meshed—and the English hospitals in the south at Ispahan and Shiraz. With their well-qualified men and women doctors, their training courses for nurses, modern methods, general medical service and especially maternal and child care, and effective health teaching, the Mission hospitals have helped to lay the foundation for the modern programme of health,

now being developed by the Government and private initiative.

Proof is not lacking of the growing appreciation of the value of modern medical service. Hospitals and the private practice of Iranian physicians show an increase in the number of patients. Public health services such as vaccination stations and clinics are more freely used. Where there are modern doctors they are in constant demand as for example the one woman doctor to whom reference has been made in the conservative town off the main highway, where the people still refer to the *mujtahid* for the final decision as to medical aid.

A salient example of the desire for medical service is that of four reactionary *sayyids* who came from a long distance to the American Hospital in Hamadan to get the doctor to leave the hospital for two days and go with them to their distant village, where the wife of one of them was seriously ill. Price was no consideration and they gladly paid fifty dollars. The confidence in the doctor and concern for the wife's life shown by a conservative religious leader is one of the high lights of change. There is also the case of the princess who gave 2,000 toman for a tubercular ward in the American Hospital in Teheran, out of gratitude for the treatment of her son, a tubercular patient. Such a tangible recognition of the value of modern hospital care cannot, however, be regarded as typical of the willingness of the general public to support health welfare, as there is a general lack of public responsibility for general welfare. Among the women of Iran there has been comparatively little development of volunteer social service and health welfare.

As to future progress along health lines, prominent leaders in Iran as in Iraq emphasize the vital importance of economic improvement as a necessity for the amelioration of health conditions. The opinion of a prominent Teheran doctor as to the situation in Iran undoubtedly applies to the East as a whole. "Western contact has tended steadily to increase the demands of the public without an increase in prosperity to meet these demands. All problems of public welfare depend in large measure on economic advance for their solution."

CHAPTER XXII

A MODERN HEALTH PROGRAMME IN SYRIA, PALESTINE AND TRANS-JORDAN

POLITICAL divisions are more or less artificial, based often on the fortunes of war rather than on essential differences of racial background and social customs. Aside from the Lebanons which is a distinct section with characteristics peculiarly its own, the rest of Syria is very similar to Palestine and Trans-jordan. This is particularly true as regards general health conditions. The social customs and attitudes of Arab women in Palestine, especially the poorer class, are those also of the same class in Syria.¹ Ignorance and deep-rooted superstitions along with bad midwifery are as usual the least common multiple in determining the physical condition of the majority of Moslem women in Syria as in Palestine. The same general attitude about marriage prevails, which makes it the focus of a woman's life and frequent child-bearing inevitable and natural. The masses are very much the same in both Palestine and Syria and only as education gains ground will definite changes begin to be evident. Political divisions, however, with their special racial problems and distinctive foreign influence, do produce a differentiation in the approach to the fundamental problems of each country—education, health and general public welfare. Because of the present difference in method and type of programme that is being promoted in Syria and Palestine and also Trans-jordan, these countries cannot be discussed as a unit, although the health problems are remarkably similar.

To form a clear impression of the development of a health programme in Syria is difficult, because of the division of the country into four distinctive administrative units. In dealing with health as with education, there is consequently no centralized effort. There are, however, certain common

¹ The term *Syria* is used to denote the country as a whole, not the one political division "The State of Syria." Columbia University Press, 1929.

factors in the whole situation, especially as it relates to the care of women and children, which especially attract attention. The comparison of Syria with Palestine and Iraq, as to hospital facilities, is interesting. In Syria the ratio of these facilities to the total population in 1925 is 1,500 persons to a bed; in Palestine 420, and in Iraq 2,300.¹ This difference may be partly explained by the difference in foreign effort in these three countries, where there has not been a concentration of foreign hospitals as in Palestine. In Syria by far the largest proportion of hospitals and dispensaries are in Beirut, Damascus and Aleppo. The foreign hospitals include American, French, and British, of which the American University Hospital is an outstanding institution not only for Syria but for the whole Near East.

Special institutions or provisions for women and children are conspicuous by their absence in Syria. There is very little beyond the maternity hospitals in Beirut. The need has apparently not been realized as one of the urgent necessities. Public health work, quarantine disinfections, and vaccination, treatment of venereal disease, control of epidemics, anti-malaria and anti-tuberculosis campaigns, increase in hospitals, establishment of research laboratories—these show the general progress of public health service, which is worthy of comment. A number of polyclinics are carried on by the Government in various parts of Syria but there is very little public effort to solve the problems of maternity and infant welfare.

The only child welfare work which the Government is promoting, but not fully financing, is the two *Goutte de Lait* centres in Damascus and Aleppo, in which infants without mothers, or those whose mothers cannot give them adequate nourishment, daily receive milk. At the time of my visit several years ago the Damascus centre was situated in a crowded quarter in the heart of the Bazaar, just off the Street called Straight. It was quite a surprise to turn out of the endless hubbub of the Oriental bazaar, climb some high dark stairs in a stone building like a citadel, and find, on reaching the top, a corridor full of women sitting on benches along the wall, with their babies in their arms,

¹ *Near East and American Philanthropy*, p. 242.

waiting their turn to receive their daily bottle of milk and have the baby examined by the very pleasant white-robed doctor. The corridor had two rooms, one the milk depot, the other the doctor's consultation office, both were clean and gave the impression of a child clinic on modern lines. Baby and maternal health posters on the wall occupied the attention of the mothers waiting their turn, for even the illiterate could read the meaning of the pictures, conspicuous among which were the posters entitled "Mother's Milk is the Best." This centre represents the co-operation of public and private financial support. On the local committee operating the centre are a number of Moslem women, some of whom are quite active in making and distributing the layettes, and in meeting with the mothers. All of this social service activity is a new experience for Moslem women. In addition to the *Goutte de Lait* in Damascus there is also a Christian Child Welfare Society carrying on a programme of general relief.

In Beirut, in connection with the American University Hospital, a health centre established some years ago has developed a modern programme of health welfare, including the care of babies that are well, visitation in the homes, and health teaching in several local schools. The comparison of the records for several years shows a larger attendance of Moslem mothers and also an increase in the number of home visits required. A change in the attitude of the public has been noticeable in the greater interest shown in the health programme in the home and in the desire for health teaching in the schools. The public health nursing and out-patient clinics of the American University of Beirut carry on the only modern health programme of this kind in Syria.

Beirut has the only two special maternity hospitals in Syria; the hospital conducted by the Faculté Française de Médecine of the Université Saint Joseph and the Maternity Hospital of the American University of Beirut. In Aleppo, eight beds in the civil hospitals are set aside for maternity care. In Damascus maternity cases are taken care of in the hospital of the school of medicine.

At the French Medical Faculty of the Jesuit University

in Beirut a maternity hospital of thirty-eight beds serves as a practical laboratory for medical students, nurses and midwives in training. The students are of all nationalities. This institution, which is partially subsidized by the Government and represents the only Government investment in maternity in the Lebanon, has both free and paying patients of all nationalities, with Moslems about half of the total. The nurses are not fully trained, and the student midwives are of a rather simple, untrained type. In connection with the maternity hospital is a foundling home under the Order of St. Vincent de Paul.

The American University Hospital takes maternity cases, and has also a special maternity branch hospital of twenty beds in a poorer district of Beirut, which serves primarily as the practical experience centre for medical students and the student midwives, and also as a much-needed service hospital for the district in which it is located. In this Branch Hospital only normal cases are handled, the abnormal cases being taken to the American University Hospital. This Branch Hospital, which is very simple in its equipment, affords an excellent demonstration of modern methods of infant welfare and maternity care on scientific lines. The psychological effect of a combination of simplicity and scientific principles is of real educational value, since the women who frequent the clinic for ante-natal care and use the hospital for their confinement, have a practical demonstration of cleanliness and child care on simple lines, and better living standards, which they can imitate in their own homes. The Ante-Natal Clinic in connection with the Maternity Hospital of the American University is of special interest, because it is the only ante-natal clinic in Syria. This ante-natal clinic serves not only as an excellent training centre for students in obstetrics, but is also a demonstration for a general programme of ante-natal clinics throughout Syria.

In Damascus a splendid British Mission Hospital, which is run on modern lines, serves a large need for all classes, especially the higher class. There is a large polyclinic and special clinic for women and maternity care which serves free as well as paying patients. In Aleppo a rather inter-

esting polyclinic is carried on by the Wakf, the Moslem religious foundation. The patients are all Moslems; women and children being in a large majority.

In different parts of Syria a programme of medical inspection is carried on in connection with schools, but more for the prevention and detection of disease than for general health teaching. There is as yet no widespread programme of public health propaganda, such as through health lectures, the use of the cinema and radio. The Public Health Department in Damascus has issued a certain number of brochures on public health which have been eagerly read.

The training of women health workers, nurses and midwives, suffers under the general handicap of the East—the prejudicial attitude toward both careers. Midwifery is considered as servants' work which is entered only because of economic necessity. Nursing has a much higher status, but has not yet attracted Moslem girls of the better class. The trained nurses and midwives are almost entirely of the Christian community. These trained workers, graduates of the hospital training schools, are undoubtedly having an effect in raising the status of these two fields of woman's health service. For the training of midwives there are three schools in Syria, two in Beirut and one in Damascus.

The midwifery training course carried on by the Jesuit Medical Faculty in Beirut under a Government subsidy requires only an elementary education for entrance. As Moslem girls can easily qualify, their number is increasing. From the graduates of this school two midwives are employed by the city of Beirut. The training course for midwives in the American University Maternity Centre (opened in 1927), is a different standard, as it specializes on the training of obstetrical nurses rather than practical midwives. The trained nurses' certificate, which represents three years' work, is required as admission to the one-year training course in midwifery. Doubtless, due to the higher standards of entrance, the American midwifery course has not as yet had any Moslem students. The training course in midwifery of the Damascus Medical Faculty (established in 1919), which was the first midwifery course in Syria, is obviously

handicapped by the lack of a special maternity branch of the university. The low entrance requirements of this course have attracted an increasing number of Moslem students.

The problem of training the native uneducated midwife in Syria has not yet been attacked as in Palestine and elsewhere. There are no courses of instruction for them. As to the registration of midwives, there is an anomalous situation, in that trained midwives are required to register and are not allowed to practice without a license, whereas the registration of the "Sairy Gamps" is impossible without an effective birth registration and control.

The most advanced nurses' training in Syria is given in the American University Hospital School of Nursing. A simpler type of nurses' training is provided in the courses of the French Medical Faculty in Beirut and Damascus Medical Faculty. The American University course in nursing (established 1905) requires a secondary school education for entrance, and covers three years of theory and practical experience in every line of nursing except mental diseases. This institution has met a great need for nurses over a very wide field, its graduates carrying on their profession all over the Near East from the Sudan to Iran. There have been practically no Moslems in training. Only girls of the higher class are educationally prepared for a course such as that in the American University of Beirut. But Moslem girls of this type in Syria are not as yet attracted to the profession of nursing.¹

Although nursing as a profession is distinctly handicapped by a prejudicial public attitude, an evidence of growing recognition of nursing service is the increase in the earning capacity of a trained nurse. Moreover, there is the beginning of a demand for private trained nurses in a few wealthy homes, although the practical trained nurse is still considered by the general community as sufficient for its needs. Beirut and the Lebanon as a whole, however, are more advanced in respect to private nursing than the rest of Syria. There private nursing is not yet a paying profession, but the change is slowly coming, as a few educated families

¹ In 1934 out of a class of forty-eight graduates there were only two Moslems.

have trained nurses. In connection with private nursing I was interested in the fact that the doctors in Syria, with whom I talked on this subject, gave as their reason why the time was not yet fully ripe for private nursing, the economic factor rather than moral conditions. Doctors in India discussing the same subject, emphasized always the fact that social customs and moral conditions made private nursing as yet very difficult and in most cases practically impossible.

For the profession of medicine women may receive training either at the American University of Beirut or the Syrian University of Damascus. In the American University Medical School one Moslem woman student has graduated from the dentistry course. There is only one Moslem woman doctor in Syria, a former student of the American Girls' School, who took her medical course in America. The Syrian University Medical School has had no Moslem women students, although two have applied who could not meet educational requirements. As Moslem girls enter secondary education and are adequately prepared, undoubtedly a number will take up medicine.

There is little question of the change in the response of the general public in Syria to medical care. This change is evident in varying degrees in all parts, from the most progressive centres such as Beirut, to the most conservative, such as Hama. Even in such an outpost as Deir-er-Zor on the Euphrates there is a growing appreciation of the Mission Hospital with its modern gospel of health. When the *Goutte de Lait* opened in Damascus, people had to be encouraged in every way possible to bring their babies. To-day the centre has more patients than it can handle. At first it was very difficult to promote inoculation for disease prevention among the people: many tried to evade it, but in 1926, when the anti-cholera inoculation was necessary, over 50,000 were inoculated without difficulty. The public health programme for malarial treatment five or six years ago was carried on with great difficulty, but to-day people will walk perhaps five miles for a treatment.

The greater private demands for medical service is a definite sign of advance; about eighty per cent of the people

of Damascus call physicians for medical care, according to the estimate of one of the doctors in the Medical University. The willingness to pay for medical care is an acid test of progress in the opinion of an Aleppo physician, who formerly received only two pounds gold (\$10.00) a year per family for medical service anywhere and at all times, whereas at the present time his fee is one gold pound for a house visit in the city and two outside. Patients could not understand before why they should pay merely for a consultation. They used to say "If you give us medicine, yes; but why pay just to chat with you?" The price for consultation now is one-half pound gold for office visits, or one pound for outside calls.

The situation in Syria, viewed as a whole, gives the impression of a slowly growing receptivity on the part of the lower classes, who do not initiate reforms for themselves but are willing recipients; and of a more *laissez-faire* attitude on the part of the higher educated classes, who for the most part rely on the Government to promote needed changes. The spirit of dissatisfaction with existing social conditions, which leads to aggressive reforms, is as yet lacking in the majority. But there is, as in every country, a small minority which is giving serious consideration to the problem of public health and general social welfare—Syrian doctors, nurses, and public-minded men and women. The attention of the socially-minded few, however, aside from health specialists, has been directed to solving the pressing problem of relief-housing, feeding, and clothing refugees, rather than the development of child welfare programmes. The emergency needs have prevented the development along other lines. The idea of women in health work and medical professions is slowly gaining ground. Syria is distinctly in the current of foreign influences; and the environment is steadily being affected by Government and private health programmes, without any aggressive promotion of change by the general Syrian public.

Palestine, although more closely related to Syria in the basic health conditions of the country, presents an interesting parallel to Iraq, in that in both countries the present programme of public health is the result of the British

occupation since the World War. The general lines of the programme are therefore similar. In Palestine the health programme is still under the British Mandate, whereas in Iraq, with the termination of the mandate the responsibility for health welfare has been assumed by the National Government. Palestine offers an interesting contrast to Iraq, as also to the rest of the Near East, in the preponderance of foreign hospitals.¹ About half the number of voluntary hospitals and clinics, which are for the most part founded by religious organizations, are located in Jerusalem and therefore do not touch the rural needs of Palestine.

Before 1921 there was no infant welfare nor maternity programme in Palestine. Since that time a fairly extensive programme has been developed with a total of forty-nine centres in 1933. This number includes the Government centres, those of the Hadassah Medical Organization primarily for Jews, the work of the Supreme Moslem Council, the American Colony Aid Centre in Jerusalem, a private Centre in Ain Karem and the two local societies, Jaffa and Haifa. A number of these infant welfare centres carry on not merely a remedial programme, but emphasize also preventive health welfare—ante-natal care and teaching of mothers. The need is also recognized for pre-school age child welfare work because of the high mortality up to five years.

Over half of the infant welfare programme in Palestine is carried on by the Hadassah Medical Association which is primarily for Jews. This is a significant fact in view of the ratio of Jews, about 400,000, to the rest of the population, about 1,310,000.² Since the needs of the Jewish community

¹ In 1933 there were 10 Government and 27 non-Government hospitals (9 Jewish and 18 Christian). There were 19 Government dispensaries and clinics, exclusive of ophthalmic and other special clinics, and 42 non-Government clinics and dispensaries of all kinds (15 Jewish and 27 others, including 3 Moslem clinics).

The hospitals and clinics under Christian agencies represent Italian, German, French, English and Scotch mission effort.

All statistics concerning health in Palestine, unless otherwise stated, are taken from the *Palestine Department of Health Annual Report*, 1933.

² *An Economic Survey of the Colonial Empire* (1933), p. 295, gives 1,119,000 as the estimated settled population which is made up of 743,000 Moslems, 265,000 Jews, 100,000 Christians, 11,000 others. Since

are so fully met by Jewish efforts, the Government and private efforts are concentrated on the needs of the Arab population, about 800,000 Moslems, although there is no race discrimination in the provision of medical facilities.

The increase in the attention to child welfare and maternal care is paralleled by the growing receptivity of the people. A morning spent in visiting homes on the Via Dolorosa and in observing a clinic hour at the Jerusalem Municipality Welfare Centre with Sitt Regina, the trained midwife superintendent, gives a close-up of what the work means to the Moslem women and their children, who live in this crowded quarter within the city walls. To Sitt Regina, who incidentally is a Jewess working with Moslems, the response of these Arab women to her work in midwifery and child welfare is most encouraging. "At first," she said, "it was hard work to promote infant welfare, very difficult to get the mothers to come to the centre. Now the number steadily grows. We have more demands for maternity work than we can meet. Of course, it is uphill work because of housing conditions, ignorance and superstition, but I can see a change."

An important part of the programme in laying a solid foundation for progress in health standards is the school medical programme, which is being actively promoted in Palestine. This health work in connection with the schools includes careful inspection and regulation of the sanitation and hygiene of school buildings, the medical inspection of school children by medical officers and nurses of the Department of Health in the Government schools and in a number of non-Government institutions, also ophthalmic treatment, and hygiene lectures for teachers. Demonstrations and classes of instruction in child welfare for senior girls in Government schools are given in a number of centres. The school health programme is having its effect in rural as well as town schools. A very keen medical officer in the Ramleh school, who explained in detail his system of registrations and showed with pride his achievement in getting the municipi-

that time the normal increase in population and special increase in the number of Jews, according to League of Nations sources, is as given above in the text.

pality to build a splendid school for girls with a very large playground and excellent sanitary equipment, was himself a convincing evidence of the type of personnel that are making the school medical service in Palestine effective. An attractive young nurse in Jaffa in neat white uniform, deftly examining and treating a class of little girls, one after another in her simply but adequately equipped school clinic, made ophthalmic care real to me in terms of children.

The training of midwives has received special attention in Palestine since 1922, when the midwives' training course was opened in connection with the Princess Mary Maternity Ward of the Government hospital. Before that time nurses in the various hospitals had been given training in midwifery but there had been no attempt to train the local midwives who, as everywhere in the East, dominate the situation. This course is developed along two lines: for entirely untrained midwives and for those who have had nurses' training. The course for the untrained former covers six months of simple teaching and practical work. The midwifery training for nurses is a three months' course including theory, experience in the maternity ward and a month of practical work outside. The practice period for the midwifery training includes a period at the Jerusalem Welfare Centre, district visiting and maternity work—all under trained midwives who have two students in training at a time.

The term "student" suggests perhaps a fresh young thing, but the students in the midwives' course in reality are quite the contrary, sometimes women of middle age, but often quite elderly women, since there is apparently no age limit, as long as they are fairly teachable. Of course, the very old and blind are not given training. These constitute quite a number, since blindness formerly was not considered by the conservatives to be a handicap but rather was an asset for midwifery. Those who are at all possible are gathered in for the course, given a certain amount of instruction in cleanliness and then a certificate, after which they are allowed to carry on until they die off. The ultimate goal, of course, is to have only trained midwives, but this will probably take a long time because it is impossible to train midwives rapidly enough to meet the need, as only six at

a time can be trained at the Jerusalem centre. In this training of the village midwives distinct progress is being made. At first, it was very difficult to recruit them, especially the Moslems. But now the Moslems as well as the Christians come voluntarily. A certain number of daughters of the village midwives take the training. Securing trained nurses to take the shorter three months' course in midwifery is even more difficult than to persuade simple midwives to enter, since midwifery has never been recognized as a worthy profession.¹

The recruiting of Moslems for midwifery training has been greatly facilitated by a co-operative public and private organization, the Midwives' Association, which is largely made up of Moslems with the wife of an English Government Official as Chairman. The primary objective of this association is to promote the idea of trained maternity services for the villages to replace the old ignorant midwives, and especially to recruit women of the higher class for nursing and midwifery. Working toward this objective, the association has had good results in promoting midwifery and has also aided in the establishment of the infant welfare centres in Jerusalem. This programme has been strengthened also by the co-operation and financial support of the Supreme Moslem Council, which already had plans for starting a maternity hospital, but was persuaded to share instead in the semi-official project. The identification of the Supreme Moslem Council with this work insures its promotion by the Moslem community.

The response of the old midwives to the opportunity for training marks the success of the plan. The keenness and almost childlike enthusiasm of some of the "students" when they return to their villages is most delightful. With their up-to-date, very shiny, new cases, well stocked with the midwifery essentials, which is given at the end of the course as a reward for good work, these women who have had a six months' exposure to scientific midwifery are quite the envy of the less fortunate old midwives, who carry the

¹ Ten graduate nurses have completed the Midwives' Training School Course. At the end of 1933 there were 368 midwives licensed to practise in Palestine and 1,193 unqualified *dair*, mostly in villages.

implements of their trade (or rather warfare against health) in sad-looking old satchels. An inspection of the varying types of equipment of a group of Hebron midwives, followed by a photograph for which they lined up eagerly, with the three trained ones, the *élite* of the Hebron midwifery profession in the centre of the picture, was an interesting experience, highly amusing but also most stimulating, as I could visualize, without too much of a stretch of imagination, a group of Hebron midwives ten years hence of quite a different type. If in Hebron, then certainly all over Palestine!

The post-war period in Palestine has brought a marked development of trained nursing. Before the British Mandate in Palestine various foreign hospitals had given a certain amount of training to simple assistants along practical lines, but there had been no standardized system of nurses' training until 1919. Since that time the training has been improved and the number of nurses in training has steadily increased.¹ The Government hospitals offer regular nurses' training and, in addition, short courses for graduate nurses desiring further training along special lines. All of the trained nurses in Palestine are Christian or Jewish, as Moslem parents have been unwilling to have their daughters enter the profession because of the prevailing adverse opinion of nursing. Palestine has also not yet had any Moslem women doctors. If there were a demand for training, the American University of Beirut Medical School would serve for women as it does for men students from Palestine.

For a number of years one of the most active forces for general welfare and especially the welfare of women and children was the Palestine Women's Council, which was established in 1920 by a body of representative organizations of all nationalities and denominations, that realized the need for united action in promoting social welfare. Its objective was the amelioration of conditions for women and children, its programme covered a wide range of activities. This Council is still continuing but is now less active.

¹ In 1921 forty students were enrolled for nurses' training in different hospitals. Between 1920 and 1933, 340 nurses passed the Government examinations and received the Graduate Nurse's Certificate.

During its period of activity it was the most effective woman's welfare agency in the Near East. Aside from this Council and the Midwives' Association, there have been no other voluntary Palestinian welfare agencies. Strictly speaking, however, these two do not represent local initiative, as they were largely promoted by English women. A small group of interested Palestine women co-operated, but did not assume major responsibility. The prevailing public attitude toward health welfare is a *laissez-faire* "Rely on the Government" attitude. The policy of the Government has been to co-operate with private effort, encourage local initiative and stimulate the people of Palestine to assume an increasing measure of responsibility. It has sought to furnish adequate medical facilities and attract the general public to take advantage of these benefits.

As has been said, the health situation in Palestine impresses one as being very similar to Syria, but the development of the health programme resembles that of Iraq, or even that of Egypt because of the similar administration of British Health Officials. In Palestine, as in these other countries of the Near East, the growing appreciation of medical care shown by the people, the development of the nursing profession, the training of midwives, the new emphasis on child welfare and maternal care represent the advancing stages in the national programme of health.

Trans-jordan, although a different political unit, seems essentially a part of Palestine, as far as general health conditions and attitudes among the people are concerned, but with less Western contact and untroubled by any Zionist thorn in the flesh. In this hinterland, which one may think of as the back door of Palestine, the stream of Western influence from the Mediterranean flows sluggishly, losing itself eventually in the sands. But changes are at work even in this primitive land across the Jordan, especially in the raw, overgrown town of Amman, which since the World War has risen from the ranks of a small insignificant town of 800 inhabitants under the control of a Turkish corporal to the distinction of a city of 15,000 inhabitants, the capital of Emir Abdullah's newly formed kingdom.

There is no lack of consciousness of need for a modern

health programme and eagerness to promote it on the part of the Director of Health, Dr. Abu Rahmeh. But Trans-jordan, although geographically an annex of Palestine, is not an annex of the public health budget in Palestine. The political independence of Trans-jordan has meant, therefore, a limited budget for health, as also for education and general public welfare. The low economic level of the country has also militated against progress. Hence the development of Trans-jordan in health as in other lines of welfare, is much slower than in Palestine.

The hospital and general medical facilities, both under Government support and private agencies are meagre and inadequate to the need.¹ There is practically no child welfare work, no Government centre, because of lack of funds; and only one voluntary centre in Amman, a small Missionary effort carried on in co-operation with the public health department. This small centre is an interesting pioneer venture in child welfare in a very old land, attempting to break down superstitions. The small maternity hospital connected with this child welfare centre is the only one in Trans-jordan.

In the development of the Trans-jordan public health programme, which has been fortunate in having the same director since its beginning in 1926, special attention has been given to anti-malaria measures, vaccination against smallpox, and prevention of the spread of contagious diseases. A vigorous school health programme has been promoted, including inspection of schools, regular medical examination and treatment of school children, with the result that improvement in the sanitation and general cleanliness of school buildings, a decrease in trachoma and other diseases among children have been achieved. Some of the health ideas taught in the schools may have also percolated into the homes.

¹ The Government hospital in Amman (28 beds) and seven small hospitals (less than 10 beds each) with four foreign hospitals (2 English mission, 1 Italian National Association, 1 Iraq Petroleum Co.) constitute the hospital facilities for Trans-jordan's estimated population of 300,000. There are 10 Government dispensaries and clinics, not including school clinics, and 6 voluntary dispensaries and clinics.

Emirate of Trans-jordan Annual Report of the Department of Health, 1934.

The number of women in the various health services is practically nil in Trans-jordan and no opportunities for training are as yet provided.¹ A few simple lectures have been given by the medical officers to the village midwives, who are required to register and secure a Government certificate to practice. But enforcement of this regulation is doubtless impossible. Even though legislation is ineffective, the supposition is that it at least sets a standard for improvement in a backward primitive country. There is one British woman doctor in Trans-jordan, no Trans-jordan women medical students nor trained nurses. The lack of education for girls, combined with the general conservative social attitude, has prevented women from entering any other professional lines than teaching. Conservatism also prevents women from taking advantage freely of medical facilities, but each year marks progress in this respect.

Changes come slowly in a primitive, sparsely populated country like Trans-jordan, dominated by the barren life of the desert. But even in the brief period since public health became a cause for consideration, one can trace the beginning of an upward movement. A virgin health programme in the ancient land of Moses has begun to register its effect.

¹ Nine midwives received licences from 1926 to 1934.

CHAPTER XXIII

A NEW HEALTH FOUNDATION FOR NATIONAL LIFE IN EGYPT AND TURKEY

EGYPT is a land of striking contrasts, presenting greater difference in the levels of life than one sees in any other country of the East except India—the highest strata of society living in luxury and leisure truly Oriental; the lowest carrying on a bare hand-to-mouth daily struggle for existence in the mud of the Nile valley. The effete higher level that practically owns Egypt is perhaps one-tenth of the whole population; the great unwashed lower level is the nine-tenths. The national problem of Egypt is the problem of the nine-tenths. There are ample evidences that the extent of this problem in reference to health is realized, and attempts are being made to solve it both by public and private agencies.

Hospital care in Egypt in 1933 included sixty-three hospitals in addition to a number of special hospitals under the Government and several Mission hospitals as in Cairo, Tanta, and Assiut.¹ There is no special maternity hospital in Egypt, but maternity cases are given specialized care in the maternity section of the Kasr El 'Aini Government Hospital, a very large, well-equipped and altogether modern institution. In the Kitchener Hospital there is also special provision for maternity in connection with the midwives' training course. The splendid Mission hospitals of the American United Presbyterian Church in Tanta and Assiut, and the Church Missionary Society in Old Cairo also provide maternity care. The Missions in Egypt, as elsewhere, have contributed much along these lines, especially before the Government programme was developed. The vast majority of maternity cases, however, in Egypt as elsewhere, never find their way to the hospital. The home, with the native untrained midwives officiating, is still preferred to the hospital.

¹ The statistics quoted concerning the health situation in Egypt, unless stated otherwise, are taken from the *Egyptian Government Almanac* 1935, Government Press, Bulaq, Cairo.

Hence in Egypt, as elsewhere, the midwife is the ever-present most important factor in maternity in Egypt.

The Child Welfare Section of the Public Health Department which was organized in 1927, emphasizes prevention of disease and health education rather than merely remedial work. This programme includes children's dispensaries and welfare centres, maternity schools, seaside sanatoria for children, and special wards in Government hospitals for treating children's diseases. Much of this work existed before the special child welfare section was organized, but the whole programme is now co-ordinated and centralized, and more attention given to prevention and ante-natal education and care.¹ The Child Welfare Service is not evenly distributed throughout the country, some sections having a number of centres while in others there are none. But attempts are being made to equalize the distribution of child welfare through the country by well-equipped and well-staffed travelling clinics. Each of these clinics has a midwife, health visitor, doctor and pharmacist, who cover their special areas, treating expectant mothers, attending confinements and instructing in child care.

A visit to one of the Cairo health centres gives a glimpse of the whole programme of child care. The staff of these centres usually includes a doctor in charge, two fully trained midwives, two assistant midwives, graduates of a practical short course in midwifery, and two health visitors who had had merely practical training in the centre. Although it was only about eight o'clock when the doctor and I arrived to visit one of these centres, the courtyard was already full of women. Apparently they come early and stay late; in fact, are encouraged to do so, since the courtyard is clean and airy, a great contrast to their dark, ill-ventilated houses, crowded closely against each other in a very congested quarter. An enclosed sand pile in one corner kept the babies amused. The women, all of the lower or lower middle class, looked very clean in spite of the long, black *haberas*, the trailing robe of the Egyptian woman of the lower class, which

¹ In 1931 there were thirty-one child welfare centres and seven children's dispensaries under the Public Health Department, and twelve child welfare places—either dispensaries or welfare centres—under private agencies.

always suggests dirt. "These are the old patients," the doctor informed me. "They are now beginning to show some effects of health teaching." The absence of flies was noticeable; some of the mothers had the baby's face covered with a thin net veil to keep off the flies. The babies looked very clean, and Koran charms were conspicuous by their absence. "We prevail on them after several visits to the clinic, to leave their charms with us," the doctor explained.

A good many of the babies were peacefully nursing, as the Egyptian mother always regards nursing as a continuous performance. The doctor asked one of them if it was the right time to nurse. She insisted that the baby had not already nursed that morning. The women seemed much interested in the skilful treatments of the baby's eyes by the midwife, who laid the baby down on the table in the centre of the court, tied a napkin around it to prevent its squirming, and proceeded with the eye-swabbing. Some babies had conjunctivitis; some, trachoma; almost all, some eye disease. "All the mothers like to have their baby's eyes treated, whether they need it or not," the nurse said; "so I apply boracic acid if nothing else is required." A blackboard by the table served for frequent demonstrations of health teaching, which greatly interested the women waiting their turn. The whole place left a vivid impression of a well-organized centre with definite educational value. The contact of the women with these health centres and with the health visitor and midwife visiting in their homes is bound to change the mothers' ideas of child care, and greatly benefit both the mother and child. The midwives of course determine the success of this programme.

The importance of training midwives is fully recognized by public officials in Egypt. As early as 1910 provincial councils began to open maternity schools in chief towns.¹ There are now nine of these schools, offering courses of six months' combination of theory and practice. The best of these maternity schools is the one connected with the

¹ 2,830 *dais* had been instructed for a six months' course in these schools up to the end of 1932. Another type of *dais*—the uneducated midwives—for a time were given three to six weeks' training. Their total through 1932 was 8,431.

Kitchener Hospital in Cairo, which gives to a maximum of ten students a course combining theory and practice in midwifery and health visiting, and covering in the practical work a rather large area of Cairo. Early each morning a group of three students with the trained supervisor sets forth in the Kitchener Hospital Chevrolet Camionette with their midwifery equipment, everything complete—even the cans of hot water. Till noon they busily make their rounds, attending confinements and visiting new patients for seven days after child-birth. The Chevrolet with its bright red sign announcing free midwifery service is in itself a convincing piece of health propaganda. Making the morning rounds of visits at various types of homes with Sitt Munira, the Moslem supervisor, and the three neatly uniformed student midwives, I gained not only an excellent cross-section of life in Cairo off Main Street, but as well a clear idea of the effectiveness of the training given in midwifery and visiting nurses' service.

A more advanced type of midwifery training is offered in the Kasr El 'Aini Hospital Course, which is a combination of trained nursing and midwifery, preparing obstetrical nurses and supervisors for Government health clinics and child welfare sections in hospitals. This type of training is stimulating more interest in nursing and midwifery as a profession.¹ Nurses' training, usually of a rather simple type, has been offered in the Mission hospitals in Assiut, which has trained Christian girls primarily, and in Tanta, which has had about an equal proportion of Moslems and Christians.²

I have called attention elsewhere to the fact that midwifery is quite a lucrative profession, as the Government needs a large number of midwives for the expanding child welfare programme and therefore pays well. This has given this career a higher status than nursing. At the beginning, however, it was necessary to advertise the Government courses; now it advertises itself, and a better type is being

¹ The number of fully qualified midwives trained at Kasr El 'Aini Hospital at the end of 1929 was 280.

² Twenty-five years ago there were thirty-two students of midwifery, in 1928 over one hundred; since then a steady increase.

attracted. A striking difference between Egypt and other countries in regard to midwifery and nurses' training is the fact that the majority in the training courses are Moslems. Of course, as the population is predominantly Moslem this is logical, but it is not yet the case in other countries.

In Upper Egypt, both nursing and midwifery are still regarded very adversely. The idea of women earning their living in any profession has made little headway. The Mission hospital in Assiut, which until a few years ago had only a very ordinary type of woman servant as nursing assistants, has with difficulty managed to promote a training course for a better class of girls. One girl from Luxor, the daughter of a pastor, offers an interesting illustration of conservatism. Inspired to become a nurse through writing a school essay on Florence Nightingale, she asked permission of her father to go to Assiut for training, was refused and therefore, left home, went to the Mission hospital and entered the training school course. The community sympathized with the father, feeling that the girl had disgraced the family by becoming a nurse, when she might have become a teacher. The example of this girl, however, has had an effect in helping to break down prejudice, as the family and the general community have at length changed their attitude and ceased to regard it as a disgrace.

As yet women doctors have scarcely begun to make themselves felt in Egypt. The first group that entered the Egyptian University in 1929 have now graduated and taken up Government service, as have also the women medical students who have studied abroad. But only one Moslem woman doctor has established private practice. An interesting feature in regard to the training of women for medical students is the fact that they have all of their interne work in the Kitchener Women's Hospital, instead of the Kasr El 'Aini with the men medical students. The reason for this may be male conservatism and opposition to the admission of women to the medical profession, since some men students have looked with disfavour on the admission of women into the University on the ground that women would receive too much preference. But although men doctors, because of anticipated competition, may not welcome the

idea of having women enter the medical profession, the attitude of the general public is not adverse. The fact that the Government endorses the training of women and needs them for Government service helps to assure the favourable attitude of the public. Doubt is expressed, however, as to whether a woman doctor could make a living by private practice, since women themselves have less confidence in women doctors and the social customs do not require women doctors for the exclusive medical care of women as is the case in India.

Health education through schools and general health propaganda are efficiently promoted in Egypt. The school health programme in Egypt, which was instituted about twenty years ago, includes regular inspection by a woman medical director, and in most schools the daily service of a school nurse. In addition the regular teachers are given instruction in elementary health service, such as simple eye-treatments.

Public health propaganda, which was organized some years ago, has steadily expanded its programme of giving lectures, furnishing posters and cinema films on child care and general health, showing various kinds of disease and the means of prevention. The Child Welfare Division, as already mentioned, carries on very effective propaganda through lectures, health posters and in various other ways.

Another very important force in promoting health education is the American University at Cairo, through its sociology classes and its Extension Department. The sociology classes have carried on various health projects. One class made a study of the social agencies in Cairo. Another carried out a health project in a village near Cairo. The extension department of the American University at Cairo carries on a yearly programme of lectures, open to the general public, on a great variety of subjects, health being given an important place.

A number of voluntary agencies in Egypt have been definitely contributing to health welfare, especially to the care of women and children. These private health programmes include the work of various Missions and other foreign agencies, and the mixed associations of Egyptians

and foreigners; the Egyptian organizations, such as the Mohammed Ali Benevolent Fund in Cairo; the women's societies, such as the Work for Egypt Society and the Union des Femmes and also the efforts of private individuals, such as Madame Hoda Sharawi's Dispensary in Cairo and Madame Wissa's interesting Village Welfare Centre near Assiut. The increase in these volunteer efforts, which supplement the Public Health Service is one of the hopeful signs of the advance toward better health conditions in Egypt. The multiplication of such centres all over Egypt is a tremendous need.

The fellaheen population is scarcely touched by all the clinics and hospitals and welfare organizations daily increasing in Egypt. As elsewhere in the East, welfare agencies have centred their activity in the cities. The village population of the Nile Valley is scarcely changed since the days of the Pharaohs. Perhaps the men travel about more and have more contact with the outside world, but the women are where they were. Mud and flies, a congested village, the Nile water to drink, a baby born every year—this is the life of a fellaheen woman to-day as it was in the past. "What should we know of change?" one fellaheen woman in a village said to my interpreter, "we're just women." The Government Health Service has shown a recognition of the need for a rural health programme, and is beginning to meet it through travelling hospitals for the treatment of ankylostoma and bilharzia, also by travelling school clinics. Public health laboratories are making special studies of these diseases, so widespread throughout Egypt. Some of these studies have been made possible here as elsewhere by the Rockefeller Foundation. In relation to the enormity of the need, all of these efforts to reach the rural population represent scarcely a beginning.

The growing appreciation of the masses for the medical care offered to them is shown very clearly by the large numbers in attendance at the various clinics of the Government and voluntary societies, and the number of homes that can be reached through the health centres. All classes of people are beginning to realize that health is an asset. There is a growing use of eye clinics. Women realize that

bad eyes are a handicap to a good marriage. Doubtless one influence bringing this change is the fact that Egyptians travel more than formerly and see that good eyes are the normal rule in Europe, and quite the reverse in Egypt.

An aggressive public health programme, promoting the amelioration of general health conditions and especially concerned with child welfare and maternal care; the awakening of the enlightened Egyptian minority to their responsibility and especially the increasing interest of Egyptian women in child welfare; the growing realization of their health needs by the general public, and their response to medical benefits offered them—these are the forces working together to build a sounder basis of health for Egyptian women. Perhaps the typical Egyptian mother and child of the future will present a different picture from that of the mother and child of to-day.

In Turkey even more than in Egypt one is conscious of the fact that the improvement of health standards is recognized as a vital necessity for national power. The actual health programme in Egypt is in some respects more fully developed than in Turkey, but there seems to be a keener realization of the integral relationship between health welfare and national strength in Turkey than in Egypt. The difference may be inherent in the fact that nationalism in Egypt is primarily directed toward complete political independence, whereas in Turkey, which is already a sovereign State, the full force of nationalism is concentrated on the general development of the new nation.

In this urge for general progress, lifting the level of national health is emphasized as one of the major objectives of the new Republic. The population of over sixteen and a half millions, according to the 1935 Census, is only about one-third of the number that Turkey could support and needs for building a strong nation. Turkey, therefore, approaches the problem of health as a national necessity. The economic development of natural resources and the increase and conservation of the population are different phases of the same problem.

The major effort in the health programme has been directed toward solving some of the particularly serious

health problems of the country: malaria, trachoma, syphilis and pulmonary tuberculosis. Each year the health appropriation has been increased, although it is still only a small proportion of the total national budget;¹ more hospitals and clinic facilities have been provided and new maternity and child welfare centres have been established. In the office of the Minister of Health, some time ago, my attention was caught by a large map with red and black circles and triangles indicating the location of hospitals, dispensaries and maternity centres—a visual evidence of growth in the Turkish health programme. The provision for maternal and child care, however, was very limited compared with other medical facilities. The recognition of the need for more attention to the health of women and children is indicated, however, by the general hygiene law that every town of 20,000 should have a dispensary for children. It has not been possible to make the law widely effective but each year marks advance toward this goal. There are three baby clinics in Istanbul and a well-developed children's hospital of long standing, the Chichli Çojuk Hastahanesi, founded by Abdul Hamid in honour of his daughter. The Model Hospital in Ankara, which in equipment is comparable to the best hospitals in Europe, offers special accommodation for women and children. Aside from Istanbul nine different cities in Turkey have special maternity hospitals.

An extensive child welfare programme is carried on by the Society for the Protection of Children, the Himayei Etval, a non-official organization, which, however, is endorsed and partially supported by the Government. The national programme which is promoted all over Turkey in every big city and town and even in some villages, covers a wide range of activities: baby clinics and homes, orphanages, small centres for training nurses in child care, day nurseries for babies of working mothers; milk stations and canteens; maternity centres; clothing and lunches for school children; educational cinemas; play places for children; and reading rooms. At Ankara, the headquarters, a well-

¹ In 1935 the health and education budgets together were less than seven per cent of the total national budget—approximately 14 million lire in comparison to 195 million lire.

developed model programme is carried on with a clinic centre and playground in the city, and in the outskirts a child home organized along modern lines under a trained leader who some years ago studied in America.¹

Aside from the Child Welfare Society and the Red Crescent, the Turkish equivalent of the Red Cross, both of which though non-official have a close relationship to Government, there are very few voluntary societies for child health and maternal welfare, or general health and public assistance. The people in Turkey have relied upon the Government to meet the welfare needs and, hence, have not assumed responsibility for individual or civic welfare. But the lack of volunteer agencies does not signify a lack of interest in public health programmes. Men, women and children, conspicuously men and children, take part in public demonstrations, such as child health weeks, and actively promote campaigns for raising funds for health welfare by tag days, public balls, benefit sales of all kinds, and by the numerous other money-raising methods, which have been developed to such a marked degree in Turkey during the last decade.

Under the Ministry of Public Instruction a well-organized school health programme is carried on with medical inspection of the schools and their examination, and treatment of every child three times a year. In promoting the school health programme, an active educational campaign against contagion is carried out for the education of the general community. The trained physical education directors are an important asset to the school health programme in correlating the preventive disease programme with constructive health teaching and exercise.

Health education of the general public is being promoted in various ways. Health posters are used effectively throughout the country. Health museums have been established in nine cities to present modern health ideas. An aggressive attack is being carried on by the Public Health Department

¹ Through the 554 local centres of the Himaye-i Etlal in 1943, 250,000 children were clothed, fed and medically treated. The Government subsidy averages 20,000 per year out of a total budget of Ltq. 400,000 (roughly Ltq. 1.25 equals \$1.00).

against superstitious practices. The old and the new attitudes toward health are vividly portrayed by two illustrations in the *Book of Progress*, which was issued in 1933 on the Tenth Anniversary of the Turkish Republic. A shrine, with the iron gratings enclosing it completely covered with dirty rags, tied there by devotees with a prayer for recovery, depicts the health determinant of the past. On the opposite page a class in a girls' normal school, receiving practical instruction on child care from a nurse, with a baby in a proper kind of baby basket, shows visually modern Turkey's scientific approach to health.

Turkey has begun to use the cinema and radio for propaganda on health and public hygiene and for health exercises of the "daily dozen" variety. For village health teaching the radio is an effective medium, as most of the villages in the Interior now have a radio in the town hall or some other public building where the people gather to hear the news. A more extensive use of these two powerful forces in health teaching, the cinema and radio, is being planned. A campaign against the old spirit of fatalism is often effectively conveyed through the sermons in the mosque. For example, a *hodja*, Ali Vahit, urging smallpox inoculation makes his point by a simple simile "If you are attacked by a dog, you will protect yourself by a stick or a stone. Why shouldn't we carry a weapon against smallpox? . . . The weapon against that disease offered by the Government is vaccination."¹

One of the main objectives in the health programme of Turkey is the promotion of rural health welfare. The public health campaigns against certain diseases, such as malaria, have been vigorously carried out in the Interior. As elsewhere in the East the mal-distribution of health facilities constitutes one of the serious hindrances to the improvement of health conditions in rural areas. To meet this problem obligatory service in Asia Minor for a certain period is required of all medical graduates, nurses from the Red Crescent Training School, and graduate midwives who

¹ A quotation in *The Turkish Transformation*, p. 219, Henry Allen, The University of Chicago Press, from *Turkish Sermons in the Age of the Republic*, p. 51.

have had their preparation at Government expense. In addition to this definite period of service required of medical workers in the Interior, the plan of having short terms of health service rendered to rural areas during the summer vacation by a group of men and women doctors and students from the Medical University has been tried with success, and will doubtless be repeated.

Schemes for co-ordinated village improvement, including health and education, have been promoted, such as the rural welfare unit in the model village of Etemetsu near Ankara, which has already been mentioned in a previous chapter. The small but very adequate hospital of Etemetsu, with its doctor and midwife, serves the needs of a circle of near-by villages. In addition to the definite Government efforts to promote better rural health conditions, there is a growing interest in village welfare among individuals and organizations. The *Halk Evi*, People's House, the official organization of the People's Party which has centres all over Turkey, especially emphasizes rural welfare in its programme, which includes the study of village health conditions, the spread of health education and the extension of medical service to villages.

The increased concern in rural welfare is in line with the major objective of modern Turkey—the increase and conservation of population. Birth control does not accord with national policy and, therefore, instruction along this line is illegal, although it is doubtless given illicitly. No literature on this subject and no contraceptives are sold in public. An effort is made to increase families by offering a reward of 50 lire (about \$50) to mothers with more than six children.¹ In order to conserve as well as increase the population the law requires a medical examination before marriage, and prohibits the marriage of those with venereal disease, also lepers and the mentally diseased.

One of the most hopeful signs of progress during the past decade in Turkey in the field of health, is the increase in trained women personnel in midwifery, nursing and medical

¹ In 1931, 1,850 lire were given; in 1932, 4,400; and the 1933 budget included 7,000 lire for the purpose of encouraging the increase in population.

service. The new social freedom in Turkey, as has already been shown in a previous chapter, has led to a corresponding freedom of women to enter professional careers. In the field of health this change is peculiarly important. Although nursing dates its inspiration from Florence Nightingale's service in the Soldiers' Hospital at Istanbul during the Crimean War, trained nursing in Turkey has only developed within the past decade. Before that time Turkish women had served as volunteer nurses in the Balkan wars and Greek-Turkish War. But now the Red Crescent Training School, which was organized in 1925, adds each year to the number of trained nurses in Turkey. Since the Red Crescent bears the full expense of the two years' training course the graduate is required to give five years' service wherever in Turkey she may be needed, or refund the cost of her training. The American Hospital Training School in Istanbul is also each year adding its quota of well-trained nurses. Through these two schools, the status of nursing is steadily being raised. The training of public health nurses is a new development in nursing. Two Turkish nurses have been sent to America under the Rockefeller Foundation for special training in this field.

The trained midwife in Turkey, as has been mentioned in an earlier chapter, is not the unique achievement of the New Republic. Slowly the trained graduates from the school connected with the Medical Faculty of Istanbul University, of whom now over a thousand are scattered widely throughout Turkey, are replacing the old untrained midwife. Until this transition can be effected, however, an effort is being made to improve the standards of the old type of midwife. Before the registration certificate now required by law is issued to the untrained midwives, they are supposed to have a period of training and teaching along very elemental lines in which they are taught the necessity of removal of jewellery, wearing clean clothes, washing the hands, and using clean instruments. The untrained midwife still serves the village and backward communities. It is obviously impossible to enforce rigidly the registration requirements, but the substitution of the new type of midwife is taking place and the value of the trained midwife is being more widely recognized.

Many of the trained midwives are being employed by municipalities, which recognize modern midwifery as a necessity. This municipal service of the trained midwife is very effective, judging from the one in Ankara with whom I spent the morning in house-to-house visiting.

Of great importance to the improvement of health conditions in Turkey is the entrance of Turkish women into various lines of medical service and the full recognition accorded to them by the Government and the general public. As yet few in number, women doctors are singled out in the community for special honours, and are regarded on a full professional equality with men doctors. In surgery, in maternity and child welfare, and in general medicine, the Turkish woman doctor is a distinct asset to Turkey and especially to Turkish women and children, effectively helping to lift the health level of Turkish life.

A number of foreign agencies and individuals are co-operating with Turkey in meeting the health needs of the country. At present there are eight hospitals under foreign support, of which three are in Istanbul. These include Italian, German, Austrian, Bulgarian and American. The work of German and Austrian nurses in Turkey during a long period in regular hospital service and nurses' training is noteworthy. In recent years the Medical University in Istanbul has had the asset of a number of German specialists on the faculty. The splendid new health unit in Ankara, including the Hygiene Institute and wonderfully equipped bacteriological research laboratories, represents the sustained interest of the Rockefeller Foundation in a world health programme, in which Turkey has a share.

Although foreign co-operation has been and is a great asset in Turkey, the progress of the past decade has been due to Turkish initiative and persistence in promoting a public health programme, even under the severe handicap of an economic crisis. In the health programme, as in other fields, Turkey is in a position to choose whatever foreign values may be desired. Turkish representatives attend all the medical congresses and hold official positions in international health organizations. Turkish health officials study the public systems of other countries and select what seems

most valuable and best adapted to the needs of Turkey. Plans for the future health programme include the expansion of rural health facilities and a continued emphasis on preventive medical welfare and positive health values. In the promotion of better health conditions since the New Republic, Turkey has had the same Minister of Health and Social Hygiene, Bay Dr. Refik.

The urge to rebuild Turkey as a thoroughly modern nation has furnished the constant impetus for improving health conditions. Conservatism as a deterrent to progress has lost its power; the spirit of progress is the controlling force. The health of the Turkish people, and especially the health of women and children, is recognized as the life insurance for the future physical strength of the nation. In every line of health and medical care, the need for trained women is recognized and their service is encouraged. The road to progress in health, as in other lines of national development, is clearly charted ahead.

PART FIVE

*The Widening Sphere of Moslem Women's
Interests*

CHAPTER XXIV

THE WIDENING SPHERE OF MOSLEM WOMEN'S INTERESTS

FORMERLY the frame of a Moslem woman's life was her home. Her contacts were limited to her family and its many ramifications. Her thought life was family centred. But within the last decade the radii of her interests have been lengthening so that to-day the periphery of her life has been extended beyond the quiet protected environment of the past into the rush and confusion of the modern world. The circle of her life is widening as the circle widens when a pebble is thrown into a still pool. Her world is no longer bounded by the four walls of her home, but by the wider area of civic and national interests and even international relationships.

To those who have known the shut-in life of Moslem women of the past, her emergence to-day in the life around her is a revelation. Fifteen years ago a Moslem woman's club was scarcely known. To-day almost every town and city in the East has its club or gathering-place for women. Simple as many of these women's clubs may be, for many women they are the little door which leads them like Alice in Wonderland into the wide world—wide not in geographical distance, but in the distance from the old limited life of the home to the unfolding world of new interests. These clubs for women developing in the East are not unlike the clubs in the small towns of America a generation ago, in their enrichment of life through wider interests and contacts. But the women's clubs in the East have a greater significance than a club in America, even in that early day, could possibly have had, as life for the Moslem woman hitherto has had no outside relationships. Through these new club groups women are beginning now to think of themselves not merely as member of a family, but as units in society. Moreover, the feeling of mutuality of interest with other women is quite a new experience, which has come to many Eastern women within the last decade. It

is also an entirely new idea for the East that women through their collective effort can make a distinctive contribution to society.

The development of women's societies in different places has followed similar lines. In many cases child welfare has given the initial urge which has brought the Moslem woman out of her home: for example, activity along these lines often has grown out of the purdah clubs in India. Sometimes other lines of welfare and philanthropy, care of orphans and charity relief, or perhaps some simple embroidery workshop employment scheme furnishes the objective for a club. Some of the organizations along welfare lines are very well developed. Often a mixed club of foreign and local leadership furnishes the beginning and centralizes the social effort of Eastern women. This has been especially true in the purdah clubs in India, many of which owe their inception to foreign leadership. The Palestine Women's Council is also a significant organization of this type which for a number of years has been a force for the general social welfare of the women of Palestine—Moslems, Christians, and Jews. The Cairo Women's Club is another interesting association of Egyptian and foreign leaders.

Education of women furnishes the *motif* in many places for group action among women; for example, the Awakening of Women Society in Damascus, which for a time had a girls' school as its major project. The educational purpose of the women's clubs in the East is basic to their central objective, which is the promotion of the general advance of women. A typical illustration is the first women's club in Teheran, the *Vatan Khahan*, Well-Wishers of the Fatherland, which for a number of years has had a small school for adult women, and promoted the extension of girls' education and legislative social reform. The club has had a large number of nominal members but only a small nucleus have worked steadily under the leadership of Mastureh Khanum Afshar on an ambitious programme for the general advance of women.

The Women's Section of the Red Lion and the Sun (the Persian Red Cross) under the patronage of the Palace—the fifteen-year-old daughter of the Shah, Princess Shahdokht

Pahlavi, is the honorary president—has enlisted a large number of members. Over five hundred women attended one of the annual meetings held in the Ivory Hall of the Palace, a most unusual evidence of the new day, as hitherto Moslem women practically never entered the Palace, save in the harem.

Recently a new Women's Club, Kanun-i-Banuan, has been started in Teheran also under the official patronage of the Crown Princess Shāhdokht Pahlavi. Sufficient funds have made possible a club centre on a prominent street, in a large building which has offices, a lecture hall with a stage for dramatics, and outdoor recreation space for tennis, basket-ball and other sports. Under the direction of the president and committee of twenty-five prominent women of Teheran a varied programme is carried on along intellectual and cultural lines with ample recreational privileges. A large number of the members are teachers. No woman with a *chaddur* is admitted. This new club has been made the centre of the emancipation movement, where a number of noteworthy gatherings for the promotion of the advance of women have been held, attended by the Prime Minister and other notables. This Women's Club in Teheran is regarded as the symbol of the new social status of women. In contrast to Iran, the idea of a woman's club in Iraq for the advancement of women has not been cordially received. In Baghdad a few years ago a very simple venture with a harmless and constructive programme of education for orphan girls in a small rented house aroused the fears of the conservatives by the high-sounding sign over the door: "The Elevation of Women."¹ As a result of the opposition in the Press and a protest sent to King Feisal, the club was closed. Perhaps it may be reopened at some later date when Baghdad is ready for a woman's club.

In some cities important groups for the future promotion of collective effort of women are the Alumnae Club of Girls' Schools and Colleges, which may develop into organizations devoted to women's interests and activities. These young women's organizations in the East which are directed toward the general advance in the status of women are an

¹ The Elevation of Women, *Nadi-al-Nahida au Nissaiya* (1923-25).

interesting evidence of the growing similarity of Eastern women's interests whether in Cairo or Teheran. The stages of development of these different associations, their type of leadership, the social and political background which determines their progress show great variety but all have the common goal of women's welfare and social advance. Some of these organizations have reached a position of national importance.

The Federation of Women's Clubs in Syria, which unites clubs from Beirut, Tripoli and Damascus, has special significance in that it represents the co-operation of foreign and Syrian, Moslem and Christian leadership. In the Federation are several Moslem societies, the Awakening of the Feminine Youth and the Society of Philanthropic Deeds in Beirut and the Awakening of Women in Damascus already mentioned, and a club from Tripoli. The Federation holds a biennial conference and carries on general social welfare.

The Feminist Union in Egypt represents a much more conscious women's movement in the usual meaning of the term, than the Syrian Federation. Although not widely representative of Egyptian women, the majority of the members being wealthy women of leisure, the Feminist Union is significant as the spearhead of a forward movement for women, under the influential leadership of Madame Sharawi Pasha. Since its inception this society has advocated political equality, suffrage and women's representation in parliament, privileges not yet granted. At the present time the Feminist Union is not aggressively advocating suffrage but awaiting a timely opportunity for further effort along this line, meanwhile promoting general social reform. A programme of social welfare and education is carried on in connection with an Industrial School project. An effective propaganda for the advance of Egyptian women is promoted through *L'Egyptienne*, the magazine of the Feminist Union which is published in French and thus effectively interprets Egyptian women to the outside world. This society, through Madame Sharawi Pasha especially, has had for a number of years a close connection with international women's movements.

The *Türk Kadın Birligi*, the Turkish Women's society,

has been quite a different type of organization from the Egyptian Feminist Union. Organized shortly after the beginning of the New Republic, and discontinued in April 1935 after the International Suffrage Alliance Congress in Istanbul, this society of Turkish women has been in a sense the symbol of the social transition through which Turkish women have passed in the last decade. This society has not initiated advance but by its existence has registered progress. In its study of various social questions of importance to women, the *Kadin Birligi* received the endorsement of the Government and in various ways was recognized by the Government, as the collective representative of Turkish women's interests.

In organizing and successfully carrying through the International Suffrage Alliance Congress in Istanbul, the *Kadin Birligi* received a remarkable degree of Government support. The use of Yildiz Palace with its excellent facilities for an international gathering, the series of entertainments in other palaces, the special railway and customs facilities for all delegates, the front page publicity in the Turkish Press throughout the Congress, and as the final climax of official endorsement of the Congress, a day's excursion to Ankara for a selected number of delegates with a reception by Kamal Ataturk at his residence near Ankara—these were all unquestioned evidences of official interest in helping the *Kadin Birligi* make the Congress an undoubted success. In the light of all this, it is not strange that the dissolution of the *Kadin Birligi* immediately after the Congress should have called forth expressions of surprise and regret from the leaders of the Woman's Movement outside of Turkey, as this seemed a strangely paradoxical situation, in fact, almost a refutation of the advanced position of Turkish women.

Perhaps the closing of the *Kadin Birligi* may be explained as a logical result of the prevailing interpretation of the primary objective of a Woman's Movement—namely to secure equal rights. If this is the main objective and justification of a Woman's Movement, then the *Kadin Birligi* may have been considered no longer necessary since these rights are now so fully secured in Turkey. Or perhaps the closing

of the *Kadin Birligi* may have been the natural result of the general concept of the new State which has as its ideal the unity of efforts of men and women in the service of the State. Whatever may be the correct interpretation as to the reason for the dissolution of the society, it has evidently been considered that the Turkish Union has served its primary purpose and the members have disbanded. The *Kadin Birligi* has now merged its efforts and finances into the *Himayei Etlal*, the Child Welfare Society of Turkey, a mixed organization of men and women. The closing of the Turkish Union has not in any sense raised a question in Turkey as to the equality of women and full recognition of their importance in the State. This event called forth very little comment of any kind. It was merely accepted as an indication that women's efforts are to be redirected along other channels. For the Western observer, however, this interesting development raises the fundamental question, as to whether the collective efforts of women's organizations do not have a contribution to render the State and Society, which is quite distinctive from their efforts with men in mixed organizations.

Women's organizations in India are more widely representative and national in scope than those of any other country of the East. The All-Indian Moslem Women's Association represents the united efforts of Moslem women to promote the educational and social interests of the women of that community. I was privileged to attend a conference in 1929, a very colourful and picturesque gathering which was primarily interesting because it indicated the growth in group consciousness of Moslem women and their unity in advocating the education of girls. Conservative Moslem women as well as modernists can unite on this platform of education, however divergent may be their views on social reforms. Aside from this distinctive Moslem association, a growing number of Moslem women are in contact with other women's organizations and a few furnish active leadership in some of these other movements.

The Women's Indian Association has been the primary champion of the suffrage cause, has promoted also a general education programme through its centre in Madras and

exerted a wide sphere of influence which reaches all communities, through publishing *Stri Dharma*, the leading women's magazine in India. The National Council of Women in its constituent councils all over India carries on an active programme of educational and social reform. Its membership and leadership are widely representative of different racial and religious communities of India. The National Y.W.C.A., one of the oldest women's organizations in India, which antedates the present forward movement of women, has promoted a national programme of a varied character with a strong emphasis on the preparation of Christian leadership and on the well-rounded development of women and girls. It brings into close relationship women of the foreign, Indian and Anglo-Indian communities, and works in close co-operation with all of the other women's organizations.

From the point of view of a woman's movement in the usual sense of the term, the most powerful force of collective women's effort in India is the All-India Women's Conference. Uniting as it does on a common platform of progress women from all over India, of different races and religions, conservatives and progressives, the All-India Women's Conference, since its inception in 1926, has become recognized as the most effective instrument of propaganda in India in educating public opinion for the social and educational advance of women. The resolutions passed at each Annual Conference cover a wide range of reforms needed; such as, increased facilities for girls' education, better health standards, improvement of rural life, moral training based on spiritual ideals, abolition of purdah and polygamy, enforcement of the child marriage law, equality of opportunity in public service, and equality of legal rights. The Home Science College, established at Delhi by the All-India Women's Education Fund, is a demonstration of the practical service rendered by this movement in the promotion of educational advance. This movement actively participates in the promotion of legislative measures for the improvement of the status of women. The demands made by the All-India Women's Conference to the Provincial Governments and to the Government of India carry great weight,

since these enlightened Indian women leaders represent a powerful influence, a small minority speaking for the great silent masses. As Lady Irwin said, "Through the All-India Women's Conference the voice of Indian women is being heard."

The women's organizations in India and perhaps in much less degree the Feminist Union in Cairo, differ from similar bodies in other countries in the East, in that they are more definitely the cause for the advance of women, whereas women's societies elsewhere are not the cause but the result of advance. The very existence of women's organizations in the East is a striking indication of change. The Turkish Society, the *Kadın Birliği*, is a good illustration of this fact, as it registered the progress of Turkish women but cannot be interpreted as having produced it. Even though as we have already seen, the Indian women's organizations are definitely a conscious instrument for effecting reform, still the general liberating movement affecting the status of women in India as elsewhere has antedated most of these organizations, and is scarcely the result of any of these special efforts to promote progress. These Women's Movements in India, therefore, as in other countries of the East, may be interpreted not merely as Women's Movement with capital letters, working for a Cause as for example the Suffrage Movement in England or America, but also as the evidence of a deep inward movement, stirring in the life of Eastern women. They represent something more fundamental than a single Cause such as Suffrage. These movements of women throughout the East are allied with powerful forces working toward general social and educational advance, which will mean a higher status of women.

Undoubtedly an impelling motive of this steady outward movement of women in the East is the spirit of nationalism which since the World War has surged through the Eastern world. In this awakening of national consciousness women have become deeply imbued with the sense of their relationship to national life. The sudden appeal of patriotism has swept away, at least temporarily, all hampering social and religious inhibitions, and given Moslem women, with other Eastern women, a sudden realization of their power and

responsibility for service to the nation. The Nationalist revolution in 1919 in Egypt offers a dramatic illustration of the awakening of women to national consciousness. Large crowds of women, Moslems and non-Moslems, thronged the streets, the upper classes and lower classes alike, veiled and unveiled, all demanding independence, shouting "Down with the English," waving banners and exulting in a frenzy of patriotism. Even the usually inarticulate fellaheen women joined in the general national outburst. This participation of Egyptian women in an uncontrolled turbulent demonstration of nationalism had doubtless certain temporary bad effects. It is, however, of permanent significance in that it marks the first awakening of national consciousness in Egyptian women, and has perhaps been the germ from which has developed a sane and constructive interest in national life among a number of thoughtful Egyptian women.

Two incidents in Palestine that show the releasing effect of the spirit of nationalism have already been mentioned—the protest against Zionism (1929) at the High Commissioner's residence by a group of unveiled women, and a later protest also against Zionism that occurred at the Holy Sepulchre at Easter 1934. Similarly women in Syria have been vocal in their demands for the national cause. When the French and Syrian Treaty was being presented in Parliament in November 1934, a crowd of veiled Moslem women met in the Salahiyah suburb, one of the best residence sections, and marched to the National Parliament to protest against the Treaty since they felt that it meant a long period of national dependence. An accident in the crowd near the Parliament, which led to the death of one of the women, created a grave situation which was associated with the demonstration. Later the Treaty was withdrawn.

¶The long sustained part played by Turkish women in the National Struggle during the Allied Occupation and Greek-Turkish War is well known. In 1921 a mass meeting of Turkish women was held at Sultan Ahmed to protest against the occupation of Smyrna by the Greeks. Accusing the Turkish men of inaction, the Turkish women threatened to take up arms themselves in national defence. In the forefront of the Turkish patriots of that period Halidé Edib

(Madame Adnan Bey) will always be especially remembered. As a powerful speaker inspiring the masses to action before the War of Independence; as a refugee in Anatolia with a price on her head; as an active participant in the Councils of War in Ankara; as a nurse in military hospitals and a member of the Intelligence Service at the front—in all these ways actively identified with the Turkish life-and-death struggle, she demonstrated the educated Turkish woman's capacity for sacrifice in national life.

Perhaps an even more stirring evidence of the Turkish woman's patriotism is symbolized in the monument on the public square in Ankara. One of the statues shows a Turkish peasant woman in the native costume of full trousers and with unveiled face, struggling forward, bent under the burden of a great bomb carried on her shoulder. This simple figure presents the grim reality of the sacrifice of hundreds of Turkish peasant women, who literally won the war, as Refet Pasha on the General Staff of the victorious Turkish army said: "We owe the greatest part of our success to the Anatolian peasant women. For hundreds and hundreds of miles they transported the ammunition on carts or on their backs along roadless wastes, protecting the ammunition with the scanty covers with which they covered their babies, who accompanied them strapped on their backs." A more recent expression of the patriotic urge in Turkey was the request, in 1933, that came from some Istanbul high school girls that they should be liable for compulsory military service. This called forth much comment. There is little probability of such a regulation, but the request offers an interesting illustration of the eager spirit of nationalism in the younger generation.

Iranian women even before the World War gave an interesting demonstration of their patriotism. During the revolution of 1910-11 three hundred women came to the *Majlis* (Parliament) and, throwing off their veils, exhorted the men to uphold the liberty and dignity of Iran. Behind the mosque curtains mass meetings of women were held, where fiery speeches were delivered on Iranian independence. The men read these documents later in the *Majlis* and said: "The women teach us how to love our country." The women

not only held meetings but gave their jewels saying: "We are women and cannot fight but we can give to our country." Another outburst of national feeling came at the time of the Treaty of Great Britain with Iran in 1919. *The Tongue of Woman*, an Iranian Woman's magazine, made such a violent protest against the treaty and stirred up such strong opposition that the magazine was finally closed.¹

But the nationalist movement in India has offered the most striking evidence of the active response of women to the urge of nationalism, suddenly calling them forth from sheltered seclusion into the limelight of world publicity. Inspired by Gandhi, Indian women eagerly pressed into the national struggle, participating fearlessly in the Civil Disobedience Movement. Processions long and wearisome in crowded city streets, picketing of wine shops and cloth shops in the heat and dust of the Indian bazaar, exposure to *lathi* charges from the police, and imprisonment for months in ordinary gaols—all these results of civil disobedience were not only accepted willingly by Indian women, but courted as a personal privilege to sacrifice themselves in the national cause. It is estimated that at least three thousand women were imprisoned during the Civil Disobedience Movement. Indian women have participated not only in the Civil Disobedience Movement and in national political congresses, but also in less public though no less patriotic service; for example, in the promotion of Indian home industry, *swadeshi*. Many Indian women have preferred this less spectacular expression of nationalism, and showed remarkable initiative and ability in the organization of individual and collective efforts to increase the use of Indian goods.

In the nationalist movement Moslem women in India as a whole, because of the purdah, have played a less important role than the women of other communities, especially Hindus. A number of individual Moslem women, however, have taken a prominent part in the national cause, for example Amman Bibi, the mother of the famous Moslem political leaders, Mohammed and Shaukat Ali, appeared

¹ *Zabau-i-Zanan*, *The Tongue of Woman*, was published bi-monthly in 1919 in Isfahan by Sadigeh Khanum Daulatabadee.

veiled on the platform of the Calcutta Congress of 1917 as a protest against the imprisonment of her sons. More significant than the role of individuals has been the mass demonstration of Moslem women in the nationalist cause; such as one in North India in which hundreds of veiled women took part.

The growth in national consciousness among women has led in some countries to their active participation in political life. Interest in public affairs is obviously limited to the enlightened few, since the masses are politically unawakened. In Egypt a small minority of women, both Moslems and Copts, has been actively identified in politics. Madame Zaghoul Pasha, since the death of her husband, has been the head of the Wafd party, often in personal danger because of her political activity. The interests of Madame Zaghoul Pasha and her group are focussed entirely on party politics. The Feminist Union under Madame Sharawi Pasha's leadership, has a more general interest in public affairs and advance in the status of women. This group is politically conscious but does not direct its activities along partisan lines.

In contrast to the political awakening of women's groups in Egypt, the women of the Middle East, Iran and Iraq, have not yet been stirred to interest in political affairs. There are, however, interesting exceptions, as for example the wife of a religious leader in Baghdad, a Member of the Parliament, who shows an avid interest in politics. Although still behind the veil, she telephones freely to different Members of the Parliament to get the political news. In Palestine and Syria there is little or no expressed desire for woman's suffrage. But political issues, as identified with nationalism in Syria and with the reaction against Zionism in Palestine, are a subject of deep concern to the women of these countries, even though they may not take an active part in public life.

The era of nationalism in Turkey, in addition to its social and economic benefits for women, has brought them full political equality. First municipal suffrage and the eligibility of women for election to city councils was granted in 1930; four years later, December 1934, national suffrage was accorded to women, and seventeen Turkish women Deputies

were elected to the Grand National Assembly in Ankara out of a total of three hundred and ninety. Equality of political status for women has been considered by the leaders of the Turkish Republic as a logical part of national development, and the natural climax of the reforms in the status of women which began in 1923. When the municipal suffrage was granted, it was tacitly understood that the full vote would come in due time. Because of the lack of struggle for suffrage, doubtless, many women in Turkey have little appreciation of its meaning. But at least a small number, the thinking minority, realize the value of their newly acquired political opportunity.

. It is worthy of mention that fourteen of the seventeen women Deputies who were elected as the first women representatives in the Grand National Assembly are teachers, and several are from small towns and rural areas. When I saw these Turkish women Deputies in the Assembly at Ankara, seriously interested in their task, I had the impression that their entrance into political life has meant merely the wider extension of service which they may have hitherto rendered in other fields. This is singularly true of the senior member of the group, Bayan Nakiye Elgün, who has now the title Erzurum Saylav, the Deputy of Erzurum. For more than twenty years she has quietly and effectively promoted woman's education, believing it to be the basis of all reform. For her the Grand National Assembly is merely a new setting for a long career of constructive activity.

In India as in Turkey political privileges for women have come during the ascendancy of the national movement. In the post-war period the major Indian States and all the provinces of British India granted women's suffrage and equal rights of election to municipal councils and legislatures. Since gaining political rights, Indian women have participated in public life as magistrates and members of legislative assemblies in steadily increasing numbers. The new Constitution of India, adopted August 1935 has now extended the opportunities for women in political life by granting national suffrage on a preferential basis, which increases the ratio of women voters, and allots to women a definite number of seats in the Federal legislative chambers.

Provision is also made for a fixed representation of the religious communities.¹

This preferential basis of women's suffrage has met with a sustained opposition from the leading women's organizations in India, since the beginning of the discussion of the new constitution in 1931. The collective opinion of Indian women has registered itself strongly in favour of equal adult suffrage and against the principle of preferential suffrage. This view was strongly expressed by a woman's committee of three outstanding women leaders—Moslem, Christian and Hindu—before the Joint Select Committee appointed by the British Parliament to consider the Indian Constitutional Reform. This delegation of women, representing three great religious faiths, expressed a united opinion against suffrage based on communal divisions, which was in striking contrast to the proverbial spirit of communal discord, that has always been considered the main barrier against national unity in India. As their view was not incorporated in the final Parliamentary Report, a memorandum of protest was sent jointly from the All-India Women's Conference, the Women's Indian Association and the National Council of Women.

After expressing appreciation for the recognition that Indian women in public life have received, and for the genuine desire of the Joint Parliamentary Committee to extend suffrage to women in larger numbers and include them in legislative offices, the memorandum strongly opposed the suffrage provisions in the new Constitution. The substance of the protest is that the preferential suffrage basis for women favours certain classes and vested interests, and that sex equality has not been observed. The sentence "With Lord Lothian, we are unrepentant believers in a system

¹ The former ratio was 1 woman to 20 men; the new ratio is 1 woman to 6 men. The Federal legislation formerly did not admit women. The new Constitution provides that the Federal legislature should have six seats in the Upper House and nine seats in the Lower House for women. Of the nine seats in the Lower House, two are reserved for Moslem women and one for an Indian Christian. In all the provincial legislatures except the North-West Frontier provinces women have one or more seats, and special provision is made for the different religious communities.

of direct election," succinctly summarizes this clear and fearless expression of a number of Indian women leaders in regard to political rights. The memorandum closes with the statement: "We wish to make it quite clear that even if we had secured or secure for ourselves all that we have wished or wish to secure and if, at the same time, we felt that the recommendations as a whole, were not in the true interest of India, we would, as women, the natural guardians of future generations, feel it our bounden duty to deny all privileges for ourselves for the sake of the common good."¹

The 1936 All-India Conference at Trivandrum reiterated its disapproval of the franchise qualifications for women but urged that women should avail themselves of the full privileges granted. It especially called upon "all educated women to see that all women qualified for the vote should apply for registration of their names on the electoral roll and use their votes to the best advantage."²

In reading such a vigorous statement one must of course bear in mind that it reflects the political consciousness of a very small minority of Indian women, among whom there are comparatively few Moslem women. But this small minority of women leaders in India is more articulate in political affairs than the women of any other country in the East. A few Indian women have played an active part in securing political rights but not in conflict with Indian men as the leading Indian nationalists have favoured political rights for Indian women. The special efforts for women's suffrage have been merely a part of the general nationalist effort, the divergence of opinion concerning woman's suffrage, as granted in the new Constitution, has a deeper meaning than merely the idea of rights for women.

A spirit of genuine concern for national welfare rather than the desire to promote merely women's interests is the keynote of the political activity of Indian women leaders. Their primary motivation is social and educational reform, but since such reforms cannot be divorced from political issues, the All-India Women's Conference, although definitely

¹ From the Report of the All-India Women's Conference, Karachi, January 1935.

² Report of the All-India Women's Conference, Trivandrum, 1936.

non-political in its origin and objective, has found it impossible to remain outside of the political field. Hence the growth in political activity of Indian women has come as the inevitable result of their awakened social consciousness and passion for national progress. Women elsewhere in the East are not yet as keenly aware of the intimate relationship between social and political issues. But feminism in the East as a whole is characterized by the same growing desire, so evident in India, for women to play their part effectively in the common good.

During the post-war period the horizon of Eastern women has been steadily widening, not merely beyond the home into civic and national life but also into a growing range of international relationships. This new contact of the women of the East with the world beyond their own national boundaries has come through many channels, but especially through the women's international organizations with which the Eastern societies are affiliated. Formerly in the conferences of these world movements, Western women, who had knowledge of the Orient, often represented the East, interpreting problems and point of view of the East. But to-day Western women would not have the temerity to try to interpret the changing East, since Eastern women themselves now represent the East. A world conference of women to-day is not complete without its Eastern delegates. During the last decade the attendance of women delegates from the Near East and India in international conferences has steadily increased. Madame Huda Sharawi Pasha for a number of years has represented Egypt in international gatherings. Members of the *Kadin Birligi* in Turkey have for the past six years attended world meetings and the conferences of the Balkan area; Indian women for a longer period than women in the Near East have been in contact with the major international organizations for women.

No one who attended the International Suffrage Alliance Congress in Istanbul (April 1935) could fail to realize the important role of the women of the East to-day in their international relationships. Three women from India (as it happened all three were Moslems), a young woman from Teheran, a number from Egypt, both Moslems and Copts,

a large delegation of Syrian women, representing Christians and Moslems, and also a group of students from the American Junior College in Beirut—all these Eastern delegates together with a group of very active Turkish delegates, the total number of Eastern women constituting perhaps half of the Congress, gave one the very definite impression of the active participation of women of the East in international life.

Not only in women's conferences but in mixed gatherings on specific international problems, Eastern women have begun to play an effective role. Women leaders from India especially have quickly found a place in international conferences of a political nature, receiving recognition more quickly in fact than have the women of the West, when one considers how recently Eastern women entered public life. After a little less than a decade of political rights two Indian women—one a Hindu, the other a Moslem—were appointed delegates to the Round Table Conference of India with England. These women delegates were regarded, not as charming feminine additions only, but as active members of the Conference, capable of intelligent deliberation on the future relationship of these two countries. Their presence at the Conference table on an equal basis with Indian men was an irrefutable evidence of the new day in India.

The growth of international consciousness among Eastern women has come first through various types of relationship with the West. Only more recently has closer contact with other countries in the East been established. "The women of Asia know more of Europe and America than of Asia—the Hindu woman knows more of the British sister than of her Arabian or Afghan relative. Many ties for over one hundred and fifty years have established a close bond between India and England." Thus a group of women leaders in India wrote several years ago to leaders of other countries of Asia, urging the desirability of having an All-Asian Conference.¹ This first Conference of the women of Asia took place accordingly in Lahore in January 1931, carrying out the primary object of promoting the cause of

¹ Official letter of invitation sent March 12, 1930, signed by a representative group of leaders of the All-India Women's Conference.

Asian womanhood. The fact that women of thirty-three countries of Asia, the Near East, Middle East and Far East, were invited, shows the unexplored possibilities of future relationship among the women of Asia.

In this increasing relationship of Eastern women with those of other countries, both of the East and West, their growing interest in the cause of peace is of foremost importance. Within the past decade women of the East have become keenly aware of their responsibility to promote peace. Rani Lakshmibai Rajwade, the Honorary Secretary of the All-Asian Women's Conference, voices the widespread conviction of Indian women when she says in the preface of the Conference Report, "Asia has realized that she should emerge once again with her old doctrine of peace and world brotherhood. New conceptions of patriotism . . . are impelling every Asian country to carry patriotism beyond the national borders, and it is more than likely that before long Asia will be united in a comity of nations determined to deliver the message of peace and good will to the world."

This commitment of Eastern women to the cause of peace may well be one of the most far-reaching results of their coming out, within the last decade, from the quiet life of the home into a world of wider relationships. Formerly conscious of belonging only to a family, the Eastern woman to-day has begun to assume her responsibility as a world citizen.

PART SIX

The Pressure of Change on Islam To-day

CHAPTER XXV

THE INTERPRETATION OF ISLAM IN THE ARABIC WORLD

ALL the changes which are taking place in the position of Moslem women are phases of a fundamental renaissance in the East to-day—the rethinking of religion. Educational opportunity, social equality, economic independence, the widening of the field of women's interest beyond the four walls of the home are all different manifestations of a vital reorganization of Eastern life. The transformation in the position of Moslem women is to a certain degree, both the cause and the effect of this change in religion. Any variation in the status of women challenges the customs of Islam; on the other hand, until these customs are challenged, little or no change in the life of Moslem women will occur.

As one talks with young Moslems of the rising generation, one realizes that they are beginning to question the authority of Islam, which has been held inviolable through the centuries, and that they are discarding customs which have held the Islamic social system static for centuries. Hence the far-reaching changes in the life of the Moslem woman. "Islam," to quote a Moslem leader in Egypt, "has set its seal of inferiority upon her, and given the sanction of religion to social customs which have deprived her of the full opportunity for self-expression and development of personality."

Although the Islamic world has often failed to do justice to womanhood, there is little doubt that the Prophet was inspired by the ideal of elevating the position of women of his day and improving social conditions, without, however, violating the prevailing concept of masculine superiority, that was characteristic of a primitive people, dominated by the ideal of physical strength. His teachings represent a social reform movement against existing practices which was very significant for that day, and included such measures as the abolition of infanticide, limitation of polygamy, protection of widows and orphans, marriage contract, the

granting of marriage dowry and inheritance rights to women. Mohammed himself took advantage of the limit of four wives, prescribed by the Koran and caused his wives to veil and avoid public contact; that is, all except his first wife Khadija, the elderly widow who is said to have attended all the meetings.¹ Customs rather than the actual teaching of the Koran resulted later in the veiling and seclusion of women. For example, in regard to the veil, according to the Koran, a woman should not show her ornaments (*Zinet*). This was subsequently interpreted to mean that a woman's ornament is her hair—an interesting parallel to the Biblical idea of a woman's hair as her crowning glory—and therefore the hair must be covered. From this the latter customs of the veil developed. Personal example rather than literal teachings regarding women as a whole were included by the commentators of the Koran in the Islamic social system.²

By incorporating the various social reforms such as the restriction of polygamy and inheritance rights directly into his religious teachings, Mohammed proved himself to be a practical idealist. Religion has always been an effective instrument for social action, but was especially so in Arabia, because the Arabs, naturally religious by temperament, were more interested in religion than in social reform. In claiming for his social teachings the authority of divine revelation, Mohammed therefore made an irresistible appeal to the Arabs of his time. Unfortunately for Moslem women, however, these socio-religious reforms designed for the seventh century have not furnished a basis for continuous progress and reform.

Too often the identification of religion with social custom has precluded any idea of change for orthodox Islam. Every utterance and act of the Prophet, since supposed to be divinely inspired, have been given permanence and finality. The social habits of early Islam have persisted in spite of changing conditions, since the interpreters of the Canon

¹ The special regulation for the veiling and seclusion of the Prophet's wives is given in the Koran, Sura 33: 53.

² The teachings of the Koran concerning women are more fully explained in the Appendix.

Law were not imbued with the spirit of social reform and the ideal of elevating womanhood, that would have made change possible as the situation changed. They have remained reactionary in their thinking, basing the teaching regarding women literally on the customs of the seventh century, and even making a more rigid interpretation than the actual customs of Mohammed's day required. Thus the teaching regarding women which may have represented an actual advance in the status of women for the seventh century, when applied literally to the nineteenth and twentieth centuries has discouraged change and kept Moslem women from being affected by the new conditions of the modern world.

Regardless of any change in conditions, the orthodox Moslem position in reference to women, as in everything else, has remained unchanged. This point of view is illustrated by the reply of a desert chief in Trans-jordan who when asked whether there was any change in religion, answered, "We don't need to talk of religion, we are all Moslem. There can be no change." His physical environment of the far-sweeping desert has remained the same since the days of the Prophet, and his concept of life is no less unchanged.

To maintain this traditional conception of women was possible as long as the Moslem world was a world apart. But the force of the twentieth century has broken with tremendous strength against the bulwarks of medieval Islam. Powerful influences outside the realm of religion—political, economic and social—have engendered widespread dissatisfaction with a social system that sanctions polygamy and is typified by the veil. Hence although reactionary authorities may be antagonistic to modern social ideals, the impulsion of progress is irresistible. The reality of change therefore is affecting the practices of Islam and the very bases of the religion itself.

Social changes due to the impact of modern civilization have involved inevitable changes in religious thought. At the same time, by a strange interaction of cause and effect, changing attitudes toward religion, which have come in modern Islam through world contact, are making possible

and motivating social progress. This interaction of social and religious change is a subject of vital significance in the study of the changing status of Moslem women, since the emancipation of women is at the very heart of social reform and also the acid test of difference between the ancient and modern points of view. The twentieth century has invoked a new relationship between religion and society in the Islamic world, since the old, completely integrated religious-social system with all its details prescribed has been trespassed upon by a modern world.

A careful study of the religious phases of this interrelated social and religious problem would present the intricacies of a jigsaw puzzle. But viewed in broad outline, the problem seems to be resolving itself along two main lines. In the first place certain radicals are deliberately trying to disestablish the authoritative socio-religious system of Islam. In so doing, however, they do not attempt to discredit it as a personal belief. In the second place, a less radical group is reinterpreting Islam in order to bring it into harmony with modern life, while still maintaining its authority as a religious system. Since the most debated point in orthodox Islam in the twentieth century is its social system, based on the seventh century, and since the central fact of this social system, as has been shown, is the position assigned to women, the reinterpretation of religion seeks to harmonize the emancipation of women with the spirit of the Koran. The modern conception of Islam is concerned with its teachings concerning the veil, polygamy, divorce and other social questions affecting women.¹

Confronted with the conflict between religious tradition and modern life, Turkey has chosen the first of the two solutions—the repudiation of the inviolable authority of religion over the State and Society and the pursuit of progress as a single goal. The rest of the Moslem world has followed the second course and attempted to keep all social reform within the spirit of the Law. Of this approach to

¹ "Appendix for the Interpretation of the Teachings of the Koran regarding Women" by a Moslem Sheikh in Syria.

Kasim Bey Amin, *Tahrir-ul-Mar'at, The Liberation of Women*, Chapter II (Cairo new edition) "Woman's Veil."

the problem Egypt is perhaps the best example. The countries that are trying to adapt themselves to the new social order by seeking to harmonize the spirit of Islam with modern thought differ widely and represent various stages of advance. Their difference, however, is one of degree rather than of kind, as they all recognize the authority of Islam to determine the bounds of social progress. It is interesting to consider the dominant religious attitudes in the different countries of the Moslem world toward their common problem of the relationship between religion and modern civilization.

Although Egypt seems to be distinctly European, judging by the general atmosphere in Cairo, the dominant official attitude toward religion is distinctly that of Asia. There is no idea of repudiating the power of Islam, but rather a definite united policy of the forces of Church and State to make Egypt the bulwark of religion, the defender of the faith. Egypt occupies without question a position of religious pre-eminence in Islam as a result of the prestige of Al Azhar, the great Moslem University, which has for over a thousand years radiated its influence through the Moslem world; also because of the influence of a Moslem sovereign committed to upholding Islamic traditions. This is a very powerful combination of forces.

The reasons for the close co-ordination of Church and State in Egypt are largely political rather than religious. The maintenance of the strength of the monarchy is served by upholding the power of established religion, which is represented by Al Azhar. Both represent a *status quo*. The fact that Egypt as a whole adheres to a conservative religious attitude is not interpreted by careful observers of Egypt as indicative of an especially religious temperament of the people, but may be considered rather as the natural result of the alliance of the influence for religious conservatism with the established policy of the State.

Because of the powerful vested interests of Islam in Egypt and the official support given to Islam, all progress in Egypt must meet the primary condition of being in harmony with Islam. Social reform receives at the present time a good deal of attention in Egypt and modernizing tendencies

are very much in evidence. A reformer like Kasim Amin, who at the beginning of the century advocated the emancipation of women on the basis of a modern interpretation of the Koran, and paid the usual price of pioneers, public censure and condemnation, to-day would not be considered an extremist or opposed to religion. But all advance must be carefully justified on the grounds of its being in harmony with the spirit of the Koran. Although the increasing latitude in interpretation is one of the hopeful signs of change in Egypt, the transition naturally takes place slowly. There is no evidence there of abolishing the *Shari'a*, the Moslem religious law, and adopting a modern civil code based on a united social system for Christians and Moslems alike.

Although no legal reform which runs counter to Islam has as yet been successful in Egypt, there are distinct evidences of new elements in the religious thinking of Egypt. The installation of electric lights in Al Azhar is a significant trend toward the modernization and improvement of Islamic institutions. The establishment of a new system of primary and secondary instruction in religious education, the change of old forms of instruction and the introduction of a modern curriculum, modern languages, sciences, and comparative religion, the transfer of students from the old mosque into modern buildings—all these changes in Al Azhar are motivated by the desire to strengthen Islam. In these reforms there is no idea of social change, but it seems probable that the exposure of thirteen thousand Moslem men students to the study of modern science and comparative religions may have some effect on the social system.

Because of the relationship of religion to politics, religion is a subject of much discussion and general interest in Egypt. The majority of the educated class follows the prevailing current of conventional religious thought for reasons of expediency, if not from belief. A certain number of Egyptian intellectuals, however, represent an articulate opposition to the authority of religion to determine social reform. Between this group, which has its centre in the Egyptian University, and Al Azhar, the centre of the conservatives, there is a constant struggle. In spite of the fact that the religious forces in Egypt prevent any drastic reforms which would

run counter to the Koran, social evolution is inevitable in a country where modern ideas are assimilated as easily as the air one breathes. Furthermore, since the dominant motivation for action in Egypt tends to be political rather than religious, the compromise method of social reform through a modern interpretation of Islam is gaining in influence. The periphery of Islamic privilege for women as sanctioned by the Koran is therefore steadily widening.

There is little question of the influence of Egypt across the Pan-Islamic world. Through a very active Press and a vigorous literature current Egyptian thought is being broadcasted from North Africa to the Indian Ocean, and is reshaping the thinking of the rising generation. Egypt offers the outstanding example of social advance through the modernization of religion, which is being followed with profound interest by other Islamic countries, especially by the intelligent conservative elements in Islam that are conscious of the need for change but antagonized by the extreme reforms of Turkey, which they regard as progress at too great a price.

A night's journey from Cairo to Jerusalem gives one the impression of having travelled back in point of time several decades when one compares the religious atmosphere of Egypt and Palestine. Jerusalem is not the advance guard of modern Islam as is Cairo, but a stronghold of religious conservatism rooted in the past. Islam in Egypt represents the co-ordination of Church and State, both united under a foreign Power. Islam in Palestine represents the separation of the Moslem Arab community from other racial and religious elements in a highly divided world under foreign control. Cairo is an expanding modern city, a Paris of the East, vibrant with intellectual activity and modern life. Jerusalem is an Eastern city of narrow streets within historic walls, with a heterogeneous modern city expanding on the outside, a mixture of foreign elements unrelated to the life within the old city. The physical difference between Cairo and Jerusalem typifies the difference between the religious attitude of Egypt and that of Palestine.

The reasons for the Orthodox position of Palestine are not difficult to understand. Jerusalem is a sacred city of

Islam and all sacred cities tend to intensify the religious feeling of their devotees. In Jerusalem, moreover, as the shrine city for three great world religions, the followers of all three faiths are more deeply imbued with religious intensity than are the devotees at other holy cities. The competition of these different religions, each claiming the same city as sacred, has tended to crystallize religious feeling into an extreme conservatism. Hence the Moslem religious current in Jerusalem flows into an orthodox channel. The political situation, moreover, tends to cause Moslems in Palestine to cling tenaciously to their religion. They find themselves on the defensive against a twofold influence—a foreign political power and an aggressive, competitive, racial and religious element, which is protected by the foreign Government and rapidly growing. Both of these alien forces are feared because it is felt they prevent Arab development; a protective attitude toward Islam is the result. This expresses itself in a careful safeguarding of Moslem social customs.

Religion and culture are inseparable ideas in Jerusalem since Islam is the product of the Arab's mind and temperament. The voice from the minaret speaks the language of the Arab and appeals to his soul. His religion and institutions, language and culture are all an inseparable composite which makes up the idea of Arab personality. Adherence to religion and safeguarding its institutions from any modernizing influence is therefore an assertion of Arab individuality and a defence against a dual aggression. This fear of losing personality, if religion and customs are changed, is voiced by a young Arab intellectual of Western education, "If a nation loses its religion, its social institutions, customs and traditions, it loses its personality." The common instinct of defences of Arab personality is expressed in an orthodox attitude toward Islam, which unites the conservatives and many liberals who, because of education and modern influence, might follow a different course under other circumstances.

This common impulse of conservatives and progressives to safeguard Islam and its institutions prevents rapid social change which would affect Moslem customs. Any aggressive

movement toward a reinterpretation of Islam, or an intellectual analysis of the social religious problem, such as one finds in Cairo, is also lacking. A few individuals may express the opinion that the veil and religion have no relationship, but there is no open effort to promote the idea. The attitude toward social reform by law is illustrated by the answer to the question which I had the temerity to ask in a conversation with three learned and worthy Moslem sheikhs in Jerusalem steeped in Islamic lore, as to their opinion of the legal reforms in Turkey, "Turkey knows no more about the Moslem law than you do," was the reply uttered by the oldest and most learned of the three, in a tone of utter finality and scorn.

As to the effect of other Moslem countries on Palestine, one has the feeling that Palestine is rather segregated from outside influence. There seems to be little interest or sympathy with the religious and social reform in Turkey; with the process of change in Egypt, Palestine is more sympathetic. But the Grand Mufti occupying the Citadel in Jerusalem, which overlooks the spacious area of the Dome of the Rock, is firmly maintaining, at the present time, the authority of Islam in Palestine.

In Trans-jordan also orthodox Islam holds sway. Inspired in an environment not unlike that of Trans-jordan to-day, the religion of the desert is not as yet challenged by any modern ideas. Education has only just begun in Trans-jordan, the social urge is as yet scarcely perceptible; hence the conflict has been until now hardly evident between the old and the new, and religion is not a subject for discussion in Trans-jordan. According to a sheikh with fairly modern ideas attached to the private staff of His Highness, Emir Abdullah, Trans-jordan, however, represents a greater degree of freedom than Mecca or Medina, where the Wahhabis wage their Puritan warfare against a man's special liberty; for example forbidding him to smoke or shave his beard. But Islam in Trans-jordan has not modified its control over women. Orthodox religion in this new frontier State is as yet uncontaminated by any higher criticism.

In Syria as in Palestine the prevailing Moslem trend seems toward the orthodox point of view. Although one is

conscious of more cross-currents in Moslem thought in Syria, the dominant impression, if one judges by the attitude toward social reform, is that ancient tradition is still very generally upheld. There are, of course, as we have shown in preceding chapters, abundant signs of a social evolution in Syria, but this is due to general forces rather than to an active programme of social reform. There are individual Moslems of advanced religious views but the collective impact tends to strengthen Islam along orthodox lines.

This dominant conservative religious trend in Syria may be due, as in Palestine, to the interplay of religious and political influences. The French Mandate has had something of the same effect as the British Mandate in building up a general protective attitude toward Islam as a line of defence against foreign power. "Whatever our belief or however modern our ideas may be, we become more Moslem under foreign pressure, since we feel ourselves a minority," was the frank explanation of a progressive Moslem doctor of Beirut as to why he did not actively promote social change.

As a modern young Turkish woman, commenting on the difference between Turkey and Syria, said, "If Turkey were in the same situation, I would probably wear two veils instead of one and pray regularly at the mosque." Also contrasting Syria with Turkey, a thoughtful Moslem woman in Beirut expressed this feeling of need for protection against foreign influence. "A sovereign Moslem State has no fear of reproducing the wrong kind of Western influence. It can choose and not have something imposed upon it. We would naturally have more confidence in Moslem leadership than in foreign."

The contrast between Beirut, and Damascus and Aleppo has already been discussed in reference to educational developments. Out of the zone of Western influence of all kinds, with a large Moslem majority, the two latter cities and the area they include are dominated by a distinctly Moslem atmosphere. But there is also a marked difference between Damascus and Aleppo. Damascus, like Jerusalem, is an historic city of Islam, where religious enthusiasm is always a deep smouldering fire, which may be quickly

fanned into flame. Moslem traditions are therefore zealously guarded against the encroachment of subversive foreign influence. Aleppo is not so steeped, as Damascus is, in Islamic culture. The focus of life in Aleppo is economic, not religious. The social influence of Turkey is more in evidence in Aleppo than elsewhere in Syria, a fact which naturally affects the religious point of view. The political situation has had some effect in retarding social change, but one is certainly less conscious in Aleppo than in other parts of Syria of the Moslem defence attitude induced by the political situation.

In Syria as a whole, there is a certain amount of re-thinking of religion but the subject calls forth much less discussion in the Press in Syria than in Egypt. Beirut is not an intellectual centre of modern Islam. There are very few individual leaders trying to interpret the Koranic laws so as to make modern social practices permissible. Some of the educated class, however, are promoting the idea that social conventions are not identified with Islam. There is probably a fairly large number of liberally minded Moslems who are only conservative from reasons of expediency. There are also many in Syria, as elsewhere, who have a definitely secular point of view, believing that there is an unsolved conflict between Islam and progress. Two expressions of opinion from young Syrians show this: "As people become educated they grow more open-minded, leave their beliefs and accept the truth," and "No educated person can have religious conviction. He may keep religion as a cultural legacy but not as a conscious belief." Naturally this group has no interest in reinterpreting Islam in order to clear the path for social progress.

As to outside influences from other Moslem countries which are affecting religious trends in Syria, Egypt plays a greater role than Turkey. The Arabic language gives the literary activity of Egypt a Syrian public and the general contact of Syria with Egypt, moreover, is far closer than with Turkey. The influence of Turkey on Syria in religious reform is negligible, although the fearless method by which Turkey has accomplished the social and religious revolution makes an appeal to a certain number of the younger genera-

tion. But as a whole religious thought in Syria is not affected to any marked degree by other Moslem countries.

The varied foreign influences from the West, especially evident in Beirut and the Lebanon, are undoubtedly having an effect on religious thought. But any change in religious attitudes of Moslems that may be taking place is an unconscious process. As long as the political situation claims the centre of attention, Moslems and Christians alike will probably view everything from that angle. "Like a horse with blinders" as a Syrian nationalist expressed it, Syria looks straight ahead along the way of political interests; other problems are viewed entirely in that perspective. Nationalism, which in Syria means political independence, is the ruling passion and religion is not the major determinant of action.

Baghdad to-day forms a striking contrast with Baghdad, the proud city of the Abbasids of the Middle Ages. Once the treasure-house of Islamic art and learning, Baghdad is to-day a centre of vigorous nationalism with less interest in religion. Orthodox Islam is still ostensibly in command but the centre of interest in Baghdad since the World War has shifted from religion to politics.

In King Feisal's support of Islam there was probably no idea of any aspirations to the Caliphate; his concern was to keep firm the bonds of relationship with Arabia. King Ghazi, in following this same principle—strict adherence to Islam—is doubtless actuated by political considerations, as well as by loyalty to his racial heritage and family ties. Whatever may be the reason for the official policy, Iraq admits less elasticity of interpretation of the Koran than does Egypt. Conditions do not encourage the development of a higher criticism of Islam in the interest of social reform. Furthermore, there are no religious leaders in Baghdad of the type of those in Cairo, who are interested in a modern apologetics of religion, nor is there much evidence of any urge to make such an interpretation.

Many of the younger generation, however, feel that religion is a social drag. "Religion has clamped the lid on the freedom of men as well as women. We have only the coffee-houses for social amusements" is the spirit of protest

uttered by educated young Moslems returning from university life in Syria, or England or America. For them the conflict between religion and progress urgently demands a solution. These educated young leaders in Baghdad are not inhibited from social reform by any cultural defence of Islam due to the political situation as in Beirut and Jerusalem. In Baghdad the spirit of nationalism is aggressive, and antagonistic to the restraint of religion. "Islam is a retrogressive force, not only blocking progress, but opposing nationalism, since it still emphasizes too much of the old idea of Pan-Islam, an impossible ideal to-day," said a Baghdad teacher just returned from study abroad. "It seems hopeless to try to do anything with Islam. The only solution is to cut loose," was the opinion expressed by another Iraqi student. In such a mood the young Moslem leaders of Iraq make no attempt to reinterpret the Koran and to compromise between social reform and religion as in Cairo. Their approach to the social-religious problem is not intellectual but pragmatic.

Forces other than Islam are determining the flow of life in Baghdad to-day. Modernism presses hard against orthodox religion. Ramadhan is loosely observed; the coffee-houses during this month of fasting are no longer closed; mosques are scantily attended. The shrine cities of Najaf and Kerbela are no longer richly endowed and filled with pilgrims. Islam in Iraq to-day has ceased to be the sole power which controls all national development. But although a secondary interest, religion still plays an important role.

Turkey's successful nationalism has inspired widespread admiration in Iraq and would inspire more direct imitation if conditions were more favourable. The fearless drastic methods of Turkey, taking tucks in the decades, as it were, to make up for lost time, makes a tremendous appeal and awakens the hope of a similar solution for the retarded civilization of Iraq. "Turkey proves the possibility of the successful adaptation of a Moslem country to modern civilization in breaking with traditions and the rigid teaching of the Koran, while still remaining a Moslem power," said a Cambridge graduate, one of the influential young Iraqi leaders. Discarding the hindrances of Islam but

retaining the Moslem affiliation, seem to many in Iraq the only way out. The influence of Egypt although vigorously exerted through the Arabic Press, makes less of a direct impression on Iraq than does the example of Turkey. The intellectual force from Egypt does not give the dynamic urge to action, such as that which comes from Turkey. It is true, that the change of letters from Arabic to Latin in Turkey may eventually affect the sense of relationship of Iraq with Turkey, since it cuts off the influence of the Turkish Press. However, Baghdad, although in the heart of the desert, eagerly faces Westward and will doubtless continue to feel a close relationship to Istanbul.

Specifically with reference to Moslem women in Iraq, the most direct outside influence has come from Syria through the Syrian teachers and through the Iraqi girls studying on scholarship in the schools of Beirut. We have already discussed the educational and social significance for Iraq of this contact with Syria. Unquestionably this relationship with Syria has had also an influence on religious attitudes. The continuous injection of modern ideals into the stream of Iraq life through the students and teachers who have been educated in Syria has had the effect of liberalizing the whole atmosphere. All of the undercurrents of religious reaction in Iraq against the controlling spirit of conservatism, will find freer outlets eventually in definite religious and social changes. "Wait till the old beards die," the remark of an elderly Baghdad woman in sympathy with modern thought, is full of Eastern wisdom.

CHAPTER XXVI

ISLAM AND CHANGE IN INDIA, IRAN AND TURKEY

ANYONE who has spent a single day in India, is conscious of the omnipresent authority of religion. Even the call of the food vendor on the railway platform, "Hindu biscuits and Mohammedan tea," shows how completely religion controls the most minute details of daily living. It is not surprising therefore, since all religions in India allow so little variation from the established orthodox idea, that Islam accordingly has assumed a restrictive social force, which is far more rigid than in any other country. Furthermore, the fact that the Moslem community of seventy-seven millions is a minority in a population of three hundred and sixty-three millions, undoubtedly has a very great effect on Moslem thought. The consciousness of being surrounded by a strong, numerically overpowering force like Hinduism (there are over 238,000,000 Hindus in India) has always tended to put the Moslem minority on the defensive.¹

The effort to assert and safeguard Moslem identity as a community has shown itself in many different ways. Moslems have clung with tenacity to their own language, Urdu. For many years they refused to take full advantage of education in English, a policy which gave the Hindus the easy opportunity to outstrip the Moslem community in business and professions. Moslems have always jealously protected Islamic culture and carefully maintained distinctive social customs; hence, the rigidity of purdah in India.

The consciousness of being a religious minority, which has dictated the emphasis upon the distinctive features of Islam, may also explain why Moslems in India are still much more imbued with the idea of Pan-Islam than are Moslems elsewhere. One reason, perhaps, why the conception of Pan-Islam dies hard in India, is the satisfaction

¹ According to the 1931 Census the total population of India is 363,100,000. Of this total, Hindus constitute 238,642,187; Moslems, 77,092,706.

which the thought of a great world empire of Islam gives to a Moslem minority. As Mohammed Ali, the outstanding Moslem leader, told me in an interesting interview. "We feel strongly the need for a link with the rest of the Moslem world, like a poor relative, who brings gifts and wants to be recognized." But this desire to retain the idea of outside affiliation with the forces of Islam runs counter to the present stream of nationalism, which ignores outside relationship. The conservative Moslem, imbued with the idea of Pan-Islam, therefore, is not an ardent nationalist, but is, as someone has said, "First a Moslem, then an Indian." The progressive Moslems, on the other hand, have little interest in the idea of an Islamic Empire outside of India. The pilgrimage appeal is passing with modern education, and as London, not Mecca, becomes the goal outside of India, the ideal of Pan-Islam fades into unreality. Other Moslem countries are of interest only as pathfinders for social reform. The thought of progressive Moslems is concentrated on nationalism and not on the unification of the world of Islam.

The opposition of the orthodox Moslem group to the Sarda Child Marriage Act illustrates the prevailing attitude toward any infringement of the Islamic Law, which is held inviolable. The rights of Moslems to control their social system under the *Shari'a* is tenaciously upheld. Natural religious conservatism, which would oppose any attack on the religious law, was intensified by the communal consciousness of a religious minority. The difference between the attitude of conservative Moslems in Egypt and in India toward social legislation is significant of the Indian Moslem situation as a whole. A sheikh in Cairo commented on this difference, "Egypt is under Moslem authority, India under foreign. Social legislation based on a reinterpretation of the Koran is more possible therefore in Egypt than in India."

Although Moslem orthodox influence is dominant in India, two movements have represented a liberalizing influence through a reinterpretation of the Koran—the Aligahr and Ahmadiyah Movements. The former, which began with the establishment of the Moslem University Centre in Aligahr in 1875 under Sir Syed Ahmed, the

Apostle of Reconciliation, as he is called because of his efforts to reconcile modern progress with the true Islam. The liberalizing educational influence of the Aligahr Movement has radically changed the Moslem outlook in India. It has advanced education for women but has not been an aggressive social force, as its primary objective has been to promote an educational awakening not to reinterpret the social message of the Koran.

The Ahmadiyah Movement, on the contrary, is concerned primarily with the interpretation of the social teachings of Islam in terms of modern progress. This movement from its centre in Lahore radiates an influence throughout the Moslem world. Motivated by the spirit of defence of Islam against Western criticism, it has built up a strong modern apologetic of the Islamic social system—the veil, polygamy, divorce, and inheritance—which is the vulnerable point of modern attack. The authority for reinterpretation of the Koran is based on such private sayings of Mohammed as “Confer with one another,” and “My people will never agree on Error.” This is interpreted as giving the modern apologist complete latitude of interpretation. As Amir Ali says in *The Spirit of Islam*, one of the most complete presentations of the modern apologists’ point of view, “The elasticity of laws is their great test and this test is pre-eminently possessed by those of Islam. Their compatibility with progress shows their founder’s wisdom.” The Ahmadiyah Movement through its reinterpretation of social teachings is doubtless having an effect on the gradual emancipation of Moslem women, since it introduces an idea of change. However, one has the impression that the movement in India is more philosophical and has perhaps less practical results in India than in Egypt.

There are, however, evidences of liberal Moslem thought, which demands practical social reform. A society of young men in Madras under the name of the Young Men’s Crescent Society, modelled after the Y.M.C.A., shows a modern social outlook in promoting the abolition of purdah, but has the distinctly Moslem objective of deepening the relationship to Islam by study circles in the interpretation of Mohammed and the Koran. This type of progressive Moslem opinion is

more concerned with positive results than with a reconciliation of Islamic teachings and modern progress. Moslem leaders of this group make the same protest in India as elsewhere against the hampering effect of religion on educational progress and social advance.

The divergent opinions in Moslem India toward Turkey register the difference between conservative and liberal Moslem thought. As Sir Ali Imam, a Moslem progressive leader, expressed it, "Turkey is regarded as either an out-cast or as a modern apostle of Islam." The orthodox Moslem naturally repudiates Turkey because of the abolition of the Caliphate, especially in view of the Caliphate agitation in India for the defence of Turkey after the World War. The progressive Moslem in India expresses admiration for Turkey as offering the successful solution of Islam in a modern world. Progressives who condemn the purdah system and feel that Moslem society must be freed from the dead hand of the past, naturally welcome the reforms of Kamal Atatürk in Turkey as an example of progress. The movement in Turkey is used by both the orthodox and liberals for propaganda through the Press. The orthodox Press has presented Turkey in a most lurid form, very often maintaining that there has been a moral decline of Turkey as a result of the freedom of women. The liberal Press has shown that the Turkish reforms are in accord with Islam, and that in adopting these Turkey has not become anti-Islamic.

The effect of the failure of Amanullah in his attempted social reform of Afghanistan was greater perhaps in India than in any other Moslem country. The orthodox forces in India have used Afghanistan as a warning to retard social progress. The Minister of Education in Bhopal, in speaking of Afghanistan, said: "Amanullah's failure has made it impossible to make certain reforms as rapidly as I had intended." Immediately after the fall of Amanullah, the influence of Afghanistan undoubtedly overshadowed that of Turkey, but progressive Moslem India has continued to follow the progress of Turkey with interest. The change in religious thinking in India away from the dominant conservatism of the present comes very slowly

but the pressure of events is undoubtedly leading toward a more liberal Moslem attitude.

In contrast to India, the decline of the power of the conservative forces in Iran is very marked. Long the symbol of the repressive power of religion and retrogressive social tendencies, Iran is rapidly becoming the symbol of change. Although the political awakening of Iran began in 1905 with the Constitution, there was no marked change in religious and social attitudes until after the accession of the present Shah (1926). Since then, the progressive forces, united with the Government, have promoted a programme of reform which is motivated by the urge to develop Iran into a united nation. The importance of religious reform in this general reform programme is shown by the statement of one of the chief counsellors of the Shah, in the early days of the régime: "Shave the beards of the mollahs and unify the nation." The emphasis on the beards of the mollahs reminds one of the source of Samson's strength. Weakening the authority of the mollahs has been regarded as fundamental to success, because of their anti-national and anti-social influence.

The definite Government programme of religious reform in Iran presents a distinct contrast to the Government policy of Iraq and Egypt. In Iran political interests either directly or indirectly are promoting religious and social reform; in Iraq and Egypt, as we have seen in an earlier chapter, the Government has exerted its influence toward keeping progress within the safe bounds of Islam. All three countries show the important role played by political forces in determining the measure of religious and social reforms.

Various phases of Iran's policy of religious and social reform very definitely suggest the influence of modern Turkey. "If Turkey, why not Iran," an Iranian doctor's brief comment, is an opinion which I frequently heard expressed on my visit to Iran in 1928, with reference to some proposed reform measure. More recently the relationship of Iran and Turkey has been even more evident. The visit of the Shah to Turkey two years ago has been followed by a number of forward moves in the reform programme

of Iran that suggests a Turkish parallel. The abolition of the *Pahlavi* hat and the adoption of European headgear, and the regulations against the *chaddur* which are applicable to teachers and students, as we have already said, recall Turkey's method of eliminating the *fez* and the veil. Certain common factors in the situation of Turkey and Iran have been conducive to the achievement of these similar lines of reform. Both are sovereign Moslem powers; in both countries Islam is a borrowed religion not deeply rooted in the national culture.

It is interesting, however, to note that Iran has made a different approach than Turkey to the problem of reforms that directly affect religion. Iran has followed the two sides of the triangle method rather than the straight-across—the hypotenuse approach of Turkey. The salient illustration of the longer process of reform in Iran is the way the power of the mollahs has been steadily undermined by a series of regulations. The wearing of turbans in the Ministry of Education in Teheran was forbidden some time ago. A number of mollahs removed the turban; others resigned and, later, several were dismissed without explanation. The Governor of Ispahan, which is the most orthodox educational centre of Iran, with its hundreds of turbaned students, ordered that no one wearing a turban could ride a bicycle. A few gave their heads the preference to their feet and abandoned their bicycles, but the majority took off their turbans and continued to ride. Finally, the compulsory order was issued for mollahs to wear the *Pahlavi* hat, and later the European hat was prescribed for mollahs as for everyone else except in connection with his religious office. "The turban is," as someone has explained, "more than merely a sign of religious authority commanding respect. Modern social ideas are rarely promoted by a man wearing a turban." The campaign against the mollahs has been carried on, however, with moderation—just so far and no farther. If drastic measures were necessary their harsh effect was usually modified. A case in point was an incident which occurred in Ghom. A number of mollahs made a demonstration of fanaticism, of which the Queen was the object. The agitators were summoned to Teheran

and punished; however, they were all given presents before being sent back to Ghom.

Social reform through legislation in Iran has been attempted, but within safe limits; so that the inviolability of the *Shari'a* law has not been questioned. The legal authority of Islam cannot be abruptly repudiated by one stroke of the pen in Iran as in Turkey. The ignorant masses, which have been entirely subject to the power of Islam, could be too easily stirred to a fanatical outburst by the conservatives. The agitation in Meshed, which followed the order to remove the *Pahlavi* hat, is an indication of what might be a more serious reaction against too drastic Islamic reform measures. Hence changes affecting religion must be made more gradually. But even although the marriage law of 1931 was inadequate and hesitant, it represents a beginning which may later lead to more definite reforms.

Liberal religious opinion in Iran has been steadily growing in the last few years, a change which is made possible by certain elements in the situation. Since Iran represents an heretical branch of Islam, it is perhaps natural that the people should be rather open to a change of belief. Moreover, since Islam is a transplanted religion in Iran, it makes no deep cultural appeal. Accordingly there is no cultural defence of Islam, which in some other centres of Islam, as we have shown, prevents any change which touches religion. In Iran, on the contrary, the Moslem religion is regarded as a destructive cultural force, having suppressed Iranian art and materially modified its form of expression. The awakening of nationalism has naturally led to the consciousness of the retrogressive effect of Islam on Iranian art and to a new appreciation of the pre-Islamic period of Iranian culture.

These various factors in the situation in Iran may explain why there has been little effort to justify social reforms in terms of the Koran. The authority of the Shah to make reforms is questioned in certain places, but on the whole the people have looked to him for reform. The final regulations against the *chaddur* were long anticipated. This action, which was the result of an adequate period of preparation, may be taken as an illustration of the present policy in

Iran of steadily promoting change through official sanctions. The final goal seems to be in Iran, as in Turkey, a modernized nation with the official power of Islam decreased in order to make possible a new basis of society.

"In Turkey we have only one goal—progress. We recognize no relationship between religion and progress since social progress is blocked if contingent on religion." A leader in the Turkish Parliament succinctly expressed in a private conversation this basis of the religious and social revolution in Turkey, which has ended the Moslem World Empire and created a virile new Turkish Republic, freed from the dominance of Islam. This brief statement sums up also the striking difference between Turkey and the rest of the Moslem world. Whereas other Moslem countries are attempting to harmonize all reform with Islam or at least are consciously making terms with the forces of Islam, Turkey has fearlessly broken the domination of religion and repudiated the binding relationship of religion to the State and social system.

How successfully Turkey has achieved this repudiation of the authority of Islam, which has been regnant for centuries, has been proved by an astounding series of reforms. The abolition of the Caliphate, the closing of the Medressehs, the mosque schools, and the secularization of all schools, the adoption of the Swiss Civil Code, the translation of the Koran, the change from Arabic to Turkish in the call to prayer—using the word *Tanri* instead of *Allah*—these and other reforms of the last decade have cut away the foundations of Islam as an authoritative system, and established Turkish society on an entirely new basis. Turkish life to-day has little kinship with life elsewhere in the Moslem East since it no longer rests on the foundations of Islam. Turkish women, completely free from the artificial restraints of the Islamic social system, represent the signal achievement of this dramatic programme of Turkish religious reforms.

The impelling motive of Turkey's denial of the authority of Islam has been the passion of nationalism. To build a vibrant new Republic on the old foundations of the Ottoman Empire was deemed impossible. Competition with the West necessitated modernization of the new Turkish Republic

as rapidly as possible. This could not be achieved on an Eastern system. Religion presented an insuperable barrier to the reorganization of society on modern lines; hence only one course seemed possible—the disestablishment of religion as an organized system. Turkey has made a direct frontal attack.

The Gordian knot was cut when the Caliphate was abolished and the Caliph expelled from the country. After that the reforms affecting religion and making progress possible followed in rapid sequence. The idea of harmonizing reform with the Koran was considered not only unnecessary but irrelevant, in view of the complete separation of Church and State. Other countries have constantly sought to maintain the even balance between religion and reform; Turkey decreed the reforms, regardless of whether they could be harmonized with the tenets of Islam. A striking illustration of the difference in results is the effective legal reform in Turkey, the adoption of the Swiss Code *en bloc*, in contrast to the attempted partial reform in the divorce law in Egypt. The latter accomplished very little since it tried to carry the double-header of conservatism and modern progress.

A number of factors have played their part in determining Turkey's clean-cut approach to the problem of social and religious reform. In the first place, the temperament of the Turkish people made drastic religious reform feasible. The Turk is not by nature as deeply religious or philosophical as the Arab or the Indian, but more interested in practical results than in theories. Furthermore, Islam as a transplanted religion in Turkey, has never been widely understood since in a foreign tongue, nor has it made a deep subliminal cultural appeal. The Turks, coming from Central Asia with their religion of the Crescent and the White Wolf, found Islam the religion of power when they entered Anatolia. Recognizing the force of Islam, they adopted it, and used it so well in establishing a far-flung Empire that Turkey became the keen-edged sword of Islam. The decline of that Empire and its final loss after the World War under the pressure of the West, made Islam a burden and a misfit for modern Turkey. Hence, the leadership of Islam was relinquished. The present repudiation of the authority of

Islam in modern Turkey is a result of the same pragmatic temperament, which made the true *Ottoman* the synonym of Moslem loyalty.

Aside from the special character and background of the Turkish people, which made possible a favourable reaction to drastic reforms, the crucial political situation of Turkey at the birth of the new Republic made reform more urgent than elsewhere in the Moslem world. After a life-and-death struggle with the Greeks, which was followed by the diplomatic conflict at Lausanne, the new nation was faced with the task of insuring its existence. The leaders of the new Turkey had saved the country from the Sultanate, which with the Foreign Powers had made Turkey one of the prize pawns of the post-war chessboard. Accordingly, when the new Republic emerged victorious out of the ruins of the old Ottoman Empire, the new Turkish leaders in the high tide of victory were able successfully to achieve most drastic religious reforms; for they had saved the nation, whereas the Sultan, the Head of Islam, had been the chief enemy of the new Republic. The saviour of the new Turkey, Kamal Ataturk, furnished the virile and commanding leadership needed to capitalize the opportunity for aggressively promoting religious and social change. The political situation of other Moslem countries, aside from that of Iran, has been in varying degree a deterrent to Islamic reform, and has tended to strengthen religious conservatism; in Turkey it offered the supreme opportunity for drastic religious change.

The difference in the political situation of Turkey and that of the rest of the Moslem East explains also the difference in Turkey's attitude toward rapid Westernization. The juxtaposition of Turkey with the West, which has meant constant political and economic pressure, has forced Turkey to realize that successful competition with the West is only possible on Western terms. The following quotation translated from an editorial in the Turkish Press several years ago, is characteristic of the appreciation of the need in Turkey of Western values. "The West is open before us like an ocean of light. We can take as much as we like. Nobody is hindering us. But we must make a real effort to

acquire it." Such an attitude is in marked contrast to the cultural complex and fear of Western influence, which is a controlling force even of progressive thought in some other Moslem countries. Such a defence attitude, characteristic of a political or religious minority, naturally finds no expression in a Moslem republic under its own vigorous leaders. "We have no fear of losing Western values. We need the West," said a prominent national leader. "We cannot make the world like Turkey. Therefore, we must make Turkey like the world."

This complete reorientation of Turkey, from the old passion—to be the supreme power of Pan-Islam to the new ambition—to play an important role among Western nations is not merely a political policy of the powerful few but has become a general national objective. From a school-girl in Turkey came the remark, "The more western Turkey becomes, the better it can hold its own." Such a commonly accepted idea has made the series of religious reforms seem inevitable.

The aggressive religious policy of Turkey, which has been the corner-stone of the Turkish reform movement, seems the very epitome of a negation of religion. It is, however, a mistake to interpret it as an anti-religious movement; such as, for instance, the movement in Soviet Russia. The attitude of modern Turkey toward Islam has been anti-orthodox, or anti-ecclesiastical, rather than anti-religious. The traditions and institutions of Islam have been ruthlessly attacked, and Islam as an organized system, deprived of its power. But the validity of Islam as a personal belief has not been denied. There has been no cessation of the services in the mosque, or rather religious observances. The muezzin five times daily from the minaret intones the call to prayer. The faithful go daily to the mosque for worship. The *Efkaf*, religious Foundation, still maintain the financial support of Islamic institutions.

But the function of religion in relation to the State has been re-defined. The right unity of political and religious power of the past is broken. "Let everyone believe as he chooses," is the present policy as far as personal belief is concerned. A significant statement of this idea was made by the former Minister of Justice, Mahmud Essad Bey, in

speaking of the adoption of the Swiss Code: "When religion has sought to rule human societies, it has been the arbitrary instrument of sovereigns, despots and strong men. In separating the temporal and the spiritual, modern civilization has saved the world from numerous calamities and has given to religion an imperishable throne in the conscience of believers."¹

It is true that the sweeping attack against orthodox Islam has had the effect of being an anti-religious movement, since the institutions which have been swept away have been regarded as essential to Islam. Islam without these institutions, shorn of its State authority and defined as a religion of merely personal belief, is a new conception. Furthermore, the sequence of reforms has been so breathtaking that the net result may easily be for a time entirely negative. The need of release from an authoritarian religion has been the major emphasis and the value of religion as a constructive force has as yet scarcely been realized. The next developments in Islam in Turkey one might suppose would come largely from the people, not the Government. It will depend upon the Turkish people to prove the validity of their religion as a faith, not a formal system. The promotion of reforms in religion as a necessity for social progress seems now to have ceased. Economic problems rather than social or religious issues occupy the front page of the newspapers. Emancipation of women, which was the pivotal factor in religious and social reforms, is now taken for granted and has lost the spotlight of publicity.

That the next phase in religious developments in Turkey will be the personal interpretation of Islam, is recognized by thoughtful Turkish leaders. A Turkish college student summed up the situation very clearly "that religion will mean something more to us than chanting the Koran in a foreign language. The Government has given us our lead. We now have the freedom and responsibility to determine what our religion means." Such a situation places Turkey in an important position for the Moslem world. It devolves upon individuals to demonstrate the efficacy of Islam as a personal faith, since in Turkey the authority of Islam to control national life has now been denied.

¹ Edition Rizzo—*Code Civil Turc*, pp. xii-xvi.

CHAPTER XXVII

THE VOICE OF WOMEN IN MODERN ISLAM

BECAUSE of the pressure of many forces every country of the Moslem East, as we have seen, shows some trend of change in the relationship between religion and life. The control of Islam as an ironclad system of rules and traditions is giving way to a more individual interpretation of religion. Since this new spirit of religious liberalism deeply affects the life of women, one constantly feels the desire to know the personal attitude of Moslem women toward their religion, and their share in determining the new religious thought in Islam.

The older generation as a whole in every country tends to be conservative in all religions but this is especially true of Islam. This unquestioning adherence to the literal interpretation of the teaching of their religion is especially characteristic of women in the middle and lower levels of society, regardless of age, and also of the village women of Asia. This great majority of Moslem women, who have remained untouched by Western influence, have been little conscious of any changes in Islam, and have themselves undergone no change in their religious outlook. In fact, they constitute very often a distinct deterrent to change, opposing any deviation from established social customs, which are in their minds identified with religious sanctions. It is very often the orthodox wife or mother who maintains the rigid conservatism of the home, however lax men may become in their observance of religious customs outside the home.

The full meaning of Islam for the devoted Moslem woman is difficult for a mere outsider to understand. This is one veil of Moslem life which the Western observer cannot lift. Accustomed to a different form of religious experience, one from the West may easily draw a false conclusion regarding the relationship of Moslem women to their religion. The small number of women in the mosques in most countries—Turkey is an exception—which offers a striking contrast

to the usual predominance of women in churches in the West, might be interpreted as a lack of worship of Moslem women, if one did not know that it is not the public prayers in the mosque but her private prayers at home which have primary significance for the Moslem woman. In her home the orthodox women will pray, with her face turned toward Mecca, five times daily in the name of the Prophet to the one God, and will cherish the devout hope as a constant follower of Mohammed, that she may make the pilgrimage to the Holy City.

The keynote of the Moslem woman's religion is complete acquiescence to fate; to protest against a lack of privileges is quite foreign to her nature. Islam may have deprived her of privileges but not of responsibilities. Her primary obligation is to accept as the will of Allah, whatever is "written on her forehead" as her fate. This spirit of fatalism has insured the undisturbed control of Islam over the destiny of Moslem women through the centuries. To-day, although the great majority of Moslem women have remained unchanged in their personal attitude toward their religion, a small minority of women has begun to question the relationship between the accepted teaching of Islam and the demands of their modern world. Education inevitably is undermining the characteristic attitude of fatalism toward religion and life. One begins to find in the different parts of the Islamic world Moslem women expressing an independent opinion of the interpretation of Islam, in order to bring religion into accord with modern needs.

In speaking of purdah in a public address, Lady Abdul Qadir, one of the outstanding Moslem leaders of India, said: "Purdah, as observed among certain classes of Indian Mohammedans, is far beyond anything enjoined by Islam—and requires modification according to the needs of the day and the rapidly changing times."¹ Another interesting illustration of the modern approach to Islam by a Moslem woman in India is the aggressive challenge to the Ulemas, the authorities of Islam, made by Begum Habibullah, an enlightened Moslem leader in Lucknow in a newspaper

¹ Lady Abdul Qadir, *Muslim Views on Purdah and Marriage*, Stri Dharma, March 1931.

article, in which she showed that the Koran does not teach educational inequality and segregation of women.

Indian women are deeply imbued with religion, but their religious devotion to-day does not cloud the vision of the educated minority, nor even of a larger number, so that they cannot discriminate between religious and social questions. The widespread testimony against child-marriage gathered from Indian women of all classes by the Age of Consent Commission, doubtless came as a great surprise to many in India and elsewhere who had not realized that there is a growing spirit of religious freedom among Indian women. The All-India Women's Conference, representing as it does the inter-communal effort of women leaders to release social reform from the bonds of religious tradition, has repeatedly given utterance to the new religious liberalism. In India, more than in any other country of the East, women have been impelled to protest individually and collectively against social handicaps. The active promotion and support of the Child Marriage Act, and the repeated resolutions against polygamy passed by the All-India Women's Conference, are exerting a powerful force toward the freedom of Hindu and Moslem women from these and other social customs, hitherto regarded as determined by religious sanctions.

The fact that women have challenged the inviolability of these sanctions is perhaps no less important than the social reforms themselves. Some Indian leaders are especially concerned to keep their endorsement of social advance in harmony with religious teaching. In the discussion on polygamy at a recent All-India Conference, one of the Moslem delegates explained that she favoured the abolition of polygamy, but she wished to call attention to the fact that "it was permitted by their religion only in case of strictest necessity arising, as for example, in the event of there being no issue from the first marriage."¹

Syria offers an interesting example of an interpretation of the social teachings of the Koran, made by a young Druse girl, Nazira Zein-el-Din, in her book, *As-Sufur-Wel-Hijab (Unveiling and Veiling)*, which evoked much com-

¹ All-India Women's Conference; Karachi, January 1935; p. 70.

ment. This book was translated into several languages, widely circulated, and brought the author a trunkful of clippings from all over the world. The Islamic teaching concerning the veil was discussed also in an oratorical contest at the American University of Beirut by Madame Ihsan Shakir El-Kousy, to whom reference has already been made. In her address, which received the second prize, she showed that the Koran does not prescribe the veil. Thus incidentally she justified her own presence unveiled in a large university.

These two examples, however, are not typical of the women of either Syria or Egypt as a whole, but less so of Syria. There is very little evidence of any analysis of Islam and very little articulate expression on religion by women in Syria: a very small minority of Egyptian women is actively interested in the relation of religion to reform. The attitude of Madame Sharawi Pasha, to whom reference has already been made as the outstanding Moslem woman leader in Egypt, shows general conformity to the prevailing policy in Egypt as regards the promotion of social advance. She has carefully based her demands for social reform on the spirit of the Koran and has not promoted reforms which do not have Islamic sanction. For example her claims for equality of education for girls have been based on the teaching of the Koran. She has urged a law prohibiting polygamy. Reference has been made in an earlier chapter to her very effective protest against polygamy in a public lecture at the American University in Cairo last year. But while protesting against polygamy she recognizes the exceptions for polygamy which are granted by the Koran (adultery, childlessness and incompatibility). One has the feeling that this policy of maintaining a careful balance between Islamic teaching and social reform, which is followed by Madame Sharawi and the Feminist Union, is dictated more by political expediency than by religious conservatism.

Among the women of Palestine no deviation from the conventional attitude toward Islam is evident. Moslem women simply reflect the prevailing religious conservatism. However, the interesting feature in the situation, to which

reference has already been made in another connection, is that Moslem women pay the price for this conservatism, of which the veil is the symbol, willingly and with a sense of pride; since by retaining the characteristic Islamic customs they feel that they have a certain distinction in contrast to the Zionist community. It is worth recalling the incident showing the counter-influence of Arab national feeling in reference to the veil, when the group of Arab women unveiled made a protest against Zionism. But as already explained, the veils were later resumed when the habitual spirit of conservatism reasserted itself. The great majority of Moslem women in Palestine, as elsewhere, are not aware of the new conflicting currents of thought.

The attitude of women in Iran and Iraq toward religion, as toward social advance, is one of passive acquiescence. Changes in Turkey have aroused much interest in both countries, and the Turkish method of drastic social and religious reforms has been little questioned in reference to its having an adverse effect on religion. The women of Iraq and Iran have been primarily interested in the achievement of Turkey. Very often in Iraq I heard the statement: "We need a Kamal Ataturk." In Iran the hope was frequently expressed at the time of my visit several years ago, that the Shah would follow Kamal Ataturk's example and issue an order to remove the *chaddur*. In Iran as elsewhere it was erroneously believed that unveiling in Turkey had been made compulsory. This hope has now been realized and, it is interesting to note, that the definite regulations against the *chaddur* have not apparently caused a widespread religious shock among the women of Iran. Even the conservatives are accepting the new freedom, I have been told, as they accepted the former social restrictions, in an attitude of acquiescence.

In marked contrast to the attitude of women in Iraq and Iran toward Turkey, Moslem women in India have repeatedly asked me with deep solicitude whether Turkey had cast aside Islam. "Have Turkish women lost their religion?" was the question that came alike from the student group and from conservative older women. The new freedom of Turkish women, if secured at the sacrifice of religion,

would seem to Moslem women in India to have cost too high a price.

In Turkey women have regarded religious changes together with all other changes, as merely a natural part of the general transformation taking place in Turkish life. There has been remarkably little analysis of the new situation in reference to the effect on religion. During the first crucial years of change the conservatives retained the veil, which older women doubtless associated with religion. But by this time the veil has, I believe, for the great majority lost any religious significance it may have had. However, recent municipal legislation of Adana and some other cities, has doubtless brought a shock to those who still have the feeling of the relationship between the veil and Islam. But they will probably accept the enforced change philosophically, as did a conservative Turkish woman in Adana, whose comment on the new regulation was: "Well, the sin will be charged against those who issued such an order and not against us, because they are forcing us to do this against our wills." This idea that unveiling is an actual sin, is probably held by very few Turkish women to-day.

The viewpoint of these orthodox Turkish women can scarcely fail to be affected unconsciously by the modern atmosphere, which has become steadily more natural, even in the smaller towns of the Interior. The new type of preaching of the *hodjah* has also had its effect. As a simple Turkish woman in Talas told me several years ago, "They tell us different things about religion to-day. The *hodjahs* formerly taught that women must always be veiled and their voice never heard in public. But they say now that these things are not religion." Thus the most orthodox women have been steadily exposed to the new idea, that social customs are not necessarily identified with religion.

The educated Turkish woman has adopted such new ideas as a logical part of the modernization of Turkish life. Before the recent period of reform this educated minority was already progressive in religious thinking for, as has already been mentioned in the discussion of Turkish education, the social-religious revolution in Turkey was preceded by a gradual period of preparation. To-day due to many forces

there is said to be a decline in the formal practices of Islam. "Many people no longer pray five times a day. Everyone is too busy," was the comment of a young Turkish business woman. A young teacher explained why comparatively few young people go to the mosques. "We must make our worship more modern to suit our modern clothes and customs. Praying without shoes and with many genuflections was a good thing in the Prophet's day but does not suit our present kind of life."

Although the private prayers of the formal type are still continued by many Moslem women in the homes and to a lesser extent in the mosque, as has always been the case among women, the turning away from the ritualistic worship by the younger generation is undoubtedly a marked present-day tendency. However, this should not, as has been said before, be interpreted merely as a trend toward irreligion, but perhaps it may indicate the genuine urge for a reform in worship, so that it may be something more than a prescribed ceremonial. "We are beginning to recognize the difference between essentials and non-essentials," a thoughtful Turkish woman said. "The religious forms and social restrictions are not suitable to-day. These can be changed without destroying our fundamental belief."

Another Turkish leader, talking with a Moslem woman from Jerusalem, who had expressed the belief that Turkey had sacrificed Islam, said, "We have separated religion from externals and made it personal. Religion is not a matter of clothes—the veil and the fez. It is not based on form but feeling. The repudiation of Islamic formalism therefore does not mean giving up Islam. The women of Palestine may be more outwardly religious in the orthodox sense of Islam but not necessarily more truly religious in the inner meaning of the term than are the women of Turkey."

In regard to this transfer of emphasis from the externals to the more individual idea of religion, a young Turkish woman student in Istanbul University expressed the opinion that there is need now for a more positive interpretation of religion. "Most of the younger Turkish girls will grow up with very little idea of Islam," she said, "since nothing positive has taken the place of the old forms, which have

lost their appeal, and since very little attention these days is paid to religion." The need for a more definite constructive idea of religion is probably not as yet generally recognized by the younger generation in Turkey, which associates religion merely with a peaceful existence of quiet contemplation in the shade of mosque walls and not with an intensely active modern life.

However, a number of thoughtful Turkish leaders, both men and women, but perhaps especially women, are beginning to realize the need of a new relationship between religion and life. It is, I believe, not too much to expect that Turkish women, who have gained so much from the social and religious reforms in Turkey, may now make some special contribution to the rethinking of religious values. Their voice, and the voice of Moslem women in other countries, which have been so little heard in shaping religious thought in the past, may help to answer the crucial question in the East to-day, as to whether the present spirit of religious liberalism in the Moslem world will mean the disintegration of Islam or the beginning of a new era of more vital faith.

CONCLUSION

EAST AND WEST

To some Western observers in the East to-day the rapid emergence of Moslem women may bring a feeling of apprehension and regret, since for many in the West the life of Eastern women has always been surrounded with romance, like Pierre Loti's *Les Désenchantés*. The thought of the quiet seclusion where the Moslem woman has guarded her family treasure with rare devotion and sacrifice has given an impression of charm and security, and infinite leisure. Into such a romantic veiled retreat doubtless many a weary nerve-worn Western club woman would fain escape, cut off from endless telephone calls and the insistent pressure of social and civic demands. And so, one often hears the Western traveller in the East deplore the fact that the Eastern woman is passing from her highly sheltered home into the limelight of the outside world. Is not the Eastern way of life after all better than the Western design for living, is their frequent query.

Without denying the fact that change does not necessarily mean progress, and new freedom on some Western models may not be a net gain but a loss, one may perhaps remind these Western observers that not all Moslem women have lived in delightful gardens enjoying the cushioned leisure of the highly protected upper class. I have caught too many glimpses of the purdah-bound lives of less fortunate Moslem women and have too often sensed the repression of personality and the restriction of such a limited segregated life, not to realize the fallacy of weaving too much romance about the charmed seclusion of the life behind the veil.

However, the question as to whether the old or the new life is desirable, is after all an academic question. The new freedom of Moslem women is an inevitable fact in the East to-day, no longer a matter of complete choice. Just as the isolation of the West is a thing of the past, so also the isolation of Eastern women must pass and is passing. Their life cannot be segregated in a vacuum, but must be lived in the

same mental and psychological climate as the world around them. The emotional and intellectual climate of the East has changed. The whole drift of the times is away from the old order of society. Women must move with the times. Hence, to deplore change in a modern world seems to the Eastern women strangely futile and unrealistic.

But thoughtful leaders of the East, although recognizing the inevitability of change, are no less aware of the fact that change is fraught with difficulties, than are their sympathetic Western friends. Grave problems germane to a period of transition press for an answer. The new social system, now being formed, demands an entirely new social code. As a Turkish woman, discussing modern social problems, said, "What was moral in my grandmother's day is now taboo, for instance, polygamy; whereas the perfectly normal social relations of young people to-day would have formerly been considered immoral." The great difference between that former social code and the code of the East to-day is that the standards of the past were secured by hard-and-fast convention; those of the present must be determined very largely by the individual.

It is exceedingly difficult for one accustomed to the social environment of the West to realize the bewildering complexity of the social problems of the East to-day in this first era of social freedom. The old life of limited social freedom had also a limited range of social problems. To-day the Eastern woman is on unfamiliar ground as she tries to meet the new social situation. The lack of normal social experience and social provision for adolescent youth, the difficulties in the transition from the old system of marriage, which was arranged by the parents, to the present basis, which is determined by individual choice, the as yet unfamiliar situation of the young unmarried woman in business and professional life—all these questions, arising from the new social freedom, make heavy demands on Eastern women to answer wisely.

The educational awakening in the East is also not without problems, characteristic of the new day—problems such as the West must also solve, but which are more crucial in the East than in the West, because of the complete shift in

the direction of Eastern life within a decade. How can modern education, which has been largely transplanted on Western patterns, be adapted to the Eastern environment, so that the school may not lead away from the home but may form the new foundations of Eastern life in the home? This is the major question for Eastern educators. They must also answer other questions. Will modern education enrich Eastern living through an emphasis on the essentials of modern life, or will it paralyse life in the East by creating a multiplicity of superficial modern demands? Moreover, will education widen the already existing cleavage between the educated minority and the unlettered masses, or will it be the means of lifting the life of the East as a whole? Unless these and other questions inherent in the new day can be successfully answered, modern education in the East may prove more of a bane than a blessing.

In this present period of transformation the East is confronted constantly on every side with the need for discrimination in the values of modern life. The process of adopting new ways of living may mean merely the transfer of superficial things, like a new façade on an old building; or this change may signify the choice of fundamental values, which can enter without violence into the fabric of Eastern life. But the acceptance of the West as the goal of progress leads often to the danger of sacrificing Eastern values in the blind imitation of all things Western. In the speed of a transition period careful selectivity is difficult if not impossible. In its present breathless urge for progress, some parts of the East remind one of a boat shooting over the rapids after being long becalmed in still water. The question naturally arises as to whether, in the rapidity of present change, the East can take time to come to the full understanding of the true worth of its own possessions, choosing some to be kept and others to be discarded, in order to make room for other special values needed for modern life.

It is not strange that the East to-day should be presented with such a multiplicity of problems. A transition period of shifting standards is bound to bring contradictions and conflict. Social patterns cannot be transferred *en bloc*. Human institutions are too inextricably related to the

cultural environment to be shifted like a Stop and Go sign in traffic. But the solution of these problems of the new day will determine whether measures of change in the East are truly measures of progress, or whether the problems of the past have been merely exchanged for the more serious problems of the future.

It is significant of the new East that women will play a important part in answering this question. In the past the voice of women was too little heard but the future direction of life in the East, will in no small measure depend on Eastern women. Since the change in the position of women, as we have seen, is the most fundamental change taking place in the East, their interpretation of the new freedom has, therefore, great significance for the East as a whole.

The large majority of women in the East, as in the West, is unconscious of the full meaning of freedom. For many Eastern women, as for many Western women, equality of opportunity is interpreted primarily in terms of personal privilege. But a small minority, in the East as in the West, has accepted the full responsibility as well as the full privileges of the new day. This small group of educated leaders in the East is seeking to find the answer to the problems inherent in their changing world. Their solution, one can safely assert, will not be to repudiate progress and retire within the harem as the easier way, but rather to try to reconcile the old with the new way of life. Theirs is the task of fusing the priceless values of their old heritage with the rich possibilities of the new freedom.

One cannot fail to have a deep respect for the women leaders of the East, who are moving with dignity from the old into the new order. Seldom have women been called upon to make such a difficult transition. The shift in standards from one generation to the next is a period of readjustment for women of the West. But Eastern women, and particularly the women of Islam, have been forced to make in their own lifetime a shift of centuries in customs and ideals. "*Orta yol yok*" (there is no middle road), an older Turkish woman leader said in commenting on the shift from the veil to the vote—the latticed window to the Grand National Assembly.

In this movement towards the freer life of to-day, Eastern women have received much from the West. Social freedom, educational advance, economic independence, political privilege and participation in public life, the widening range of interests and activities of Eastern women—in short, the whole forward movement toward a free life for women has been inspired by the advance of women in the West. The feminist struggle in the West, to establish the principle of equality, has in no small measure prepared the way, so that men of affairs, nationalist leaders of the East to-day, have accepted equal opportunity for women as an inseparable element of Western progress. Therefore, as a logical requisite in the new nation building of the East, women have been accorded a large measure of liberty and responsibility. Eastern women have for a long time consciously turned their eyes westward as the goal of their endeavour. Moreover, they have realized that the efforts of great leaders of the West, like Josephine Butler, Jane Adams and Carrie Chapman Catt, have perhaps in no small measure contributed to the fact that the new freedom of women in the East has been granted without a struggle. These and other Western women leaders have been an inspiration for the women pioneers of the East, as they have crossed new frontiers and charted new paths of progress.

But to-day there is a new relationship between Eastern women and the women of the West. The International Suffrage Alliance Congress in Istanbul in April 1935, which brought together so many Eastern and Western leaders in that city which joins Europe and Asia, was a fitting symbol of this reorientation of the East and the West. In the past the East has received richly from the West; in the future the West may receive even as richly from the East. This new *rapprochement* of the East and West has special significance at the present time. During the decade in which Eastern women under the impelling example of the West have been outward bound, in certain advanced countries in the West women have shifted their direction and are turning inward. Strangely paradoxical to-day is the contrast between the emergence of Moslem women into full participation in economic and public life, as for example

the women of Turkey, and the curtailment of the economic and political participation of German women, which has led to their withdrawal into a sphere of activity centred in the home.

The example of Germany has not been without its effect on other countries in the West, since in the interrelated world of to-day, no cordon of thought can be established by which the ideals of one country can be isolated from all other countries as if in a ward for a contagious disease. Certain European countries have already begun to follow a policy similar to that of Germany in restricting the economic participation of women. One naturally raises the question as to whether the example of Germany will also be emulated in the East, and thus retard the forward movement of Eastern women.

A young Turkish woman, in commenting on the *Kirche, Küche, Kinder* movement in Germany, as it is called, expressed the opinion that Turkish women need not fear the example of Germany, since modern Turkey is following other ideals. Equally interesting is the comment of an Indian woman leader, "The East is less likely than the West to be influenced by the German women's movement, since this represents an extreme, and the West is more susceptible than the East to extreme movements. We of the East will still continue to try to bring our women into a freer life, even though you women of the West may turn back into the home."

This opinion that the forward movement of Eastern women will not be affected by the present trends in Germany seems to be justified by the situation in the East to-day. Certainly the steady advance of women in Asia along many lines does not give any evidence of a reversal of the direction in which the current of change in Eastern life is moving. The effect of National Socialist ideas on the position of women does not seem to have entered Eastern thought.

It may be suggested perhaps that Russia is at present closer to the East than Germany. The presence of a Moslem population and the dramatic advance of Moslem women in the Soviet Republic may constitute a bond of interest

between the Islamic world and Russia. Moreover, it is certainly true that within the last few years some countries in Asia have been drawing into closer economic relations with Russia. Hence there may be a growing influence of Russia in some parts of the East in the realm of economic and political doctrine. But it may perhaps be questioned whether the Russian social revolution, which has caused a change in the position of women, has directly affected the social reform movement in different parts of Asia.

Present-day social change in Russia is an integral part of the distinctive political philosophy and cultural background of Russia, and both of these are strikingly different from the life and thought of the Moslem East. Therefore, even though there may be certain broad lines of similarity between the emancipation of the women of Soviet Russia and the growing freedom of Eastern women, the Russian movement does not bear a vital relationship to the social movement in the East—either to the rapid social revolution of Turkey or the more gradual social evolution taking place elsewhere in Asia. Eastern women leaders in the Near East, the Middle East and India—those of the thoughtful minority, who alone are conscious of foreign ideals—are certainly little aware of any social influence from Russia. They have gained their inspiration for progress from other countries in the West with which the East has long had a measure of contact. To-day, as we have seen, these relationships are steadily increasing.

Whatever may be in the future the main sources of Western influence in the life of Eastern women, the conflicting currents in Western thought to-day challenge explorative thinking in regard to the position of women both in the East and West. The German movement has brought into sharp contrast two conflicting philosophies of the status of women. The one is aggressive feminism, such as according to National Socialism, the former feminist movement in Germany represented—a judgment, however, which one is led to believe is not justified. The other concept of women's position represents the other extreme; namely, the present "Back to the Home" movement which is vigorously promoted in Germany to-day. Neither of these

ideals is adequate for a modern world. Russia introduces still another concept of the place of women, giving to them a complete measure of equality without any element of struggle for rights and privileges. This would seem to be the attainment of the earlier feminist's goal. However one must remember the fact that in modern Russia the interests of the individual, whether man or woman, are subordinated to the collective ideal of the State; whereas the former feminist movement has been based upon the ideal of the complete freedom of the individual.

These divergent ideas as to the status of women, and also the problem of the relationship of the individual to the larger life of the community are being carefully considered to-day by thoughtful people of every country. The emergence of Eastern women has come therefore at a timely moment, when there are these opposing currents in Western thought. Imbued as Eastern women are with the ideals of Western freedom, but also endowed with their own rich Eastern heritage, the women leaders of the East may be able to demonstrate that there is no fundamental conflict between the creative activity of women in the home and their increasing participation in economic life and public affairs. Close association with some of these women leaders of the East justifies the hope that they will be equal to this task.

Eastern women now coming into power, without a period of conflict for equal rights, have a certain freedom of the spirit and an untarnished enthusiasm. As they assume their new positions of influence their thought can be focussed, not on the need for rights, but on the responsibility to use effectively the rights and privileges that they have already received. As they seek fuller self-development and freer self-expression, one has confidence to believe that they will not lose their own special assets—their quiet poise and capacity for sacrificial service, which have been matured in the silence of a long waiting. In their interpretation of the new freedom they should have much to contribute to the West, so that the East and West together may achieve a better understanding of the true position of women in a modern world.

APPENDIX

AN INTERPRETATION OF THE PRINCIPAL KORANIC TEACHINGS ABOUT WOMEN. REPRESENTING THE VIEW OF A SYRIAN MOSLEM SHEIKH¹

DURING the Pre-Islamic Age in Arabia, there was little modesty and frequent immorality. The Prophet and his intimate followers sought to overcome the worst abuses, by teaching people to respect the same modesty in womanhood which was upheld in more advanced parts of the East.

The Koran did not definitely order *harem* life and the veil. Peasant and Bedouin women have gone unveiled without criticism. Even conservative authorities do not feel it to be necessary to excommunicate the Turks and Iranians, because they have given up seclusion and the veil.

The Koran did prohibit adultery and proclaim fundamental rules of decency. It did not encourage slavery and polygamy, but rather urged a backward people to treat slaves as kindly as possible and to appreciate the unfairness of ordinary polygamy. It issued a few special rules for the family of the Prophet, which was the royal family of Medina and especially menaced by the meddling and gossip of trouble-makers.

A sheikh, trained at the University of Al Azhar at Cairo, has encouraged the presentation of the following verses from the Koran and has suggested a few modifications in Mauli Muhammad Ali's translation. In reading these verses the reader should realize that no English translation can do justice to the magnificent poetic style of the Koran and that the particular verses chosen are of a legalistic nature, so that they do not give any idea of the passages, which fill the Koran with spiritual power.

Sura IV, Verse 34. "Men are the maintainers of women, because Allah has made some to excel others and because they (men) spend out of their property. The good women are therefore pious, guarding in the absence (of their men) what God has ordained."

Sura IV, Verse 3. "Marry such women as seem good to you, two and three and four; but if you fear that you will not do

¹ The spelling Shaykh is also used in the transliteration from the Arabic.

justice (between them), then (marry) only one or what your right hands possess."

Sura XXIV, Verse 2. "(As for) the fornicatress and the fornicator, flog each of them, (giving) a hundred stripes."

Sura XXIV, Verse 27. "O you who believe! do not enter houses other than your own houses until you have asked permission and saluted their inmates; this is better for you, that you may be mindful."

This verse was evidently addressed to tent dwellers, who were unaccustomed to city life. The following verse was especially meant for ill-mannered persons, who evidently pushed their way into the Prophet's home, perhaps hoping to gain favours from the Prophet through the intervention of his wives.

Sura XXXIII, Verse 53. "O you who believe! do not enter the houses of the Prophet unless permission is given to you for a meal. Do not wait around while the cooking is being finished. But when you are invited, enter, and when you have taken food, then disperse, not seeking to listen to talk, which gives the Prophet trouble and makes him bashful with you—but Allah is not bashful about the truth. And when you ask of them any articles, ask of them from behind an obstruction. This is purer for your hearts and (for) their hearts; and it does not behoove you that you should give trouble to the Apostle of Allah, nor that you should ever marry his wives after him; surely this is grievous in the sight of Allah."

The purpose of the next verse was probably to assure protection for the wives of the Prophet and members of the families of the early Muslims, when they mingled with the people in Medina. The town was a centre for many rough Bedouins from the desert, for numerous groups of unbelievers and also for many slaves, so that it seemed wise to protect the Muslim women from interference and insult.

Sura XXXIII, Verse 59. "O Prophet! say to your wives and your daughters and the women of the believers that they draw together their over-garments; this will be more proper, that they may be known, and thus they will not be given trouble; and Allah is Forgiving, Merciful."

The two famous verses, which follow, can be understood if one realizes how primitive the life of Arabia was during the Age of Ignorance, before Islam. Until the Prophet put a stop to the

custom, the pilgrims walked about the Ka'ba entirely naked. During the hot summer weather the pagan women evidently wore few clothes. What they did wear was sometimes more for decoration than for modesty.

Divorce, concubinage and immorality were common in the towns, where the people had apparently degenerated from the stricter code of the desert.

The interpretation of learned Islamic commentators regards the word "ornaments" as referring to both jewellery and fancy articles of clothing. The phrase "let them not strike their feet" is interpreted as an order to refrain from rattling their anklets or anything that might suggest a lascivious dance.

Sura XXIV, Verses 30 and 31. "Say to the believing men that they cast down their looks and guard their private parts; that is purer for them; surely Allah is aware of what they do. And say to the believing women that they cast down their looks and guard their private parts and not display their ornaments except what appears thereof, and let them wear their head-coverings over their bosoms, and not display their ornaments except to their husbands or their fathers, or the fathers of their husbands, or their sons, or the sons of their husbands, or their brothers, or their brothers' sons, or their sisters' sons, or their women, or those whom their right hands possess, or the male servants not having need (of women), or the children who have not attained knowledge of what is hidden of women; and let them not strike their feet so that what they hide of their ornaments may be known; and turn to Allah all of you, O believers! so that you may be successful."

Basing their social customs upon these precepts, the families of the new Islamic state sought seclusion. They represented the ruling class of a rapidly forming empire, so that it was natural for them to seek a certain aloofness for their women.

The ability of the upper classes to withdraw from contact with the common people soon became a mark of social distinction, which separated them from the peasants, the subject races and the slaves. The city women sacrificed independence of action to gain social prestige.

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INDOOR AND OUTDOOR COSTUMES OF WOMEN OF IRAN BEFORE THE PRESENT TRANSFORMATION INTO EUROPEAN STYLES



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
AN INDIAN PURDAH AGENTS OF THE POORER CLASS IN A CLASSROOM

H. P. L. 1901



Picture by] [Vester and Co., American Colony, Jerusalem

GROUP OF JERUSALEM WOMEN AT THE GATE OF
THE RESIDENCY, OCTOBER 26, 1929, MAKING A
PROTEST AGAINST ZIONISM




SPORTS DAY, ON WHICH HUNDREDS OF NEWBORN CHILDREN JOINED IN THE NEW IDEAS OF PHYSICAL EXERCISE



A MOSLEM GIRL IN DAMASCUS WHO HAS DONNED
THE CHARSHAF AT AN EARLY AGE, BUT HAS NOT
YET DROPPED THE VEIL



THE LIFE OF THE WOMAN OF THE DESERT -- A BARE LEVEL OF EXISTENCE



THE FIRST GIRLS' ATHLETIC EXHIBITION IN TABRIZ, JUNE 1935



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(H. R. Page)

THE UNEDUCATED MORE OF INDIA'S POPULATION ARE TO BE TAUGHT BY THE GROUP. BAZAAR AT RAW JHINDI



THE AWAKENING OF EGYPT

Statue in Cairo in front of the Railway Station




BEGUM SHAREEFAH HAMID ALI, A DISTINGUISHED MOSLEM LEADER OF THE
WOMEN OF INDIA



EGYPTIAN GIRLS ENJOY BASKET-BALL
American Mission Junior College, Cairo



MOSLEM SCHOOL TEACHERS ON THE PLAYGROUND DURING A



PIONEERS IN CO-EDUCATION, AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF BEIRUT



A COOKING CLASS IN THE HOME ARTS SCHOOL AT ISTANBUL



THEY ARE THE "PEOPLE'S CHOICE" FOR THE "PEOPLE'S CHOICE" AWARD FOR THE YEAR 1964.



Picture by]

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THE VILLAGE WOMAN OF ASIA—AN ECONOMIC ASSET



Photo by]

[The American Colony, Jerusalem


THE TYPICAL VILLAGE MIDWIFE OF PALESTINE



WOMEN OF INDIA



A MOSLEM MOTHER VEILED, WATCHES THE TREATMENT OF HER CHILD AT THE CLINIC OF THE CHILDREN'S WELFARE SOCIETY IN BAGHDAD



THE NURSES' TRAINING SCHOOL OF THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF BEIRUT INCLUDES STUDENTS FROM A WIDE AREA
-- FROM THE SUDAN TO IRAN




THE BEDOUIN WOMAN FREE FROM THE RESTRAINTS OF THE VEIL



HEBRON MIDWIVES PROUD OF THEIR NEW EQUIPMENT. THE REWARD OF A SIX WEEKS' TRAINING COURSE. IN
JERUSALEM



THE STATUE OF THE TYPICAL TURKISH PEASANT WOMAN, WHO
HELPED TO WIN THE GREEK-TURKISH WAR. PUBLIC SQUARE AT
ANKARA



PROMINENT LEADERS IN THE ALL-ASIAN WOMEN'S CONFERENCE, JANUARY 1931, LAHORE, INDIA



Picture by]

[H. R. Fenger

VEILED WOMEN IN DELHI VIEWING THE PEARL MOSQUE THROUGH THE
ARCHES OF THE HALL OF PRIVATE AUDIENCE



**LADY ABDUL QADIR. A MOSLEM LEADER OF LAHORE NOTED FOR HER DEVOTED
SERVICE IN THE ADVANCE OF INDIAN WOMEN**



TURKISH COMMITTEE FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SUFFRAGE CONGRESS, ISTANBUL, APRIL 1935

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